--- /dev/null
+From b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2016 18:00:29 +0000
+Subject: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
+
+From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
+
+commit b348d7dddb6c4fbfc810b7a0626e8ec9e29f7cbb upstream.
+
+Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
+usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
+packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
+part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
+urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
+Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
+preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
+Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
+Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c
++++ b/drivers/staging/usbip/usbip_common.c
+@@ -785,6 +785,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device
+ if (!(size > 0))
+ return 0;
+
++ if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
++ /* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
++ if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
++ usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
++ return 0;
++ } else {
++ usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
++ return -EPIPE;
++ }
++ }
++
+ ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
+ if (ret != size) {
+ dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);