Thanks to Peter Lewis for requesting this change.
[ISC-Bugs 47062]
+! Option reference count was not correctly decremented in error path
+ when parsing buffer for options. Reported by Felix Wilhelm, Google
+ Security Team.
+ [ISC-Bugs #47140]
+ CVE: CVE-2018-5733
+
+! Corrected an issue where large sized 'X/x' format options were causing
+ option handling logic to overwrite memory when expanding them to human
+ readable form. Reported by Felix Wilhelm, Google Security Team.
+ [ISC-Bugs #47139]
+ CVE: CVE-2018-5732
+
Changes since 4.1-ESV-R15b1
- None
DHCP options parsing and reassembly. */
/*
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2017 by Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2018 by Internet Systems Consortium, Inc. ("ISC")
* Copyright (c) 1995-2003 by Internet Software Consortium
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
/* If the length is outrageous, the options are bad. */
if (offset + len > length) {
+ /* Avoid reference count overflow */
+ option_dereference(&option, MDL);
reason = "option length exceeds option buffer length";
bogus:
log_error("parse_option_buffer: malformed option "
/* Format the specified option so that a human can easily read it. */
-
+/* Maximum pretty printed size */
+#define MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE 32*1024
const char *pretty_print_option (option, data, len, emit_commas, emit_quotes)
struct option *option;
const unsigned char *data;
int emit_commas;
int emit_quotes;
{
- static char optbuf [32768]; /* XXX */
- static char *endbuf = &optbuf[sizeof(optbuf)];
+ /* We add 128 byte pad so we don't have to add checks everywhere. */
+ static char optbuf [MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE + 128]; /* XXX */
+ static char *endbuf = optbuf + MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE;
int hunksize = 0;
int opthunk = 0;
int hunkinc = 0;
fmtbuf [j]);
}
op += strlen (op);
+ if (op >= endbuf) {
+ log_error ("Option data exceeds"
+ " maximum size %d", MAX_OUTPUT_SIZE);
+ return ("<error>");
+ }
+
if (dp == data + len)
break;
if (j + 1 < numelem && comma != ':')