--- /dev/null
+From 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 21 Feb 2017 15:07:11 -0800
+Subject: fscrypt: remove broken support for detecting keyring key revocation
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit 1b53cf9815bb4744958d41f3795d5d5a1d365e2d upstream.
+
+Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
+had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
+"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
+severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
+an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
+threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
+This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
+
+This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
+the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
+an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
+it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
+block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
+possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
+dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
+simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
+already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
+This change is not expected to break any applications.
+
+In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
+revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
+waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
+and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
+caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
+
+This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
+encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
+with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
+CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
+CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
+shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
+of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
+
+Fixes: b7236e21d55f ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/ext4/crypto_key.c | 28 +++++++---------------------
+ fs/ext4/ext4.h | 14 +-------------
+ fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h | 1 -
+ fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c | 28 +++++++---------------------
+ fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 14 +-------------
+ fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h | 1 -
+ 6 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
+@@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ void ext4_free_crypt_info(struct ext4_cr
+ if (!ci)
+ return;
+
+- if (ci->ci_keyring_key)
+- key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key);
+ crypto_free_ablkcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
+ kmem_cache_free(ext4_crypt_info_cachep, ci);
+ }
+@@ -111,7 +109,7 @@ void ext4_free_encryption_info(struct in
+ ext4_free_crypt_info(ci);
+ }
+
+-int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
++int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
+ {
+ struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
+ struct ext4_crypt_info *crypt_info;
+@@ -128,22 +126,15 @@ int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct ino
+ char mode;
+ int res;
+
++ if (ei->i_crypt_info)
++ return 0;
++
+ if (!ext4_read_workqueue) {
+ res = ext4_init_crypto();
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+ }
+
+-retry:
+- crypt_info = ACCESS_ONCE(ei->i_crypt_info);
+- if (crypt_info) {
+- if (!crypt_info->ci_keyring_key ||
+- key_validate(crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0)
+- return 0;
+- ext4_free_encryption_info(inode, crypt_info);
+- goto retry;
+- }
+-
+ res = ext4_xattr_get(inode, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
+ EXT4_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
+ &ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+@@ -166,7 +157,6 @@ retry:
+ crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
+ crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
+ crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
+- crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = NULL;
+ memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
+ sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
+ if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+@@ -206,7 +196,6 @@ retry:
+ keyring_key = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+- crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
+ if (keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon) {
+ printk_once(KERN_WARNING
+ "ext4: key type must be logon\n");
+@@ -253,16 +242,13 @@ got_key:
+ ext4_encryption_key_size(mode));
+ if (res)
+ goto out;
+- memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key));
+- if (cmpxchg(&ei->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) != NULL) {
+- ext4_free_crypt_info(crypt_info);
+- goto retry;
+- }
+- return 0;
+
++ if (cmpxchg(&ei->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL)
++ crypt_info = NULL;
+ out:
+ if (res == -ENOKEY)
+ res = 0;
++ key_put(keyring_key);
+ ext4_free_crypt_info(crypt_info);
+ memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key));
+ return res;
+--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
++++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+@@ -2330,23 +2330,11 @@ static inline void ext4_fname_free_filen
+ /* crypto_key.c */
+ void ext4_free_crypt_info(struct ext4_crypt_info *ci);
+ void ext4_free_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_crypt_info *ci);
+-int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode);
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION
+ int ext4_has_encryption_key(struct inode *inode);
+
+-static inline int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
+-{
+- struct ext4_crypt_info *ci = EXT4_I(inode)->i_crypt_info;
+-
+- if (!ci ||
+- (ci->ci_keyring_key &&
+- (ci->ci_keyring_key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+- (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
+- (1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD)))))
+- return _ext4_get_encryption_info(inode);
+- return 0;
+-}
++int ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode);
+
+ static inline struct ext4_crypt_info *ext4_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
+ {
+--- a/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h
++++ b/fs/ext4/ext4_crypto.h
+@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ struct ext4_crypt_info {
+ char ci_filename_mode;
+ char ci_flags;
+ struct crypto_ablkcipher *ci_ctfm;
+- struct key *ci_keyring_key;
+ char ci_master_key[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+ };
+
+--- a/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c
++++ b/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c
+@@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ static void f2fs_free_crypt_info(struct
+ if (!ci)
+ return;
+
+- key_put(ci->ci_keyring_key);
+ crypto_free_ablkcipher(ci->ci_ctfm);
+ kmem_cache_free(f2fs_crypt_info_cachep, ci);
+ }
+@@ -113,7 +112,7 @@ void f2fs_free_encryption_info(struct in
+ f2fs_free_crypt_info(ci);
+ }
+
+-int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
++int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
+ {
+ struct f2fs_inode_info *fi = F2FS_I(inode);
+ struct f2fs_crypt_info *crypt_info;
+@@ -129,18 +128,12 @@ int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct ino
+ char mode;
+ int res;
+
++ if (fi->i_crypt_info)
++ return 0;
++
+ res = f2fs_crypto_initialize();
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+-retry:
+- crypt_info = ACCESS_ONCE(fi->i_crypt_info);
+- if (crypt_info) {
+- if (!crypt_info->ci_keyring_key ||
+- key_validate(crypt_info->ci_keyring_key) == 0)
+- return 0;
+- f2fs_free_encryption_info(inode, crypt_info);
+- goto retry;
+- }
+
+ res = f2fs_getxattr(inode, F2FS_XATTR_INDEX_ENCRYPTION,
+ F2FS_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT,
+@@ -159,7 +152,6 @@ retry:
+ crypt_info->ci_data_mode = ctx.contents_encryption_mode;
+ crypt_info->ci_filename_mode = ctx.filenames_encryption_mode;
+ crypt_info->ci_ctfm = NULL;
+- crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = NULL;
+ memcpy(crypt_info->ci_master_key, ctx.master_key_descriptor,
+ sizeof(crypt_info->ci_master_key));
+ if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+@@ -197,7 +189,6 @@ retry:
+ keyring_key = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+- crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
+ BUG_ON(keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon);
+ ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
+ if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct f2fs_encryption_key)) {
+@@ -230,17 +221,12 @@ retry:
+ if (res)
+ goto out;
+
+- memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key));
+- if (cmpxchg(&fi->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) != NULL) {
+- f2fs_free_crypt_info(crypt_info);
+- goto retry;
+- }
+- return 0;
+-
++ if (cmpxchg(&fi->i_crypt_info, NULL, crypt_info) == NULL)
++ crypt_info = NULL;
+ out:
+ if (res == -ENOKEY && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ res = 0;
+-
++ key_put(keyring_key);
+ f2fs_free_crypt_info(crypt_info);
+ memzero_explicit(raw_key, sizeof(raw_key));
+ return res;
+--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
++++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+@@ -2149,7 +2149,6 @@ void f2fs_end_io_crypto_work(struct f2fs
+
+ /* crypto_key.c */
+ void f2fs_free_encryption_info(struct inode *, struct f2fs_crypt_info *);
+-int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode);
+
+ /* crypto_fname.c */
+ bool f2fs_valid_filenames_enc_mode(uint32_t);
+@@ -2170,18 +2169,7 @@ void f2fs_exit_crypto(void);
+
+ int f2fs_has_encryption_key(struct inode *);
+
+-static inline int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
+-{
+- struct f2fs_crypt_info *ci = F2FS_I(inode)->i_crypt_info;
+-
+- if (!ci ||
+- (ci->ci_keyring_key &&
+- (ci->ci_keyring_key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) |
+- (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED) |
+- (1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD)))))
+- return _f2fs_get_encryption_info(inode);
+- return 0;
+-}
++int f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode);
+
+ void f2fs_fname_crypto_free_buffer(struct f2fs_str *);
+ int f2fs_fname_setup_filename(struct inode *, const struct qstr *,
+--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h
++++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs_crypto.h
+@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ struct f2fs_crypt_info {
+ char ci_filename_mode;
+ char ci_flags;
+ struct crypto_ablkcipher *ci_ctfm;
+- struct key *ci_keyring_key;
+ char ci_master_key[F2FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+ };
+
+++ /dev/null
-From 63cb6d5f004ca44f9b8e562b6dd191f717a4960e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2017 21:18:53 -0700
-Subject: KVM: nVMX: Fix nested VPID vmx exec control
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
-
-commit 63cb6d5f004ca44f9b8e562b6dd191f717a4960e upstream.
-
-This can be reproduced by running kvm-unit-tests/vmx.flat on L0 w/ vpid disabled.
-
-Test suite: VPID
-Unhandled exception 6 #UD at ip 00000000004051a6
-error_code=0000 rflags=00010047 cs=00000008
-rax=0000000000000000 rcx=0000000000000001 rdx=0000000000000047 rbx=0000000000402f79
-rbp=0000000000456240 rsi=0000000000000001 rdi=0000000000000000
-r8=000000000000000a r9=00000000000003f8 r10=0000000080010011 r11=0000000000000000
-r12=0000000000000003 r13=0000000000000708 r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000
-cr0=0000000080010031 cr2=0000000000000000 cr3=0000000007fff000 cr4=0000000000002020
-cr8=0000000000000000
-STACK: @4051a6 40523e 400f7f 402059 40028f
-
-We should hide and forbid VPID in L1 if it is disabled on L0. However, nested VPID
-enable bit is set unconditionally during setup nested vmx exec controls though VPID
-is not exposed through nested VMX capablity. This patch fixes it by don't set nested
-VPID enable bit if it is disabled on L0.
-
-Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
-Fixes: 5c614b3583e (KVM: nVMX: nested VPID emulation)
-Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-
----
- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 7 ++++---
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
-@@ -2620,7 +2620,6 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(s
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
-- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING |
-@@ -2650,10 +2649,12 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(s
- * though it is treated as global context. The alternative is
- * not failing the single-context invvpid, and it is worse.
- */
-- if (enable_vpid)
-+ if (enable_vpid) {
-+ vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
-+ SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
- vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps = VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT |
- VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SUPPORTED_MASK;
-- else
-+ } else
- vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps = 0;
-
- if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
+++ /dev/null
-From bcdde302b8268ef7dbc4ddbdaffb5b44eafe9a1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@gmail.com>
-Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2016 07:00:30 +0300
-Subject: KVM: nVMX: invvpid handling improvements
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-From: Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@gmail.com>
-
-commit bcdde302b8268ef7dbc4ddbdaffb5b44eafe9a1e upstream.
-
- - Expose all invalidation types to the L1
-
- - Reject invvpid instruction, if L1 passed zero vpid value to single
- context invalidations
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Dakinevich <jan.dakinevich@gmail.com>
-Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-
----
- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
-@@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool
-
- #define VMX_MISC_EMULATED_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE 5
-
-+#define VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SUPPORTED_MASK \
-+ (VMX_VPID_EXTENT_INDIVIDUAL_ADDR_BIT | \
-+ VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT_BIT | \
-+ VMX_VPID_EXTENT_GLOBAL_CONTEXT_BIT | \
-+ VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_NON_GLOBAL_BIT)
-+
- /*
- * These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting:
- * ple_gap: upper bound on the amount of time between two successive
-@@ -2646,8 +2652,7 @@ static void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(s
- */
- if (enable_vpid)
- vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps = VMX_VPID_INVVPID_BIT |
-- VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT_BIT |
-- VMX_VPID_EXTENT_GLOBAL_CONTEXT_BIT;
-+ VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SUPPORTED_MASK;
- else
- vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps = 0;
-
-@@ -7407,7 +7412,8 @@ static int handle_invvpid(struct kvm_vcp
- vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
- type = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, (vmx_instruction_info >> 28) & 0xf);
-
-- types = (vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps >> 8) & 0x7;
-+ types = (vmx->nested.nested_vmx_vpid_caps &
-+ VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SUPPORTED_MASK) >> 8;
-
- if (!(types & (1UL << type))) {
- nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
-@@ -7429,21 +7435,27 @@ static int handle_invvpid(struct kvm_vcp
- }
-
- switch (type) {
-+ case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_INDIVIDUAL_ADDR:
- case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_CONTEXT:
-- /*
-- * Old versions of KVM use the single-context version so we
-- * have to support it; just treat it the same as all-context.
-- */
-+ case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_SINGLE_NON_GLOBAL:
-+ if (!vpid) {
-+ nested_vmx_failValid(vcpu,
-+ VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID);
-+ skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
-+ return 1;
-+ }
-+ break;
- case VMX_VPID_EXTENT_ALL_CONTEXT:
-- __vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vpid02);
-- nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
- break;
- default:
-- /* Trap individual address invalidation invvpid calls */
-- BUG_ON(1);
-- break;
-+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
-+ skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
-+ return 1;
- }
-
-+ __vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, vmx->nested.vpid02);
-+ nested_vmx_succeed(vcpu);
-+
- skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
- return 1;
- }
--- /dev/null
+From 619bd4a71874a8fd78eb6ccf9f272c5e98bcc7b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2017 15:40:06 +0100
+Subject: sched/rt: Add a missing rescheduling point
+
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+
+commit 619bd4a71874a8fd78eb6ccf9f272c5e98bcc7b7 upstream.
+
+Since the change in commit:
+
+ fd7a4bed1835 ("sched, rt: Convert switched_{from, to}_rt() / prio_changed_rt() to balance callbacks")
+
+... we don't reschedule a task under certain circumstances:
+
+Lets say task-A, SCHED_OTHER, is running on CPU0 (and it may run only on
+CPU0) and holds a PI lock. This task is removed from the CPU because it
+used up its time slice and another SCHED_OTHER task is running. Task-B on
+CPU1 runs at RT priority and asks for the lock owned by task-A. This
+results in a priority boost for task-A. Task-B goes to sleep until the
+lock has been made available. Task-A is already runnable (but not active),
+so it receives no wake up.
+
+The reality now is that task-A gets on the CPU once the scheduler decides
+to remove the current task despite the fact that a high priority task is
+enqueued and waiting. This may take a long time.
+
+The desired behaviour is that CPU0 immediately reschedules after the
+priority boost which made task-A the task with the lowest priority.
+
+Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
+Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Fixes: fd7a4bed1835 ("sched, rt: Convert switched_{from, to}_rt() prio_changed_rt() to balance callbacks")
+Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170124144006.29821-1-bigeasy@linutronix.de
+Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ kernel/sched/deadline.c | 3 +--
+ kernel/sched/rt.c | 3 +--
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/sched/deadline.c
++++ b/kernel/sched/deadline.c
+@@ -1771,12 +1771,11 @@ static void switched_to_dl(struct rq *rq
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ if (p->nr_cpus_allowed > 1 && rq->dl.overloaded)
+ queue_push_tasks(rq);
+-#else
++#endif
+ if (dl_task(rq->curr))
+ check_preempt_curr_dl(rq, p, 0);
+ else
+ resched_curr(rq);
+-#endif
+ }
+ }
+
+--- a/kernel/sched/rt.c
++++ b/kernel/sched/rt.c
+@@ -2136,10 +2136,9 @@ static void switched_to_rt(struct rq *rq
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ if (p->nr_cpus_allowed > 1 && rq->rt.overloaded)
+ queue_push_tasks(rq);
+-#else
++#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
+ if (p->prio < rq->curr->prio)
+ resched_curr(rq);
+-#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
+ }
+ }
+
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
