--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Date: Thu, 14 Jan 2016 15:28:19 +0100
+Subject: batman-adv: Avoid recursive call_rcu for batadv_bla_claim
+
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 63b399272294e7a939cde41792dca38c549f0484 ]
+
+The batadv_claim_free_ref function uses call_rcu to delay the free of the
+batadv_bla_claim object until no (already started) rcu_read_lock is enabled
+anymore. This makes sure that no context is still trying to access the
+object which should be removed. But batadv_bla_claim also contains a
+reference to backbone_gw which must be removed.
+
+The reference drop of backbone_gw was done in the call_rcu function
+batadv_claim_free_rcu but should actually be done in the
+batadv_claim_release function to avoid nested call_rcus. This is important
+because rcu_barrier (e.g. batadv_softif_free or batadv_exit) will not
+detect the inner call_rcu as relevant for its execution. Otherwise this
+barrier will most likely be inserted in the queue before the callback of
+the first call_rcu was executed. The caller of rcu_barrier will therefore
+continue to run before the inner call_rcu callback finished.
+
+Fixes: 23721387c409 ("batman-adv: add basic bridge loop avoidance code")
+Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Acked-by: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de>
+Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
+Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 10 +++-------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c
++++ b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c
+@@ -127,21 +127,17 @@ batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(struct batad
+ }
+
+ /* finally deinitialize the claim */
+-static void batadv_claim_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
++static void batadv_claim_release(struct batadv_bla_claim *claim)
+ {
+- struct batadv_bla_claim *claim;
+-
+- claim = container_of(rcu, struct batadv_bla_claim, rcu);
+-
+ batadv_backbone_gw_free_ref(claim->backbone_gw);
+- kfree(claim);
++ kfree_rcu(claim, rcu);
+ }
+
+ /* free a claim, call claim_free_rcu if its the last reference */
+ static void batadv_claim_free_ref(struct batadv_bla_claim *claim)
+ {
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&claim->refcount))
+- call_rcu(&claim->rcu, batadv_claim_free_rcu);
++ batadv_claim_release(claim);
+ }
+
+ /**
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 12:06:19 +0100
+Subject: batman-adv: Avoid recursive call_rcu for batadv_nc_node
+
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 44e8e7e91d6c7c7ab19688750f7257292640d1a0 ]
+
+The batadv_nc_node_free_ref function uses call_rcu to delay the free of the
+batadv_nc_node object until no (already started) rcu_read_lock is enabled
+anymore. This makes sure that no context is still trying to access the
+object which should be removed. But batadv_nc_node also contains a
+reference to orig_node which must be removed.
+
+The reference drop of orig_node was done in the call_rcu function
+batadv_nc_node_free_rcu but should actually be done in the
+batadv_nc_node_release function to avoid nested call_rcus. This is
+important because rcu_barrier (e.g. batadv_softif_free or batadv_exit) will
+not detect the inner call_rcu as relevant for its execution. Otherwise this
+barrier will most likely be inserted in the queue before the callback of
+the first call_rcu was executed. The caller of rcu_barrier will therefore
+continue to run before the inner call_rcu callback finished.
+
+Fixes: d56b1705e28c ("batman-adv: network coding - detect coding nodes and remove these after timeout")
+Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
+Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/batman-adv/network-coding.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/batman-adv/network-coding.c
++++ b/net/batman-adv/network-coding.c
+@@ -203,28 +203,25 @@ void batadv_nc_init_orig(struct batadv_o
+ }
+
+ /**
+- * batadv_nc_node_free_rcu - rcu callback to free an nc node and remove
+- * its refcount on the orig_node
+- * @rcu: rcu pointer of the nc node
++ * batadv_nc_node_release - release nc_node from lists and queue for free after
++ * rcu grace period
++ * @nc_node: the nc node to free
+ */
+-static void batadv_nc_node_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
++static void batadv_nc_node_release(struct batadv_nc_node *nc_node)
+ {
+- struct batadv_nc_node *nc_node;
+-
+- nc_node = container_of(rcu, struct batadv_nc_node, rcu);
+ batadv_orig_node_free_ref(nc_node->orig_node);
+- kfree(nc_node);
++ kfree_rcu(nc_node, rcu);
+ }
+
+ /**
+- * batadv_nc_node_free_ref - decrements the nc node refcounter and possibly
+- * frees it
++ * batadv_nc_node_free_ref - decrement the nc node refcounter and possibly
++ * release it
+ * @nc_node: the nc node to free
+ */
+ static void batadv_nc_node_free_ref(struct batadv_nc_node *nc_node)
+ {
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&nc_node->refcount))
+- call_rcu(&nc_node->rcu, batadv_nc_node_free_rcu);
++ batadv_nc_node_release(nc_node);
+ }
+
+ /**
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 12:06:25 +0100
+Subject: batman-adv: Drop immediate batadv_hard_iface free function
+
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit b4d922cfc9c08318eeb77d53b7633740e6b0efb0 ]
+
+It is not allowed to free the memory of an object which is part of a list
+which is protected by rcu-read-side-critical sections without making sure
+that no other context is accessing the object anymore. This usually happens
+by removing the references to this object and then waiting until the rcu
+grace period is over and no one (allowedly) accesses it anymore.
+
+But the _now functions ignore this completely. They free the object
+directly even when a different context still tries to access it. This has
+to be avoided and thus these functions must be removed and all functions
+have to use batadv_hardif_free_ref.
+
+Fixes: 89652331c00f ("batman-adv: split tq information in neigh_node struct")
+Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
+Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/batman-adv/hard-interface.h | 12 ------------
+ net/batman-adv/originator.c | 14 +++++++-------
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.h
++++ b/net/batman-adv/hard-interface.h
+@@ -75,18 +75,6 @@ batadv_hardif_free_ref(struct batadv_har
+ call_rcu(&hard_iface->rcu, batadv_hardif_free_rcu);
+ }
+
+-/**
+- * batadv_hardif_free_ref_now - decrement the hard interface refcounter and
+- * possibly free it (without rcu callback)
+- * @hard_iface: the hard interface to free
+- */
+-static inline void
+-batadv_hardif_free_ref_now(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
+-{
+- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&hard_iface->refcount))
+- batadv_hardif_free_rcu(&hard_iface->rcu);
+-}
+-
+ static inline struct batadv_hard_iface *
+ batadv_primary_if_get_selected(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
+ {
+--- a/net/batman-adv/originator.c
++++ b/net/batman-adv/originator.c
+@@ -189,16 +189,16 @@ void batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_ref(struct
+
+ /**
+ * batadv_neigh_node_free_rcu - free the neigh_node
+- * @rcu: rcu pointer of the neigh_node
++ * batadv_neigh_node_release - release neigh_node from lists and queue for
++ * free after rcu grace period
++ * @neigh_node: neigh neighbor to free
+ */
+-static void batadv_neigh_node_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
++static void batadv_neigh_node_release(struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node)
+ {
+ struct hlist_node *node_tmp;
+- struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node;
+ struct batadv_neigh_ifinfo *neigh_ifinfo;
+ struct batadv_algo_ops *bao;
+
+- neigh_node = container_of(rcu, struct batadv_neigh_node, rcu);
+ bao = neigh_node->orig_node->bat_priv->bat_algo_ops;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(neigh_ifinfo, node_tmp,
+@@ -209,9 +209,9 @@ static void batadv_neigh_node_free_rcu(s
+ if (bao->bat_neigh_free)
+ bao->bat_neigh_free(neigh_node);
+
+- batadv_hardif_free_ref_now(neigh_node->if_incoming);
++ batadv_hardif_free_ref(neigh_node->if_incoming);
+
+- kfree(neigh_node);
++ kfree_rcu(neigh_node, rcu);
+ }
+
+ /**
+@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static void batadv_neigh_node_free_rcu(s
+ void batadv_neigh_node_free_ref(struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node)
+ {
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&neigh_node->refcount))
+- call_rcu(&neigh_node->rcu, batadv_neigh_node_free_rcu);
++ batadv_neigh_node_release(neigh_node);
+ }
+
+ /**
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 12:06:22 +0100
+Subject: batman-adv: Drop immediate batadv_neigh_node free function
+
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 2baa753c276f27f8e844637561ad597867aa6fb6 ]
+
+It is not allowed to free the memory of an object which is part of a list
+which is protected by rcu-read-side-critical sections without making sure
+that no other context is accessing the object anymore. This usually happens
+by removing the references to this object and then waiting until the rcu
+grace period is over and no one (allowedly) accesses it anymore.
+
+But the _now functions ignore this completely. They free the object
+directly even when a different context still tries to access it. This has
+to be avoided and thus these functions must be removed and all functions
+have to use batadv_neigh_node_free_ref.
+
+Fixes: 89652331c00f ("batman-adv: split tq information in neigh_node struct")
+Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
+Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/batman-adv/originator.c | 33 ++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/batman-adv/originator.c
++++ b/net/batman-adv/originator.c
+@@ -229,20 +229,8 @@ static void batadv_neigh_node_free_rcu(s
+ }
+
+ /**
+- * batadv_neigh_node_free_ref_now - decrement the neighbors refcounter
+- * and possibly free it (without rcu callback)
+- * @neigh_node: neigh neighbor to free
+- */
+-static void
+-batadv_neigh_node_free_ref_now(struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node)
+-{
+- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&neigh_node->refcount))
+- batadv_neigh_node_free_rcu(&neigh_node->rcu);
+-}
+-
+-/**
+ * batadv_neigh_node_free_ref - decrement the neighbors refcounter
+- * and possibly free it
++ * and possibly release it
+ * @neigh_node: neigh neighbor to free
+ */
+ void batadv_neigh_node_free_ref(struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node)
+@@ -532,24 +520,23 @@ out:
+ }
+
+ /**
+- * batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_rcu - free the orig_ifinfo object
+- * @rcu: rcu pointer of the orig_ifinfo object
++ * batadv_orig_ifinfo_release - release orig_ifinfo from lists and queue for
++ * free after rcu grace period
++ * @orig_ifinfo: the orig_ifinfo object to release
+ */
+-static void batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
++static void batadv_orig_ifinfo_release(struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *orig_ifinfo)
+ {
+- struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *orig_ifinfo;
+ struct batadv_neigh_node *router;
+
+- orig_ifinfo = container_of(rcu, struct batadv_orig_ifinfo, rcu);
+-
+ if (orig_ifinfo->if_outgoing != BATADV_IF_DEFAULT)
+- batadv_hardif_free_ref_now(orig_ifinfo->if_outgoing);
++ batadv_hardif_free_ref(orig_ifinfo->if_outgoing);
+
+ /* this is the last reference to this object */
+ router = rcu_dereference_protected(orig_ifinfo->router, true);
+ if (router)
+- batadv_neigh_node_free_ref_now(router);
+- kfree(orig_ifinfo);
++ batadv_neigh_node_free_ref(router);
++
++ kfree_rcu(orig_ifinfo, rcu);
+ }
+
+ /**
+@@ -560,7 +547,7 @@ static void batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_rcu(
+ void batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *orig_ifinfo)
+ {
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&orig_ifinfo->refcount))
+- call_rcu(&orig_ifinfo->rcu, batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_rcu);
++ batadv_orig_ifinfo_release(orig_ifinfo);
+ }
+
+ /**
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 12:06:21 +0100
+Subject: batman-adv: Drop immediate batadv_orig_ifinfo free function
+
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit deed96605f5695cb945e0b3d79429581857a2b9d ]
+
+It is not allowed to free the memory of an object which is part of a list
+which is protected by rcu-read-side-critical sections without making sure
+that no other context is accessing the object anymore. This usually happens
+by removing the references to this object and then waiting until the rcu
+grace period is over and no one (allowedly) accesses it anymore.
+
+But the _now functions ignore this completely. They free the object
+directly even when a different context still tries to access it. This has
+to be avoided and thus these functions must be removed and all functions
+have to use batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref.
+
+Fixes: 7351a4822d42 ("batman-adv: split out router from orig_node")
+Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
+Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/batman-adv/originator.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/batman-adv/originator.c
++++ b/net/batman-adv/originator.c
+@@ -553,76 +553,79 @@ static void batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_rcu(
+ }
+
+ /**
+- * batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref - decrement the refcounter and possibly free
+- * the orig_ifinfo (without rcu callback)
++ * batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref - decrement the refcounter and possibly release
++ * the orig_ifinfo
+ * @orig_ifinfo: the orig_ifinfo object to release
+ */
+-static void
+-batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref_now(struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *orig_ifinfo)
++void batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *orig_ifinfo)
+ {
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&orig_ifinfo->refcount))
+- batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_rcu(&orig_ifinfo->rcu);
++ call_rcu(&orig_ifinfo->rcu, batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_rcu);
+ }
+
+ /**
+- * batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref - decrement the refcounter and possibly free
+- * the orig_ifinfo
+- * @orig_ifinfo: the orig_ifinfo object to release
++ * batadv_orig_node_free_rcu - free the orig_node
++ * @rcu: rcu pointer of the orig_node
+ */
+-void batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *orig_ifinfo)
++static void batadv_orig_node_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+ {
+- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&orig_ifinfo->refcount))
+- call_rcu(&orig_ifinfo->rcu, batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_rcu);
++ struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node;
++
++ orig_node = container_of(rcu, struct batadv_orig_node, rcu);
++
++ batadv_mcast_purge_orig(orig_node);
++
++ batadv_frag_purge_orig(orig_node, NULL);
++
++ if (orig_node->bat_priv->bat_algo_ops->bat_orig_free)
++ orig_node->bat_priv->bat_algo_ops->bat_orig_free(orig_node);
++
++ kfree(orig_node->tt_buff);
++ kfree(orig_node);
+ }
+
+-static void batadv_orig_node_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
++/**
++ * batadv_orig_node_release - release orig_node from lists and queue for
++ * free after rcu grace period
++ * @orig_node: the orig node to free
++ */
++static void batadv_orig_node_release(struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node)
+ {
+ struct hlist_node *node_tmp;
+ struct batadv_neigh_node *neigh_node;
+- struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node;
+ struct batadv_orig_ifinfo *orig_ifinfo;
+
+- orig_node = container_of(rcu, struct batadv_orig_node, rcu);
+-
+ spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
+
+ /* for all neighbors towards this originator ... */
+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(neigh_node, node_tmp,
+ &orig_node->neigh_list, list) {
+ hlist_del_rcu(&neigh_node->list);
+- batadv_neigh_node_free_ref_now(neigh_node);
++ batadv_neigh_node_free_ref(neigh_node);
+ }
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(orig_ifinfo, node_tmp,
+ &orig_node->ifinfo_list, list) {
+ hlist_del_rcu(&orig_ifinfo->list);
+- batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref_now(orig_ifinfo);
++ batadv_orig_ifinfo_free_ref(orig_ifinfo);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_bh(&orig_node->neigh_list_lock);
+
+- batadv_mcast_purge_orig(orig_node);
+-
+ /* Free nc_nodes */
+ batadv_nc_purge_orig(orig_node->bat_priv, orig_node, NULL);
+
+- batadv_frag_purge_orig(orig_node, NULL);
+-
+- if (orig_node->bat_priv->bat_algo_ops->bat_orig_free)
+- orig_node->bat_priv->bat_algo_ops->bat_orig_free(orig_node);
+-
+- kfree(orig_node->tt_buff);
+- kfree(orig_node);
++ call_rcu(&orig_node->rcu, batadv_orig_node_free_rcu);
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * batadv_orig_node_free_ref - decrement the orig node refcounter and possibly
+- * schedule an rcu callback for freeing it
++ * release it
+ * @orig_node: the orig node to free
+ */
+ void batadv_orig_node_free_ref(struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node)
+ {
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&orig_node->refcount))
+- call_rcu(&orig_node->rcu, batadv_orig_node_free_rcu);
++ batadv_orig_node_release(orig_node);
+ }
+
+ /**
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 12:06:24 +0100
+Subject: batman-adv: Drop immediate neigh_ifinfo free function
+
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit ae3e1e36e3cb6c686a7a2725af20ca86aa46d62a ]
+
+It is not allowed to free the memory of an object which is part of a list
+which is protected by rcu-read-side-critical sections without making sure
+that no other context is accessing the object anymore. This usually happens
+by removing the references to this object and then waiting until the rcu
+grace period is over and no one (allowedly) accesses it anymore.
+
+But the _now functions ignore this completely. They free the object
+directly even when a different context still tries to access it. This has
+to be avoided and thus these functions must be removed and all functions
+have to use batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_ref.
+
+Fixes: 89652331c00f ("batman-adv: split tq information in neigh_node struct")
+Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
+Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/batman-adv/originator.c | 34 ++++++++++------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/batman-adv/originator.c
++++ b/net/batman-adv/originator.c
+@@ -163,42 +163,28 @@ err:
+ }
+
+ /**
+- * batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_rcu - free the neigh_ifinfo object
+- * @rcu: rcu pointer of the neigh_ifinfo object
+- */
+-static void batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+-{
+- struct batadv_neigh_ifinfo *neigh_ifinfo;
+-
+- neigh_ifinfo = container_of(rcu, struct batadv_neigh_ifinfo, rcu);
+-
+- if (neigh_ifinfo->if_outgoing != BATADV_IF_DEFAULT)
+- batadv_hardif_free_ref_now(neigh_ifinfo->if_outgoing);
+-
+- kfree(neigh_ifinfo);
+-}
+-
+-/**
+- * batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_now - decrement the refcounter and possibly free
+- * the neigh_ifinfo (without rcu callback)
++ * batadv_neigh_ifinfo_release - release neigh_ifinfo from lists and queue for
++ * free after rcu grace period
+ * @neigh_ifinfo: the neigh_ifinfo object to release
+ */
+ static void
+-batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_ref_now(struct batadv_neigh_ifinfo *neigh_ifinfo)
++batadv_neigh_ifinfo_release(struct batadv_neigh_ifinfo *neigh_ifinfo)
+ {
+- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&neigh_ifinfo->refcount))
+- batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_rcu(&neigh_ifinfo->rcu);
++ if (neigh_ifinfo->if_outgoing != BATADV_IF_DEFAULT)
++ batadv_hardif_free_ref(neigh_ifinfo->if_outgoing);
++
++ kfree_rcu(neigh_ifinfo, rcu);
+ }
+
+ /**
+- * batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_ref - decrement the refcounter and possibly free
++ * batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_ref - decrement the refcounter and possibly release
+ * the neigh_ifinfo
+ * @neigh_ifinfo: the neigh_ifinfo object to release
+ */
+ void batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_ref(struct batadv_neigh_ifinfo *neigh_ifinfo)
+ {
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&neigh_ifinfo->refcount))
+- call_rcu(&neigh_ifinfo->rcu, batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_rcu);
++ batadv_neigh_ifinfo_release(neigh_ifinfo);
+ }
+
+ /**
+@@ -217,7 +203,7 @@ static void batadv_neigh_node_free_rcu(s
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry_safe(neigh_ifinfo, node_tmp,
+ &neigh_node->ifinfo_list, list) {
+- batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_ref_now(neigh_ifinfo);
++ batadv_neigh_ifinfo_free_ref(neigh_ifinfo);
+ }
+
+ if (bao->bat_neigh_free)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 12:06:20 +0100
+Subject: batman-adv: Drop immediate orig_node free function
+
+From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 42eff6a617e23b691f8e4467f4687ed7245a92db ]
+
+It is not allowed to free the memory of an object which is part of a list
+which is protected by rcu-read-side-critical sections without making sure
+that no other context is accessing the object anymore. This usually happens
+by removing the references to this object and then waiting until the rcu
+grace period is over and no one (allowedly) accesses it anymore.
+
+But the _now functions ignore this completely. They free the object
+directly even when a different context still tries to access it. This has
+to be avoided and thus these functions must be removed and all functions
+have to use batadv_orig_node_free_ref.
+
+Fixes: 72822225bd41 ("batman-adv: Fix rcu_barrier() miss due to double call_rcu() in TT code")
+Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
+Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/batman-adv/originator.c | 11 -----------
+ net/batman-adv/originator.h | 1 -
+ net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 28 +++++++++++++---------------
+ 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/batman-adv/originator.c
++++ b/net/batman-adv/originator.c
+@@ -601,17 +601,6 @@ void batadv_orig_node_free_ref(struct ba
+ batadv_orig_node_release(orig_node);
+ }
+
+-/**
+- * batadv_orig_node_free_ref_now - decrement the orig node refcounter and
+- * possibly free it (without rcu callback)
+- * @orig_node: the orig node to free
+- */
+-void batadv_orig_node_free_ref_now(struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node)
+-{
+- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&orig_node->refcount))
+- batadv_orig_node_free_rcu(&orig_node->rcu);
+-}
+-
+ void batadv_originator_free(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
+ {
+ struct batadv_hashtable *hash = bat_priv->orig_hash;
+--- a/net/batman-adv/originator.h
++++ b/net/batman-adv/originator.h
+@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ int batadv_originator_init(struct batadv
+ void batadv_originator_free(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv);
+ void batadv_purge_orig_ref(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv);
+ void batadv_orig_node_free_ref(struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node);
+-void batadv_orig_node_free_ref_now(struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node);
+ struct batadv_orig_node *batadv_orig_node_new(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
+ const u8 *addr);
+ struct batadv_neigh_node *
+--- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
++++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
+@@ -240,20 +240,6 @@ int batadv_tt_global_hash_count(struct b
+ return count;
+ }
+
+-static void batadv_tt_orig_list_entry_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+-{
+- struct batadv_tt_orig_list_entry *orig_entry;
+-
+- orig_entry = container_of(rcu, struct batadv_tt_orig_list_entry, rcu);
+-
+- /* We are in an rcu callback here, therefore we cannot use
+- * batadv_orig_node_free_ref() and its call_rcu():
+- * An rcu_barrier() wouldn't wait for that to finish
+- */
+- batadv_orig_node_free_ref_now(orig_entry->orig_node);
+- kfree(orig_entry);
+-}
+-
+ /**
+ * batadv_tt_local_size_mod - change the size by v of the local table identified
+ * by vid
+@@ -349,13 +335,25 @@ static void batadv_tt_global_size_dec(st
+ batadv_tt_global_size_mod(orig_node, vid, -1);
+ }
+
++/**
++ * batadv_tt_orig_list_entry_release - release tt orig entry from lists and
++ * queue for free after rcu grace period
++ * @orig_entry: tt orig entry to be free'd
++ */
++static void
++batadv_tt_orig_list_entry_release(struct batadv_tt_orig_list_entry *orig_entry)
++{
++ batadv_orig_node_free_ref(orig_entry->orig_node);
++ kfree_rcu(orig_entry, rcu);
++}
++
+ static void
+ batadv_tt_orig_list_entry_free_ref(struct batadv_tt_orig_list_entry *orig_entry)
+ {
+ if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&orig_entry->refcount))
+ return;
+
+- call_rcu(&orig_entry->rcu, batadv_tt_orig_list_entry_free_rcu);
++ batadv_tt_orig_list_entry_release(orig_entry);
+ }
+
+ /**
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 08:28:43 -0500
+Subject: bonding: Prevent IPv6 link local address on enslaved devices
+
+From: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 03d84a5f83a67e692af00a3d3901e7820e3e84d5 ]
+
+Commit 1f718f0f4f97 ("bonding: populate neighbour's private on enslave")
+undoes the fix provided by commit c2edacf80e15 ("bonding / ipv6: no addrconf
+for slaves separately from master") by effectively setting the slave flag
+after the slave has been opened. If the slave comes up quickly enough, it
+will go through the IPv6 addrconf before the slave flag has been set and
+will get a link local IPv6 address.
+
+In order to ensure that addrconf knows to ignore the slave devices on state
+change, set IFF_SLAVE before dev_open() during bonding enslavement.
+
+Fixes: 1f718f0f4f97 ("bonding: populate neighbour's private on enslave")
+Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c
+@@ -1207,7 +1207,6 @@ static int bond_master_upper_dev_link(st
+ err = netdev_master_upper_dev_link_private(slave_dev, bond_dev, slave);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+- slave_dev->flags |= IFF_SLAVE;
+ rtmsg_ifinfo(RTM_NEWLINK, slave_dev, IFF_SLAVE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -1465,6 +1464,9 @@ int bond_enslave(struct net_device *bond
+ }
+ }
+
++ /* set slave flag before open to prevent IPv6 addrconf */
++ slave_dev->flags |= IFF_SLAVE;
++
+ /* open the slave since the application closed it */
+ res = dev_open(slave_dev);
+ if (res) {
+@@ -1725,6 +1727,7 @@ err_close:
+ dev_close(slave_dev);
+
+ err_restore_mac:
++ slave_dev->flags &= ~IFF_SLAVE;
+ if (!bond->params.fail_over_mac ||
+ BOND_MODE(bond) != BOND_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP) {
+ /* XXX TODO - fom follow mode needs to change master's
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 19:03:54 +0100
+Subject: bridge: fix lockdep addr_list_lock false positive splat
+
+From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit c6894dec8ea9ae05747124dce98b3b5c2e69b168 ]
+
+After promisc mode management was introduced a bridge device could do
+dev_set_promiscuity from its ndo_change_rx_flags() callback which in
+turn can be called after the bridge's addr_list_lock has been taken
+(e.g. by dev_uc_add). This causes a false positive lockdep splat because
+the port interfaces' addr_list_lock is taken when br_manage_promisc()
+runs after the bridge's addr list lock was already taken.
+To remove the false positive introduce a custom bridge addr_list_lock
+class and set it on bridge init.
+A simple way to reproduce this is with the following:
+$ brctl addbr br0
+$ ip l add l br0 br0.100 type vlan id 100
+$ ip l set br0 up
+$ ip l set br0.100 up
+$ echo 1 > /sys/class/net/br0/bridge/vlan_filtering
+$ brctl addif br0 eth0
+Splat:
+[ 43.684325] =============================================
+[ 43.684485] [ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
+[ 43.684636] 4.4.0-rc8+ #54 Not tainted
+[ 43.684755] ---------------------------------------------
+[ 43.684906] brctl/1187 is trying to acquire lock:
+[ 43.685047] (_xmit_ETHER){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff8150169e>] dev_set_rx_mode+0x1e/0x40
+[ 43.685460] but task is already holding lock:
+[ 43.685618] (_xmit_ETHER){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff815072a7>] dev_uc_add+0x27/0x80
+[ 43.686015] other info that might help us debug this:
+[ 43.686316] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
+
+[ 43.686743] CPU0
+[ 43.686967] ----
+[ 43.687197] lock(_xmit_ETHER);
+[ 43.687544] lock(_xmit_ETHER);
+[ 43.687886] *** DEADLOCK ***
+
+[ 43.688438] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
+
+[ 43.688882] 2 locks held by brctl/1187:
+[ 43.689134] #0: (rtnl_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81510317>] rtnl_lock+0x17/0x20
+[ 43.689852] #1: (_xmit_ETHER){+.....}, at: [<ffffffff815072a7>] dev_uc_add+0x27/0x80
+[ 43.690575] stack backtrace:
+[ 43.690970] CPU: 0 PID: 1187 Comm: brctl Not tainted 4.4.0-rc8+ #54
+[ 43.691270] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.8.1-20150318_183358- 04/01/2014
+[ 43.691770] ffffffff826a25c0 ffff8800369fb8e0 ffffffff81360ceb ffffffff826a25c0
+[ 43.692425] ffff8800369fb9b8 ffffffff810d0466 ffff8800369fb968 ffffffff81537139
+[ 43.693071] ffff88003a08c880 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000002080020
+[ 43.693709] Call Trace:
+[ 43.693931] [<ffffffff81360ceb>] dump_stack+0x4b/0x70
+[ 43.694199] [<ffffffff810d0466>] __lock_acquire+0x1e46/0x1e90
+[ 43.694483] [<ffffffff81537139>] ? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x139/0x3e0
+[ 43.694789] [<ffffffff8153b5da>] ? nlmsg_notify+0x5a/0xc0
+[ 43.695064] [<ffffffff810d10f5>] lock_acquire+0xe5/0x1f0
+[ 43.695340] [<ffffffff8150169e>] ? dev_set_rx_mode+0x1e/0x40
+[ 43.695623] [<ffffffff815edea5>] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x45/0x80
+[ 43.695901] [<ffffffff8150169e>] ? dev_set_rx_mode+0x1e/0x40
+[ 43.696180] [<ffffffff8150169e>] dev_set_rx_mode+0x1e/0x40
+[ 43.696460] [<ffffffff8150189c>] dev_set_promiscuity+0x3c/0x50
+[ 43.696750] [<ffffffffa0586845>] br_port_set_promisc+0x25/0x50 [bridge]
+[ 43.697052] [<ffffffffa05869aa>] br_manage_promisc+0x8a/0xe0 [bridge]
+[ 43.697348] [<ffffffffa05826ee>] br_dev_change_rx_flags+0x1e/0x20 [bridge]
+[ 43.697655] [<ffffffff81501532>] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x132/0x1f0
+[ 43.697943] [<ffffffff81501672>] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x82/0x90
+[ 43.698223] [<ffffffff815072de>] dev_uc_add+0x5e/0x80
+[ 43.698498] [<ffffffffa05b3c62>] vlan_device_event+0x542/0x650 [8021q]
+[ 43.698798] [<ffffffff8109886d>] notifier_call_chain+0x5d/0x80
+[ 43.699083] [<ffffffff810988b6>] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
+[ 43.699374] [<ffffffff814f456e>] call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x6e/0x80
+[ 43.699678] [<ffffffff814f4596>] call_netdevice_notifiers+0x16/0x20
+[ 43.699973] [<ffffffffa05872be>] br_add_if+0x47e/0x4c0 [bridge]
+[ 43.700259] [<ffffffffa058801e>] add_del_if+0x6e/0x80 [bridge]
+[ 43.700548] [<ffffffffa0588b5f>] br_dev_ioctl+0xaf/0xc0 [bridge]
+[ 43.700836] [<ffffffff8151a7ac>] dev_ifsioc+0x30c/0x3c0
+[ 43.701106] [<ffffffff8151aac9>] dev_ioctl+0xf9/0x6f0
+[ 43.701379] [<ffffffff81254345>] ? mntput_no_expire+0x5/0x450
+[ 43.701665] [<ffffffff812543ee>] ? mntput_no_expire+0xae/0x450
+[ 43.701947] [<ffffffff814d7b02>] sock_do_ioctl+0x42/0x50
+[ 43.702219] [<ffffffff814d8175>] sock_ioctl+0x1e5/0x290
+[ 43.702500] [<ffffffff81242d0b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x2cb/0x5c0
+[ 43.702771] [<ffffffff81243079>] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
+[ 43.703033] [<ffffffff815eebb6>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x7a
+
+CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
+CC: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+CC: Bridge list <bridge@lists.linux-foundation.org>
+CC: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com>
+CC: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Fixes: 2796d0c648c9 ("bridge: Automatically manage port promiscuous mode.")
+Reported-by: Andy Gospodarek <gospo@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/bridge/br_device.c | 8 ++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/bridge/br_device.c
++++ b/net/bridge/br_device.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
+ const struct nf_br_ops __rcu *nf_br_ops __read_mostly;
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_br_ops);
+
++static struct lock_class_key bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key;
++
+ /* net device transmit always called with BH disabled */
+ netdev_tx_t br_dev_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+@@ -87,6 +89,11 @@ out:
+ return NETDEV_TX_OK;
+ }
+
++static void br_set_lockdep_class(struct net_device *dev)
++{
++ lockdep_set_class(&dev->addr_list_lock, &bridge_netdev_addr_lock_key);
++}
++
+ static int br_dev_init(struct net_device *dev)
+ {
+ struct net_bridge *br = netdev_priv(dev);
+@@ -99,6 +106,7 @@ static int br_dev_init(struct net_device
+ err = br_vlan_init(br);
+ if (err)
+ free_percpu(br->stats);
++ br_set_lockdep_class(dev);
+
+ return err;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 15:28:13 +0100
+Subject: dwc_eth_qos: Fix dma address for multi-fragment skbs
+
+From: Lars Persson <lars.persson@axis.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit d461873272169a3fc3a8d155d7b1c92e9d97b419 ]
+
+The offset inside the fragment was not used for the dma address and
+silent data corruption resulted because TSO makes the checksum match.
+
+Fixes: 077742dac2c7 ("dwc_eth_qos: Add support for Synopsys DWC Ethernet QoS")
+Signed-off-by: Lars Persson <larper@axis.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/synopsys/dwc_eth_qos.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/synopsys/dwc_eth_qos.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/synopsys/dwc_eth_qos.c
+@@ -2107,7 +2107,7 @@ static int dwceqos_tx_frags(struct sk_bu
+ dd = &lp->tx_descs[lp->tx_next];
+
+ /* Set DMA Descriptor fields */
+- dd->des0 = dma_handle;
++ dd->des0 = dma_handle + consumed_size;
+ dd->des1 = 0;
+ dd->des2 = dma_size;
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 09:35:51 -0800
+Subject: ipv6: tcp: add rcu locking in tcp_v6_send_synack()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 3e4006f0b86a5ae5eb0e8215f9a9e1db24506977 ]
+
+When first SYNACK is sent, we already hold rcu_read_lock(), but this
+is not true if a SYNACK is retransmitted, as a timer (soft) interrupt
+does not hold rcu_read_lock()
+
+Fixes: 45f6fad84cc30 ("ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt")
+Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+@@ -462,8 +462,10 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_synack(const stru
+ if (np->repflow && ireq->pktopts)
+ fl6->flowlabel = ip6_flowlabel(ipv6_hdr(ireq->pktopts));
+
++ rcu_read_lock();
+ err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
+ np->tclass);
++ rcu_read_unlock();
+ err = net_xmit_eval(err);
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 04:56:56 -0800
+Subject: ipv6: update skb->csum when CE mark is propagated
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 34ae6a1aa0540f0f781dd265366036355fdc8930 ]
+
+When a tunnel decapsulates the outer header, it has to comply
+with RFC 6080 and eventually propagate CE mark into inner header.
+
+It turns out IP6_ECN_set_ce() does not correctly update skb->csum
+for CHECKSUM_COMPLETE packets, triggering infamous "hw csum failure"
+messages and stack traces.
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/inet_ecn.h | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
+ net/ipv6/xfrm6_mode_tunnel.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/inet_ecn.h
++++ b/include/net/inet_ecn.h
+@@ -111,11 +111,24 @@ static inline void ipv4_copy_dscp(unsign
+
+ struct ipv6hdr;
+
+-static inline int IP6_ECN_set_ce(struct ipv6hdr *iph)
++/* Note:
++ * IP_ECN_set_ce() has to tweak IPV4 checksum when setting CE,
++ * meaning both changes have no effect on skb->csum if/when CHECKSUM_COMPLETE
++ * In IPv6 case, no checksum compensates the change in IPv6 header,
++ * so we have to update skb->csum.
++ */
++static inline int IP6_ECN_set_ce(struct sk_buff *skb, struct ipv6hdr *iph)
+ {
++ __be32 from, to;
++
+ if (INET_ECN_is_not_ect(ipv6_get_dsfield(iph)))
+ return 0;
+- *(__be32*)iph |= htonl(INET_ECN_CE << 20);
++
++ from = *(__be32 *)iph;
++ to = from | htonl(INET_ECN_CE << 20);
++ *(__be32 *)iph = to;
++ if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
++ skb->csum = csum_add(csum_sub(skb->csum, from), to);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+@@ -142,7 +155,7 @@ static inline int INET_ECN_set_ce(struct
+ case cpu_to_be16(ETH_P_IPV6):
+ if (skb_network_header(skb) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) <=
+ skb_tail_pointer(skb))
+- return IP6_ECN_set_ce(ipv6_hdr(skb));
++ return IP6_ECN_set_ce(skb, ipv6_hdr(skb));
+ break;
+ }
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_mode_tunnel.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_mode_tunnel.c
+@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static inline void ipip6_ecn_decapsulate
+ struct ipv6hdr *inner_iph = ipipv6_hdr(skb);
+
+ if (INET_ECN_is_ce(XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB(skb)->tos))
+- IP6_ECN_set_ce(inner_iph);
++ IP6_ECN_set_ce(skb, inner_iph);
+ }
+
+ /* Add encapsulation header.
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
+Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 20:17:08 +0100
+Subject: net: bpf: reject invalid shifts
+
+From: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
+
+[ Upstream commit 229394e8e62a4191d592842cf67e80c62a492937 ]
+
+On ARM64, a BUG() is triggered in the eBPF JIT if a filter with a
+constant shift that can't be encoded in the immediate field of the
+UBFM/SBFM instructions is passed to the JIT. Since these shifts
+amounts, which are negative or >= regsize, are invalid, reject them in
+the eBPF verifier and the classic BPF filter checker, for all
+architectures.
+
+Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
+Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
+Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ net/core/filter.c | 5 +++++
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
++++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+@@ -1121,6 +1121,16 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct verifier_
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
++ if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH ||
++ opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) {
++ int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32;
++
++ if (insn->imm < 0 || insn->imm >= size) {
++ verbose("invalid shift %d\n", insn->imm);
++ return -EINVAL;
++ }
++ }
++
+ /* pattern match 'bpf_add Rx, imm' instruction */
+ if (opcode == BPF_ADD && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 &&
+ regs[insn->dst_reg].type == FRAME_PTR &&
+--- a/net/core/filter.c
++++ b/net/core/filter.c
+@@ -777,6 +777,11 @@ static int bpf_check_classic(const struc
+ if (ftest->k == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
++ case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_K:
++ case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_K:
++ if (ftest->k >= 32)
++ return -EINVAL;
++ break;
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_MEM:
+ case BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM:
+ case BPF_ST:
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Doron Tsur <doront@mellanox.com>
+Date: Sun, 17 Jan 2016 11:25:47 +0200
+Subject: net/mlx5_core: Fix trimming down IRQ number
+
+From: Doron Tsur <doront@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 0b6e26ce89391327d955a756a7823272238eb867 ]
+
+With several ConnectX-4 cards installed on a server, one may receive
+irqn > 255 from the kernel API, which we mistakenly trim to 8bit.
+
+This causes EQ creation failure with the following stack trace:
+[<ffffffff812a11f4>] dump_stack+0x48/0x64
+[<ffffffff810ace21>] __setup_irq+0x3a1/0x4f0
+[<ffffffff810ad7e0>] request_threaded_irq+0x120/0x180
+[<ffffffffa0923660>] ? mlx5_eq_int+0x450/0x450 [mlx5_core]
+[<ffffffffa0922f64>] mlx5_create_map_eq+0x1e4/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
+[<ffffffffa091de01>] alloc_comp_eqs+0xb1/0x180 [mlx5_core]
+[<ffffffffa091ea99>] mlx5_dev_init+0x5e9/0x6e0 [mlx5_core]
+[<ffffffffa091ec29>] init_one+0x99/0x1c0 [mlx5_core]
+[<ffffffff812e2afc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xa0
+
+Fixing it by changing of the irqn type from u8 to unsigned int to
+support values > 255
+
+Fixes: 61d0e73e0a5a ('net/mlx5_core: Use the the real irqn in eq->irqn')
+Reported-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Doron Tsur <doront@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Matan Barak <matanb@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c | 2 +-
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 6 +++---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c | 3 ++-
+ include/linux/mlx5/cq.h | 2 +-
+ include/linux/mlx5/driver.h | 5 +++--
+ 5 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c
++++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c
+@@ -756,7 +756,7 @@ struct ib_cq *mlx5_ib_create_cq(struct i
+ int uninitialized_var(index);
+ int uninitialized_var(inlen);
+ int cqe_size;
+- int irqn;
++ unsigned int irqn;
+ int eqn;
+ int err;
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c
+@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ static int mlx5e_create_cq(struct mlx5e_
+ struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = priv->mdev;
+ struct mlx5_core_cq *mcq = &cq->mcq;
+ int eqn_not_used;
+- int irqn;
++ unsigned int irqn;
+ int err;
+ u32 i;
+
+@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ static int mlx5e_enable_cq(struct mlx5e_
+ void *in;
+ void *cqc;
+ int inlen;
+- int irqn_not_used;
++ unsigned int irqn_not_used;
+ int eqn;
+ int err;
+
+@@ -1504,7 +1504,7 @@ static int mlx5e_create_drop_cq(struct m
+ struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = priv->mdev;
+ struct mlx5_core_cq *mcq = &cq->mcq;
+ int eqn_not_used;
+- int irqn;
++ unsigned int irqn;
+ int err;
+
+ err = mlx5_cqwq_create(mdev, ¶m->wq, param->cqc, &cq->wq,
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
+@@ -568,7 +568,8 @@ static void mlx5_irq_clear_affinity_hint
+ mlx5_irq_clear_affinity_hint(mdev, i);
+ }
+
+-int mlx5_vector2eqn(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, int vector, int *eqn, int *irqn)
++int mlx5_vector2eqn(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, int vector, int *eqn,
++ unsigned int *irqn)
+ {
+ struct mlx5_eq_table *table = &dev->priv.eq_table;
+ struct mlx5_eq *eq, *n;
+--- a/include/linux/mlx5/cq.h
++++ b/include/linux/mlx5/cq.h
+@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct mlx5_core_cq {
+ atomic_t refcount;
+ struct completion free;
+ unsigned vector;
+- int irqn;
++ unsigned int irqn;
+ void (*comp) (struct mlx5_core_cq *);
+ void (*event) (struct mlx5_core_cq *, enum mlx5_event);
+ struct mlx5_uar *uar;
+--- a/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h
++++ b/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h
+@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ struct mlx5_eq {
+ u32 cons_index;
+ struct mlx5_buf buf;
+ int size;
+- u8 irqn;
++ unsigned int irqn;
+ u8 eqn;
+ int nent;
+ u64 mask;
+@@ -762,7 +762,8 @@ int mlx5_create_map_eq(struct mlx5_core_
+ int mlx5_destroy_unmap_eq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_eq *eq);
+ int mlx5_start_eqs(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev);
+ int mlx5_stop_eqs(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev);
+-int mlx5_vector2eqn(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, int vector, int *eqn, int *irqn);
++int mlx5_vector2eqn(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, int vector, int *eqn,
++ unsigned int *irqn);
+ int mlx5_core_attach_mcg(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, union ib_gid *mgid, u32 qpn);
+ int mlx5_core_detach_mcg(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, union ib_gid *mgid, u32 qpn);
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 21:38:44 -0800
+Subject: net: pktgen: fix null ptr deref in skb allocation
+
+From: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 3de03596dfeee48bc803c1d1a6daf60a459929f3 ]
+
+Fix possible null pointer dereference that may occur when calling
+skb_reserve() on a null skb.
+
+Fixes: 879c7220e82 ("net: pktgen: Observe needed_headroom of the device")
+Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.r.fastabend@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/pktgen.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/pktgen.c
++++ b/net/core/pktgen.c
+@@ -2787,7 +2787,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *pktgen_alloc_skb(
+ } else {
+ skb = __netdev_alloc_skb(dev, size, GFP_NOWAIT);
+ }
+- skb_reserve(skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev));
++
++ if (likely(skb))
++ skb_reserve(skb, LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev));
+
+ return skb;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Jan 2016 15:21:46 +0300
+Subject: net: preserve IP control block during GSO segmentation
+
+From: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 9207f9d45b0ad071baa128e846d7e7ed85016df3 ]
+
+Skb_gso_segment() uses skb control block during segmentation.
+This patch adds 32-bytes room for previous control block which
+will be copied into all resulting segments.
+
+This patch fixes kernel crash during fragmenting forwarded packets.
+Fragmentation requires valid IP CB in skb for clearing ip options.
+Also patch removes custom save/restore in ovs code, now it's redundant.
+
+Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
+Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALYGNiP-0MZ-FExV2HutTvE9U-QQtkKSoE--KN=JQE5STYsjAA@mail.gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/linux/skbuff.h | 3 ++-
+ net/core/dev.c | 5 +++++
+ net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 1 +
+ net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 5 +----
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c | 2 ++
+ 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
++++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
+@@ -3446,7 +3446,8 @@ struct skb_gso_cb {
+ int encap_level;
+ __u16 csum_start;
+ };
+-#define SKB_GSO_CB(skb) ((struct skb_gso_cb *)(skb)->cb)
++#define SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET 32
++#define SKB_GSO_CB(skb) ((struct skb_gso_cb *)((skb)->cb + SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET))
+
+ static inline int skb_tnl_header_len(const struct sk_buff *inner_skb)
+ {
+--- a/net/core/dev.c
++++ b/net/core/dev.c
+@@ -2542,6 +2542,8 @@ static inline bool skb_needs_check(struc
+ *
+ * It may return NULL if the skb requires no segmentation. This is
+ * only possible when GSO is used for verifying header integrity.
++ *
++ * Segmentation preserves SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET bytes of previous skb cb.
+ */
+ struct sk_buff *__skb_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ netdev_features_t features, bool tx_path)
+@@ -2556,6 +2558,9 @@ struct sk_buff *__skb_gso_segment(struct
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+ }
+
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET +
++ sizeof(*SKB_GSO_CB(skb)) > sizeof(skb->cb));
++
+ SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->mac_offset = skb_headroom(skb);
+ SKB_GSO_CB(skb)->encap_level = 0;
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+@@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ static int ip_finish_output_gso(struct n
+ * from host network stack.
+ */
+ features = netif_skb_features(skb);
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*IPCB(skb)) > SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET);
+ segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, features & ~NETIF_F_GSO_MASK);
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(segs)) {
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+--- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
++++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c
+@@ -336,12 +336,10 @@ static int queue_gso_packets(struct data
+ unsigned short gso_type = skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type;
+ struct sw_flow_key later_key;
+ struct sk_buff *segs, *nskb;
+- struct ovs_skb_cb ovs_cb;
+ int err;
+
+- ovs_cb = *OVS_CB(skb);
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*OVS_CB(skb)) > SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET);
+ segs = __skb_gso_segment(skb, NETIF_F_SG, false);
+- *OVS_CB(skb) = ovs_cb;
+ if (IS_ERR(segs))
+ return PTR_ERR(segs);
+ if (segs == NULL)
+@@ -359,7 +357,6 @@ static int queue_gso_packets(struct data
+ /* Queue all of the segments. */
+ skb = segs;
+ do {
+- *OVS_CB(skb) = ovs_cb;
+ if (gso_type & SKB_GSO_UDP && skb != segs)
+ key = &later_key;
+
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c
+@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ static int xfrm_output_gso(struct net *n
+ {
+ struct sk_buff *segs;
+
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*IPCB(skb)) > SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET);
++ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*IP6CB(skb)) > SKB_SGO_CB_OFFSET);
+ segs = skb_gso_segment(skb, 0);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ if (IS_ERR(segs))
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 14:52:43 -0500
+Subject: net: sctp: prevent writes to cookie_hmac_alg from accessing invalid memory
+
+From: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 320f1a4a175e7cd5d3f006f92b4d4d3e2cbb7bb5 ]
+
+proc_dostring() needs an initialized destination string, while the one
+provided in proc_sctp_do_hmac_alg() contains stack garbage.
+
+Thus, writing to cookie_hmac_alg would strlen() that garbage and end up
+accessing invalid memory.
+
+Fixes: 3c68198e7 ("sctp: Make hmac algorithm selection for cookie generation dynamic")
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/sysctl.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
++++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
+@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_hmac_alg(struct
+ struct ctl_table tbl;
+ bool changed = false;
+ char *none = "none";
+- char tmp[8];
++ char tmp[8] = {0};
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(&tbl, 0, sizeof(struct ctl_table));
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 08:58:00 -0800
+Subject: phonet: properly unshare skbs in phonet_rcv()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 7aaed57c5c2890634cfadf725173c7c68ea4cb4f ]
+
+Ivaylo Dimitrov reported a regression caused by commit 7866a621043f
+("dev: add per net_device packet type chains").
+
+skb->dev becomes NULL and we crash in __netif_receive_skb_core().
+
+Before above commit, different kind of bugs or corruptions could happen
+without major crash.
+
+But the root cause is that phonet_rcv() can queue skb without checking
+if skb is shared or not.
+
+Many thanks to Ivaylo Dimitrov for his help, diagnosis and tests.
+
+Reported-by: Ivaylo Dimitrov <ivo.g.dimitrov.75@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Ivaylo Dimitrov <ivo.g.dimitrov.75@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Remi Denis-Courmont <courmisch@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/phonet/af_phonet.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/phonet/af_phonet.c
++++ b/net/phonet/af_phonet.c
+@@ -377,6 +377,10 @@ static int phonet_rcv(struct sk_buff *sk
+ struct sockaddr_pn sa;
+ u16 len;
+
++ skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
++ if (!skb)
++ return NET_RX_DROP;
++
+ /* check we have at least a full Phonet header */
+ if (!pskb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct phonethdr)))
+ goto out;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 11:47:01 -0500
+Subject: sched,cls_flower: set key address type when present
+
+From: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 66530bdf85eb1d72a0c399665e09a2c2298501c6 ]
+
+only when user space passes the addresses should we consider their
+presence
+
+Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
+Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sched/cls_flower.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/sched/cls_flower.c
++++ b/net/sched/cls_flower.c
+@@ -252,23 +252,28 @@ static int fl_set_key(struct net *net, s
+ fl_set_key_val(tb, key->eth.src, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_ETH_SRC,
+ mask->eth.src, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_ETH_SRC_MASK,
+ sizeof(key->eth.src));
++
+ fl_set_key_val(tb, &key->basic.n_proto, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_ETH_TYPE,
+ &mask->basic.n_proto, TCA_FLOWER_UNSPEC,
+ sizeof(key->basic.n_proto));
++
+ if (key->basic.n_proto == htons(ETH_P_IP) ||
+ key->basic.n_proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
+ fl_set_key_val(tb, &key->basic.ip_proto, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IP_PROTO,
+ &mask->basic.ip_proto, TCA_FLOWER_UNSPEC,
+ sizeof(key->basic.ip_proto));
+ }
+- if (key->control.addr_type == FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS) {
++
++ if (tb[TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV4_SRC] || tb[TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV4_DST]) {
++ key->control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV4_ADDRS;
+ fl_set_key_val(tb, &key->ipv4.src, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV4_SRC,
+ &mask->ipv4.src, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV4_SRC_MASK,
+ sizeof(key->ipv4.src));
+ fl_set_key_val(tb, &key->ipv4.dst, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV4_DST,
+ &mask->ipv4.dst, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV4_DST_MASK,
+ sizeof(key->ipv4.dst));
+- } else if (key->control.addr_type == FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS) {
++ } else if (tb[TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV6_SRC] || tb[TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV6_DST]) {
++ key->control.addr_type = FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_IPV6_ADDRS;
+ fl_set_key_val(tb, &key->ipv6.src, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV6_SRC,
+ &mask->ipv6.src, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV6_SRC_MASK,
+ sizeof(key->ipv6.src));
+@@ -276,6 +281,7 @@ static int fl_set_key(struct net *net, s
+ &mask->ipv6.dst, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_IPV6_DST_MASK,
+ sizeof(key->ipv6.dst));
+ }
++
+ if (key->basic.ip_proto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
+ fl_set_key_val(tb, &key->tp.src, TCA_FLOWER_KEY_TCP_SRC,
+ &mask->tp.src, TCA_FLOWER_UNSPEC,
usb-cp210x-add-id-for-elv-marble-sound-board-1.patch
usb-core-lpm-fix-usb3_hardware_lpm-sysfs-node.patch
xhci-refuse-loading-if-nousb-is-used.patch
+unix-properly-account-for-fds-passed-over-unix-sockets.patch
+vxlan-fix-test-which-detect-duplicate-vxlan-iface.patch
+net-sctp-prevent-writes-to-cookie_hmac_alg-from-accessing-invalid-memory.patch
+ipv6-tcp-add-rcu-locking-in-tcp_v6_send_synack.patch
+tcp_yeah-don-t-set-ssthresh-below-2.patch
+sched-cls_flower-set-key-address-type-when-present.patch
+net-pktgen-fix-null-ptr-deref-in-skb-allocation.patch
+udp-disallow-ufo-for-sockets-with-so_no_check-option.patch
+net-preserve-ip-control-block-during-gso-segmentation.patch
+bonding-prevent-ipv6-link-local-address-on-enslaved-devices.patch
+dwc_eth_qos-fix-dma-address-for-multi-fragment-skbs.patch
+phonet-properly-unshare-skbs-in-phonet_rcv.patch
+net-bpf-reject-invalid-shifts.patch
+ipv6-update-skb-csum-when-ce-mark-is-propagated.patch
+bridge-fix-lockdep-addr_list_lock-false-positive-splat.patch
+net-mlx5_core-fix-trimming-down-irq-number.patch
+team-replace-rcu_read_lock-with-a-mutex-in-team_vlan_rx_kill_vid.patch
+batman-adv-avoid-recursive-call_rcu-for-batadv_bla_claim.patch
+batman-adv-avoid-recursive-call_rcu-for-batadv_nc_node.patch
+batman-adv-drop-immediate-batadv_orig_ifinfo-free-function.patch
+batman-adv-drop-immediate-batadv_neigh_node-free-function.patch
+batman-adv-drop-immediate-neigh_ifinfo-free-function.patch
+batman-adv-drop-immediate-batadv_hard_iface-free-function.patch
+batman-adv-drop-immediate-orig_node-free-function.patch
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 13:42:43 -0500
+Subject: tcp_yeah: don't set ssthresh below 2
+
+From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 83d15e70c4d8909d722c0d64747d8fb42e38a48f ]
+
+For tcp_yeah, use an ssthresh floor of 2, the same floor used by Reno
+and CUBIC, per RFC 5681 (equation 4).
+
+tcp_yeah_ssthresh() was sometimes returning a 0 or negative ssthresh
+value if the intended reduction is as big or bigger than the current
+cwnd. Congestion control modules should never return a zero or
+negative ssthresh. A zero ssthresh generally results in a zero cwnd,
+causing the connection to stall. A negative ssthresh value will be
+interpreted as a u32 and will set a target cwnd for PRR near 4
+billion.
+
+Oleksandr Natalenko reported that a system using tcp_yeah with ECN
+could see a warning about a prior_cwnd of 0 in
+tcp_cwnd_reduction(). Testing verified that this was due to
+tcp_yeah_ssthresh() misbehaving in this way.
+
+Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
+Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c
+@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ static u32 tcp_yeah_ssthresh(struct sock
+ yeah->fast_count = 0;
+ yeah->reno_count = max(yeah->reno_count>>1, 2U);
+
+- return tp->snd_cwnd - reduction;
++ return max_t(int, tp->snd_cwnd - reduction, 2);
+ }
+
+ static struct tcp_congestion_ops tcp_yeah __read_mostly = {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 17:30:22 +0200
+Subject: team: Replace rcu_read_lock with a mutex in team_vlan_rx_kill_vid
+
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 60a6531bfe49555581ccd65f66a350cc5693fcde ]
+
+We can't be within an RCU read-side critical section when deleting
+VLANs, as underlying drivers might sleep during the hardware operation.
+Therefore, replace the RCU critical section with a mutex. This is
+consistent with team_vlan_rx_add_vid.
+
+Fixes: 3d249d4ca7d0 ("net: introduce ethernet teaming device")
+Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/team/team.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/team/team.c
++++ b/drivers/net/team/team.c
+@@ -1845,10 +1845,10 @@ static int team_vlan_rx_kill_vid(struct
+ struct team *team = netdev_priv(dev);
+ struct team_port *port;
+
+- rcu_read_lock();
+- list_for_each_entry_rcu(port, &team->port_list, list)
++ mutex_lock(&team->lock);
++ list_for_each_entry(port, &team->port_list, list)
+ vlan_vid_del(port->dev, proto, vid);
+- rcu_read_unlock();
++ mutex_unlock(&team->lock);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Kube=C4=8Dek?= <mkubecek@suse.cz>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 07:50:30 +0100
+Subject: udp: disallow UFO for sockets with SO_NO_CHECK option
+
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Michal=20Kube=C4=8Dek?= <mkubecek@suse.cz>
+
+[ Upstream commit 40ba330227ad00b8c0cdf2f425736ff9549cc423 ]
+
+Commit acf8dd0a9d0b ("udp: only allow UFO for packets from SOCK_DGRAM
+sockets") disallows UFO for packets sent from raw sockets. We need to do
+the same also for SOCK_DGRAM sockets with SO_NO_CHECK options, even if
+for a bit different reason: while such socket would override the
+CHECKSUM_PARTIAL set by ip_ufo_append_data(), gso_size is still set and
+bad offloading flags warning is triggered in __skb_gso_segment().
+
+In the IPv6 case, SO_NO_CHECK option is ignored but we need to disallow
+UFO for packets sent by sockets with UDP_NO_CHECK6_TX option.
+
+Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
+Tested-by: Shannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@intel.com>
+Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 2 +-
+ net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ip_output.c
+@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ static int __ip_append_data(struct sock
+ if (((length > mtu) || (skb && skb_is_gso(skb))) &&
+ (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) &&
+ (rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO) && !rt->dst.header_len &&
+- (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)) {
++ (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) && !sk->sk_no_check_tx) {
+ err = ip_ufo_append_data(sk, queue, getfrag, from, length,
+ hh_len, fragheaderlen, transhdrlen,
+ maxfraglen, flags);
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+@@ -1353,7 +1353,7 @@ emsgsize:
+ (skb && skb_is_gso(skb))) &&
+ (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_UDP) &&
+ (rt->dst.dev->features & NETIF_F_UFO) &&
+- (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM)) {
++ (sk->sk_type == SOCK_DGRAM) && !udp_get_no_check6_tx(sk)) {
+ err = ip6_ufo_append_data(sk, queue, getfrag, from, length,
+ hh_len, fragheaderlen,
+ transhdrlen, mtu, flags, fl6);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: willy tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 07:54:56 +0100
+Subject: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
+
+From: willy tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+[ Upstream commit 712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593 ]
+
+It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
+the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
+to keep the process' fd count low.
+
+This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
+in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
+more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
+
+Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
+Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
+Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
+Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
+ net/unix/af_unix.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
+ net/unix/garbage.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/sched.h
++++ b/include/linux/sched.h
+@@ -830,6 +830,7 @@ struct user_struct {
+ unsigned long mq_bytes; /* How many bytes can be allocated to mqueue? */
+ #endif
+ unsigned long locked_shm; /* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */
++ unsigned long unix_inflight; /* How many files in flight in unix sockets */
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ struct key *uid_keyring; /* UID specific keyring */
+--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
++++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
+@@ -1513,6 +1513,21 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_
+ sock_wfree(skb);
+ }
+
++/*
++ * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
++ * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
++ * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
++ * it across threads. Tough.
++ */
++static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
++{
++ struct user_struct *user = current_user();
++
++ if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
++ return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
++ return false;
++}
++
+ #define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4
+
+ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
+@@ -1521,6 +1536,9 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_co
+ unsigned char max_level = 0;
+ int unix_sock_count = 0;
+
++ if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
++ return -ETOOMANYREFS;
++
+ for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+
+@@ -1542,10 +1560,8 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_co
+ if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+- if (unix_sock_count) {
+- for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+- }
++ for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++ unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ return max_level;
+ }
+
+--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
++++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
+@@ -120,11 +120,11 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+ {
+ struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
+
++ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
++
+ if (s) {
+ struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
+
+- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+-
+ if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
+ BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
+ list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
+@@ -132,25 +132,28 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+ BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
+ }
+ unix_tot_inflight++;
+- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ }
++ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
++ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ }
+
+ void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
+ {
+ struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
+
++ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
++
+ if (s) {
+ struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
+
+- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
+
+ if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
+ list_del_init(&u->link);
+ unix_tot_inflight--;
+- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ }
++ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
++ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ }
+
+ static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *),
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 21:31:27 PST 2016
+From: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 Jan 2016 11:26:53 +0100
+Subject: vxlan: fix test which detect duplicate vxlan iface
+
+From: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 07b9b37c227cb8d88d478b4a9c5634fee514ede1 ]
+
+When a vxlan interface is created, the driver checks that there is not
+another vxlan interface with the same properties. To do this, it checks
+the existing vxlan udp socket. Since commit 1c51a9159dde, the creation of
+the vxlan socket is done only when the interface is set up, thus it breaks
+that test.
+
+Example:
+$ ip l a vxlan10 type vxlan id 10 group 239.0.0.10 dev eth0 dstport 0
+$ ip l a vxlan11 type vxlan id 10 group 239.0.0.10 dev eth0 dstport 0
+$ ip -br l | grep vxlan
+vxlan10 DOWN f2:55:1c:6a:fb:00 <BROADCAST,MULTICAST>
+vxlan11 DOWN 7a:cb:b9:38:59:0d <BROADCAST,MULTICAST>
+
+Instead of checking sockets, let's loop over the vxlan iface list.
+
+Fixes: 1c51a9159dde ("vxlan: fix race caused by dropping rtnl_unlock")
+Reported-by: Thomas Faivre <thomas.faivre@6wind.com>
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/vxlan.c | 12 +++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c
++++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c
+@@ -2751,7 +2751,7 @@ static int vxlan_dev_configure(struct ne
+ struct vxlan_config *conf)
+ {
+ struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(src_net, vxlan_net_id);
+- struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev);
++ struct vxlan_dev *vxlan = netdev_priv(dev), *tmp;
+ struct vxlan_rdst *dst = &vxlan->default_dst;
+ unsigned short needed_headroom = ETH_HLEN;
+ int err;
+@@ -2817,9 +2817,15 @@ static int vxlan_dev_configure(struct ne
+ if (!vxlan->cfg.age_interval)
+ vxlan->cfg.age_interval = FDB_AGE_DEFAULT;
+
+- if (vxlan_find_vni(src_net, conf->vni, use_ipv6 ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET,
+- vxlan->cfg.dst_port, vxlan->flags))
++ list_for_each_entry(tmp, &vn->vxlan_list, next) {
++ if (tmp->cfg.vni == conf->vni &&
++ (tmp->default_dst.remote_ip.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6 ||
++ tmp->cfg.saddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) == use_ipv6 &&
++ tmp->cfg.dst_port == vxlan->cfg.dst_port &&
++ (tmp->flags & VXLAN_F_RCV_FLAGS) ==
++ (vxlan->flags & VXLAN_F_RCV_FLAGS))
+ return -EEXIST;
++ }
+
+ dev->ethtool_ops = &vxlan_ethtool_ops;
+
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
