If you don't know what to do here, say "Y".
+config ERRATA_THEAD_GHOSTWRITE
+ bool "Apply T-Head Ghostwrite errata"
+ depends on ERRATA_THEAD && RISCV_ISA_XTHEADVECTOR
+ default y
+ help
+ The T-Head C9xx cores have a vulnerability in the xtheadvector
+ instruction set. When this errata is enabled, the CPUs will be probed
+ to determine if they are vulnerable and disable xtheadvector.
+
+ If you don't know what to do here, say "Y".
+
endmenu # "CPU errata selection"
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/dma-noncoherent.h>
return true;
}
+static bool errata_probe_ghostwrite(unsigned int stage,
+ unsigned long arch_id, unsigned long impid)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ERRATA_THEAD_GHOSTWRITE))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * target-c9xx cores report arch_id and impid as 0
+ *
+ * While ghostwrite may not affect all c9xx cores that implement
+ * xtheadvector, there is no futher granularity than c9xx. Assume
+ * vulnerable for this entire class of processors when xtheadvector is
+ * enabled.
+ */
+ if (arch_id != 0 || impid != 0)
+ return false;
+
+ if (stage != RISCV_ALTERNATIVES_EARLY_BOOT)
+ return false;
+
+ ghostwrite_set_vulnerable();
+
+ return true;
+}
+
static u32 thead_errata_probe(unsigned int stage,
unsigned long archid, unsigned long impid)
{
if (errata_probe_pmu(stage, archid, impid))
cpu_req_errata |= BIT(ERRATA_THEAD_PMU);
+ errata_probe_ghostwrite(stage, archid, impid);
+
return cpu_req_errata;
}
--- /dev/null
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Interface for managing mitigations for riscv vulnerabilities.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2024 Rivos Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ASM_BUGS_H
+#define __ASM_BUGS_H
+
+/* Watch out, ordering is important here. */
+enum mitigation_state {
+ UNAFFECTED,
+ MITIGATED,
+ VULNERABLE,
+};
+
+void ghostwrite_set_vulnerable(void);
+bool ghostwrite_enable_mitigation(void);
+enum mitigation_state ghostwrite_get_state(void);
+
+#endif /* __ASM_BUGS_H */
#ifdef CONFIG_ERRATA_THEAD
#define ERRATA_THEAD_MAE 0
#define ERRATA_THEAD_PMU 1
-#define ERRATA_THEAD_NUMBER 2
+#define ERRATA_THEAD_GHOSTWRITE 2
+#define ERRATA_THEAD_NUMBER 3
#endif
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
obj-$(CONFIG_64BIT) += pi/
obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += acpi.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA) += acpi_numa.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) += bugs.o
--- /dev/null
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2024 Rivos Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/sprintf.h>
+
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
+#include <asm/vendor_extensions/thead.h>
+
+static enum mitigation_state ghostwrite_state;
+
+void ghostwrite_set_vulnerable(void)
+{
+ ghostwrite_state = VULNERABLE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Vendor extension alternatives will use the value set at the time of boot
+ * alternative patching, thus this must be called before boot alternatives are
+ * patched (and after extension probing) to be effective.
+ *
+ * Returns true if mitgated, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool ghostwrite_enable_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_XTHEADVECTOR) &&
+ ghostwrite_state == VULNERABLE && !cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ disable_xtheadvector();
+ ghostwrite_state = MITIGATED;
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+enum mitigation_state ghostwrite_get_state(void)
+{
+ return ghostwrite_state;
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_ghostwrite(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_XTHEADVECTOR)) {
+ switch (ghostwrite_state) {
+ case UNAFFECTED:
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ case MITIGATED:
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: xtheadvector disabled\n");
+ case VULNERABLE:
+ fallthrough;
+ default:
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ }
+ } else {
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+ }
+}
#include <linux/of.h>
#include <asm/acpi.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/hwcap.h>
static int __init riscv_fill_hwcap_from_ext_list(unsigned long *isa2hwcap)
{
unsigned int cpu;
+ bool mitigated;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
unsigned long this_hwcap = 0;
riscv_fill_vendor_ext_list(cpu);
}
- if (has_xtheadvector_no_alternatives() && has_thead_homogeneous_vlenb() < 0) {
+ /*
+ * Execute ghostwrite mitigation immediately after detecting extensions
+ * to disable xtheadvector if necessary.
+ */
+ mitigated = ghostwrite_enable_mitigation();
+
+ if (!mitigated && has_xtheadvector_no_alternatives() && has_thead_homogeneous_vlenb() < 0) {
pr_warn("Unsupported heterogeneous vlenb detected, vector extension disabled.\n");
disable_xtheadvector();
}
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(spec_rstack_overflow);
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(gds);
CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(reg_file_data_sampling);
+CPU_SHOW_VULN_FALLBACK(ghostwrite);
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_rstack_overflow, 0444, cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(reg_file_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(ghostwrite, 0444, cpu_show_ghostwrite, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
&dev_attr_spec_rstack_overflow.attr,
&dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr,
&dev_attr_reg_file_data_sampling.attr,
+ &dev_attr_ghostwrite.attr,
NULL
};
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_ghostwrite(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,