]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/stable-queue.git/commitdiff
3.0-stable patches
authorGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Fri, 20 Jan 2012 16:25:37 +0000 (11:25 -0500)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Fri, 20 Jan 2012 16:25:37 +0000 (11:25 -0500)
added patches:
proc-clean-up-and-fix-proc-pid-mem-handling.patch

queue-3.0/proc-clean-up-and-fix-proc-pid-mem-handling.patch [new file with mode: 0644]
queue-3.0/series

diff --git a/queue-3.0/proc-clean-up-and-fix-proc-pid-mem-handling.patch b/queue-3.0/proc-clean-up-and-fix-proc-pid-mem-handling.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..4098f35
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+From e268337dfe26dfc7efd422a804dbb27977a3cccc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Date: Tue, 17 Jan 2012 15:21:19 -0800
+Subject: proc: clean up and fix /proc/<pid>/mem handling
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+
+commit e268337dfe26dfc7efd422a804dbb27977a3cccc upstream.
+
+Jüri Aedla reported that the /proc/<pid>/mem handling really isn't very
+robust, and it also doesn't match the permission checking of any of the
+other related files.
+
+This changes it to do the permission checks at open time, and instead of
+tracking the process, it tracks the VM at the time of the open.  That
+simplifies the code a lot, but does mean that if you hold the file
+descriptor open over an execve(), you'll continue to read from the _old_
+VM.
+
+That is different from our previous behavior, but much simpler.  If
+somebody actually finds a load where this matters, we'll need to revert
+this commit.
+
+I suspect that nobody will ever notice - because the process mapping
+addresses will also have changed as part of the execve.  So you cannot
+actually usefully access the fd across a VM change simply because all
+the offsets for IO would have changed too.
+
+Reported-by: Jüri Aedla <asd@ut.ee>
+Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
+
+---
+ fs/proc/base.c |  145 +++++++++++++++------------------------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/proc/base.c
++++ b/fs/proc/base.c
+@@ -194,65 +194,7 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *
+       return result;
+ }
+-static struct mm_struct *__check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+-{
+-      struct mm_struct *mm;
+-
+-      mm = get_task_mm(task);
+-      if (!mm)
+-              return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+-
+-      /*
+-       * A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses
+-       * to use system calls instead of load instructions.
+-       */
+-      if (task == current)
+-              return mm;
+-
+-      /*
+-       * If current is actively ptrace'ing, and would also be
+-       * permitted to freshly attach with ptrace now, permit it.
+-       */
+-      if (task_is_stopped_or_traced(task)) {
+-              int match;
+-              rcu_read_lock();
+-              match = (tracehook_tracer_task(task) == current);
+-              rcu_read_unlock();
+-              if (match && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
+-                      return mm;
+-      }
+-
+-      /*
+-       * No one else is allowed.
+-       */
+-      mmput(mm);
+-      return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+-}
+-
+-/*
+- * If current may access user memory in @task return a reference to the
+- * corresponding mm, otherwise ERR_PTR.
+- */
+-static struct mm_struct *check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+-{
+-      struct mm_struct *mm;
+-      int err;
+-
+-      /*
+-       * Avoid racing if task exec's as we might get a new mm but validate
+-       * against old credentials.
+-       */
+-      err = mutex_lock_killable(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+-      if (err)
+-              return ERR_PTR(err);
+-
+-      mm = __check_mem_permission(task);
+-      mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+-
+-      return mm;
+-}
+-
+-struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
++static struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+ {
+       struct mm_struct *mm;
+       int err;
+@@ -263,7 +205,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct tas
+       mm = get_task_mm(task);
+       if (mm && mm != current->mm &&
+-                      !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
++                      !ptrace_may_access(task, mode)) {
+               mmput(mm);
+               mm = ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+       }
+@@ -272,6 +214,11 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct tas
+       return mm;
+ }
++struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
++{
++      return mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
++}
++
+ static int proc_pid_cmdline(struct task_struct *task, char * buffer)
+ {
+       int res = 0;
+@@ -816,38 +763,39 @@ static const struct file_operations proc
+ static int mem_open(struct inode* inode, struct file* file)
+ {
+-      file->private_data = (void*)((long)current->self_exec_id);
++      struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
++      struct mm_struct *mm;
++
++      if (!task)
++              return -ESRCH;
++
++      mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
++      put_task_struct(task);
++
++      if (IS_ERR(mm))
++              return PTR_ERR(mm);
++
+       /* OK to pass negative loff_t, we can catch out-of-range */
+       file->f_mode |= FMODE_UNSIGNED_OFFSET;
++      file->private_data = mm;
++
+       return 0;
+ }
+ static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
+                       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+ {
+-      struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
++      int ret;
+       char *page;
+       unsigned long src = *ppos;
+-      int ret = -ESRCH;
+-      struct mm_struct *mm;
++      struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
+-      if (!task)
+-              goto out_no_task;
++      if (!mm)
++              return 0;
+-      ret = -ENOMEM;
+       page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
+       if (!page)
+-              goto out;
+-
+-      mm = check_mem_permission(task);
+-      ret = PTR_ERR(mm);
+-      if (IS_ERR(mm))
+-              goto out_free;
+-
+-      ret = -EIO;
+- 
+-      if (file->private_data != (void*)((long)current->self_exec_id))
+-              goto out_put;
++              return -ENOMEM;
+       ret = 0;
+  
+@@ -874,13 +822,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_read(struct file * fi
+       }
+       *ppos = src;
+-out_put:
+-      mmput(mm);
+-out_free:
+       free_page((unsigned long) page);
+-out:
+-      put_task_struct(task);
+-out_no_task:
+       return ret;
+ }
+@@ -889,27 +831,15 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * f
+ {
+       int copied;
+       char *page;
+-      struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
+       unsigned long dst = *ppos;
+-      struct mm_struct *mm;
++      struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
+-      copied = -ESRCH;
+-      if (!task)
+-              goto out_no_task;
++      if (!mm)
++              return 0;
+-      copied = -ENOMEM;
+       page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY);
+       if (!page)
+-              goto out_task;
+-
+-      mm = check_mem_permission(task);
+-      copied = PTR_ERR(mm);
+-      if (IS_ERR(mm))
+-              goto out_free;
+-
+-      copied = -EIO;
+-      if (file->private_data != (void *)((long)current->self_exec_id))
+-              goto out_mm;
++              return -ENOMEM;
+       copied = 0;
+       while (count > 0) {
+@@ -933,13 +863,7 @@ static ssize_t mem_write(struct file * f
+       }
+       *ppos = dst;
+-out_mm:
+-      mmput(mm);
+-out_free:
+       free_page((unsigned long) page);
+-out_task:
+-      put_task_struct(task);
+-out_no_task:
+       return copied;
+ }
+@@ -959,11 +883,20 @@ loff_t mem_lseek(struct file *file, loff
+       return file->f_pos;
+ }
++static int mem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
++{
++      struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
++
++      mmput(mm);
++      return 0;
++}
++
+ static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = {
+       .llseek         = mem_lseek,
+       .read           = mem_read,
+       .write          = mem_write,
+       .open           = mem_open,
++      .release        = mem_release,
+ };
+ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
index e59883acf6dd4d4b2dc821de07f5fab6430f057b..9d56f5fabf8c71ce0947834eb5ea14bd5bae75f6 100644 (file)
@@ -61,3 +61,4 @@ fix-cputime-overflow-in-uptime_proc_show.patch
 block-add-and-use-scsi_blk_cmd_ioctl.patch
 block-fail-scsi-passthrough-ioctls-on-partition-devices.patch
 dm-do-not-forward-ioctls-from-logical-volumes-to-the.patch
+proc-clean-up-and-fix-proc-pid-mem-handling.patch