--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:57:13 -0400
+Subject: ethtool: fix potential userspace buffer overflow
+
+From: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 0ee4e76937d69128a6a66861ba393ebdc2ffc8a2 ]
+
+ethtool_get_regs() allocates a buffer of size ops->get_regs_len(),
+and pass it to the kernel driver via ops->get_regs() for filling.
+
+There is no restriction about what the kernel drivers can or cannot do
+with the open ethtool_regs structure. They usually set regs->version
+and ignore regs->len or set it to the same size as ops->get_regs_len().
+
+But if userspace allocates a smaller buffer for the registers dump,
+we would cause a userspace buffer overflow in the final copy_to_user()
+call, which uses the regs.len value potentially reset by the driver.
+
+To fix this, make this case obvious and store regs.len before calling
+ops->get_regs(), to only copy as much data as requested by userspace,
+up to the value returned by ops->get_regs_len().
+
+While at it, remove the redundant check for non-null regbuf.
+
+Signed-off-by: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/ethtool.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
++++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
+@@ -1402,13 +1402,16 @@ static int ethtool_get_regs(struct net_d
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
++ if (regs.len < reglen)
++ reglen = regs.len;
++
+ ops->get_regs(dev, ®s, regbuf);
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_to_user(useraddr, ®s, sizeof(regs)))
+ goto out;
+ useraddr += offsetof(struct ethtool_regs, data);
+- if (regbuf && copy_to_user(useraddr, regbuf, regs.len))
++ if (copy_to_user(useraddr, regbuf, reglen))
+ goto out;
+ ret = 0;
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 16:32:59 -0400
+Subject: Fix memory leak in sctp_process_init
+
+From: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 0a8dd9f67cd0da7dc284f48b032ce00db1a68791 ]
+
+syzbot found the following leak in sctp_process_init
+BUG: memory leak
+unreferenced object 0xffff88810ef68400 (size 1024):
+ comm "syz-executor273", pid 7046, jiffies 4294945598 (age 28.770s)
+ hex dump (first 32 bytes):
+ 1d de 28 8d de 0b 1b e3 b5 c2 f9 68 fd 1a 97 25 ..(........h...%
+ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
+ backtrace:
+ [<00000000a02cebbd>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:55
+[inline]
+ [<00000000a02cebbd>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline]
+ [<00000000a02cebbd>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline]
+ [<00000000a02cebbd>] __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3658 [inline]
+ [<00000000a02cebbd>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x15d/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3675
+ [<000000009e6245e6>] kmemdup+0x27/0x60 mm/util.c:119
+ [<00000000dfdc5d2d>] kmemdup include/linux/string.h:432 [inline]
+ [<00000000dfdc5d2d>] sctp_process_init+0xa7e/0xc20
+net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:2437
+ [<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_cmd_process_init net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:682
+[inline]
+ [<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_cmd_interpreter net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1384
+[inline]
+ [<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1194
+[inline]
+ [<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_do_sm+0xbdc/0x1d60 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1165
+ [<0000000044e11f96>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x13c/0x200
+net/sctp/associola.c:1074
+ [<00000000ec43804d>] sctp_inq_push+0x7f/0xb0 net/sctp/inqueue.c:95
+ [<00000000726aa954>] sctp_backlog_rcv+0x5e/0x2a0 net/sctp/input.c:354
+ [<00000000d9e249a8>] sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:950 [inline]
+ [<00000000d9e249a8>] __release_sock+0xab/0x110 net/core/sock.c:2418
+ [<00000000acae44fa>] release_sock+0x37/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2934
+ [<00000000963cc9ae>] sctp_sendmsg+0x2c0/0x990 net/sctp/socket.c:2122
+ [<00000000a7fc7565>] inet_sendmsg+0x64/0x120 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:802
+ [<00000000b732cbd3>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
+ [<00000000b732cbd3>] sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x70 net/socket.c:671
+ [<00000000274c57ab>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x393/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2292
+ [<000000008252aedb>] __sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xf0 net/socket.c:2330
+ [<00000000f7bf23d1>] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2339 [inline]
+ [<00000000f7bf23d1>] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline]
+ [<00000000f7bf23d1>] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 net/socket.c:2337
+ [<00000000a8b4131f>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:3
+
+The problem was that the peer.cookie value points to an skb allocated
+area on the first pass through this function, at which point it is
+overwritten with a heap allocated value, but in certain cases, where a
+COOKIE_ECHO chunk is included in the packet, a second pass through
+sctp_process_init is made, where the cookie value is re-allocated,
+leaking the first allocation.
+
+Fix is to always allocate the cookie value, and free it when we are done
+using it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot+f7e9153b037eac9b1df8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+CC: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
+CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 13 +++----------
+ net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c | 5 +++++
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
++++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+@@ -2318,7 +2318,6 @@ int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_associ
+ union sctp_addr addr;
+ struct sctp_af *af;
+ int src_match = 0;
+- char *cookie;
+
+ /* We must include the address that the INIT packet came from.
+ * This is the only address that matters for an INIT packet.
+@@ -2422,14 +2421,6 @@ int sctp_process_init(struct sctp_associ
+ /* Peer Rwnd : Current calculated value of the peer's rwnd. */
+ asoc->peer.rwnd = asoc->peer.i.a_rwnd;
+
+- /* Copy cookie in case we need to resend COOKIE-ECHO. */
+- cookie = asoc->peer.cookie;
+- if (cookie) {
+- asoc->peer.cookie = kmemdup(cookie, asoc->peer.cookie_len, gfp);
+- if (!asoc->peer.cookie)
+- goto clean_up;
+- }
+-
+ /* RFC 2960 7.2.1 The initial value of ssthresh MAY be arbitrarily
+ * high (for example, implementations MAY use the size of the receiver
+ * advertised window).
+@@ -2595,7 +2586,9 @@ do_addr_param:
+ case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
+ asoc->peer.cookie_len =
+ ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
+- asoc->peer.cookie = param.cookie->body;
++ asoc->peer.cookie = kmemdup(param.cookie->body, asoc->peer.cookie_len, gfp);
++ if (!asoc->peer.cookie)
++ retval = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO:
+--- a/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
++++ b/net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c
+@@ -878,6 +878,11 @@ static void sctp_cmd_new_state(struct sc
+ asoc->rto_initial;
+ }
+
++ if (sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED)) {
++ kfree(asoc->peer.cookie);
++ asoc->peer.cookie = NULL;
++ }
++
+ if (sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED) ||
+ sctp_state(asoc, CLOSED) ||
+ sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED)) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:15:19 +0200
+Subject: ipv6: fix EFAULT on sendto with icmpv6 and hdrincl
+
+From: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit b9aa52c4cb457e7416cc0c95f475e72ef4a61336 ]
+
+The following code returns EFAULT (Bad address):
+
+ s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMPV6);
+ setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_HDRINCL, 1);
+ sendto(ipv6_icmp6_packet, addr); /* returns -1, errno = EFAULT */
+
+The IPv4 equivalent code works. A workaround is to use IPPROTO_RAW
+instead of IPPROTO_ICMPV6.
+
+The failure happens because 2 bytes are eaten from the msghdr by
+rawv6_probe_proto_opt() starting from commit 19e3c66b52ca ("ipv6
+equivalent of "ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after
+raw_probe_proto_opt""), but at that time it was not a problem because
+IPV6_HDRINCL was not yet introduced.
+
+Only eat these 2 bytes if hdrincl == 0.
+
+Fixes: 715f504b1189 ("ipv6: add IPV6_HDRINCL option for raw sockets")
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
+Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/raw.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c
+@@ -889,11 +889,14 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk
+ opt = ipv6_fixup_options(&opt_space, opt);
+
+ fl6.flowi6_proto = proto;
+- rfv.msg = msg;
+- rfv.hlen = 0;
+- err = rawv6_probe_proto_opt(&rfv, &fl6);
+- if (err)
+- goto out;
++
++ if (!hdrincl) {
++ rfv.msg = msg;
++ rfv.hlen = 0;
++ err = rawv6_probe_proto_opt(&rfv, &fl6);
++ if (err)
++ goto out;
++ }
+
+ if (!ipv6_addr_any(daddr))
+ fl6.daddr = *daddr;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 19:10:46 +0800
+Subject: ipv6: fix the check before getting the cookie in rt6_get_cookie
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit b7999b07726c16974ba9ca3bb9fe98ecbec5f81c ]
+
+In Jianlin's testing, netperf was broken with 'Connection reset by peer',
+as the cookie check failed in rt6_check() and ip6_dst_check() always
+returned NULL.
+
+It's caused by Commit 93531c674315 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB
+entries from dst based routes"), where the cookie can be got only when
+'c1'(see below) for setting dst_cookie whereas rt6_check() is called
+when !'c1' for checking dst_cookie, as we can see in ip6_dst_check().
+
+Since in ip6_dst_check() both rt6_dst_from_check() (c1) and rt6_check()
+(!c1) will check the 'from' cookie, this patch is to remove the c1 check
+in rt6_get_cookie(), so that the dst_cookie can always be set properly.
+
+c1:
+ (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU || unlikely(!list_empty(&rt->rt6i_uncached)))
+
+Fixes: 93531c674315 ("net/ipv6: separate handling of FIB entries from dst based routes")
+Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/ip6_fib.h | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/ip6_fib.h
++++ b/include/net/ip6_fib.h
+@@ -199,8 +199,7 @@ static inline u32 rt6_get_cookie(const s
+ {
+ u32 cookie = 0;
+
+- if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_PCPU ||
+- (unlikely(!list_empty(&rt->rt6i_uncached)) && rt->dst.from))
++ if (rt->dst.from)
+ rt = (struct rt6_info *)(rt->dst.from);
+
+ rt6_get_cookie_safe(rt, &cookie);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 09:15:18 +0200
+Subject: ipv6: use READ_ONCE() for inet->hdrincl as in ipv4
+
+From: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 59e3e4b52663a9d97efbce7307f62e4bc5c9ce91 ]
+
+As it was done in commit 8f659a03a0ba ("net: ipv4: fix for a race
+condition in raw_sendmsg") and commit 20b50d79974e ("net: ipv4: emulate
+READ_ONCE() on ->hdrincl bit-field in raw_sendmsg()") for ipv4, copy the
+value of inet->hdrincl in a local variable, to avoid introducing a race
+condition in the next commit.
+
+Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/raw.c | 12 ++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c
+@@ -782,6 +782,7 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk
+ struct sockcm_cookie sockc;
+ struct ipcm6_cookie ipc6;
+ int addr_len = msg->msg_namelen;
++ int hdrincl;
+ u16 proto;
+ int err;
+
+@@ -795,6 +796,13 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk
+ if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
++ /* hdrincl should be READ_ONCE(inet->hdrincl)
++ * but READ_ONCE() doesn't work with bit fields.
++ * Doing this indirectly yields the same result.
++ */
++ hdrincl = inet->hdrincl;
++ hdrincl = READ_ONCE(hdrincl);
++
+ /*
+ * Get and verify the address.
+ */
+@@ -913,7 +921,7 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk
+ fl6.flowi6_oif = np->ucast_oif;
+ security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
+
+- if (inet->hdrincl)
++ if (hdrincl)
+ fl6.flowi6_flags |= FLOWI_FLAG_KNOWN_NH;
+
+ if (ipc6.tclass < 0)
+@@ -936,7 +944,7 @@ static int rawv6_sendmsg(struct sock *sk
+ goto do_confirm;
+
+ back_from_confirm:
+- if (inet->hdrincl)
++ if (hdrincl)
+ err = rawv6_send_hdrinc(sk, msg, len, &fl6, &dst, msg->msg_flags);
+ else {
+ ipc6.opt = opt;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 May 2019 18:18:42 -0700
+Subject: neighbor: Call __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref in neigh_xmit
+
+From: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4b2a2bfeb3f056461a90bd621e8bd7d03fa47f60 ]
+
+Commit cd9ff4de0107 changed the key for IFF_POINTOPOINT devices to
+INADDR_ANY but neigh_xmit which is used for MPLS encapsulations was not
+updated to use the altered key. The result is that every packet Tx does
+a lookup on the gateway address which does not find an entry, a new one
+is created only to find the existing one in the table right before the
+insert since arp_constructor was updated to reset the primary key. This
+is seen in the allocs and destroys counters:
+ ip -s -4 ntable show | head -10 | grep alloc
+
+which increase for each packet showing the unnecessary overhread.
+
+Fix by having neigh_xmit use __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref for NEIGH_ARP_TABLE.
+
+Fixes: cd9ff4de0107 ("ipv4: Make neigh lookup keys for loopback/point-to-point devices be INADDR_ANY")
+Reported-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/neighbour.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/neighbour.c
++++ b/net/core/neighbour.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ #include <linux/times.h>
+ #include <net/net_namespace.h>
+ #include <net/neighbour.h>
++#include <net/arp.h>
+ #include <net/dst.h>
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <net/netevent.h>
+@@ -2528,7 +2529,13 @@ int neigh_xmit(int index, struct net_dev
+ if (!tbl)
+ goto out;
+ rcu_read_lock_bh();
+- neigh = __neigh_lookup_noref(tbl, addr, dev);
++ if (index == NEIGH_ARP_TABLE) {
++ u32 key = *((u32 *)addr);
++
++ neigh = __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref(dev, key);
++ } else {
++ neigh = __neigh_lookup_noref(tbl, addr, dev);
++ }
+ if (!neigh)
+ neigh = __neigh_create(tbl, addr, dev, false);
+ err = PTR_ERR(neigh);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: Erez Alfasi <ereza@mellanox.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 17:42:52 +0300
+Subject: net/mlx4_en: ethtool, Remove unsupported SFP EEPROM high pages query
+
+From: Erez Alfasi <ereza@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 135dd9594f127c8a82d141c3c8430e9e2143216a ]
+
+Querying EEPROM high pages data for SFP module is currently
+not supported by our driver but is still tried, resulting in
+invalid FW queries.
+
+Set the EEPROM ethtool data length to 256 for SFP module to
+limit the reading for page 0 only and prevent invalid FW queries.
+
+Fixes: 7202da8b7f71 ("ethtool, net/mlx4_en: Cable info, get_module_info/eeprom ethtool support")
+Signed-off-by: Erez Alfasi <ereza@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c | 4 +++-
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/port.c | 5 -----
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/en_ethtool.c
+@@ -1982,6 +1982,8 @@ static int mlx4_en_set_tunable(struct ne
+ return ret;
+ }
+
++#define MLX4_EEPROM_PAGE_LEN 256
++
+ static int mlx4_en_get_module_info(struct net_device *dev,
+ struct ethtool_modinfo *modinfo)
+ {
+@@ -2016,7 +2018,7 @@ static int mlx4_en_get_module_info(struc
+ break;
+ case MLX4_MODULE_ID_SFP:
+ modinfo->type = ETH_MODULE_SFF_8472;
+- modinfo->eeprom_len = ETH_MODULE_SFF_8472_LEN;
++ modinfo->eeprom_len = MLX4_EEPROM_PAGE_LEN;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/port.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/port.c
+@@ -2077,11 +2077,6 @@ int mlx4_get_module_info(struct mlx4_dev
+ size -= offset + size - I2C_PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ i2c_addr = I2C_ADDR_LOW;
+- if (offset >= I2C_PAGE_SIZE) {
+- /* Reset offset to high page */
+- i2c_addr = I2C_ADDR_HIGH;
+- offset -= I2C_PAGE_SIZE;
+- }
+
+ cable_info = (struct mlx4_cable_info *)inmad->data;
+ cable_info->dev_mem_address = cpu_to_be16(offset);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 04:00:03 -0400
+Subject: net: rds: fix memory leak in rds_ib_flush_mr_pool
+
+From: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 85cb928787eab6a2f4ca9d2a798b6f3bed53ced1 ]
+
+When the following tests last for several hours, the problem will occur.
+
+Server:
+ rds-stress -r 1.1.1.16 -D 1M
+Client:
+ rds-stress -r 1.1.1.14 -s 1.1.1.16 -D 1M -T 30
+
+The following will occur.
+
+"
+Starting up....
+tsks tx/s rx/s tx+rx K/s mbi K/s mbo K/s tx us/c rtt us cpu
+%
+ 1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
+ 1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
+ 1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
+ 1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
+"
+>From vmcore, we can find that clean_list is NULL.
+
+>From the source code, rds_mr_flushd calls rds_ib_mr_pool_flush_worker.
+Then rds_ib_mr_pool_flush_worker calls
+"
+ rds_ib_flush_mr_pool(pool, 0, NULL);
+"
+Then in function
+"
+int rds_ib_flush_mr_pool(struct rds_ib_mr_pool *pool,
+ int free_all, struct rds_ib_mr **ibmr_ret)
+"
+ibmr_ret is NULL.
+
+In the source code,
+"
+...
+list_to_llist_nodes(pool, &unmap_list, &clean_nodes, &clean_tail);
+if (ibmr_ret)
+ *ibmr_ret = llist_entry(clean_nodes, struct rds_ib_mr, llnode);
+
+/* more than one entry in llist nodes */
+if (clean_nodes->next)
+ llist_add_batch(clean_nodes->next, clean_tail, &pool->clean_list);
+...
+"
+When ibmr_ret is NULL, llist_entry is not executed. clean_nodes->next
+instead of clean_nodes is added in clean_list.
+So clean_nodes is discarded. It can not be used again.
+The workqueue is executed periodically. So more and more clean_nodes are
+discarded. Finally the clean_list is NULL.
+Then this problem will occur.
+
+Fixes: 1bc144b62524 ("net, rds, Replace xlist in net/rds/xlist.h with llist")
+Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
+Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rds/ib_rdma.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/rds/ib_rdma.c
++++ b/net/rds/ib_rdma.c
+@@ -416,12 +416,14 @@ int rds_ib_flush_mr_pool(struct rds_ib_m
+ wait_clean_list_grace();
+
+ list_to_llist_nodes(pool, &unmap_list, &clean_nodes, &clean_tail);
+- if (ibmr_ret)
++ if (ibmr_ret) {
+ *ibmr_ret = llist_entry(clean_nodes, struct rds_ib_mr, llnode);
+-
++ clean_nodes = clean_nodes->next;
++ }
+ /* more than one entry in llist nodes */
+- if (clean_nodes->next)
+- llist_add_batch(clean_nodes->next, clean_tail, &pool->clean_list);
++ if (clean_nodes)
++ llist_add_batch(clean_nodes, clean_tail,
++ &pool->clean_list);
+
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2019 15:13:00 +0100
+Subject: net: sfp: read eeprom in maximum 16 byte increments
+
+From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
+
+[ Upstream commit 28e74a7cfd6403f0d1c0f8b10b45d6fae37b227e ]
+
+Some SFP modules do not like reads longer than 16 bytes, so read the
+EEPROM in chunks of 16 bytes at a time. This behaviour is not specified
+in the SFP MSAs, which specifies:
+
+ "The serial interface uses the 2-wire serial CMOS E2PROM protocol
+ defined for the ATMEL AT24C01A/02/04 family of components."
+
+and
+
+ "As long as the SFP+ receives an acknowledge, it shall serially clock
+ out sequential data words. The sequence is terminated when the host
+ responds with a NACK and a STOP instead of an acknowledge."
+
+We must avoid breaking a read across a 16-bit quantity in the diagnostic
+page, thankfully all 16-bit quantities in that page are naturally
+aligned.
+
+Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
+Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/phy/sfp.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/phy/sfp.c
++++ b/drivers/net/phy/sfp.c
+@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ static int sfp__i2c_read(struct i2c_adap
+ void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+ struct i2c_msg msgs[2];
++ size_t this_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ msgs[0].addr = bus_addr;
+@@ -179,11 +180,26 @@ static int sfp__i2c_read(struct i2c_adap
+ msgs[1].len = len;
+ msgs[1].buf = buf;
+
+- ret = i2c_transfer(i2c, msgs, ARRAY_SIZE(msgs));
+- if (ret < 0)
+- return ret;
++ while (len) {
++ this_len = len;
++ if (this_len > 16)
++ this_len = 16;
+
+- return ret == ARRAY_SIZE(msgs) ? len : 0;
++ msgs[1].len = this_len;
++
++ ret = i2c_transfer(i2c, msgs, ARRAY_SIZE(msgs));
++ if (ret < 0)
++ return ret;
++
++ if (ret != ARRAY_SIZE(msgs))
++ break;
++
++ msgs[1].buf += this_len;
++ dev_addr += this_len;
++ len -= this_len;
++ }
++
++ return msgs[1].buf - (u8 *)buf;
+ }
+
+ static int sfp_i2c_read(struct sfp *sfp, bool a2, u8 addr, void *buf,
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 15:45:03 +0200
+Subject: pktgen: do not sleep with the thread lock held.
+
+From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 720f1de4021f09898b8c8443f3b3e995991b6e3a ]
+
+Currently, the process issuing a "start" command on the pktgen procfs
+interface, acquires the pktgen thread lock and never release it, until
+all pktgen threads are completed. The above can blocks indefinitely any
+other pktgen command and any (even unrelated) netdevice removal - as
+the pktgen netdev notifier acquires the same lock.
+
+The issue is demonstrated by the following script, reported by Matteo:
+
+ip -b - <<'EOF'
+ link add type dummy
+ link add type veth
+ link set dummy0 up
+EOF
+modprobe pktgen
+echo reset >/proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl
+{
+ echo rem_device_all
+ echo add_device dummy0
+} >/proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
+echo count 0 >/proc/net/pktgen/dummy0
+echo start >/proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl &
+sleep 1
+rmmod veth
+
+Fix the above releasing the thread lock around the sleep call.
+
+Additionally we must prevent racing with forcefull rmmod - as the
+thread lock no more protects from them. Instead, acquire a self-reference
+before waiting for any thread. As a side effect, running
+
+rmmod pktgen
+
+while some thread is running now fails with "module in use" error,
+before this patch such command hanged indefinitely.
+
+Note: the issue predates the commit reported in the fixes tag, but
+this fix can't be applied before the mentioned commit.
+
+v1 -> v2:
+ - no need to check for thread existence after flipping the lock,
+ pktgen threads are freed only at net exit time
+ -
+
+Fixes: 6146e6a43b35 ("[PKTGEN]: Removes thread_{un,}lock() macros.")
+Reported-and-tested-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/pktgen.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/core/pktgen.c
++++ b/net/core/pktgen.c
+@@ -3149,7 +3149,13 @@ static int pktgen_wait_thread_run(struct
+ {
+ while (thread_is_running(t)) {
+
++ /* note: 't' will still be around even after the unlock/lock
++ * cycle because pktgen_thread threads are only cleared at
++ * net exit
++ */
++ mutex_unlock(&pktgen_thread_lock);
+ msleep_interruptible(100);
++ mutex_lock(&pktgen_thread_lock);
+
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ goto signal;
+@@ -3164,6 +3170,10 @@ static int pktgen_wait_all_threads_run(s
+ struct pktgen_thread *t;
+ int sig = 1;
+
++ /* prevent from racing with rmmod */
++ if (!try_module_get(THIS_MODULE))
++ return sig;
++
+ mutex_lock(&pktgen_thread_lock);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(t, &pn->pktgen_threads, th_list) {
+@@ -3177,6 +3187,7 @@ static int pktgen_wait_all_threads_run(s
+ t->control |= (T_STOP);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&pktgen_thread_lock);
++ module_put(THIS_MODULE);
+ return sig;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 41da877a19fb3d45dad80997e92f25965feaabc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Date: Sun, 9 Jun 2019 09:55:08 +0200
+Subject: Revert "fib_rules: fix error in backport of e9919a24d302 ("fib_rules: return 0...")"
+
+From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+This reverts commit 691306ebd18f945e44b4552a4bfcca3475e5d957 as the
+patch that this "fixes" is about to be reverted...
+
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/fib_rules.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/fib_rules.c
++++ b/net/core/fib_rules.c
+@@ -564,7 +564,6 @@ int fib_nl_newrule(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ }
+
+ if (rule_exists(ops, frh, tb, rule)) {
+- err = 0;
+ if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL)
+ err = -EEXIST;
+ goto errout_free;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 09 Jun 2019 09:44:19 AM CEST
+From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 12:27:14 +0800
+Subject: Revert "fib_rules: return 0 directly if an exactly same rule exists when NLM_F_EXCL not supplied"
+
+From: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4970b42d5c362bf873982db7d93245c5281e58f4 ]
+
+This reverts commit e9919a24d3022f72bcadc407e73a6ef17093a849.
+
+Nathan reported the new behaviour breaks Android, as Android just add
+new rules and delete old ones.
+
+If we return 0 without adding dup rules, Android will remove the new
+added rules and causing system to soft-reboot.
+
+Fixes: e9919a24d302 ("fib_rules: return 0 directly if an exactly same rule exists when NLM_F_EXCL not supplied")
+Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Yaro Slav <yaro330@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <zenczykowski@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/fib_rules.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/fib_rules.c
++++ b/net/core/fib_rules.c
+@@ -563,9 +563,9 @@ int fib_nl_newrule(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ rule->uid_range = fib_kuid_range_unset;
+ }
+
+- if (rule_exists(ops, frh, tb, rule)) {
+- if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL)
+- err = -EEXIST;
++ if ((nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL) &&
++ rule_exists(ops, frh, tb, rule)) {
++ err = -EEXIST;
+ goto errout_free;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+ethtool-fix-potential-userspace-buffer-overflow.patch
+fix-memory-leak-in-sctp_process_init.patch
+neighbor-call-__ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref-in-neigh_xmit.patch
+net-mlx4_en-ethtool-remove-unsupported-sfp-eeprom-high-pages-query.patch
+net-rds-fix-memory-leak-in-rds_ib_flush_mr_pool.patch
+pktgen-do-not-sleep-with-the-thread-lock-held.patch
+ipv6-fix-efault-on-sendto-with-icmpv6-and-hdrincl.patch
+ipv6-use-read_once-for-inet-hdrincl-as-in-ipv4.patch
+net-sfp-read-eeprom-in-maximum-16-byte-increments.patch
+ipv6-fix-the-check-before-getting-the-cookie-in-rt6_get_cookie.patch
+revert-fib_rules-fix-error-in-backport-of-e9919a24d302-fib_rules-return-0.patch
+revert-fib_rules-return-0-directly-if-an-exactly-same-rule-exists-when-nlm_f_excl-not-supplied.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
