5.18-stable patches

added patches:
	random-account-for-arch-randomness-in-bits.patch
	random-avoid-checking-crng_ready-twice-in-random_init.patch
	random-mark-bootloader-randomness-code-as-__init.patch

diff --git a/queue-5.18/random-account-for-arch-randomness-in-bits.patch b/queue-5.18/random-account-for-arch-randomness-in-bits.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..a9d29b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-5.18/random-account-for-arch-randomness-in-bits.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From foo@baz Mon Jun 13 11:00:46 AM CEST 2022
+From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 10:07:49 +0200
+Subject: random: account for arch randomness in bits
+To: stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
+Message-ID: <20220613080749.153222-4-Jason@zx2c4.com>
+
+From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+
+commit 77fc95f8c0dc9e1f8e620ec14d2fb65028fb7adc upstream.
+
+Rather than accounting in bytes and multiplying (shifting), we can just
+account in bits and avoid the shift. The main motivation for this is
+there are other patches in flux that expand this code a bit, and
+avoiding the duplication of "* 8" everywhere makes things a bit clearer.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 12e45a2a6308 ("random: credit architectural init the exact amount")
+Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/char/random.c |    8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -817,7 +817,7 @@ early_param("random.trust_bootloader", p
+ int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
+ {
+       ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
+-      unsigned int i, arch_bytes;
++      unsigned int i, arch_bits;
+       unsigned long entropy;
+ 
+ #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
+@@ -825,12 +825,12 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
+       _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
+ #endif
+ 
+-      for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
++      for (i = 0, arch_bits = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
+            i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
+               if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
+                   !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
+                       entropy = random_get_entropy();
+-                      arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy);
++                      arch_bits -= sizeof(entropy) * 8;
+               }
+               _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+       }
+@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
+       if (crng_ready())
+               crng_reseed();
+       else if (trust_cpu)
+-              _credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8);
++              _credit_init_bits(arch_bits);
+ 
+       return 0;
+ }

diff --git a/queue-5.18/random-avoid-checking-crng_ready-twice-in-random_init.patch b/queue-5.18/random-avoid-checking-crng_ready-twice-in-random_init.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..6fb032e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-5.18/random-avoid-checking-crng_ready-twice-in-random_init.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From foo@baz Mon Jun 13 11:00:46 AM CEST 2022
+From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 10:07:47 +0200
+Subject: random: avoid checking crng_ready() twice in random_init()
+To: stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
+Message-ID: <20220613080749.153222-2-Jason@zx2c4.com>
+
+From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+
+commit 9b29b6b20376ab64e1b043df6301d8a92378e631 upstream.
+
+The current flow expands to:
+
+    if (crng_ready())
+       ...
+    else if (...)
+        if (!crng_ready())
+            ...
+
+The second crng_ready() call is redundant, but can't so easily be
+optimized out by the compiler.
+
+This commit simplifies that to:
+
+    if (crng_ready()
+        ...
+    else if (...)
+        ...
+
+Fixes: 560181c27b58 ("random: move initialization functions out of hot pages")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
+Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/char/random.c |    2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
+       if (crng_ready())
+               crng_reseed();
+       else if (trust_cpu)
+-              credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8);
++              _credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8);
+ 
+       return 0;
+ }

diff --git a/queue-5.18/random-mark-bootloader-randomness-code-as-__init.patch b/queue-5.18/random-mark-bootloader-randomness-code-as-__init.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..d94c44f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-5.18/random-mark-bootloader-randomness-code-as-__init.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+From foo@baz Mon Jun 13 11:00:46 AM CEST 2022
+From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Date: Mon, 13 Jun 2022 10:07:48 +0200
+Subject: random: mark bootloader randomness code as __init
+To: stable@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
+Message-ID: <20220613080749.153222-3-Jason@zx2c4.com>
+
+From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+
+commit 39e0f991a62ed5efabd20711a7b6e7da92603170 upstream.
+
+add_bootloader_randomness() and the variables it touches are only used
+during __init and not after, so mark these as __init. At the same time,
+unexport this, since it's only called by other __init code that's
+built-in.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 428826f5358c ("fdt: add support for rng-seed")
+Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/char/random.c  |    7 +++----
+ include/linux/random.h |    2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -793,8 +793,8 @@ static void __cold _credit_init_bits(siz
+  *
+  **********************************************************************/
+ 
+-static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+-static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
++static bool trust_cpu __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
++static bool trust_bootloader __initdata = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
+ static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
+ {
+       return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
+@@ -890,13 +890,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_random
+  * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
+  * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
+  */
+-void __cold add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
++void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+       mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+       if (trust_bootloader)
+               credit_init_bits(len * 8);
+ }
+-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
+ 
+ #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID)
+ static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(vmfork_chain);
+--- a/include/linux/random.h
++++ b/include/linux/random.h
+@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
+ struct notifier_block;
+ 
+ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+-void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
++void __init add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+                         unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
+ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;

diff --git a/queue-5.18/series b/queue-5.18/series
index 54f68feb7701e871501cbedbcbbbfe7a0b641141..eb3945f7e149c1ba917dea3a68c61a03337f3b7b 100644 (file)
--- a/queue-5.18/series
+++ b/queue-5.18/series
@@ -333,3 +333,6 @@ drm-amd-display-remove-stale-config-guards.patch
 drm-amdgpu-update-vcn-codec-support-for-yellow-carp.patch
 virtio-rng-make-device-ready-before-making-request.patch
 powerpc-32-fix-overread-overwrite-of-thread_struct-via-ptrace.patch
+random-avoid-checking-crng_ready-twice-in-random_init.patch
+random-mark-bootloader-randomness-code-as-__init.patch
+random-account-for-arch-randomness-in-bits.patch