+++ /dev/null
-From d3d73d1797c87b53a86cffe77b7e3d65e9d1e6f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
-Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 22:20:26 +0200
-Subject: ovl: verify permissions in ovl_path_open()
-
-From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
-
-[ Upstream commit 56230d956739b9cb1cbde439d76227d77979a04d ]
-
-Check permission before opening a real file.
-
-ovl_path_open() is used by readdir and copy-up routines.
-
-ovl_permission() theoretically already checked copy up permissions, but it
-doesn't hurt to re-do these checks during the actual copy-up.
-
-For directory reading ovl_permission() only checks access to topmost
-underlying layer. Readdir on a merged directory accesses layers below the
-topmost one as well. Permission wasn't checked for these layers.
-
-Note: modifying ovl_permission() to perform this check would be far more
-complex and hence more bug prone. The result is less precise permissions
-returned in access(2). If this turns out to be an issue, we can revisit
-this bug.
-
-Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
----
- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-index afdc2533ce74d..76d6610767f6f 100644
---- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-@@ -307,7 +307,32 @@ bool ovl_is_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry)
-
- struct file *ovl_path_open(struct path *path, int flags)
- {
-- return dentry_open(path, flags | O_NOATIME, current_cred());
-+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
-+ int err, acc_mode;
-+
-+ if (flags & ~(O_ACCMODE | O_LARGEFILE))
-+ BUG();
-+
-+ switch (flags & O_ACCMODE) {
-+ case O_RDONLY:
-+ acc_mode = MAY_READ;
-+ break;
-+ case O_WRONLY:
-+ acc_mode = MAY_WRITE;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ BUG();
-+ }
-+
-+ err = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode | MAY_OPEN);
-+ if (err)
-+ return ERR_PTR(err);
-+
-+ /* O_NOATIME is an optimization, don't fail if not permitted */
-+ if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
-+ flags |= O_NOATIME;
-+
-+ return dentry_open(path, flags, current_cred());
- }
-
- int ovl_copy_up_start(struct dentry *dentry)
---
-2.25.1
-
vfio-mdev-fix-reference-count-leak-in-add_mdev_suppo.patch
openrisc-fix-issue-with-argument-clobbering-for-clon.patch
gfs2-allow-lock_nolock-mount-to-specify-jid-x.patch
-ovl-verify-permissions-in-ovl_path_open.patch
scsi-iscsi-fix-reference-count-leak-in-iscsi_boot_cr.patch
scsi-ufs-don-t-update-urgent-bkops-level-when-toggli.patch
pinctrl-imxl-fix-an-error-handling-path-in-imx1_pinc.patch
+++ /dev/null
-From b78fa94c3d7b15f905158e0e6284dec795af2b69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
-Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 22:20:26 +0200
-Subject: ovl: verify permissions in ovl_path_open()
-
-From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
-
-[ Upstream commit 56230d956739b9cb1cbde439d76227d77979a04d ]
-
-Check permission before opening a real file.
-
-ovl_path_open() is used by readdir and copy-up routines.
-
-ovl_permission() theoretically already checked copy up permissions, but it
-doesn't hurt to re-do these checks during the actual copy-up.
-
-For directory reading ovl_permission() only checks access to topmost
-underlying layer. Readdir on a merged directory accesses layers below the
-topmost one as well. Permission wasn't checked for these layers.
-
-Note: modifying ovl_permission() to perform this check would be far more
-complex and hence more bug prone. The result is less precise permissions
-returned in access(2). If this turns out to be an issue, we can revisit
-this bug.
-
-Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
----
- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-index db8bdb29b3207..afbc6a97da2ac 100644
---- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-@@ -479,7 +479,32 @@ bool ovl_is_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry)
-
- struct file *ovl_path_open(struct path *path, int flags)
- {
-- return dentry_open(path, flags | O_NOATIME, current_cred());
-+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
-+ int err, acc_mode;
-+
-+ if (flags & ~(O_ACCMODE | O_LARGEFILE))
-+ BUG();
-+
-+ switch (flags & O_ACCMODE) {
-+ case O_RDONLY:
-+ acc_mode = MAY_READ;
-+ break;
-+ case O_WRONLY:
-+ acc_mode = MAY_WRITE;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ BUG();
-+ }
-+
-+ err = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode | MAY_OPEN);
-+ if (err)
-+ return ERR_PTR(err);
-+
-+ /* O_NOATIME is an optimization, don't fail if not permitted */
-+ if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
-+ flags |= O_NOATIME;
-+
-+ return dentry_open(path, flags, current_cred());
- }
-
- /* Caller should hold ovl_inode->lock */
---
-2.25.1
-
rxrpc-adjust-proc-net-rxrpc-calls-to-display-call-de.patch
openrisc-fix-issue-with-argument-clobbering-for-clon.patch
gfs2-allow-lock_nolock-mount-to-specify-jid-x.patch
-ovl-verify-permissions-in-ovl_path_open.patch
scsi-iscsi-fix-reference-count-leak-in-iscsi_boot_cr.patch
scsi-ufs-don-t-update-urgent-bkops-level-when-toggli.patch
pinctrl-imxl-fix-an-error-handling-path-in-imx1_pinc.patch
+++ /dev/null
-From fd3b50197726327cc1db1cc1f76c9e2232912d0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
-Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 22:20:26 +0200
-Subject: ovl: verify permissions in ovl_path_open()
-
-From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
-
-[ Upstream commit 56230d956739b9cb1cbde439d76227d77979a04d ]
-
-Check permission before opening a real file.
-
-ovl_path_open() is used by readdir and copy-up routines.
-
-ovl_permission() theoretically already checked copy up permissions, but it
-doesn't hurt to re-do these checks during the actual copy-up.
-
-For directory reading ovl_permission() only checks access to topmost
-underlying layer. Readdir on a merged directory accesses layers below the
-topmost one as well. Permission wasn't checked for these layers.
-
-Note: modifying ovl_permission() to perform this check would be far more
-complex and hence more bug prone. The result is less precise permissions
-returned in access(2). If this turns out to be an issue, we can revisit
-this bug.
-
-Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
----
- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-index f5678a3f83508..eb325322a893d 100644
---- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-@@ -475,7 +475,32 @@ bool ovl_is_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry)
-
- struct file *ovl_path_open(struct path *path, int flags)
- {
-- return dentry_open(path, flags | O_NOATIME, current_cred());
-+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
-+ int err, acc_mode;
-+
-+ if (flags & ~(O_ACCMODE | O_LARGEFILE))
-+ BUG();
-+
-+ switch (flags & O_ACCMODE) {
-+ case O_RDONLY:
-+ acc_mode = MAY_READ;
-+ break;
-+ case O_WRONLY:
-+ acc_mode = MAY_WRITE;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ BUG();
-+ }
-+
-+ err = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode | MAY_OPEN);
-+ if (err)
-+ return ERR_PTR(err);
-+
-+ /* O_NOATIME is an optimization, don't fail if not permitted */
-+ if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
-+ flags |= O_NOATIME;
-+
-+ return dentry_open(path, flags, current_cred());
- }
-
- /* Caller should hold ovl_inode->lock */
---
-2.25.1
-
ceph-don-t-return-estale-if-there-s-still-an-open-fi.patch
nfsd4-make-drc_slab-global-not-per-net.patch
gfs2-allow-lock_nolock-mount-to-specify-jid-x.patch
-ovl-verify-permissions-in-ovl_path_open.patch
scsi-iscsi-fix-reference-count-leak-in-iscsi_boot_cr.patch
scsi-ufs-don-t-update-urgent-bkops-level-when-toggli.patch
pinctrl-imxl-fix-an-error-handling-path-in-imx1_pinc.patch
+++ /dev/null
-From d01777f34c182b4f2cd6fc6bb7a6116338a954f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
-Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2020 22:20:26 +0200
-Subject: ovl: verify permissions in ovl_path_open()
-
-From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
-
-[ Upstream commit 56230d956739b9cb1cbde439d76227d77979a04d ]
-
-Check permission before opening a real file.
-
-ovl_path_open() is used by readdir and copy-up routines.
-
-ovl_permission() theoretically already checked copy up permissions, but it
-doesn't hurt to re-do these checks during the actual copy-up.
-
-For directory reading ovl_permission() only checks access to topmost
-underlying layer. Readdir on a merged directory accesses layers below the
-topmost one as well. Permission wasn't checked for these layers.
-
-Note: modifying ovl_permission() to perform this check would be far more
-complex and hence more bug prone. The result is less precise permissions
-returned in access(2). If this turns out to be an issue, we can revisit
-this bug.
-
-Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
-Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
----
- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-index 36b60788ee473..a0878039332a4 100644
---- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
-@@ -459,7 +459,32 @@ bool ovl_is_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry)
-
- struct file *ovl_path_open(struct path *path, int flags)
- {
-- return dentry_open(path, flags | O_NOATIME, current_cred());
-+ struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
-+ int err, acc_mode;
-+
-+ if (flags & ~(O_ACCMODE | O_LARGEFILE))
-+ BUG();
-+
-+ switch (flags & O_ACCMODE) {
-+ case O_RDONLY:
-+ acc_mode = MAY_READ;
-+ break;
-+ case O_WRONLY:
-+ acc_mode = MAY_WRITE;
-+ break;
-+ default:
-+ BUG();
-+ }
-+
-+ err = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode | MAY_OPEN);
-+ if (err)
-+ return ERR_PTR(err);
-+
-+ /* O_NOATIME is an optimization, don't fail if not permitted */
-+ if (inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
-+ flags |= O_NOATIME;
-+
-+ return dentry_open(path, flags, current_cred());
- }
-
- /* Caller should hold ovl_inode->lock */
---
-2.25.1
-
nfsd4-make-drc_slab-global-not-per-net.patch
pwm-imx27-fix-rounding-behavior.patch
gfs2-allow-lock_nolock-mount-to-specify-jid-x.patch
-ovl-verify-permissions-in-ovl_path_open.patch
scsi-iscsi-fix-reference-count-leak-in-iscsi_boot_cr.patch
scsi-ufs-don-t-update-urgent-bkops-level-when-toggli.patch
modpost-fix-i-ignore-errors-makeflags-detection.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
