audit: fix potential integer overflow in audit_log_n_hex()

The function calculates new_len as len << 1 for hex encoding. This
has two overflow risks: the shift itself can overflow when len is
large, and the result can be truncated when assigned to new_len
(declared as int) from the size_t calculation.

Fix by using check_shl_overflow() to catch shift overflow and
changing new_len and loop counter i to size_t to prevent truncation.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 168b7173959f ("AUDIT: Clean up logging of untrusted strings")
Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Robaina <rrobaina@redhat.com>
[PM: remove vertical whitspace noise]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index feaa4e2271d78a0ff9cbe434cd2e722f02fb1aa2..562476937fa793def6c7b3e8893a46dc8966a81e 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
 
 #include "audit.h"
 
@@ -2080,7 +2081,8 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...)
 void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
                size_t len)
 {
-       int i, avail, new_len;
+       int avail;
+       size_t i, new_len;
        unsigned char *ptr;
        struct sk_buff *skb;
 
@@ -2090,7 +2092,12 @@ void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf,
        BUG_ON(!ab->skb);
        skb = ab->skb;
        avail = skb_tailroom(skb);
-       new_len = len<<1;
+
+       if (check_shl_overflow(len, 1, &new_len)) {
+               audit_log_format(ab, "?");
+               return;
+       }
+
        if (new_len >= avail) {
                /* Round the buffer request up to the next multiple */
                new_len = AUDIT_BUFSIZ*(((new_len-avail)/AUDIT_BUFSIZ) + 1);