--- /dev/null
+From c8b1d7436045d3599bae56aef1682813ecccaad7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 10 Jul 2020 12:55:08 +0200
+Subject: bnxt_en: fix NULL dereference in case SR-IOV configuration fails
+
+From: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
+
+commit c8b1d7436045d3599bae56aef1682813ecccaad7 upstream.
+
+we need to set 'active_vfs' back to 0, if something goes wrong during the
+allocation of SR-IOV resources: otherwise, further VF configurations will
+wrongly assume that bp->pf.vf[x] are valid memory locations, and commands
+like the ones in the following sequence:
+
+ # echo 2 >/sys/bus/pci/devices/${ADDR}/sriov_numvfs
+ # ip link set dev ens1f0np0 up
+ # ip link set dev ens1f0np0 vf 0 trust on
+
+will cause a kernel crash similar to this:
+
+ bnxt_en 0000:3b:00.0: not enough MMIO resources for SR-IOV
+ BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014
+ #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
+ #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
+ PGD 0 P4D 0
+ Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
+ CPU: 43 PID: 2059 Comm: ip Tainted: G I 5.8.0-rc2.upstream+ #871
+ Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R740/08D89F, BIOS 2.2.11 06/13/2019
+ RIP: 0010:bnxt_set_vf_trust+0x5b/0x110 [bnxt_en]
+ Code: 44 24 58 31 c0 e8 f5 fb ff ff 85 c0 0f 85 b6 00 00 00 48 8d 1c 5b 41 89 c6 b9 0b 00 00 00 48 c1 e3 04 49 03 9c 24 f0 0e 00 00 <8b> 43 14 89 c2 83 c8 10 83 e2 ef 45 84 ed 49 89 e5 0f 44 c2 4c 89
+ RSP: 0018:ffffac6246a1f570 EFLAGS: 00010246
+ RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000000b
+ RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff98b28f538900
+ RBP: ffff98b28f538900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000008
+ R10: ffffffffb9515be0 R11: ffffac6246a1f678 R12: ffff98b28f538000
+ R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffffffc05451e0
+ FS: 00007fde0f688800(0000) GS:ffff98baffd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+ CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+ CR2: 0000000000000014 CR3: 000000104bb0a003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
+ DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+ DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
+ PKRU: 55555554
+ Call Trace:
+ do_setlink+0x994/0xfe0
+ __rtnl_newlink+0x544/0x8d0
+ rtnl_newlink+0x47/0x70
+ rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x29f/0x350
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x4a/0x110
+ netlink_unicast+0x21d/0x300
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x329/0x450
+ sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x60
+ ____sys_sendmsg+0x204/0x280
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0x88/0xd0
+ __sys_sendmsg+0x5e/0xa0
+ do_syscall_64+0x47/0x80
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+
+Fixes: c0c050c58d840 ("bnxt_en: New Broadcom ethernet driver.")
+Reported-by: Fei Liu <feliu@redhat.com>
+CC: Jonathan Toppins <jtoppins@redhat.com>
+CC: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
+Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
+Acked-by: Jonathan Toppins <jtoppins@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt_sriov.c
+@@ -295,6 +295,7 @@ static void bnxt_free_vf_resources(struc
+ }
+ }
+
++ bp->pf.active_vfs = 0;
+ kfree(bp->pf.vf);
+ bp->pf.vf = NULL;
+ }
+@@ -535,7 +536,6 @@ void bnxt_sriov_disable(struct bnxt *bp)
+
+ bnxt_free_vf_resources(bp);
+
+- bp->pf.active_vfs = 0;
+ bp->pf.max_pf_rx_rings = bp->pf.max_rx_rings;
+ bp->pf.max_pf_tx_rings = bp->pf.max_tx_rings;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 11:04:44 AM CEST
+From: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
+Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 11:50:17 -0600
+Subject: genetlink: remove genl_bind
+
+From: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1e82a62fec613844da9e558f3493540a5b7a7b67 ]
+
+A potential deadlock can occur during registering or unregistering a
+new generic netlink family between the main nl_table_lock and the
+cb_lock where each thread wants the lock held by the other, as
+demonstrated below.
+
+1) Thread 1 is performing a netlink_bind() operation on a socket. As part
+ of this call, it will call netlink_lock_table(), incrementing the
+ nl_table_users count to 1.
+2) Thread 2 is registering (or unregistering) a genl_family via the
+ genl_(un)register_family() API. The cb_lock semaphore will be taken for
+ writing.
+3) Thread 1 will call genl_bind() as part of the bind operation to handle
+ subscribing to GENL multicast groups at the request of the user. It will
+ attempt to take the cb_lock semaphore for reading, but it will fail and
+ be scheduled away, waiting for Thread 2 to finish the write.
+4) Thread 2 will call netlink_table_grab() during the (un)registration
+ call. However, as Thread 1 has incremented nl_table_users, it will not
+ be able to proceed, and both threads will be stuck waiting for the
+ other.
+
+genl_bind() is a noop, unless a genl_family implements the mcast_bind()
+function to handle setting up family-specific multicast operations. Since
+no one in-tree uses this functionality as Cong pointed out, simply removing
+the genl_bind() function will remove the possibility for deadlock, as there
+is no attempt by Thread 1 above to take the cb_lock semaphore.
+
+Fixes: c380d9a7afff ("genetlink: pass multicast bind/unbind to families")
+Suggested-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sean Tranchetti <stranche@codeaurora.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/genetlink.h | 8 -------
+ net/netlink/genetlink.c | 52 ------------------------------------------------
+ 2 files changed, 60 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/genetlink.h
++++ b/include/net/genetlink.h
+@@ -33,12 +33,6 @@ struct genl_info;
+ * do additional, common, filtering and return an error
+ * @post_doit: called after an operation's doit callback, it may
+ * undo operations done by pre_doit, for example release locks
+- * @mcast_bind: a socket bound to the given multicast group (which
+- * is given as the offset into the groups array)
+- * @mcast_unbind: a socket was unbound from the given multicast group.
+- * Note that unbind() will not be called symmetrically if the
+- * generic netlink family is removed while there are still open
+- * sockets.
+ * @attrbuf: buffer to store parsed attributes
+ * @family_list: family list
+ * @mcgrps: multicast groups used by this family (private)
+@@ -61,8 +55,6 @@ struct genl_family {
+ void (*post_doit)(const struct genl_ops *ops,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct genl_info *info);
+- int (*mcast_bind)(struct net *net, int group);
+- void (*mcast_unbind)(struct net *net, int group);
+ struct nlattr ** attrbuf; /* private */
+ const struct genl_ops * ops; /* private */
+ const struct genl_multicast_group *mcgrps; /* private */
+--- a/net/netlink/genetlink.c
++++ b/net/netlink/genetlink.c
+@@ -1007,63 +1007,11 @@ static struct genl_multicast_group genl_
+ { .name = "notify", },
+ };
+
+-static int genl_bind(struct net *net, int group)
+-{
+- int i, err = -ENOENT;
+-
+- down_read(&cb_lock);
+- for (i = 0; i < GENL_FAM_TAB_SIZE; i++) {
+- struct genl_family *f;
+-
+- list_for_each_entry(f, genl_family_chain(i), family_list) {
+- if (group >= f->mcgrp_offset &&
+- group < f->mcgrp_offset + f->n_mcgrps) {
+- int fam_grp = group - f->mcgrp_offset;
+-
+- if (!f->netnsok && net != &init_net)
+- err = -ENOENT;
+- else if (f->mcast_bind)
+- err = f->mcast_bind(net, fam_grp);
+- else
+- err = 0;
+- break;
+- }
+- }
+- }
+- up_read(&cb_lock);
+-
+- return err;
+-}
+-
+-static void genl_unbind(struct net *net, int group)
+-{
+- int i;
+-
+- down_read(&cb_lock);
+- for (i = 0; i < GENL_FAM_TAB_SIZE; i++) {
+- struct genl_family *f;
+-
+- list_for_each_entry(f, genl_family_chain(i), family_list) {
+- if (group >= f->mcgrp_offset &&
+- group < f->mcgrp_offset + f->n_mcgrps) {
+- int fam_grp = group - f->mcgrp_offset;
+-
+- if (f->mcast_unbind)
+- f->mcast_unbind(net, fam_grp);
+- break;
+- }
+- }
+- }
+- up_read(&cb_lock);
+-}
+-
+ static int __net_init genl_pernet_init(struct net *net)
+ {
+ struct netlink_kernel_cfg cfg = {
+ .input = genl_rcv,
+ .flags = NL_CFG_F_NONROOT_RECV,
+- .bind = genl_bind,
+- .unbind = genl_unbind,
+ };
+
+ /* we'll bump the group number right afterwards */
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 11:27:40 AM CEST
+From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+Date: Fri, 3 Jul 2020 17:00:32 +0200
+Subject: ipv4: fill fl4_icmp_{type,code} in ping_v4_sendmsg
+
+From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+
+[ Upstream commit 5eff06902394425c722f0a44d9545909a8800f79 ]
+
+IPv4 ping sockets don't set fl4.fl4_icmp_{type,code}, which leads to
+incomplete IPsec ACQUIRE messages being sent to userspace. Currently,
+both raw sockets and IPv6 ping sockets set those fields.
+
+Expected output of "ip xfrm monitor":
+ acquire proto esp
+ sel src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 proto icmp type 8 code 0 dev ens4
+ policy src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32
+ <snip>
+
+Currently with ping sockets:
+ acquire proto esp
+ sel src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32 proto icmp type 0 code 0 dev ens4
+ policy src 10.0.2.15/32 dst 8.8.8.8/32
+ <snip>
+
+The Libreswan test suite found this problem after Fedora changed the
+value for the sysctl net.ipv4.ping_group_range.
+
+Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind")
+Reported-by: Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com>
+Tested-by: Paul Wouters <pwouters@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/ping.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
+@@ -802,6 +802,9 @@ static int ping_v4_sendmsg(struct sock *
+ RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE, sk->sk_protocol,
+ inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk), faddr, saddr, 0, 0);
+
++ fl4.fl4_icmp_type = user_icmph.type;
++ fl4.fl4_icmp_code = user_icmph.code;
++
+ security_sk_classify_flow(sk, flowi4_to_flowi(&fl4));
+ rt = ip_route_output_flow(net, &fl4, sk);
+ if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 11:27:40 AM CEST
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 02:02:32 +0800
+Subject: l2tp: remove skb_dst_set() from l2tp_xmit_skb()
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 27d53323664c549b5bb2dfaaf6f7ad6e0376a64e ]
+
+In the tx path of l2tp, l2tp_xmit_skb() calls skb_dst_set() to set
+skb's dst. However, it will eventually call inet6_csk_xmit() or
+ip_queue_xmit() where skb's dst will be overwritten by:
+
+ skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst);
+
+without releasing the old dst in skb. Then it causes dst/dev refcnt leak:
+
+ unregister_netdevice: waiting for eth0 to become free. Usage count = 1
+
+This can be reproduced by simply running:
+
+ # modprobe l2tp_eth && modprobe l2tp_ip
+ # sh ./tools/testing/selftests/net/l2tp.sh
+
+So before going to inet6_csk_xmit() or ip_queue_xmit(), skb's dst
+should be dropped. This patch is to fix it by removing skb_dst_set()
+from l2tp_xmit_skb() and moving skb_dst_drop() into l2tp_xmit_core().
+
+Fixes: 3557baabf280 ("[L2TP]: PPP over L2TP driver core")
+Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
+Tested-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c | 5 +----
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
++++ b/net/l2tp/l2tp_core.c
+@@ -1139,6 +1139,7 @@ static int l2tp_xmit_core(struct l2tp_se
+
+ /* Queue the packet to IP for output */
+ skb->ignore_df = 1;
++ skb_dst_drop(skb);
+ #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ if (tunnel->sock->sk_family == PF_INET6 && !tunnel->v4mapped)
+ error = inet6_csk_xmit(tunnel->sock, skb, NULL);
+@@ -1203,10 +1204,6 @@ int l2tp_xmit_skb(struct l2tp_session *s
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+- /* Get routing info from the tunnel socket */
+- skb_dst_drop(skb);
+- skb_dst_set(skb, sk_dst_check(sk, 0));
+-
+ inet = inet_sk(sk);
+ fl = &inet->cork.fl;
+ switch (tunnel->encap) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 11:27:40 AM CEST
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Sat, 27 Jun 2020 13:31:50 -0700
+Subject: llc: make sure applications use ARPHRD_ETHER
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit a9b1110162357689a34992d5c925852948e5b9fd ]
+
+syzbot was to trigger a bug by tricking AF_LLC with
+non sensible addr->sllc_arphrd
+
+It seems clear LLC requires an Ethernet device.
+
+Back in commit abf9d537fea2 ("llc: add support for SO_BINDTODEVICE")
+Octavian Purdila added possibility for application to use a zero
+value for sllc_arphrd, convert it to ARPHRD_ETHER to not cause
+regressions on existing applications.
+
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in list_empty include/linux/list.h:268 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:126 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in wq_has_sleeper include/linux/wait.h:160 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skwq_has_sleeper include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline]
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_def_write_space+0x642/0x670 net/core/sock.c:2813
+Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e0b4078 by task ksoftirqd/3/27
+
+CPU: 3 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0
+Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x197/0x210 lib/dump_stack.c:118
+ print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xd4/0x30b mm/kasan/report.c:374
+ __kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x41 mm/kasan/report.c:506
+ kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
+ __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
+ __read_once_size include/linux/compiler.h:199 [inline]
+ list_empty include/linux/list.h:268 [inline]
+ waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:126 [inline]
+ wq_has_sleeper include/linux/wait.h:160 [inline]
+ skwq_has_sleeper include/net/sock.h:2092 [inline]
+ sock_def_write_space+0x642/0x670 net/core/sock.c:2813
+ sock_wfree+0x1e1/0x260 net/core/sock.c:1958
+ skb_release_head_state+0xeb/0x260 net/core/skbuff.c:652
+ skb_release_all+0x16/0x60 net/core/skbuff.c:663
+ __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:679 [inline]
+ consume_skb net/core/skbuff.c:838 [inline]
+ consume_skb+0xfb/0x410 net/core/skbuff.c:832
+ __dev_kfree_skb_any+0xa4/0xd0 net/core/dev.c:2967
+ dev_kfree_skb_any include/linux/netdevice.h:3650 [inline]
+ e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource.isra.0+0x21b/0x3a0 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1963
+ e1000_clean_tx_irq drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3854 [inline]
+ e1000_clean+0x4cc/0x1d10 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3796
+ napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6532 [inline]
+ net_rx_action+0x508/0x1120 net/core/dev.c:6600
+ __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
+ run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:603 [inline]
+ run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:595
+ smpboot_thread_fn+0x6a3/0xa40 kernel/smpboot.c:165
+ kthread+0x361/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:255
+ ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
+
+Allocated by task 8247:
+ save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
+ set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
+ __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:513 [inline]
+ __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:486
+ kasan_slab_alloc+0xf/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:521
+ slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:584 [inline]
+ slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3320 [inline]
+ kmem_cache_alloc+0x121/0x710 mm/slab.c:3484
+ sock_alloc_inode+0x1c/0x1d0 net/socket.c:240
+ alloc_inode+0x68/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:230
+ new_inode_pseudo+0x19/0xf0 fs/inode.c:919
+ sock_alloc+0x41/0x270 net/socket.c:560
+ __sock_create+0xc2/0x730 net/socket.c:1384
+ sock_create net/socket.c:1471 [inline]
+ __sys_socket+0x103/0x220 net/socket.c:1513
+ __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1522 [inline]
+ __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1520 [inline]
+ __ia32_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1520
+ do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:337 [inline]
+ do_fast_syscall_32+0x27b/0xe16 arch/x86/entry/common.c:408
+ entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x70/0x7f arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:139
+
+Freed by task 17:
+ save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
+ set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
+ kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:335 [inline]
+ __kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:474
+ kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:483
+ __cache_free mm/slab.c:3426 [inline]
+ kmem_cache_free+0x86/0x320 mm/slab.c:3694
+ sock_free_inode+0x20/0x30 net/socket.c:261
+ i_callback+0x44/0x80 fs/inode.c:219
+ __rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:222 [inline]
+ rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2183 [inline]
+ rcu_core+0x570/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2408
+ rcu_core_si+0x9/0x10 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2417
+ __do_softirq+0x262/0x98c kernel/softirq.c:292
+
+The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e0b4000
+ which belongs to the cache sock_inode_cache of size 1152
+The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of
+ 1152-byte region [ffff88801e0b4000, ffff88801e0b4480)
+The buggy address belongs to the page:
+page:ffffea0000782d00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88807aa59c40 index:0xffff88801e0b4ffd
+raw: 00fffe0000000200 ffffea00008e6c88 ffffea0000782d48 ffff88807aa59c40
+raw: ffff88801e0b4ffd ffff88801e0b4000 0000000100000003 0000000000000000
+page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
+
+Memory state around the buggy address:
+ ffff88801e0b3f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
+ ffff88801e0b3f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
+>ffff88801e0b4000: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
+ ^
+ ffff88801e0b4080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
+ ffff88801e0b4100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
+
+Fixes: abf9d537fea2 ("llc: add support for SO_BINDTODEVICE")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/llc/af_llc.c | 10 +++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/llc/af_llc.c
++++ b/net/llc/af_llc.c
+@@ -271,6 +271,10 @@ static int llc_ui_autobind(struct socket
+
+ if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED))
+ goto out;
++ if (!addr->sllc_arphrd)
++ addr->sllc_arphrd = ARPHRD_ETHER;
++ if (addr->sllc_arphrd != ARPHRD_ETHER)
++ goto out;
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
+ llc->dev = dev_get_by_index(&init_net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
+@@ -328,15 +332,15 @@ static int llc_ui_bind(struct socket *so
+ if (unlikely(!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) || addrlen != sizeof(*addr)))
+ goto out;
+ rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+- if (unlikely(addr->sllc_family != AF_LLC))
++ if (!addr->sllc_arphrd)
++ addr->sllc_arphrd = ARPHRD_ETHER;
++ if (unlikely(addr->sllc_family != AF_LLC || addr->sllc_arphrd != ARPHRD_ETHER))
+ goto out;
+ rc = -ENODEV;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
+ llc->dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(&init_net, sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
+ if (llc->dev) {
+- if (!addr->sllc_arphrd)
+- addr->sllc_arphrd = llc->dev->type;
+ if (is_zero_ether_addr(addr->sllc_mac))
+ memcpy(addr->sllc_mac, llc->dev->dev_addr,
+ IFHWADDRLEN);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 11:27:40 AM CEST
+From: Martin Varghese <martin.varghese@nokia.com>
+Date: Sun, 5 Jul 2020 14:23:49 +0530
+Subject: net: Added pointer check for dst->ops->neigh_lookup in dst_neigh_lookup_skb
+
+From: Martin Varghese <martin.varghese@nokia.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 394de110a73395de2ca4516b0de435e91b11b604 ]
+
+The packets from tunnel devices (eg bareudp) may have only
+metadata in the dst pointer of skb. Hence a pointer check of
+neigh_lookup is needed in dst_neigh_lookup_skb
+
+Kernel crashes when packets from bareudp device is processed in
+the kernel neighbour subsytem.
+
+[ 133.384484] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
+[ 133.385240] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
+[ 133.385828] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
+[ 133.386603] PGD 0 P4D 0
+[ 133.386875] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP PTI
+[ 133.387275] CPU: 0 PID: 5045 Comm: ping Tainted: G W 5.8.0-rc2+ #15
+[ 133.388052] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
+[ 133.391076] RIP: 0010:0x0
+[ 133.392401] Code: Bad RIP value.
+[ 133.394029] RSP: 0018:ffffb79980003d50 EFLAGS: 00010246
+[ 133.396656] RAX: 0000000080000102 RBX: ffff9de2fe0d6600 RCX: ffff9de2fe5e9d00
+[ 133.399018] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 RDI: ffff9de2fc21b400
+[ 133.399685] RBP: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+[ 133.400350] R10: ffff9de2fbc6be22 R11: ffff9de2fe0d6600 R12: ffff9de2fc21b400
+[ 133.401010] R13: ffff9de2fe0d6628 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003
+[ 133.401667] FS: 00007fe014918740(0000) GS:ffff9de2fec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+[ 133.402412] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+[ 133.402948] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000003bb72000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
+[ 133.403611] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+[ 133.404270] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
+[ 133.404933] Call Trace:
+[ 133.405169] <IRQ>
+[ 133.405367] __neigh_update+0x5a4/0x8f0
+[ 133.405734] arp_process+0x294/0x820
+[ 133.406076] ? __netif_receive_skb_core+0x866/0xe70
+[ 133.406557] arp_rcv+0x129/0x1c0
+[ 133.406882] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x95/0xb0
+[ 133.407340] process_backlog+0xa7/0x150
+[ 133.407705] net_rx_action+0x2af/0x420
+[ 133.408457] __do_softirq+0xda/0x2a8
+[ 133.408813] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
+[ 133.409290] </IRQ>
+[ 133.409519] do_softirq_own_stack+0x39/0x50
+[ 133.410036] do_softirq+0x50/0x60
+[ 133.410401] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x50/0x60
+[ 133.410871] ip_finish_output2+0x195/0x530
+[ 133.411288] ip_output+0x72/0xf0
+[ 133.411673] ? __ip_finish_output+0x1f0/0x1f0
+[ 133.412122] ip_send_skb+0x15/0x40
+[ 133.412471] raw_sendmsg+0x853/0xab0
+[ 133.412855] ? insert_pfn+0xfe/0x270
+[ 133.413827] ? vvar_fault+0xec/0x190
+[ 133.414772] sock_sendmsg+0x57/0x80
+[ 133.415685] __sys_sendto+0xdc/0x160
+[ 133.416605] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1d4/0x2b0
+[ 133.417679] ? __audit_syscall_exit+0x1d9/0x280
+[ 133.418753] ? __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x5d/0x1a0
+[ 133.419819] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
+[ 133.420848] do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x90
+[ 133.421768] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+[ 133.422833] RIP: 0033:0x7fe013689c03
+[ 133.423749] Code: Bad RIP value.
+[ 133.424624] RSP: 002b:00007ffc7288f418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
+[ 133.425940] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000056151fc63720 RCX: 00007fe013689c03
+[ 133.427225] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 000056151fc63720 RDI: 0000000000000003
+[ 133.428481] RBP: 00007ffc72890b30 R08: 000056151fc60500 R09: 0000000000000010
+[ 133.429757] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000040
+[ 133.431041] R13: 000056151fc636e0 R14: 000056151fc616bc R15: 0000000000000080
+[ 133.432481] Modules linked in: mpls_iptunnel act_mirred act_tunnel_key cls_flower sch_ingress veth mpls_router ip_tunnel bareudp ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel macsec udp_diag inet_diag unix_diag af_packet_diag netlink_diag binfmt_misc xt_MASQUERADE iptable_nat xt_addrtype xt_conntrack nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc ebtable_filter ebtables overlay ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_filter sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2 pcspkr i2c_piix4 virtio_balloon joydev ip_tables xfs libcrc32c ata_generic qxl pata_acpi drm_ttm_helper ttm drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm ata_piix libata virtio_net net_failover virtio_console failover virtio_blk i2c_core virtio_pci virtio_ring serio_raw floppy virtio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
+[ 133.444045] CR2: 0000000000000000
+[ 133.445082] ---[ end trace f4aeee1958fd1638 ]---
+[ 133.446236] RIP: 0010:0x0
+[ 133.447180] Code: Bad RIP value.
+[ 133.448152] RSP: 0018:ffffb79980003d50 EFLAGS: 00010246
+[ 133.449363] RAX: 0000000080000102 RBX: ffff9de2fe0d6600 RCX: ffff9de2fe5e9d00
+[ 133.450835] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 RDI: ffff9de2fc21b400
+[ 133.452237] RBP: ffff9de2fe5e9d00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+[ 133.453722] R10: ffff9de2fbc6be22 R11: ffff9de2fe0d6600 R12: ffff9de2fc21b400
+[ 133.455149] R13: ffff9de2fe0d6628 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000003
+[ 133.456520] FS: 00007fe014918740(0000) GS:ffff9de2fec00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+[ 133.458046] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+[ 133.459342] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000003bb72000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
+[ 133.460782] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+[ 133.462240] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
+[ 133.463697] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
+[ 133.465226] Kernel Offset: 0xfa00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
+[ 133.467025] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---
+
+Fixes: aaa0c23cb901 ("Fix dst_neigh_lookup/dst_neigh_lookup_skb return value handling bug")
+Signed-off-by: Martin Varghese <martin.varghese@nokia.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/net/dst.h | 10 +++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/include/net/dst.h
++++ b/include/net/dst.h
+@@ -470,7 +470,15 @@ static inline struct neighbour *dst_neig
+ static inline struct neighbour *dst_neigh_lookup_skb(const struct dst_entry *dst,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+- struct neighbour *n = dst->ops->neigh_lookup(dst, skb, NULL);
++ struct neighbour *n = NULL;
++
++ /* The packets from tunnel devices (eg bareudp) may have only
++ * metadata in the dst pointer of skb. Hence a pointer check of
++ * neigh_lookup is needed.
++ */
++ if (dst->ops->neigh_lookup)
++ n = dst->ops->neigh_lookup(dst, skb, NULL);
++
+ return IS_ERR(n) ? NULL : n;
+ }
+
drm-radeon-fix-double-free.patch
arc-entry-fix-potential-efa-clobber-when-tif_syscall_trace.patch
arc-elf-use-right-elf_arch.patch
+bnxt_en-fix-null-dereference-in-case-sr-iov-configuration-fails.patch
+ipv4-fill-fl4_icmp_-type-code-in-ping_v4_sendmsg.patch
+l2tp-remove-skb_dst_set-from-l2tp_xmit_skb.patch
+llc-make-sure-applications-use-arphrd_ether.patch
+net-added-pointer-check-for-dst-ops-neigh_lookup-in-dst_neigh_lookup_skb.patch
+genetlink-remove-genl_bind.patch
+tcp-make-sure-listeners-don-t-initialize-congestion-control-state.patch
+tcp-md5-add-missing-memory-barriers-in-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key.patch
+tcp-md5-refine-tcp_md5_do_add-tcp_md5_hash_key-barriers.patch
+tcp-md5-allow-changing-md5-keys-in-all-socket-states.patch
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 11:27:40 AM CEST
+From: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
+Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 16:18:34 -0700
+Subject: tcp: make sure listeners don't initialize congestion-control state
+
+From: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit ce69e563b325f620863830c246a8698ccea52048 ]
+
+syzkaller found its way into setsockopt with TCP_CONGESTION "cdg".
+tcp_cdg_init() does a kcalloc to store the gradients. As sk_clone_lock
+just copies all the memory, the allocated pointer will be copied as
+well, if the app called setsockopt(..., TCP_CONGESTION) on the listener.
+If now the socket will be destroyed before the congestion-control
+has properly been initialized (through a call to tcp_init_transfer), we
+will end up freeing memory that does not belong to that particular
+socket, opening the door to a double-free:
+
+[ 11.413102] ==================================================================
+[ 11.414181] BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0
+[ 11.415329]
+[ 11.415560] CPU: 3 PID: 4884 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.8.0-rc2 #80
+[ 11.416544] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
+[ 11.418148] Call Trace:
+[ 11.418534] <IRQ>
+[ 11.418834] dump_stack+0x7d/0xb0
+[ 11.419297] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a/0x210
+[ 11.422079] kasan_report_invalid_free+0x51/0x80
+[ 11.423433] __kasan_slab_free+0x15e/0x170
+[ 11.424761] kfree+0x8c/0x230
+[ 11.425157] tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0
+[ 11.425872] tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0
+[ 11.426493] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0
+[ 11.427093] tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0xb29/0x1100
+[ 11.427731] tcp_get_cookie_sock+0xc3/0x4a0
+[ 11.429457] cookie_v4_check+0x13d0/0x2500
+[ 11.433189] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x60e/0x780
+[ 11.433727] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2869/0x2e10
+[ 11.437143] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x23/0x190
+[ 11.437810] ip_local_deliver+0x294/0x350
+[ 11.439566] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x15d/0x1a0
+[ 11.441995] process_backlog+0x1b1/0x6b0
+[ 11.443148] net_rx_action+0x37e/0xc40
+[ 11.445361] __do_softirq+0x18c/0x61a
+[ 11.445881] asm_call_on_stack+0x12/0x20
+[ 11.446409] </IRQ>
+[ 11.446716] do_softirq_own_stack+0x34/0x40
+[ 11.447259] do_softirq.part.0+0x26/0x30
+[ 11.447827] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x46/0x50
+[ 11.448406] ip_finish_output2+0x60f/0x1bc0
+[ 11.450109] __ip_queue_xmit+0x71c/0x1b60
+[ 11.451861] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1727/0x3bb0
+[ 11.453789] tcp_rcv_state_process+0x3070/0x4d3a
+[ 11.456810] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x2ad/0x780
+[ 11.457995] __release_sock+0x14b/0x2c0
+[ 11.458529] release_sock+0x4a/0x170
+[ 11.459005] __inet_stream_connect+0x467/0xc80
+[ 11.461435] inet_stream_connect+0x4e/0xa0
+[ 11.462043] __sys_connect+0x204/0x270
+[ 11.465515] __x64_sys_connect+0x6a/0xb0
+[ 11.466088] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70
+[ 11.466617] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+[ 11.467341] RIP: 0033:0x7f56046dc469
+[ 11.467844] Code: Bad RIP value.
+[ 11.468282] RSP: 002b:00007f5604dccdd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
+[ 11.469326] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000068bf00 RCX: 00007f56046dc469
+[ 11.470379] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000004
+[ 11.471311] RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+[ 11.472286] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
+[ 11.473341] R13: 000000000041427c R14: 00007f5604dcd5c0 R15: 0000000000000003
+[ 11.474321]
+[ 11.474527] Allocated by task 4884:
+[ 11.475031] save_stack+0x1b/0x40
+[ 11.475548] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xc2/0xd0
+[ 11.476182] tcp_cdg_init+0xf0/0x150
+[ 11.476744] tcp_init_congestion_control+0x9b/0x3a0
+[ 11.477435] tcp_set_congestion_control+0x270/0x32f
+[ 11.478088] do_tcp_setsockopt.isra.0+0x521/0x1a00
+[ 11.478744] __sys_setsockopt+0xff/0x1e0
+[ 11.479259] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0x150
+[ 11.479895] do_syscall_64+0x3e/0x70
+[ 11.480395] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+[ 11.481097]
+[ 11.481321] Freed by task 4872:
+[ 11.481783] save_stack+0x1b/0x40
+[ 11.482230] __kasan_slab_free+0x12c/0x170
+[ 11.482839] kfree+0x8c/0x230
+[ 11.483240] tcp_cleanup_congestion_control+0x58/0xd0
+[ 11.483948] tcp_v4_destroy_sock+0x57/0x5a0
+[ 11.484502] inet_csk_destroy_sock+0x153/0x2c0
+[ 11.485144] tcp_close+0x932/0xfe0
+[ 11.485642] inet_release+0xc1/0x1c0
+[ 11.486131] __sock_release+0xc0/0x270
+[ 11.486697] sock_close+0xc/0x10
+[ 11.487145] __fput+0x277/0x780
+[ 11.487632] task_work_run+0xeb/0x180
+[ 11.488118] __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x15a/0x160
+[ 11.488834] do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x70
+[ 11.489326] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+
+Wei Wang fixed a part of these CDG-malloc issues with commit c12014440750
+("tcp: memset ca_priv data to 0 properly").
+
+This patch here fixes the listener-scenario: We make sure that listeners
+setting the congestion-control through setsockopt won't initialize it
+(thus CDG never allocates on listeners). For those who use AF_UNSPEC to
+reuse a socket, tcp_disconnect() is changed to cleanup afterwards.
+
+(The issue can be reproduced at least down to v4.4.x.)
+
+Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
+Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Fixes: 2b0a8c9eee81 ("tcp: add CDG congestion control")
+Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 3 +++
+ net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+@@ -2259,6 +2259,9 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int
+ tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
+ tp->snd_cwnd_cnt = 0;
+ tp->window_clamp = 0;
++ if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->release)
++ icsk->icsk_ca_ops->release(sk);
++ memset(icsk->icsk_ca_priv, 0, sizeof(icsk->icsk_ca_priv));
+ tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
+ tcp_clear_retrans(tp);
+ tp->total_retrans = 0;
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_cong.c
+@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ static void tcp_reinit_congestion_contro
+ icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
+ icsk->icsk_ca_setsockopt = 1;
+
+- if (sk->sk_state != TCP_CLOSE)
++ if (!((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN)))
+ tcp_init_congestion_control(sk);
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 11:27:40 AM CEST
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2020 16:41:01 -0700
+Subject: tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 6a2febec338df7e7699a52d00b2e1207dcf65b28 ]
+
+MD5 keys are read with RCU protection, and tcp_md5_do_add()
+might update in-place a prior key.
+
+Normally, typical RCU updates would allocate a new piece
+of memory. In this case only key->key and key->keylen might
+be updated, and we do not care if an incoming packet could
+see the old key, the new one, or some intermediate value,
+since changing the key on a live flow is known to be problematic
+anyway.
+
+We only want to make sure that in the case key->keylen
+is changed, cpus in tcp_md5_hash_key() wont try to use
+uninitialized data, or crash because key->keylen was
+read twice to feed sg_init_one() and ahash_request_set_crypt()
+
+Fixes: 9ea88a153001 ("tcp: md5: check md5 signature without socket lock")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 5 ++++-
+ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+@@ -3088,9 +3088,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_skb_data);
+
+ int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key)
+ {
++ u8 keylen = key->keylen;
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+
+- sg_init_one(&sg, key->key, key->keylen);
++ smp_rmb(); /* paired with smp_wmb() in tcp_md5_do_add() */
++
++ sg_init_one(&sg, key->key, keylen);
+ return crypto_hash_update(&hp->md5_desc, &sg, key->keylen);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key);
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+@@ -933,6 +933,9 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, cons
+ if (key) {
+ /* Pre-existing entry - just update that one. */
+ memcpy(key->key, newkey, newkeylen);
++
++ smp_wmb(); /* pairs with smp_rmb() in tcp_md5_hash_key() */
++
+ key->keylen = newkeylen;
+ return 0;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 11:04:44 AM CEST
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2020 18:39:33 -0700
+Subject: tcp: md5: allow changing MD5 keys in all socket states
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1ca0fafd73c5268e8fc4b997094b8bb2bfe8deea ]
+
+This essentially reverts commit 721230326891 ("tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG
+or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets")
+
+Mathieu reported that many vendors BGP implementations can
+actually switch TCP MD5 on established flows.
+
+Quoting Mathieu :
+ Here is a list of a few network vendors along with their behavior
+ with respect to TCP MD5:
+
+ - Cisco: Allows for password to be changed, but within the hold-down
+ timer (~180 seconds).
+ - Juniper: When password is initially set on active connection it will
+ reset, but after that any subsequent password changes no network
+ resets.
+ - Nokia: No notes on if they flap the tcp connection or not.
+ - Ericsson/RedBack: Allows for 2 password (old/new) to co-exist until
+ both sides are ok with new passwords.
+ - Meta-Switch: Expects the password to be set before a connection is
+ attempted, but no further info on whether they reset the TCP
+ connection on a change.
+ - Avaya: Disable the neighbor, then set password, then re-enable.
+ - Zebos: Would normally allow the change when socket connected.
+
+We can revert my prior change because commit 9424e2e7ad93 ("tcp: md5: fix potential
+overestimation of TCP option space") removed the leak of 4 kernel bytes to
+the wire that was the main reason for my patch.
+
+While doing my investigations, I found a bug when a MD5 key is changed, leading
+to these commits that stable teams want to consider before backporting this revert :
+
+ Commit 6a2febec338d ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()")
+ Commit e6ced831ef11 ("tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers")
+
+Fixes: 721230326891 "tcp: md5: reject TCP_MD5SIG or TCP_MD5SIG_EXT on established sockets"
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 5 +----
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+@@ -2596,10 +2596,7 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
+ case TCP_MD5SIG:
+- if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_CLOSE | TCPF_LISTEN))
+- err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optval, optlen);
+- else
+- err = -EINVAL;
++ err = tp->af_specific->md5_parse(sk, optval, optlen);
+ break;
+ #endif
+ case TCP_USER_TIMEOUT:
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Fri 17 Jul 2020 11:04:44 AM CEST
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Jul 2020 11:43:04 -0700
+Subject: tcp: md5: refine tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key() barriers
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit e6ced831ef11a2a06e8d00aad9d4fc05b610bf38 ]
+
+My prior fix went a bit too far, according to Herbert and Mathieu.
+
+Since we accept that concurrent TCP MD5 lookups might see inconsistent
+keys, we can use READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() instead of smp_rmb()/smp_wmb()
+
+Clearing all key->key[] is needed to avoid possible KMSAN reports,
+if key->keylen is increased. Since tcp_md5_do_add() is not fast path,
+using __GFP_ZERO to clear all struct tcp_md5sig_key is simpler.
+
+data_race() was added in linux-5.8 and will prevent KCSAN reports,
+this can safely be removed in stable backports, if data_race() is
+not yet backported.
+
+v2: use data_race() both in tcp_md5_hash_key() and tcp_md5_do_add()
+
+Fixes: 6a2febec338d ("tcp: md5: add missing memory barriers in tcp_md5_do_add()/tcp_md5_hash_key()")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 6 +++---
+ net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 14 ++++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+@@ -3088,12 +3088,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_skb_data);
+
+ int tcp_md5_hash_key(struct tcp_md5sig_pool *hp, const struct tcp_md5sig_key *key)
+ {
+- u8 keylen = key->keylen;
++ u8 keylen = READ_ONCE(key->keylen); /* paired with WRITE_ONCE() in tcp_md5_do_add */
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+
+- smp_rmb(); /* paired with smp_wmb() in tcp_md5_do_add() */
+-
+ sg_init_one(&sg, key->key, keylen);
++
++ /* tcp_md5_do_add() might change key->key under us */
+ return crypto_hash_update(&hp->md5_desc, &sg, key->keylen);
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key);
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+@@ -931,12 +931,18 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, cons
+
+ key = tcp_md5_do_lookup(sk, addr, family);
+ if (key) {
+- /* Pre-existing entry - just update that one. */
++ /* Pre-existing entry - just update that one.
++ * Note that the key might be used concurrently.
++ */
+ memcpy(key->key, newkey, newkeylen);
+
+- smp_wmb(); /* pairs with smp_rmb() in tcp_md5_hash_key() */
++ /* Pairs with READ_ONCE() in tcp_md5_hash_key().
++ * Also note that a reader could catch new key->keylen value
++ * but old key->key[], this is the reason we use __GFP_ZERO
++ * at sock_kmalloc() time below these lines.
++ */
++ WRITE_ONCE(key->keylen, newkeylen);
+
+- key->keylen = newkeylen;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -953,7 +959,7 @@ int tcp_md5_do_add(struct sock *sk, cons
+ rcu_assign_pointer(tp->md5sig_info, md5sig);
+ }
+
+- key = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key), gfp);
++ key = sock_kmalloc(sk, sizeof(*key), gfp | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!key)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool()) {
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
