]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/linux.git/commitdiff
iommu/vt-d: Don't apply gfx quirks to untrusted devices
authorRajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
Mon, 22 Jun 2020 23:13:42 +0000 (07:13 +0800)
committerJoerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Tue, 23 Jun 2020 08:08:32 +0000 (10:08 +0200)
Currently, an external malicious PCI device can masquerade the VID:PID
of faulty gfx devices, and thus apply iommu quirks to effectively
disable the IOMMU restrictions for itself.

Thus we need to ensure that the device we are applying quirks to, is
indeed an internal trusted device.

Signed-off-by: Rajat Jain <rajatja@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200622231345.29722-4-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c

index 0fa394f7bbf91308ac519595a829cb68827b12f7..66d07b1a3be2eb76c6cd7c8356ac38152c6b59c6 100644 (file)
@@ -6020,6 +6020,23 @@ intel_iommu_domain_set_attr(struct iommu_domain *domain,
        return ret;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Check that the device does not live on an external facing PCI port that is
+ * marked as untrusted. Such devices should not be able to apply quirks and
+ * thus not be able to bypass the IOMMU restrictions.
+ */
+static bool risky_device(struct pci_dev *pdev)
+{
+       if (pdev->untrusted) {
+               pci_info(pdev,
+                        "Skipping IOMMU quirk for dev [%04X:%04X] on untrusted PCI link\n",
+                        pdev->vendor, pdev->device);
+               pci_info(pdev, "Please check with your BIOS/Platform vendor about this\n");
+               return true;
+       }
+       return false;
+}
+
 const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops = {
        .capable                = intel_iommu_capable,
        .domain_alloc           = intel_iommu_domain_alloc,
@@ -6059,6 +6076,9 @@ const struct iommu_ops intel_iommu_ops = {
 
 static void quirk_iommu_igfx(struct pci_dev *dev)
 {
+       if (risky_device(dev))
+               return;
+
        pci_info(dev, "Disabling IOMMU for graphics on this chipset\n");
        dmar_map_gfx = 0;
 }
@@ -6100,6 +6120,9 @@ DECLARE_PCI_FIXUP_HEADER(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x163D, quirk_iommu_igfx);
 
 static void quirk_iommu_rwbf(struct pci_dev *dev)
 {
+       if (risky_device(dev))
+               return;
+
        /*
         * Mobile 4 Series Chipset neglects to set RWBF capability,
         * but needs it. Same seems to hold for the desktop versions.
@@ -6130,6 +6153,9 @@ static void quirk_calpella_no_shadow_gtt(struct pci_dev *dev)
 {
        unsigned short ggc;
 
+       if (risky_device(dev))
+               return;
+
        if (pci_read_config_word(dev, GGC, &ggc))
                return;
 
@@ -6163,6 +6189,12 @@ static void __init check_tylersburg_isoch(void)
        pdev = pci_get_device(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x3a3e, NULL);
        if (!pdev)
                return;
+
+       if (risky_device(pdev)) {
+               pci_dev_put(pdev);
+               return;
+       }
+
        pci_dev_put(pdev);
 
        /* System Management Registers. Might be hidden, in which case
@@ -6172,6 +6204,11 @@ static void __init check_tylersburg_isoch(void)
        if (!pdev)
                return;
 
+       if (risky_device(pdev)) {
+               pci_dev_put(pdev);
+               return;
+       }
+
        if (pci_read_config_dword(pdev, 0x188, &vtisochctrl)) {
                pci_dev_put(pdev);
                return;