--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 06 Oct 2019 11:10:46 AM CEST
+From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2019 17:12:41 +0200
+Subject: hso: fix NULL-deref on tty open
+
+From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 8353da9fa69722b54cba82b2ec740afd3d438748 ]
+
+Fix NULL-pointer dereference on tty open due to a failure to handle a
+missing interrupt-in endpoint when probing modem ports:
+
+ BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000006
+ ...
+ RIP: 0010:tiocmget_submit_urb+0x1c/0xe0 [hso]
+ ...
+ Call Trace:
+ hso_start_serial_device+0xdc/0x140 [hso]
+ hso_serial_open+0x118/0x1b0 [hso]
+ tty_open+0xf1/0x490
+
+Fixes: 542f54823614 ("tty: Modem functions for the HSO driver")
+Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/usb/hso.c | 12 ++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/usb/hso.c
++++ b/drivers/net/usb/hso.c
+@@ -2650,14 +2650,18 @@ static struct hso_device *hso_create_bul
+ */
+ if (serial->tiocmget) {
+ tiocmget = serial->tiocmget;
++ tiocmget->endp = hso_get_ep(interface,
++ USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT,
++ USB_DIR_IN);
++ if (!tiocmget->endp) {
++ dev_err(&interface->dev, "Failed to find INT IN ep\n");
++ goto exit;
++ }
++
+ tiocmget->urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (tiocmget->urb) {
+ mutex_init(&tiocmget->mutex);
+ init_waitqueue_head(&tiocmget->waitq);
+- tiocmget->endp = hso_get_ep(
+- interface,
+- USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_INT,
+- USB_DIR_IN);
+ } else
+ hso_free_tiomget(serial);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 06 Oct 2019 11:10:46 AM CEST
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2019 09:38:55 -0700
+Subject: ipv6: drop incoming packets having a v4mapped source address
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 6af1799aaf3f1bc8defedddfa00df3192445bbf3 ]
+
+This began with a syzbot report. syzkaller was injecting
+IPv6 TCP SYN packets having a v4mapped source address.
+
+After an unsuccessful 4-tuple lookup, TCP creates a request
+socket (SYN_RECV) and calls reqsk_queue_hash_req()
+
+reqsk_queue_hash_req() calls sk_ehashfn(sk)
+
+At this point we have AF_INET6 sockets, and the heuristic
+used by sk_ehashfn() to either hash the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses
+is to use ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)
+
+For the particular spoofed packet, we end up hashing V4 addresses
+which were not initialized by the TCP IPv6 stack, so KMSAN fired
+a warning.
+
+I first fixed sk_ehashfn() to test both source and destination addresses,
+but then faced various problems, including user-space programs
+like packetdrill that had similar assumptions.
+
+Instead of trying to fix the whole ecosystem, it is better
+to admit that we have a dual stack behavior, and that we
+can not build linux kernels without V4 stack anyway.
+
+The dual stack API automatically forces the traffic to be IPv4
+if v4mapped addresses are used at bind() or connect(), so it makes
+no sense to allow IPv6 traffic to use the same v4mapped class.
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
+@@ -151,6 +151,16 @@ int ipv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct
+ if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(&hdr->saddr))
+ goto err;
+
++ /* While RFC4291 is not explicit about v4mapped addresses
++ * in IPv6 headers, it seems clear linux dual-stack
++ * model can not deal properly with these.
++ * Security models could be fooled by ::ffff:127.0.0.1 for example.
++ *
++ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-itojun-v6ops-v4mapped-harmful-02
++ */
++ if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&hdr->saddr))
++ goto err;
++
+ skb->transport_header = skb->network_header + sizeof(*hdr);
+ IP6CB(skb)->nhoff = offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr);
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 06 Oct 2019 11:10:46 AM CEST
+From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2019 15:11:17 +0200
+Subject: net: ipv4: avoid mixed n_redirects and rate_tokens usage
+
+From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit b406472b5ad79ede8d10077f0c8f05505ace8b6d ]
+
+Since commit c09551c6ff7f ("net: ipv4: use a dedicated counter
+for icmp_v4 redirect packets") we use 'n_redirects' to account
+for redirect packets, but we still use 'rate_tokens' to compute
+the redirect packets exponential backoff.
+
+If the device sent to the relevant peer any ICMP error packet
+after sending a redirect, it will also update 'rate_token' according
+to the leaking bucket schema; typically 'rate_token' will raise
+above BITS_PER_LONG and the redirect packets backoff algorithm
+will produce undefined behavior.
+
+Fix the issue using 'n_redirects' to compute the exponential backoff
+in ip_rt_send_redirect().
+
+Note that we still clear rate_tokens after a redirect silence period,
+to avoid changing an established behaviour.
+
+The root cause predates git history; before the mentioned commit in
+the critical scenario, the kernel stopped sending redirects, after
+the mentioned commit the behavior more randomic.
+
+Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com>
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Fixes: c09551c6ff7f ("net: ipv4: use a dedicated counter for icmp_v4 redirect packets")
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo.bianconi@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/route.c | 5 ++---
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
+@@ -897,16 +897,15 @@ void ip_rt_send_redirect(struct sk_buff
+ if (peer->rate_tokens == 0 ||
+ time_after(jiffies,
+ (peer->rate_last +
+- (ip_rt_redirect_load << peer->rate_tokens)))) {
++ (ip_rt_redirect_load << peer->n_redirects)))) {
+ __be32 gw = rt_nexthop(rt, ip_hdr(skb)->daddr);
+
+ icmp_send(skb, ICMP_REDIRECT, ICMP_REDIR_HOST, gw);
+ peer->rate_last = jiffies;
+- ++peer->rate_tokens;
+ ++peer->n_redirects;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE
+ if (log_martians &&
+- peer->rate_tokens == ip_rt_redirect_number)
++ peer->n_redirects == ip_rt_redirect_number)
+ net_warn_ratelimited("host %pI4/if%d ignores redirects for %pI4 to %pI4\n",
+ &ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, inet_iif(skb),
+ &ip_hdr(skb)->daddr, &gw);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 06 Oct 2019 11:10:46 AM CEST
+From: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2019 15:24:39 -0500
+Subject: net: qlogic: Fix memory leak in ql_alloc_large_buffers
+
+From: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1acb8f2a7a9f10543868ddd737e37424d5c36cf4 ]
+
+In ql_alloc_large_buffers, a new skb is allocated via netdev_alloc_skb.
+This skb should be released if pci_dma_mapping_error fails.
+
+Fixes: 0f8ab89e825f ("qla3xxx: Check return code from pci_map_single() in ql_release_to_lrg_buf_free_list(), ql_populate_free_queue(), ql_alloc_large_buffers(), and ql3xxx_send()")
+Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qla3xxx.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qla3xxx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qla3xxx.c
+@@ -2783,6 +2783,7 @@ static int ql_alloc_large_buffers(struct
+ netdev_err(qdev->ndev,
+ "PCI mapping failed with error: %d\n",
+ err);
++ dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb);
+ ql_free_large_buffers(qdev);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 06 Oct 2019 11:10:46 AM CEST
+From: Dotan Barak <dotanb@dev.mellanox.co.il>
+Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 10:21:02 -0700
+Subject: net/rds: Fix error handling in rds_ib_add_one()
+
+From: Dotan Barak <dotanb@dev.mellanox.co.il>
+
+[ Upstream commit d64bf89a75b65f83f06be9fb8f978e60d53752db ]
+
+rds_ibdev:ipaddr_list and rds_ibdev:conn_list are initialized
+after allocation some resources such as protection domain.
+If allocation of such resources fail, then these uninitialized
+variables are accessed in rds_ib_dev_free() in failure path. This
+can potentially crash the system. The code has been updated to
+initialize these variables very early in the function.
+
+Signed-off-by: Dotan Barak <dotanb@dev.mellanox.co.il>
+Signed-off-by: Sudhakar Dindukurti <sudhakar.dindukurti@oracle.com>
+Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rds/ib.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/rds/ib.c
++++ b/net/rds/ib.c
+@@ -146,6 +146,9 @@ static void rds_ib_add_one(struct ib_dev
+ atomic_set(&rds_ibdev->refcount, 1);
+ INIT_WORK(&rds_ibdev->free_work, rds_ib_dev_free);
+
++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ibdev->ipaddr_list);
++ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ibdev->conn_list);
++
+ rds_ibdev->max_wrs = dev_attr->max_qp_wr;
+ rds_ibdev->max_sge = min(dev_attr->max_sge, RDS_IB_MAX_SGE);
+
+@@ -187,9 +190,6 @@ static void rds_ib_add_one(struct ib_dev
+ rds_ibdev->fmr_max_remaps, rds_ibdev->max_1m_fmrs,
+ rds_ibdev->max_8k_fmrs);
+
+- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ibdev->ipaddr_list);
+- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rds_ibdev->conn_list);
+-
+ down_write(&rds_ib_devices_lock);
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&rds_ibdev->list, &rds_ib_devices);
+ up_write(&rds_ib_devices_lock);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 06 Oct 2019 11:10:46 AM CEST
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2019 11:08:34 -0700
+Subject: nfc: fix memory leak in llcp_sock_bind()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit a0c2dc1fe63e2869b74c1c7f6a81d1745c8a695d ]
+
+sysbot reported a memory leak after a bind() has failed.
+
+While we are at it, abort the operation if kmemdup() has failed.
+
+BUG: memory leak
+unreferenced object 0xffff888105d83ec0 (size 32):
+ comm "syz-executor067", pid 7207, jiffies 4294956228 (age 19.430s)
+ hex dump (first 32 bytes):
+ 00 69 6c 65 20 72 65 61 64 00 6e 65 74 3a 5b 34 .ile read.net:[4
+ 30 32 36 35 33 33 30 39 37 5d 00 00 00 00 00 00 026533097]......
+ backtrace:
+ [<0000000036bac473>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive /./include/linux/kmemleak.h:43 [inline]
+ [<0000000036bac473>] slab_post_alloc_hook /mm/slab.h:522 [inline]
+ [<0000000036bac473>] slab_alloc /mm/slab.c:3319 [inline]
+ [<0000000036bac473>] __do_kmalloc /mm/slab.c:3653 [inline]
+ [<0000000036bac473>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x169/0x2d0 /mm/slab.c:3670
+ [<000000000cd39d07>] kmemdup+0x27/0x60 /mm/util.c:120
+ [<000000008e57e5fc>] kmemdup /./include/linux/string.h:432 [inline]
+ [<000000008e57e5fc>] llcp_sock_bind+0x1b3/0x230 /net/nfc/llcp_sock.c:107
+ [<000000009cb0b5d3>] __sys_bind+0x11c/0x140 /net/socket.c:1647
+ [<00000000492c3bbc>] __do_sys_bind /net/socket.c:1658 [inline]
+ [<00000000492c3bbc>] __se_sys_bind /net/socket.c:1656 [inline]
+ [<00000000492c3bbc>] __x64_sys_bind+0x1e/0x30 /net/socket.c:1656
+ [<0000000008704b2a>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 /arch/x86/entry/common.c:296
+ [<000000009f4c57a4>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
+
+Fixes: 30cc4587659e ("NFC: Move LLCP code to the NFC top level diirectory")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/nfc/llcp_sock.c | 7 ++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c
++++ b/net/nfc/llcp_sock.c
+@@ -118,9 +118,14 @@ static int llcp_sock_bind(struct socket
+ llcp_sock->service_name = kmemdup(llcp_addr.service_name,
+ llcp_sock->service_name_len,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+-
++ if (!llcp_sock->service_name) {
++ ret = -ENOMEM;
++ goto put_dev;
++ }
+ llcp_sock->ssap = nfc_llcp_get_sdp_ssap(local, llcp_sock);
+ if (llcp_sock->ssap == LLCP_SAP_MAX) {
++ kfree(llcp_sock->service_name);
++ llcp_sock->service_name = NULL;
+ ret = -EADDRINUSE;
+ goto put_dev;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 06 Oct 2019 10:01:35 AM CEST
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2019 18:24:43 -0700
+Subject: sch_cbq: validate TCA_CBQ_WRROPT to avoid crash
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit e9789c7cc182484fc031fd88097eb14cb26c4596 ]
+
+syzbot reported a crash in cbq_normalize_quanta() caused
+by an out of range cl->priority.
+
+iproute2 enforces this check, but malicious users do not.
+
+kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
+kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
+general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
+Modules linked in:
+CPU: 1 PID: 26447 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.3+ #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+RIP: 0010:cbq_normalize_quanta.part.0+0x1fd/0x430 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:902
+RSP: 0018:ffff8801a5c333b0 EFLAGS: 00010206
+RAX: 0000000020000003 RBX: 00000000fffffff8 RCX: ffffc9000712f000
+RDX: 00000000000043bf RSI: ffffffff83be8962 RDI: 0000000100000018
+RBP: ffff8801a5c33420 R08: 000000000000003a R09: 0000000000000000
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000000002ef
+R13: ffff88018da95188 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 0000000000000015
+FS: 00007f37d26b1700(0000) GS:ffff8801dad00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+CR2: 00000000004c7cec CR3: 00000001bcd0a006 CR4: 00000000001626f0
+DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
+Call Trace:
+ [<ffffffff83be9d57>] cbq_normalize_quanta include/net/pkt_sched.h:27 [inline]
+ [<ffffffff83be9d57>] cbq_addprio net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1097 [inline]
+ [<ffffffff83be9d57>] cbq_set_wrr+0x2d7/0x450 net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1115
+ [<ffffffff83bee8a7>] cbq_change_class+0x987/0x225b net/sched/sch_cbq.c:1537
+ [<ffffffff83b96985>] tc_ctl_tclass+0x555/0xcd0 net/sched/sch_api.c:2329
+ [<ffffffff83a84655>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x485/0xc10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5248
+ [<ffffffff83cadf0a>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2510
+ [<ffffffff83a7db6d>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5266
+ [<ffffffff83cac2c6>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1324 [inline]
+ [<ffffffff83cac2c6>] netlink_unicast+0x536/0x720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1350
+ [<ffffffff83cacd4a>] netlink_sendmsg+0x89a/0xd50 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1939
+ [<ffffffff8399d46e>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:673 [inline]
+ [<ffffffff8399d46e>] sock_sendmsg+0x12e/0x170 net/socket.c:684
+ [<ffffffff8399f1fd>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x81d/0x960 net/socket.c:2359
+ [<ffffffff839a2d05>] __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2397
+ [<ffffffff839a2df9>] SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2406 [inline]
+ [<ffffffff839a2df9>] SyS_sendmsg+0x29/0x30 net/socket.c:2404
+ [<ffffffff8101ccc8>] do_syscall_64+0x528/0x770 arch/x86/entry/common.c:305
+ [<ffffffff84400091>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sched/sch_cbq.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/sched/sch_cbq.c
++++ b/net/sched/sch_cbq.c
+@@ -1340,6 +1340,26 @@ static const struct nla_policy cbq_polic
+ [TCA_CBQ_POLICE] = { .len = sizeof(struct tc_cbq_police) },
+ };
+
++static int cbq_opt_parse(struct nlattr *tb[TCA_CBQ_MAX + 1], struct nlattr *opt)
++{
++ int err;
++
++ if (!opt)
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ err = nla_parse_nested(tb, TCA_CBQ_MAX, opt, cbq_policy);
++ if (err < 0)
++ return err;
++
++ if (tb[TCA_CBQ_WRROPT]) {
++ const struct tc_cbq_wrropt *wrr = nla_data(tb[TCA_CBQ_WRROPT]);
++
++ if (wrr->priority > TC_CBQ_MAXPRIO)
++ err = -EINVAL;
++ }
++ return err;
++}
++
+ static int cbq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, struct nlattr *opt)
+ {
+ struct cbq_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch);
+@@ -1347,7 +1367,7 @@ static int cbq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, s
+ struct tc_ratespec *r;
+ int err;
+
+- err = nla_parse_nested(tb, TCA_CBQ_MAX, opt, cbq_policy);
++ err = cbq_opt_parse(tb, opt);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+@@ -1728,10 +1748,7 @@ cbq_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32
+ struct cbq_class *parent;
+ struct qdisc_rate_table *rtab = NULL;
+
+- if (opt == NULL)
+- return -EINVAL;
+-
+- err = nla_parse_nested(tb, TCA_CBQ_MAX, opt, cbq_policy);
++ err = cbq_opt_parse(tb, opt);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 06 Oct 2019 11:10:46 AM CEST
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2019 10:34:45 -0700
+Subject: sch_dsmark: fix potential NULL deref in dsmark_init()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 474f0813a3002cb299bb73a5a93aa1f537a80ca8 ]
+
+Make sure TCA_DSMARK_INDICES was provided by the user.
+
+syzbot reported :
+
+kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
+kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
+general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
+CPU: 1 PID: 8799 Comm: syz-executor235 Not tainted 5.3.0+ #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+RIP: 0010:nla_get_u16 include/net/netlink.h:1501 [inline]
+RIP: 0010:dsmark_init net/sched/sch_dsmark.c:364 [inline]
+RIP: 0010:dsmark_init+0x193/0x640 net/sched/sch_dsmark.c:339
+Code: 85 db 58 0f 88 7d 03 00 00 e8 e9 1a ac fb 48 8b 9d 70 ff ff ff 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 04 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ca
+RSP: 0018:ffff88809426f3b8 EFLAGS: 00010247
+RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff85c6eb09
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff85c6eb17 RDI: 0000000000000004
+RBP: ffff88809426f4b0 R08: ffff88808c4085c0 R09: ffffed1015d26159
+R10: ffffed1015d26158 R11: ffff8880ae930ac7 R12: ffff8880a7e96940
+R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88809426f8c0 R15: 0000000000000000
+FS: 0000000001292880(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+CR2: 0000000020000080 CR3: 000000008ca1b000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
+DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
+Call Trace:
+ qdisc_create+0x4ee/0x1210 net/sched/sch_api.c:1237
+ tc_modify_qdisc+0x524/0x1c50 net/sched/sch_api.c:1653
+ rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x463/0xb00 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5223
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x177/0x450 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477
+ rtnetlink_rcv+0x1d/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5241
+ netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline]
+ netlink_unicast+0x531/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x8a5/0xd60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:637 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg+0xd7/0x130 net/socket.c:657
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0x803/0x920 net/socket.c:2311
+ __sys_sendmsg+0x105/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2356
+ __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2365 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2363 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xb0 net/socket.c:2363
+ do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x760 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
+RIP: 0033:0x440369
+
+Fixes: 758cc43c6d73 ("[PKT_SCHED]: Fix dsmark to apply changes consistent")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sched/sch_dsmark.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/sched/sch_dsmark.c
++++ b/net/sched/sch_dsmark.c
+@@ -362,6 +362,8 @@ static int dsmark_init(struct Qdisc *sch
+ goto errout;
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
++ if (!tb[TCA_DSMARK_INDICES])
++ goto errout;
+ indices = nla_get_u16(tb[TCA_DSMARK_INDICES]);
+
+ if (hweight32(indices) != 1)
kmemleak-increase-debug_kmemleak_early_log_size-defa.patch
android-binder-remove-waitqueue-when-thread-exits.patch
android-binder-synchronize_rcu-when-using-pollfree.patch
+hso-fix-null-deref-on-tty-open.patch
+ipv6-drop-incoming-packets-having-a-v4mapped-source-address.patch
+net-ipv4-avoid-mixed-n_redirects-and-rate_tokens-usage.patch
+net-qlogic-fix-memory-leak-in-ql_alloc_large_buffers.patch
+nfc-fix-memory-leak-in-llcp_sock_bind.patch
+sch_dsmark-fix-potential-null-deref-in-dsmark_init.patch
+xen-netfront-do-not-use-0u-as-error-return-value-for-xennet_fill_frags.patch
+net-rds-fix-error-handling-in-rds_ib_add_one.patch
+sch_cbq-validate-tca_cbq_wrropt-to-avoid-crash.patch
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun 06 Oct 2019 11:10:46 AM CEST
+From: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 21:56:41 +0800
+Subject: xen-netfront: do not use ~0U as error return value for xennet_fill_frags()
+
+From: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit a761129e3625688310aecf26e1be9e98e85f8eb5 ]
+
+xennet_fill_frags() uses ~0U as return value when the sk_buff is not able
+to cache extra fragments. This is incorrect because the return type of
+xennet_fill_frags() is RING_IDX and 0xffffffff is an expected value for
+ring buffer index.
+
+In the situation when the rsp_cons is approaching 0xffffffff, the return
+value of xennet_fill_frags() may become 0xffffffff which xennet_poll() (the
+caller) would regard as error. As a result, queue->rx.rsp_cons is set
+incorrectly because it is updated only when there is error. If there is no
+error, xennet_poll() would be responsible to update queue->rx.rsp_cons.
+Finally, queue->rx.rsp_cons would point to the rx ring buffer entries whose
+queue->rx_skbs[i] and queue->grant_rx_ref[i] are already cleared to NULL.
+This leads to NULL pointer access in the next iteration to process rx ring
+buffer entries.
+
+The symptom is similar to the one fixed in
+commit 00b368502d18 ("xen-netfront: do not assume sk_buff_head list is
+empty in error handling").
+
+This patch changes the return type of xennet_fill_frags() to indicate
+whether it is successful or failed. The queue->rx.rsp_cons will be
+always updated inside this function.
+
+Fixes: ad4f15dc2c70 ("xen/netfront: don't bug in case of too many frags")
+Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 17 +++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
++++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+@@ -874,9 +874,9 @@ static int xennet_set_skb_gso(struct sk_
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
+- struct sk_buff *skb,
+- struct sk_buff_head *list)
++static int xennet_fill_frags(struct netfront_queue *queue,
++ struct sk_buff *skb,
++ struct sk_buff_head *list)
+ {
+ RING_IDX cons = queue->rx.rsp_cons;
+ struct sk_buff *nskb;
+@@ -895,7 +895,7 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct
+ if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS)) {
+ queue->rx.rsp_cons = ++cons + skb_queue_len(list);
+ kfree_skb(nskb);
+- return ~0U;
++ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ skb_add_rx_frag(skb, skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags,
+@@ -906,7 +906,9 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct
+ kfree_skb(nskb);
+ }
+
+- return cons;
++ queue->rx.rsp_cons = cons;
++
++ return 0;
+ }
+
+ static int checksum_setup(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
+@@ -1032,8 +1034,7 @@ err:
+ skb->data_len = rx->status;
+ skb->len += rx->status;
+
+- i = xennet_fill_frags(queue, skb, &tmpq);
+- if (unlikely(i == ~0U))
++ if (unlikely(xennet_fill_frags(queue, skb, &tmpq)))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (rx->flags & XEN_NETRXF_csum_blank)
+@@ -1043,7 +1044,7 @@ err:
+
+ __skb_queue_tail(&rxq, skb);
+
+- queue->rx.rsp_cons = ++i;
++ i = ++queue->rx.rsp_cons;
+ work_done++;
+ }
+
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
