]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/kernel/linux.git/commitdiff
bpf: Fix array bounds error with may_goto
authorJiayuan Chen <mrpre@163.com>
Fri, 14 Feb 2025 09:18:21 +0000 (17:18 +0800)
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Sat, 15 Feb 2025 03:55:15 +0000 (19:55 -0800)
may_goto uses an additional 8 bytes on the stack, which causes the
interpreters[] array to go out of bounds when calculating index by
stack_size.

1. If a BPF program is rewritten, re-evaluate the stack size. For non-JIT
cases, reject loading directly.

2. For non-JIT cases, calculating interpreters[idx] may still cause
out-of-bounds array access, and just warn about it.

3. For jit_requested cases, the execution of bpf_func also needs to be
warned. So move the definition of function __bpf_prog_ret0_warn out of
the macro definition CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON.

Reported-by: syzbot+d2a2c639d03ac200a4f1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000000f823606139faa5d@google.com/
Fixes: 011832b97b311 ("bpf: Introduce may_goto instruction")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <mrpre@163.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250214091823.46042-2-mrpre@163.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
kernel/bpf/core.c
kernel/bpf/verifier.c

index da729cbbaeb90cba9eb8ad3b615486e546eae800..a0200fbbace99ac5752cb9d8b64a16c3e110e4d5 100644 (file)
@@ -2290,17 +2290,18 @@ void bpf_patch_call_args(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 stack_depth)
        insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS;
 }
 #endif
-#else
+#endif
+
 static unsigned int __bpf_prog_ret0_warn(const void *ctx,
                                         const struct bpf_insn *insn)
 {
        /* If this handler ever gets executed, then BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
-        * is not working properly, so warn about it!
+        * is not working properly, or interpreter is being used when
+        * prog->jit_requested is not 0, so warn about it!
         */
        WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
        return 0;
 }
-#endif
 
 bool bpf_prog_map_compatible(struct bpf_map *map,
                             const struct bpf_prog *fp)
@@ -2380,8 +2381,18 @@ static void bpf_prog_select_func(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 {
 #ifndef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON
        u32 stack_depth = max_t(u32, fp->aux->stack_depth, 1);
+       u32 idx = (round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1;
 
-       fp->bpf_func = interpreters[(round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1];
+       /* may_goto may cause stack size > 512, leading to idx out-of-bounds.
+        * But for non-JITed programs, we don't need bpf_func, so no bounds
+        * check needed.
+        */
+       if (!fp->jit_requested &&
+           !WARN_ON_ONCE(idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(interpreters))) {
+               fp->bpf_func = interpreters[idx];
+       } else {
+               fp->bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret0_warn;
+       }
 #else
        fp->bpf_func = __bpf_prog_ret0_warn;
 #endif
index 04d1d75d9ff95f85148859f5a33bb6fd37bdb141..3c286ec9e8413d7c7c7aa94937f4d99214c56430 100644 (file)
@@ -21903,6 +21903,13 @@ next_insn:
                if (subprogs[cur_subprog + 1].start == i + delta + 1) {
                        subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth += stack_depth_extra;
                        subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_extra = stack_depth_extra;
+
+                       stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
+                       if (stack_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK && !prog->jit_requested) {
+                               verbose(env, "stack size %d(extra %d) is too large\n",
+                                       stack_depth, stack_depth_extra);
+                               return -EINVAL;
+                       }
                        cur_subprog++;
                        stack_depth = subprogs[cur_subprog].stack_depth;
                        stack_depth_extra = 0;