The Supported Rates IE length from an incoming Association Request frame
was used directly as the memcpy() length when copying into a fixed-size
16-byte stack buffer (supportRate). A malicious station can advertise an
IE length larger than 16 bytes, causing a stack buffer overflow.
Clamp ie_len to the buffer size before copying the Supported Rates IE,
and correct the bounds check when merging Extended Supported Rates to
prevent a second potential overflow.
This prevents kernel stack corruption triggered by malformed association
requests.
Signed-off-by: Navaneeth K <knavaneeth786@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
status = WLAN_STATUS_CHALLENGE_FAIL;
goto OnAssocReqFail;
} else {
+ if (ie_len > sizeof(supportRate))
+ ie_len = sizeof(supportRate);
+
memcpy(supportRate, p+2, ie_len);
supportRateNum = ie_len;
pkt_len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - ie_offset);
if (p) {
- if (supportRateNum <= sizeof(supportRate)) {
+ if (supportRateNum + ie_len <= sizeof(supportRate)) {
memcpy(supportRate+supportRateNum, p+2, ie_len);
supportRateNum += ie_len;
}