--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
+Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 14:31:48 -0500
+Subject: bnxt_en: Disable interrupts when allocating CP rings or NQs.
+
+From: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 5e66e35aab335b83d9ffb220d8a3a13986a7a60e ]
+
+When calling firmware to allocate a CP ring or NQ, an interrupt associated
+with that ring may be generated immediately before the doorbell is even
+setup after the firmware call returns. When servicing the interrupt, the
+driver may crash when trying to access the doorbell.
+
+Fix it by disabling interrupt on that vector until the doorbell is
+set up.
+
+Fixes: 697197e5a173 ("bnxt_en: Re-structure doorbells.")
+Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
+@@ -4903,12 +4903,18 @@ static int bnxt_hwrm_ring_alloc(struct b
+ struct bnxt_cp_ring_info *cpr = &bnapi->cp_ring;
+ struct bnxt_ring_struct *ring = &cpr->cp_ring_struct;
+ u32 map_idx = ring->map_idx;
++ unsigned int vector;
+
++ vector = bp->irq_tbl[map_idx].vector;
++ disable_irq_nosync(vector);
+ rc = hwrm_ring_alloc_send_msg(bp, ring, type, map_idx);
+- if (rc)
++ if (rc) {
++ enable_irq(vector);
+ goto err_out;
++ }
+ bnxt_set_db(bp, &cpr->cp_db, type, map_idx, ring->fw_ring_id);
+ bnxt_db_nq(bp, &cpr->cp_db, cpr->cp_raw_cons);
++ enable_irq(vector);
+ bp->grp_info[i].cp_fw_ring_id = ring->fw_ring_id;
+
+ if (!i) {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 11:39:41 -0800
+Subject: dccp: fool proof ccid_hc_[rt]x_parse_options()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 9b1f19d810e92d6cdc68455fbc22d9f961a58ce1 ]
+
+Similarly to commit 276bdb82dedb ("dccp: check ccid before dereferencing")
+it is wise to test for a NULL ccid.
+
+kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
+kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
+general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
+CPU: 1 PID: 16 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3+ #37
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+RIP: 0010:ccid_hc_tx_parse_options net/dccp/ccid.h:205 [inline]
+RIP: 0010:dccp_parse_options+0x8d9/0x12b0 net/dccp/options.c:233
+Code: c5 0f b6 75 b3 80 38 00 0f 85 d6 08 00 00 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b b8 f8 07 00 00 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 08 00 0f 85 95 08 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b
+kobject: 'loop5' (0000000080f78fc1): kobject_uevent_env
+RSP: 0018:ffff8880a94df0b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
+RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880858ac723 RCX: dffffc0000000000
+RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000007 RDI: 0000000000000001
+RBP: ffff8880a94df140 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888061b83a80
+R10: ffffed100c370752 R11: ffff888061b83a97 R12: 0000000000000026
+R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
+FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+CR2: 00007f0defa33518 CR3: 000000008db5e000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
+kobject: 'loop5' (0000000080f78fc1): fill_kobj_path: path = '/devices/virtual/block/loop5'
+DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
+Call Trace:
+ dccp_rcv_state_process+0x2b6/0x1af6 net/dccp/input.c:654
+ dccp_v4_do_rcv+0x100/0x190 net/dccp/ipv4.c:688
+ sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:936 [inline]
+ __sk_receive_skb+0x3a9/0xea0 net/core/sock.c:473
+ dccp_v4_rcv+0x10cb/0x1f80 net/dccp/ipv4.c:880
+ ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xb6/0xa20 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:208
+ ip_local_deliver_finish+0x23b/0x390 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:234
+ NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
+ NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:283 [inline]
+ ip_local_deliver+0x1f0/0x740 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:255
+ dst_input include/net/dst.h:450 [inline]
+ ip_rcv_finish+0x1f4/0x2f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:414
+ NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:289 [inline]
+ NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:283 [inline]
+ ip_rcv+0xed/0x620 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:524
+ __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x160/0x210 net/core/dev.c:4973
+ __netif_receive_skb+0x2c/0x1c0 net/core/dev.c:5083
+ process_backlog+0x206/0x750 net/core/dev.c:5923
+ napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6346 [inline]
+ net_rx_action+0x76d/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:6412
+ __do_softirq+0x30b/0xb11 kernel/softirq.c:292
+ run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:654 [inline]
+ run_ksoftirqd+0x8e/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:646
+ smpboot_thread_fn+0x6ab/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164
+ kthread+0x357/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:246
+ ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:352
+Modules linked in:
+---[ end trace 58a0ba03bea2c376 ]---
+RIP: 0010:ccid_hc_tx_parse_options net/dccp/ccid.h:205 [inline]
+RIP: 0010:dccp_parse_options+0x8d9/0x12b0 net/dccp/options.c:233
+Code: c5 0f b6 75 b3 80 38 00 0f 85 d6 08 00 00 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b b8 f8 07 00 00 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 08 00 0f 85 95 08 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b
+RSP: 0018:ffff8880a94df0b8 EFLAGS: 00010246
+RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880858ac723 RCX: dffffc0000000000
+RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: 0000000000000007 RDI: 0000000000000001
+RBP: ffff8880a94df140 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888061b83a80
+R10: ffffed100c370752 R11: ffff888061b83a97 R12: 0000000000000026
+R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
+FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880ae700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+CR2: 00007f0defa33518 CR3: 0000000009871000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
+DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/dccp/ccid.h | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/dccp/ccid.h
++++ b/net/dccp/ccid.h
+@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static inline void ccid_hc_tx_packet_rec
+ static inline int ccid_hc_tx_parse_options(struct ccid *ccid, struct sock *sk,
+ u8 pkt, u8 opt, u8 *val, u8 len)
+ {
+- if (ccid->ccid_ops->ccid_hc_tx_parse_options == NULL)
++ if (!ccid || !ccid->ccid_ops->ccid_hc_tx_parse_options)
+ return 0;
+ return ccid->ccid_ops->ccid_hc_tx_parse_options(sk, pkt, opt, val, len);
+ }
+@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static inline int ccid_hc_tx_parse_optio
+ static inline int ccid_hc_rx_parse_options(struct ccid *ccid, struct sock *sk,
+ u8 pkt, u8 opt, u8 *val, u8 len)
+ {
+- if (ccid->ccid_ops->ccid_hc_rx_parse_options == NULL)
++ if (!ccid || !ccid->ccid_ops->ccid_hc_rx_parse_options)
+ return 0;
+ return ccid->ccid_ops->ccid_hc_rx_parse_options(sk, pkt, opt, val, len);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Govindarajulu Varadarajan <gvaradar@cisco.com>
+Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 06:59:00 -0800
+Subject: enic: fix checksum validation for IPv6
+
+From: Govindarajulu Varadarajan <gvaradar@cisco.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 7596175e99b3d4bce28022193efd954c201a782a ]
+
+In case of IPv6 pkts, ipv4_csum_ok is 0. Because of this, driver does
+not set skb->ip_summed. So IPv6 rx checksum is not offloaded.
+
+Signed-off-by: Govindarajulu Varadarajan <gvaradar@cisco.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c
+@@ -1434,7 +1434,8 @@ static void enic_rq_indicate_buf(struct
+ * csum is correct or is zero.
+ */
+ if ((netdev->features & NETIF_F_RXCSUM) && !csum_not_calc &&
+- tcp_udp_csum_ok && ipv4_csum_ok && outer_csum_ok) {
++ tcp_udp_csum_ok && outer_csum_ok &&
++ (ipv4_csum_ok || ipv6)) {
+ skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
+ skb->csum_level = encap;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
+Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 10:42:30 -0800
+Subject: lib/test_rhashtable: Make test_insert_dup() allocate its hash table dynamically
+
+From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit fc42a689c4c097859e5bd37b5ea11b60dc426df6 ]
+
+The test_insert_dup() function from lib/test_rhashtable.c passes a
+pointer to a stack object to rhltable_init(). Allocate the hash table
+dynamically to avoid that the following is reported with object
+debugging enabled:
+
+ODEBUG: object (ptrval) is on stack (ptrval), but NOT annotated.
+WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at lib/debugobjects.c:368 __debug_object_init+0x312/0x480
+Modules linked in:
+EIP: __debug_object_init+0x312/0x480
+Call Trace:
+ ? debug_object_init+0x1a/0x20
+ ? __init_work+0x16/0x30
+ ? rhashtable_init+0x1e1/0x460
+ ? sched_clock_cpu+0x57/0xe0
+ ? rhltable_init+0xb/0x20
+ ? test_insert_dup+0x32/0x20f
+ ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x38/0xf0
+ ? ida_dump+0x10/0x10
+ ? jhash+0x130/0x130
+ ? my_hashfn+0x30/0x30
+ ? test_rht_init+0x6aa/0xab4
+ ? ida_dump+0x10/0x10
+ ? test_rhltable+0xc5c/0xc5c
+ ? do_one_initcall+0x67/0x28e
+ ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x22/0xe0
+ ? restore_all_kernel+0xf/0x70
+ ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0xc/0x10
+ ? restore_all_kernel+0xf/0x70
+ ? kernel_init_freeable+0x142/0x213
+ ? rest_init+0x230/0x230
+ ? kernel_init+0x10/0x110
+ ? schedule_tail_wrapper+0x9/0xc
+ ? ret_from_fork+0x19/0x24
+
+Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
+Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
+Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ lib/test_rhashtable.c | 23 +++++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/test_rhashtable.c
++++ b/lib/test_rhashtable.c
+@@ -541,38 +541,45 @@ static unsigned int __init print_ht(stru
+ static int __init test_insert_dup(struct test_obj_rhl *rhl_test_objects,
+ int cnt, bool slow)
+ {
+- struct rhltable rhlt;
++ struct rhltable *rhlt;
+ unsigned int i, ret;
+ const char *key;
+ int err = 0;
+
+- err = rhltable_init(&rhlt, &test_rht_params_dup);
+- if (WARN_ON(err))
++ rhlt = kmalloc(sizeof(*rhlt), GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (WARN_ON(!rhlt))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
++ err = rhltable_init(rhlt, &test_rht_params_dup);
++ if (WARN_ON(err)) {
++ kfree(rhlt);
+ return err;
++ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ rhl_test_objects[i].value.tid = i;
+- key = rht_obj(&rhlt.ht, &rhl_test_objects[i].list_node.rhead);
++ key = rht_obj(&rhlt->ht, &rhl_test_objects[i].list_node.rhead);
+ key += test_rht_params_dup.key_offset;
+
+ if (slow) {
+- err = PTR_ERR(rhashtable_insert_slow(&rhlt.ht, key,
++ err = PTR_ERR(rhashtable_insert_slow(&rhlt->ht, key,
+ &rhl_test_objects[i].list_node.rhead));
+ if (err == -EAGAIN)
+ err = 0;
+ } else
+- err = rhltable_insert(&rhlt,
++ err = rhltable_insert(rhlt,
+ &rhl_test_objects[i].list_node,
+ test_rht_params_dup);
+ if (WARN(err, "error %d on element %d/%d (%s)\n", err, i, cnt, slow? "slow" : "fast"))
+ goto skip_print;
+ }
+
+- ret = print_ht(&rhlt);
++ ret = print_ht(rhlt);
+ WARN(ret != cnt, "missing rhltable elements (%d != %d, %s)\n", ret, cnt, slow? "slow" : "fast");
+
+ skip_print:
+- rhltable_destroy(&rhlt);
++ rhltable_destroy(rhlt);
++ kfree(rhlt);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Petr Machata <petrm@mellanox.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 14:50:38 +0000
+Subject: net: cls_flower: Remove filter from mask before freeing it
+
+From: Petr Machata <petrm@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit c1f7e02979edd7a3a3e69fe04be60b1d650dc8a7 ]
+
+In fl_change(), when adding a new rule (i.e. fold == NULL), a driver may
+reject the new rule, for example due to resource exhaustion. By that
+point, the new rule was already assigned a mask, and it was added to
+that mask's hash table. The clean-up path that's invoked as a result of
+the rejection however neglects to undo the hash table addition, and
+proceeds to free the new rule, thus leaving a dangling pointer in the
+hash table.
+
+Fix by removing fnew from the mask's hash table before it is freed.
+
+Fixes: 35cc3cefc4de ("net/sched: cls_flower: Reject duplicated rules also under skip_sw")
+Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@mellanox.com>
+Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sched/cls_flower.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/sched/cls_flower.c
++++ b/net/sched/cls_flower.c
+@@ -1257,7 +1257,7 @@ static int fl_change(struct net *net, st
+ if (!tc_skip_hw(fnew->flags)) {
+ err = fl_hw_replace_filter(tp, fnew, extack);
+ if (err)
+- goto errout_mask;
++ goto errout_mask_ht;
+ }
+
+ if (!tc_in_hw(fnew->flags))
+@@ -1287,6 +1287,10 @@ static int fl_change(struct net *net, st
+ kfree(mask);
+ return 0;
+
++errout_mask_ht:
++ rhashtable_remove_fast(&fnew->mask->ht, &fnew->ht_node,
++ fnew->mask->filter_ht_params);
++
+ errout_mask:
+ fl_mask_put(head, fnew->mask, false);
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 11:20:29 +0100
+Subject: net: dp83640: expire old TX-skb
+
+From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+
+[ Upstream commit 53bc8d2af08654659abfadfd3e98eb9922ff787c ]
+
+During sendmsg() a cloned skb is saved via dp83640_txtstamp() in
+->tx_queue. After the NIC sends this packet, the PHY will reply with a
+timestamp for that TX packet. If the cable is pulled at the right time I
+don't see that packet. It might gets flushed as part of queue shutdown
+on NIC's side.
+Once the link is up again then after the next sendmsg() we enqueue
+another skb in dp83640_txtstamp() and have two on the list. Then the PHY
+will send a reply and decode_txts() attaches it to the first skb on the
+list.
+No crash occurs since refcounting works but we are one packet behind.
+linuxptp/ptp4l usually closes the socket and opens a new one (in such a
+timeout case) so those "stale" replies never get there. However it does
+not resume normal operation anymore.
+
+Purge old skbs in decode_txts().
+
+Fixes: cb646e2b02b2 ("ptp: Added a clock driver for the National Semiconductor PHYTER.")
+Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Kurt Kanzenbach <kurt@linutronix.de>
+Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c | 13 ++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
++++ b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
+@@ -898,14 +898,14 @@ static void decode_txts(struct dp83640_p
+ struct phy_txts *phy_txts)
+ {
+ struct skb_shared_hwtstamps shhwtstamps;
++ struct dp83640_skb_info *skb_info;
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+- u64 ns;
+ u8 overflow;
++ u64 ns;
+
+ /* We must already have the skb that triggered this. */
+-
++again:
+ skb = skb_dequeue(&dp83640->tx_queue);
+-
+ if (!skb) {
+ pr_debug("have timestamp but tx_queue empty\n");
+ return;
+@@ -920,6 +920,11 @@ static void decode_txts(struct dp83640_p
+ }
+ return;
+ }
++ skb_info = (struct dp83640_skb_info *)skb->cb;
++ if (time_after(jiffies, skb_info->tmo)) {
++ kfree_skb(skb);
++ goto again;
++ }
+
+ ns = phy2txts(phy_txts);
+ memset(&shhwtstamps, 0, sizeof(shhwtstamps));
+@@ -1472,6 +1477,7 @@ static bool dp83640_rxtstamp(struct phy_
+ static void dp83640_txtstamp(struct phy_device *phydev,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, int type)
+ {
++ struct dp83640_skb_info *skb_info = (struct dp83640_skb_info *)skb->cb;
+ struct dp83640_private *dp83640 = phydev->priv;
+
+ switch (dp83640->hwts_tx_en) {
+@@ -1484,6 +1490,7 @@ static void dp83640_txtstamp(struct phy_
+ /* fall through */
+ case HWTSTAMP_TX_ON:
+ skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags |= SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS;
++ skb_info->tmo = jiffies + SKB_TIMESTAMP_TIMEOUT;
+ skb_queue_tail(&dp83640->tx_queue, skb);
+ break;
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Arun Parameswaran <arun.parameswaran@broadcom.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2019 16:01:18 -0800
+Subject: net: dsa: b53: Fix for failure when irq is not defined in dt
+
+From: Arun Parameswaran <arun.parameswaran@broadcom.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 39841cc1cbb69344539c98a1fa9d858ed124c7ba ]
+
+Fixes the issues with non BCM58XX chips in the b53 driver
+failing, when the irq is not specified in the device tree.
+
+Removed the check for BCM58XX in b53_srab_prepare_irq(),
+so the 'port->irq' will be set to '-EXIO' if the irq is not
+specified in the device tree.
+
+Fixes: 16994374a6fc ("net: dsa: b53: Make SRAB driver manage port interrupts")
+Fixes: b2ddc48a81b5 ("net: dsa: b53: Do not fail when IRQ are not initialized")
+Signed-off-by: Arun Parameswaran <arun.parameswaran@broadcom.com>
+Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_srab.c | 3 ---
+ 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_srab.c
++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_srab.c
+@@ -511,9 +511,6 @@ static void b53_srab_prepare_irq(struct
+ /* Clear all pending interrupts */
+ writel(0xffffffff, priv->regs + B53_SRAB_INTR);
+
+- if (dev->pdata && dev->pdata->chip_id != BCM58XX_DEVICE_ID)
+- return;
+-
+ for (i = 0; i < B53_N_PORTS; i++) {
+ port = &priv->port_intrs[i];
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
+Date: Sat, 2 Feb 2019 17:53:29 +0000
+Subject: net: dsa: Fix lockdep false positive splat
+
+From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit c8101f7729daee251f4f6505f9d135ec08e1342f ]
+
+Creating a macvtap on a DSA-backed interface results in the following
+splat when lockdep is enabled:
+
+[ 19.638080] IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): lan0: link becomes ready
+[ 23.041198] device lan0 entered promiscuous mode
+[ 23.043445] device eth0 entered promiscuous mode
+[ 23.049255]
+[ 23.049557] ============================================
+[ 23.055021] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
+[ 23.060490] 5.0.0-rc3-00013-g56c857a1b8d3 #118 Not tainted
+[ 23.066132] --------------------------------------------
+[ 23.071598] ip/2861 is trying to acquire lock:
+[ 23.076171] 00000000f61990cb (_xmit_ETHER){+...}, at: dev_set_rx_mode+0x1c/0x38
+[ 23.083693]
+[ 23.083693] but task is already holding lock:
+[ 23.089696] 00000000ecf0c3b4 (_xmit_ETHER){+...}, at: dev_uc_add+0x24/0x70
+[ 23.096774]
+[ 23.096774] other info that might help us debug this:
+[ 23.103494] Possible unsafe locking scenario:
+[ 23.103494]
+[ 23.109584] CPU0
+[ 23.112093] ----
+[ 23.114601] lock(_xmit_ETHER);
+[ 23.117917] lock(_xmit_ETHER);
+[ 23.121233]
+[ 23.121233] *** DEADLOCK ***
+[ 23.121233]
+[ 23.127325] May be due to missing lock nesting notation
+[ 23.127325]
+[ 23.134315] 2 locks held by ip/2861:
+[ 23.137987] #0: 000000003b766c72 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}, at: rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x338/0x4e0
+[ 23.146231] #1: 00000000ecf0c3b4 (_xmit_ETHER){+...}, at: dev_uc_add+0x24/0x70
+[ 23.153757]
+[ 23.153757] stack backtrace:
+[ 23.158243] CPU: 0 PID: 2861 Comm: ip Not tainted 5.0.0-rc3-00013-g56c857a1b8d3 #118
+[ 23.166212] Hardware name: Globalscale Marvell ESPRESSOBin Board (DT)
+[ 23.172843] Call trace:
+[ 23.175358] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188
+[ 23.179116] show_stack+0x14/0x20
+[ 23.182524] dump_stack+0xb4/0xec
+[ 23.185928] __lock_acquire+0x123c/0x1860
+[ 23.190048] lock_acquire+0xc8/0x248
+[ 23.193724] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x40/0x58
+[ 23.197755] dev_set_rx_mode+0x1c/0x38
+[ 23.201607] dev_set_promiscuity+0x3c/0x50
+[ 23.205820] dsa_slave_change_rx_flags+0x5c/0x70
+[ 23.210567] __dev_set_promiscuity+0x148/0x1e0
+[ 23.215136] __dev_set_rx_mode+0x74/0x98
+[ 23.219167] dev_uc_add+0x54/0x70
+[ 23.222575] macvlan_open+0x170/0x1d0
+[ 23.226336] __dev_open+0xe0/0x160
+[ 23.229830] __dev_change_flags+0x16c/0x1b8
+[ 23.234132] dev_change_flags+0x20/0x60
+[ 23.238074] do_setlink+0x2d0/0xc50
+[ 23.241658] __rtnl_newlink+0x5f8/0x6e8
+[ 23.245601] rtnl_newlink+0x50/0x78
+[ 23.249184] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x360/0x4e0
+[ 23.253397] netlink_rcv_skb+0xe8/0x130
+[ 23.257338] rtnetlink_rcv+0x14/0x20
+[ 23.261012] netlink_unicast+0x190/0x210
+[ 23.265043] netlink_sendmsg+0x288/0x350
+[ 23.269075] sock_sendmsg+0x18/0x30
+[ 23.272659] ___sys_sendmsg+0x29c/0x2c8
+[ 23.276602] __sys_sendmsg+0x60/0xb8
+[ 23.280276] __arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x1c/0x28
+[ 23.284488] el0_svc_common+0xd8/0x138
+[ 23.288340] el0_svc_handler+0x24/0x80
+[ 23.292192] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
+
+This looks fairly harmless (no actual deadlock occurs), and is
+fixed in a similar way to c6894dec8ea9 ("bridge: fix lockdep
+addr_list_lock false positive splat") by putting the addr_list_lock
+in its own lockdep class.
+
+Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/dsa/master.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/dsa/master.c
++++ b/net/dsa/master.c
+@@ -179,6 +179,8 @@ static const struct attribute_group dsa_
+ .attrs = dsa_slave_attrs,
+ };
+
++static struct lock_class_key dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key;
++
+ int dsa_master_setup(struct net_device *dev, struct dsa_port *cpu_dp)
+ {
+ int ret;
+@@ -190,6 +192,8 @@ int dsa_master_setup(struct net_device *
+ wmb();
+
+ dev->dsa_ptr = cpu_dp;
++ lockdep_set_class(&dev->addr_list_lock,
++ &dsa_master_addr_list_lock_key);
+
+ ret = dsa_master_ethtool_setup(dev);
+ if (ret)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 18:35:15 +0300
+Subject: net: dsa: Fix NULL checking in dsa_slave_set_eee()
+
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 00670cb8a73b10b10d3c40f045c15411715e4465 ]
+
+This function can't succeed if dp->pl is NULL. It will Oops inside the
+call to return phylink_ethtool_get_eee(dp->pl, e);
+
+Fixes: 1be52e97ed3e ("dsa: slave: eee: Allow ports to use phylink")
+Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/dsa/slave.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/dsa/slave.c
++++ b/net/dsa/slave.c
+@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ static int dsa_slave_set_eee(struct net_
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Port's PHY and MAC both need to be EEE capable */
+- if (!dev->phydev && !dp->pl)
++ if (!dev->phydev || !dp->pl)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (!ds->ops->set_mac_eee)
+@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ static int dsa_slave_get_eee(struct net_
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Port's PHY and MAC both need to be EEE capable */
+- if (!dev->phydev && !dp->pl)
++ if (!dev->phydev || !dp->pl)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (!ds->ops->get_mac_eee)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
+Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2019 00:02:58 +0100
+Subject: net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Fix counting of ATU violations
+
+From: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
+
+[ Upstream commit 75c05a74e745ae7d663b04d75777af80ada2233c ]
+
+The ATU port vector contains a bit per port of the switch. The code
+wrongly used it as a port number, and incremented a port counter. This
+resulted in the wrong interfaces counter being incremented, and
+potentially going off the end of the array of ports.
+
+Fix this by using the source port ID for the violation, which really
+is a port number.
+
+Reported-by: Chris Healy <Chris.Healy@zii.aero>
+Tested-by: Chris Healy <Chris.Healy@zii.aero>
+Fixes: 65f60e4582bd ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: Keep ATU/VTU violation statistics")
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c | 21 ++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
++++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/global1_atu.c
+@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob
+ {
+ struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip = dev_id;
+ struct mv88e6xxx_atu_entry entry;
++ int spid;
+ int err;
+ u16 val;
+
+@@ -336,6 +337,8 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
++ spid = entry.state;
++
+ if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_AGE_OUT_VIOLATION) {
+ dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev,
+ "ATU age out violation for %pM\n",
+@@ -344,23 +347,23 @@ static irqreturn_t mv88e6xxx_g1_atu_prob
+
+ if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_MEMBER_VIOLATION) {
+ dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev,
+- "ATU member violation for %pM portvec %x\n",
+- entry.mac, entry.portvec);
+- chip->ports[entry.portvec].atu_member_violation++;
++ "ATU member violation for %pM portvec %x spid %d\n",
++ entry.mac, entry.portvec, spid);
++ chip->ports[spid].atu_member_violation++;
+ }
+
+ if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_MISS_VIOLATION) {
+ dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev,
+- "ATU miss violation for %pM portvec %x\n",
+- entry.mac, entry.portvec);
+- chip->ports[entry.portvec].atu_miss_violation++;
++ "ATU miss violation for %pM portvec %x spid %d\n",
++ entry.mac, entry.portvec, spid);
++ chip->ports[spid].atu_miss_violation++;
+ }
+
+ if (val & MV88E6XXX_G1_ATU_OP_FULL_VIOLATION) {
+ dev_err_ratelimited(chip->dev,
+- "ATU full violation for %pM portvec %x\n",
+- entry.mac, entry.portvec);
+- chip->ports[entry.portvec].atu_full_violation++;
++ "ATU full violation for %pM portvec %x spid %d\n",
++ entry.mac, entry.portvec, spid);
++ chip->ports[spid].atu_full_violation++;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&chip->reg_lock);
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Rundong Ge <rdong.ge@gmail.com>
+Date: Sat, 2 Feb 2019 14:29:35 +0000
+Subject: net: dsa: slave: Don't propagate flag changes on down slave interfaces
+
+From: Rundong Ge <rdong.ge@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 17ab4f61b8cd6f9c38e9d0b935d86d73b5d0d2b5 ]
+
+The unbalance of master's promiscuity or allmulti will happen after ifdown
+and ifup a slave interface which is in a bridge.
+
+When we ifdown a slave interface , both the 'dsa_slave_close' and
+'dsa_slave_change_rx_flags' will clear the master's flags. The flags
+of master will be decrease twice.
+In the other hand, if we ifup the slave interface again, since the
+slave's flags were cleared the 'dsa_slave_open' won't set the master's
+flag, only 'dsa_slave_change_rx_flags' that triggered by 'br_add_if'
+will set the master's flags. The flags of master is increase once.
+
+Only propagating flag changes when a slave interface is up makes
+sure this does not happen. The 'vlan_dev_change_rx_flags' had the
+same problem and was fixed, and changes here follows that fix.
+
+Fixes: 91da11f870f0 ("net: Distributed Switch Architecture protocol support")
+Signed-off-by: Rundong Ge <rdong.ge@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/dsa/slave.c | 13 ++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/dsa/slave.c
++++ b/net/dsa/slave.c
+@@ -140,11 +140,14 @@ static int dsa_slave_close(struct net_de
+ static void dsa_slave_change_rx_flags(struct net_device *dev, int change)
+ {
+ struct net_device *master = dsa_slave_to_master(dev);
+-
+- if (change & IFF_ALLMULTI)
+- dev_set_allmulti(master, dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI ? 1 : -1);
+- if (change & IFF_PROMISC)
+- dev_set_promiscuity(master, dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC ? 1 : -1);
++ if (dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
++ if (change & IFF_ALLMULTI)
++ dev_set_allmulti(master,
++ dev->flags & IFF_ALLMULTI ? 1 : -1);
++ if (change & IFF_PROMISC)
++ dev_set_promiscuity(master,
++ dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC ? 1 : -1);
++ }
+ }
+
+ static void dsa_slave_set_rx_mode(struct net_device *dev)
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 3 Dec 2018 22:14:04 -0800
+Subject: net/mlx5e: Force CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY for short ethernet frames
+
+From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit e8c8b53ccaff568fef4c13a6ccaf08bf241aa01a ]
+
+When an ethernet frame is padded to meet the minimum ethernet frame
+size, the padding octets are not covered by the hardware checksum.
+Fortunately the padding octets are usually zero's, which don't affect
+checksum. However, we have a switch which pads non-zero octets, this
+causes kernel hardware checksum fault repeatedly.
+
+Prior to:
+commit '88078d98d1bb ("net: pskb_trim_rcsum() and CHECKSUM_COMPLETE ...")'
+skb checksum was forced to be CHECKSUM_NONE when padding is detected.
+After it, we need to keep skb->csum updated, like what we do for RXFCS.
+However, fixing up CHECKSUM_COMPLETE requires to verify and parse IP
+headers, it is not worthy the effort as the packets are so small that
+CHECKSUM_COMPLETE can't save anything.
+
+Fixes: 88078d98d1bb ("net: pskb_trim_rcsum() and CHECKSUM_COMPLETE are friends"),
+Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com>
+Cc: Nikola Ciprich <nikola.ciprich@linuxbox.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rx.c
+@@ -732,6 +732,8 @@ static u8 get_ip_proto(struct sk_buff *s
+ ((struct ipv6hdr *)ip_p)->nexthdr;
+ }
+
++#define short_frame(size) ((size) <= ETH_ZLEN + ETH_FCS_LEN)
++
+ static inline void mlx5e_handle_csum(struct net_device *netdev,
+ struct mlx5_cqe64 *cqe,
+ struct mlx5e_rq *rq,
+@@ -754,6 +756,17 @@ static inline void mlx5e_handle_csum(str
+ if (unlikely(test_bit(MLX5E_RQ_STATE_NO_CSUM_COMPLETE, &rq->state)))
+ goto csum_unnecessary;
+
++ /* CQE csum doesn't cover padding octets in short ethernet
++ * frames. And the pad field is appended prior to calculating
++ * and appending the FCS field.
++ *
++ * Detecting these padded frames requires to verify and parse
++ * IP headers, so we simply force all those small frames to be
++ * CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY even if they are not padded.
++ */
++ if (short_frame(skb->len))
++ goto csum_unnecessary;
++
+ if (likely(is_last_ethertype_ip(skb, &network_depth, &proto))) {
+ if (unlikely(get_ip_proto(skb, network_depth, proto) == IPPROTO_SCTP))
+ goto csum_unnecessary;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Guy Shattah <sguy@mellanox.com>
+Date: Mon, 28 Jan 2019 13:58:07 +0000
+Subject: net/mlx5e: Use the inner headers to determine tc/pedit offload limitation on decap flows
+
+From: Guy Shattah <sguy@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1651925d403e077e3fc86f961905e27c6810e132 ]
+
+In packets that need to be decaped the internal headers
+have to be checked, not the external ones.
+
+Fixes: bdd66ac0aeed ("net/mlx5e: Disallow TC offloading of unsupported match/action combinations")
+Signed-off-by: Guy Shattah <sguy@mellanox.com>
+Reviewed-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c | 9 +++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c
+@@ -2133,6 +2133,7 @@ static bool csum_offload_supported(struc
+
+ static bool modify_header_match_supported(struct mlx5_flow_spec *spec,
+ struct tcf_exts *exts,
++ u32 match_actions,
+ struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+ {
+ const struct tc_action *a;
+@@ -2143,7 +2144,11 @@ static bool modify_header_match_supporte
+ u16 ethertype;
+ int nkeys, i;
+
+- headers_v = MLX5_ADDR_OF(fte_match_param, spec->match_value, outer_headers);
++ if (match_actions & MLX5_FLOW_CONTEXT_ACTION_DECAP)
++ headers_v = MLX5_ADDR_OF(fte_match_param, spec->match_value, inner_headers);
++ else
++ headers_v = MLX5_ADDR_OF(fte_match_param, spec->match_value, outer_headers);
++
+ ethertype = MLX5_GET(fte_match_set_lyr_2_4, headers_v, ethertype);
+
+ /* for non-IP we only re-write MACs, so we're okay */
+@@ -2200,7 +2205,7 @@ static bool actions_match_supported(stru
+
+ if (actions & MLX5_FLOW_CONTEXT_ACTION_MOD_HDR)
+ return modify_header_match_supported(&parse_attr->spec, exts,
+- extack);
++ actions, extack);
+
+ return true;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 13:23:38 -0800
+Subject: net: systemport: Fix WoL with password after deep sleep
+
+From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 8dfb8d2cceb76b74ad5b58cc65c75994329b4d5e ]
+
+Broadcom STB chips support a deep sleep mode where all register
+contents are lost. Because we were stashing the MagicPacket password
+into some of these registers a suspend into that deep sleep then a
+resumption would not lead to being able to wake-up from MagicPacket with
+password again.
+
+Fix this by keeping a software copy of the password and program it
+during suspend.
+
+Fixes: 83e82f4c706b ("net: systemport: add Wake-on-LAN support")
+Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c | 25 ++++++++++---------------
+ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.h | 2 ++
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.c
+@@ -520,7 +520,6 @@ static void bcm_sysport_get_wol(struct n
+ struct ethtool_wolinfo *wol)
+ {
+ struct bcm_sysport_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
+- u32 reg;
+
+ wol->supported = WAKE_MAGIC | WAKE_MAGICSECURE | WAKE_FILTER;
+ wol->wolopts = priv->wolopts;
+@@ -528,11 +527,7 @@ static void bcm_sysport_get_wol(struct n
+ if (!(priv->wolopts & WAKE_MAGICSECURE))
+ return;
+
+- /* Return the programmed SecureOn password */
+- reg = umac_readl(priv, UMAC_PSW_MS);
+- put_unaligned_be16(reg, &wol->sopass[0]);
+- reg = umac_readl(priv, UMAC_PSW_LS);
+- put_unaligned_be32(reg, &wol->sopass[2]);
++ memcpy(wol->sopass, priv->sopass, sizeof(priv->sopass));
+ }
+
+ static int bcm_sysport_set_wol(struct net_device *dev,
+@@ -548,13 +543,8 @@ static int bcm_sysport_set_wol(struct ne
+ if (wol->wolopts & ~supported)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+- /* Program the SecureOn password */
+- if (wol->wolopts & WAKE_MAGICSECURE) {
+- umac_writel(priv, get_unaligned_be16(&wol->sopass[0]),
+- UMAC_PSW_MS);
+- umac_writel(priv, get_unaligned_be32(&wol->sopass[2]),
+- UMAC_PSW_LS);
+- }
++ if (wol->wolopts & WAKE_MAGICSECURE)
++ memcpy(priv->sopass, wol->sopass, sizeof(priv->sopass));
+
+ /* Flag the device and relevant IRQ as wakeup capable */
+ if (wol->wolopts) {
+@@ -2592,13 +2582,18 @@ static int bcm_sysport_suspend_to_wol(st
+ unsigned int index, i = 0;
+ u32 reg;
+
+- /* Password has already been programmed */
+ reg = umac_readl(priv, UMAC_MPD_CTRL);
+ if (priv->wolopts & (WAKE_MAGIC | WAKE_MAGICSECURE))
+ reg |= MPD_EN;
+ reg &= ~PSW_EN;
+- if (priv->wolopts & WAKE_MAGICSECURE)
++ if (priv->wolopts & WAKE_MAGICSECURE) {
++ /* Program the SecureOn password */
++ umac_writel(priv, get_unaligned_be16(&priv->sopass[0]),
++ UMAC_PSW_MS);
++ umac_writel(priv, get_unaligned_be32(&priv->sopass[2]),
++ UMAC_PSW_LS);
+ reg |= PSW_EN;
++ }
+ umac_writel(priv, reg, UMAC_MPD_CTRL);
+
+ if (priv->wolopts & WAKE_FILTER) {
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.h
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bcmsysport.h
+@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
+ #define __BCM_SYSPORT_H
+
+ #include <linux/bitmap.h>
++#include <linux/ethtool.h>
+ #include <linux/if_vlan.h>
+ #include <linux/net_dim.h>
+
+@@ -778,6 +779,7 @@ struct bcm_sysport_priv {
+ unsigned int crc_fwd:1;
+ u16 rev;
+ u32 wolopts;
++ u8 sopass[SOPASS_MAX];
+ unsigned int wol_irq_disabled:1;
+
+ /* MIB related fields */
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 08:47:10 -0800
+Subject: rds: fix refcount bug in rds_sock_addref
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 6fa19f5637a6c22bc0999596bcc83bdcac8a4fa6 ]
+
+syzbot was able to catch a bug in rds [1]
+
+The issue here is that the socket might be found in a hash table
+but that its refcount has already be set to 0 by another cpu.
+
+We need to use refcount_inc_not_zero() to be safe here.
+
+[1]
+
+refcount_t: increment on 0; use-after-free.
+WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23129 at lib/refcount.c:153 refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:153 [inline]
+WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 23129 at lib/refcount.c:153 refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:151
+Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
+CPU: 1 PID: 23129 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc4+ #53
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x1db/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
+ panic+0x2cb/0x65c kernel/panic.c:214
+ __warn.cold+0x20/0x48 kernel/panic.c:571
+ report_bug+0x263/0x2b0 lib/bug.c:186
+ fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 [inline]
+ fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:173 [inline]
+ do_error_trap+0x11b/0x200 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:271
+ do_invalid_op+0x37/0x50 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:290
+ invalid_op+0x14/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:973
+RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked lib/refcount.c:153 [inline]
+RIP: 0010:refcount_inc_checked+0x61/0x70 lib/refcount.c:151
+Code: 1d 51 63 c8 06 31 ff 89 de e8 eb 1b f2 fd 84 db 75 dd e8 a2 1a f2 fd 48 c7 c7 60 9f 81 88 c6 05 31 63 c8 06 01 e8 af 65 bb fd <0f> 0b eb c1 90 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 49
+RSP: 0018:ffff8880a0cbf1e8 EFLAGS: 00010282
+RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffc90006113000
+RDX: 000000000001047d RSI: ffffffff81685776 RDI: 0000000000000005
+RBP: ffff8880a0cbf1f8 R08: ffff888097c9e100 R09: ffffed1015ce5021
+R10: ffffed1015ce5020 R11: ffff8880ae728107 R12: ffff8880723c20c0
+R13: ffff8880723c24b0 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffed1014197e64
+ sock_hold include/net/sock.h:647 [inline]
+ rds_sock_addref+0x19/0x20 net/rds/af_rds.c:675
+ rds_find_bound+0x97c/0x1080 net/rds/bind.c:82
+ rds_recv_incoming+0x3be/0x1430 net/rds/recv.c:362
+ rds_loop_xmit+0xf3/0x2a0 net/rds/loop.c:96
+ rds_send_xmit+0x1355/0x2a10 net/rds/send.c:355
+ rds_sendmsg+0x323c/0x44e0 net/rds/send.c:1368
+ sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline]
+ sock_sendmsg+0xdd/0x130 net/socket.c:631
+ __sys_sendto+0x387/0x5f0 net/socket.c:1788
+ __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1800 [inline]
+ __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1796 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1796
+ do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
+RIP: 0033:0x458089
+Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
+RSP: 002b:00007fc266df8c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 0000000000458089
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000204b3fff RDI: 0000000000000005
+RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 00000000202b4000 R09: 0000000000000010
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fc266df96d4
+R13: 00000000004c56e4 R14: 00000000004d94a8 R15: 00000000ffffffff
+
+Fixes: cc4dfb7f70a3 ("rds: fix two RCU related problems")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Cc: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
+Cc: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
+Cc: rds-devel@oss.oracle.com
+Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rds/bind.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/rds/bind.c
++++ b/net/rds/bind.c
+@@ -78,10 +78,10 @@ struct rds_sock *rds_find_bound(const st
+ __rds_create_bind_key(key, addr, port, scope_id);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ rs = rhashtable_lookup(&bind_hash_table, key, ht_parms);
+- if (rs && !sock_flag(rds_rs_to_sk(rs), SOCK_DEAD))
+- rds_sock_addref(rs);
+- else
++ if (rs && (sock_flag(rds_rs_to_sk(rs), SOCK_DEAD) ||
++ !refcount_inc_not_zero(&rds_rs_to_sk(rs)->sk_refcnt)))
+ rs = NULL;
++
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ rdsdebug("returning rs %p for %pI6c:%u\n", rs, addr,
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
+Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 16:59:46 +0000
+Subject: Revert "net: phy: marvell: avoid pause mode on SGMII-to-Copper for 88e151x"
+
+From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
+
+[ Upstream commit c14f07c6211cc01d52ed92cce1fade5071b8d197 ]
+
+This reverts commit 6623c0fba10ef45b64ca213ad5dec926f37fa9a0.
+
+The original diagnosis was incorrect: it appears that the NIC had
+PHY polling mode enabled, which meant that it overwrote the PHYs
+advertisement register during negotiation.
+
+Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
+Tested-by: Yonglong Liu <liuyonglong@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/phy/marvell.c | 12 ------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c
++++ b/drivers/net/phy/marvell.c
+@@ -847,8 +847,6 @@ static int m88e1510_config_init(struct p
+
+ /* SGMII-to-Copper mode initialization */
+ if (phydev->interface == PHY_INTERFACE_MODE_SGMII) {
+- u32 pause;
+-
+ /* Select page 18 */
+ err = marvell_set_page(phydev, 18);
+ if (err < 0)
+@@ -871,16 +869,6 @@ static int m88e1510_config_init(struct p
+ err = marvell_set_page(phydev, MII_MARVELL_COPPER_PAGE);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+-
+- /* There appears to be a bug in the 88e1512 when used in
+- * SGMII to copper mode, where the AN advertisement register
+- * clears the pause bits each time a negotiation occurs.
+- * This means we can never be truely sure what was advertised,
+- * so disable Pause support.
+- */
+- pause = SUPPORTED_Pause | SUPPORTED_Asym_Pause;
+- phydev->supported &= ~pause;
+- phydev->advertising &= ~pause;
+ }
+
+ return m88e1318_config_init(phydev);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 08:36:06 -0800
+Subject: rxrpc: bad unlock balance in rxrpc_recvmsg
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 6dce3c20ac429e7a651d728e375853370c796e8d ]
+
+When either "goto wait_interrupted;" or "goto wait_error;"
+paths are taken, socket lock has already been released.
+
+This patch fixes following syzbot splat :
+
+WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
+5.0.0-rc4+ #59 Not tainted
+-------------------------------------
+syz-executor223/8256 is trying to release lock (sk_lock-AF_RXRPC) at:
+[<ffffffff86651353>] rxrpc_recvmsg+0x6d3/0x3099 net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:598
+but there are no more locks to release!
+
+other info that might help us debug this:
+1 lock held by syz-executor223/8256:
+ #0: 00000000fa9ed0f4 (slock-AF_RXRPC){+...}, at: spin_lock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:334 [inline]
+ #0: 00000000fa9ed0f4 (slock-AF_RXRPC){+...}, at: release_sock+0x20/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:2798
+
+stack backtrace:
+CPU: 1 PID: 8256 Comm: syz-executor223 Not tainted 5.0.0-rc4+ #59
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
+ print_unlock_imbalance_bug kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3391 [inline]
+ print_unlock_imbalance_bug.cold+0x114/0x123 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3368
+ __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3601 [inline]
+ lock_release+0x67e/0xa00 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3860
+ sock_release_ownership include/net/sock.h:1471 [inline]
+ release_sock+0x183/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:2808
+ rxrpc_recvmsg+0x6d3/0x3099 net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:598
+ sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:794 [inline]
+ sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:801 [inline]
+ sock_recvmsg+0xd0/0x110 net/socket.c:797
+ __sys_recvfrom+0x1ff/0x350 net/socket.c:1845
+ __do_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:1863 [inline]
+ __se_sys_recvfrom net/socket.c:1859 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_recvfrom+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1859
+ do_syscall_64+0x103/0x610 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
+RIP: 0033:0x446379
+Code: e8 2c b3 02 00 48 83 c4 18 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 2b 09 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
+RSP: 002b:00007fe5da89fd98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002d
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000006dbc28 RCX: 0000000000446379
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
+RBP: 00000000006dbc20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000006dbc2c
+R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 20c49ba5e353f7cf
+
+Fixes: 248f219cb8bc ("rxrpc: Rewrite the data and ack handling code")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
++++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c
+@@ -596,6 +596,7 @@ error_requeue_call:
+ }
+ error_no_call:
+ release_sock(&rx->sk);
++error_trace:
+ trace_rxrpc_recvmsg(call, rxrpc_recvmsg_return, 0, 0, 0, ret);
+ return ret;
+
+@@ -604,7 +605,7 @@ wait_interrupted:
+ wait_error:
+ finish_wait(sk_sleep(&rx->sk), &wait);
+ call = NULL;
+- goto error_no_call;
++ goto error_trace;
+ }
+
+ /**
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2019 03:27:58 +0800
+Subject: sctp: check and update stream->out_curr when allocating stream_out
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit cfe4bd7a257f6d6f81d3458d8c9d9ec4957539e6 ]
+
+Now when using stream reconfig to add out streams, stream->out
+will get re-allocated, and all old streams' information will
+be copied to the new ones and the old ones will be freed.
+
+So without stream->out_curr updated, next time when trying to
+send from stream->out_curr stream, a panic would be caused.
+
+This patch is to check and update stream->out_curr when
+allocating stream_out.
+
+v1->v2:
+ - define fa_index() to get elem index from stream->out_curr.
+v2->v3:
+ - repost with no change.
+
+Fixes: 5bbbbe32a431 ("sctp: introduce stream scheduler foundations")
+Reported-by: Ying Xu <yinxu@redhat.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot+e33a3a138267ca119c7d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/stream.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/stream.c
++++ b/net/sctp/stream.c
+@@ -84,6 +84,19 @@ static void fa_zero(struct flex_array *f
+ }
+ }
+
++static size_t fa_index(struct flex_array *fa, void *elem, size_t count)
++{
++ size_t index = 0;
++
++ while (count--) {
++ if (elem == flex_array_get(fa, index))
++ break;
++ index++;
++ }
++
++ return index;
++}
++
+ /* Migrates chunks from stream queues to new stream queues if needed,
+ * but not across associations. Also, removes those chunks to streams
+ * higher than the new max.
+@@ -147,6 +160,13 @@ static int sctp_stream_alloc_out(struct
+
+ if (stream->out) {
+ fa_copy(out, stream->out, 0, min(outcnt, stream->outcnt));
++ if (stream->out_curr) {
++ size_t index = fa_index(stream->out, stream->out_curr,
++ stream->outcnt);
++
++ BUG_ON(index == stream->outcnt);
++ stream->out_curr = flex_array_get(out, index);
++ }
+ fa_free(stream->out);
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 15:15:22 +0100
+Subject: sctp: walk the list of asoc safely
+
+From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit ba59fb0273076637f0add4311faa990a5eec27c0 ]
+
+In sctp_sendmesg(), when walking the list of endpoint associations, the
+association can be dropped from the list, making the list corrupt.
+Properly handle this by using list_for_each_entry_safe()
+
+Fixes: 4910280503f3 ("sctp: add support for snd flag SCTP_SENDALL process in sendmsg")
+Reported-by: Secunia Research <vuln@secunia.com>
+Tested-by: Secunia Research <vuln@secunia.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/socket.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
++++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
+@@ -2027,7 +2027,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sctp_endpoint *ep = sctp_sk(sk)->ep;
+ struct sctp_transport *transport = NULL;
+ struct sctp_sndrcvinfo _sinfo, *sinfo;
+- struct sctp_association *asoc;
++ struct sctp_association *asoc, *tmp;
+ struct sctp_cmsgs cmsgs;
+ union sctp_addr *daddr;
+ bool new = false;
+@@ -2053,7 +2053,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk,
+
+ /* SCTP_SENDALL process */
+ if ((sflags & SCTP_SENDALL) && sctp_style(sk, UDP)) {
+- list_for_each_entry(asoc, &ep->asocs, asocs) {
++ list_for_each_entry_safe(asoc, tmp, &ep->asocs, asocs) {
+ err = sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags(asoc, sflags, msg,
+ msg_len);
+ if (err == 0)
scripts-gdb-fix-lx-version-string-output.patch
xprtrdma-don-t-wake-pending-tasks-until-disconnect-i.patch
thermal-hwmon-inline-helpers-when-config_thermal_hwmon-is-not-set.patch
+dccp-fool-proof-ccid_hc_x_parse_options.patch
+enic-fix-checksum-validation-for-ipv6.patch
+lib-test_rhashtable-make-test_insert_dup-allocate-its-hash-table-dynamically.patch
+net-dp83640-expire-old-tx-skb.patch
+net-dsa-fix-lockdep-false-positive-splat.patch
+net-dsa-fix-null-checking-in-dsa_slave_set_eee.patch
+net-dsa-mv88e6xxx-fix-counting-of-atu-violations.patch
+net-dsa-slave-don-t-propagate-flag-changes-on-down-slave-interfaces.patch
+net-systemport-fix-wol-with-password-after-deep-sleep.patch
+rds-fix-refcount-bug-in-rds_sock_addref.patch
+revert-net-phy-marvell-avoid-pause-mode-on-sgmii-to-copper-for-88e151x.patch
+rxrpc-bad-unlock-balance-in-rxrpc_recvmsg.patch
+sctp-check-and-update-stream-out_curr-when-allocating-stream_out.patch
+sctp-walk-the-list-of-asoc-safely.patch
+skge-potential-memory-corruption-in-skge_get_regs.patch
+virtio_net-account-for-tx-bytes-and-packets-on-sending-xdp_frames.patch
+bnxt_en-disable-interrupts-when-allocating-cp-rings-or-nqs.patch
+net-cls_flower-remove-filter-from-mask-before-freeing-it.patch
+net-dsa-b53-fix-for-failure-when-irq-is-not-defined-in-dt.patch
+net-mlx5e-use-the-inner-headers-to-determine-tc-pedit-offload-limitation-on-decap-flows.patch
+net-mlx5e-force-checksum_unnecessary-for-short-ethernet-frames.patch
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 1 Feb 2019 11:28:16 +0300
+Subject: skge: potential memory corruption in skge_get_regs()
+
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 294c149a209c6196c2de85f512b52ef50f519949 ]
+
+The "p" buffer is 0x4000 bytes long. B3_RI_WTO_R1 is 0x190. The value
+of "regs->len" is in the 1-0x4000 range. The bug here is that
+"regs->len - B3_RI_WTO_R1" can be a negative value which would lead to
+memory corruption and an abrupt crash.
+
+Fixes: c3f8be961808 ("[PATCH] skge: expand ethtool debug register dump")
+Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/skge.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/skge.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/skge.c
+@@ -152,8 +152,10 @@ static void skge_get_regs(struct net_dev
+ memset(p, 0, regs->len);
+ memcpy_fromio(p, io, B3_RAM_ADDR);
+
+- memcpy_fromio(p + B3_RI_WTO_R1, io + B3_RI_WTO_R1,
+- regs->len - B3_RI_WTO_R1);
++ if (regs->len > B3_RI_WTO_R1) {
++ memcpy_fromio(p + B3_RI_WTO_R1, io + B3_RI_WTO_R1,
++ regs->len - B3_RI_WTO_R1);
++ }
+ }
+
+ /* Wake on Lan only supported on Yukon chips with rev 1 or above */
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Sun Feb 10 12:42:47 CET 2019
+From: Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp>
+Date: Thu, 31 Jan 2019 20:40:30 +0900
+Subject: virtio_net: Account for tx bytes and packets on sending xdp_frames
+
+From: Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp>
+
+[ Upstream commit 546f28974d771b124fb0bf7b551b343888cf0419 ]
+
+Previously virtnet_xdp_xmit() did not account for device tx counters,
+which caused confusions.
+To be consistent with SKBs, account them on freeing xdp_frames.
+
+Reported-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp>
+Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
++++ b/drivers/net/virtio_net.c
+@@ -502,6 +502,8 @@ static int virtnet_xdp_xmit(struct net_d
+ struct bpf_prog *xdp_prog;
+ struct send_queue *sq;
+ unsigned int len;
++ int packets = 0;
++ int bytes = 0;
+ int drops = 0;
+ int kicks = 0;
+ int ret, err;
+@@ -525,10 +527,18 @@ static int virtnet_xdp_xmit(struct net_d
+
+ /* Free up any pending old buffers before queueing new ones. */
+ while ((ptr = virtqueue_get_buf(sq->vq, &len)) != NULL) {
+- if (likely(is_xdp_frame(ptr)))
+- xdp_return_frame(ptr_to_xdp(ptr));
+- else
+- napi_consume_skb(ptr, false);
++ if (likely(is_xdp_frame(ptr))) {
++ struct xdp_frame *frame = ptr_to_xdp(ptr);
++
++ bytes += frame->len;
++ xdp_return_frame(frame);
++ } else {
++ struct sk_buff *skb = ptr;
++
++ bytes += skb->len;
++ napi_consume_skb(skb, false);
++ }
++ packets++;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+@@ -548,6 +558,8 @@ static int virtnet_xdp_xmit(struct net_d
+ }
+ out:
+ u64_stats_update_begin(&sq->stats.syncp);
++ sq->stats.bytes += bytes;
++ sq->stats.packets += packets;
+ sq->stats.xdp_tx += n;
+ sq->stats.xdp_tx_drops += drops;
+ sq->stats.kicks += kicks;
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
