--- /dev/null
+From efd21e10fc3bf4c6da122470a5ae89ec4ed8d180 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Meng Li <Meng.Li@windriver.com>
+Date: Mon, 1 Nov 2021 11:13:53 +0800
+Subject: crypto: caam - replace this_cpu_ptr with raw_cpu_ptr
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Meng Li <Meng.Li@windriver.com>
+
+commit efd21e10fc3bf4c6da122470a5ae89ec4ed8d180 upstream.
+
+When enable the kernel debug config, there is below calltrace detected:
+BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: cryptomgr_test/339
+caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30
+CPU: 9 PID: 339 Comm: cryptomgr_test Not tainted 5.10.63-yocto-standard #1
+Hardware name: NXP Layerscape LX2160ARDB (DT)
+Call trace:
+ dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1a0
+ show_stack+0x24/0x30
+ dump_stack+0xf0/0x13c
+ check_preemption_disabled+0x100/0x110
+ debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x30
+ dpaa2_caam_enqueue+0x10c/0x25c
+ ......
+ cryptomgr_test+0x38/0x60
+ kthread+0x158/0x164
+ ret_from_fork+0x10/0x38
+According to the comment in commit ac5d15b4519f("crypto: caam/qi2
+ - use affine DPIOs "), because preemption is no longer disabled
+while trying to enqueue an FQID, it might be possible to run the
+enqueue on a different CPU(due to migration, when in process context),
+however this wouldn't be a functionality issue. But there will be
+above calltrace when enable kernel debug config. So, replace this_cpu_ptr
+with raw_cpu_ptr to avoid above call trace.
+
+Fixes: ac5d15b4519f ("crypto: caam/qi2 - use affine DPIOs")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Meng Li <Meng.Li@windriver.com>
+Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c
++++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi2.c
+@@ -5470,7 +5470,7 @@ int dpaa2_caam_enqueue(struct device *de
+ dpaa2_fd_set_len(&fd, dpaa2_fl_get_len(&req->fd_flt[1]));
+ dpaa2_fd_set_flc(&fd, req->flc_dma);
+
+- ppriv = this_cpu_ptr(priv->ppriv);
++ ppriv = raw_cpu_ptr(priv->ppriv);
+ for (i = 0; i < (priv->dpseci_attr.num_tx_queues << 1); i++) {
+ err = dpaa2_io_service_enqueue_fq(ppriv->dpio, ppriv->req_fqid,
+ &fd);
--- /dev/null
+From c2aec59be093bd44627bc4f6bc67e4614a93a7b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2021 10:03:30 +0100
+Subject: crypto: omap-aes - Fix broken pm_runtime_and_get() usage
+
+From: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
+
+commit c2aec59be093bd44627bc4f6bc67e4614a93a7b6 upstream.
+
+This fix is basically the same as 3d6b661330a7 ("crypto: stm32 -
+Revert broken pm_runtime_resume_and_get changes"), just for the omap
+driver. If the return value isn't used, then pm_runtime_get_sync()
+has to be used for ensuring that the usage count is balanced.
+
+Fixes: 1f34cc4a8da3 ("crypto: omap-aes - Fix PM reference leak on omap-aes.c")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/crypto/omap-aes.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/crypto/omap-aes.c
++++ b/drivers/crypto/omap-aes.c
+@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static int omap_aes_suspend(struct devic
+
+ static int omap_aes_resume(struct device *dev)
+ {
+- pm_runtime_resume_and_get(dev);
++ pm_runtime_get_sync(dev);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ #endif
--- /dev/null
+From 29009604ad4e3ef784fd9b9fef6f23610ddf633d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
+Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2021 20:50:22 +0100
+Subject: crypto: stm32/crc32 - Fix kernel BUG triggered in probe()
+
+From: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
+
+commit 29009604ad4e3ef784fd9b9fef6f23610ddf633d upstream.
+
+The include/linux/crypto.h struct crypto_alg field cra_driver_name description
+states "Unique name of the transformation provider. " ... " this contains the
+name of the chip or provider and the name of the transformation algorithm."
+
+In case of the stm32-crc driver, field cra_driver_name is identical for all
+registered transformation providers and set to the name of the driver itself,
+which is incorrect. This patch fixes it by assigning a unique cra_driver_name
+to each registered transformation provider.
+
+The kernel crash is triggered when the driver calls crypto_register_shashes()
+which calls crypto_register_shash(), which calls crypto_register_alg(), which
+calls __crypto_register_alg(), which returns -EEXIST, which is propagated
+back through this call chain. Upon -EEXIST from crypto_register_shash(), the
+crypto_register_shashes() starts unregistering the providers back, and calls
+crypto_unregister_shash(), which calls crypto_unregister_alg(), and this is
+where the BUG() triggers due to incorrect cra_refcnt.
+
+Fixes: b51dbe90912a ("crypto: stm32 - Support for STM32 CRC32 crypto module")
+Signed-off-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.12+
+Cc: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com>
+Cc: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@st.com>
+Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Cc: Lionel Debieve <lionel.debieve@st.com>
+Cc: Nicolas Toromanoff <nicolas.toromanoff@st.com>
+Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
+Cc: linux-stm32@st-md-mailman.stormreply.com
+To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
+Acked-by: Nicolas Toromanoff <nicolas.toromanoff@foss.st.com>
+Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-crc32.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-crc32.c
++++ b/drivers/crypto/stm32/stm32-crc32.c
+@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = {
+ .digestsize = CHKSUM_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "crc32",
+- .cra_driver_name = DRIVER_NAME,
++ .cra_driver_name = "stm32-crc32-crc32",
+ .cra_priority = 200,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .cra_blocksize = CHKSUM_BLOCK_SIZE,
+@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ static struct shash_alg algs[] = {
+ .digestsize = CHKSUM_DIGEST_SIZE,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "crc32c",
+- .cra_driver_name = DRIVER_NAME,
++ .cra_driver_name = "stm32-crc32-crc32c",
+ .cra_priority = 200,
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
+ .cra_blocksize = CHKSUM_BLOCK_SIZE,
--- /dev/null
+From 0f420c383a2bb414ebccedf9289b5b815f1295fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Zhu Lingshan <lingshan.zhu@intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 16:12:55 +0800
+Subject: ifcvf/vDPA: fix misuse virtio-net device config size for blk dev
+
+From: Zhu Lingshan <lingshan.zhu@intel.com>
+
+commit 0f420c383a2bb414ebccedf9289b5b815f1295fe upstream.
+
+This commit fixes a misuse of virtio-net device config size issue
+for virtio-block devices.
+
+A new member config_size in struct ifcvf_hw is introduced and would
+be initialized through vdpa_dev_add() to record correct device
+config size.
+
+To be more generic, rename ifcvf_hw.net_config to ifcvf_hw.dev_config,
+the helpers ifcvf_read/write_net_config() to ifcvf_read/write_dev_config()
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhu Lingshan <lingshan.zhu@intel.com>
+Reported-and-suggested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
+Fixes: 6ad31d162a4e ("vDPA/ifcvf: enable Intel C5000X-PL virtio-block for vDPA")
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211201081255.60187-1-lingshan.zhu@intel.com
+Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/vdpa/ifcvf/ifcvf_base.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ drivers/vdpa/ifcvf/ifcvf_base.h | 9 +++++---
+ drivers/vdpa/ifcvf/ifcvf_main.c | 24 +++--------------------
+ 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/vdpa/ifcvf/ifcvf_base.c
++++ b/drivers/vdpa/ifcvf/ifcvf_base.c
+@@ -143,8 +143,8 @@ int ifcvf_init_hw(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, s
+ IFCVF_DBG(pdev, "hw->isr = %p\n", hw->isr);
+ break;
+ case VIRTIO_PCI_CAP_DEVICE_CFG:
+- hw->net_cfg = get_cap_addr(hw, &cap);
+- IFCVF_DBG(pdev, "hw->net_cfg = %p\n", hw->net_cfg);
++ hw->dev_cfg = get_cap_addr(hw, &cap);
++ IFCVF_DBG(pdev, "hw->dev_cfg = %p\n", hw->dev_cfg);
+ break;
+ }
+
+@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ next:
+ }
+
+ if (hw->common_cfg == NULL || hw->notify_base == NULL ||
+- hw->isr == NULL || hw->net_cfg == NULL) {
++ hw->isr == NULL || hw->dev_cfg == NULL) {
+ IFCVF_ERR(pdev, "Incomplete PCI capabilities\n");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ next:
+ IFCVF_DBG(pdev,
+ "PCI capability mapping: common cfg: %p, notify base: %p\n, isr cfg: %p, device cfg: %p, multiplier: %u\n",
+ hw->common_cfg, hw->notify_base, hw->isr,
+- hw->net_cfg, hw->notify_off_multiplier);
++ hw->dev_cfg, hw->notify_off_multiplier);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+@@ -242,33 +242,54 @@ int ifcvf_verify_min_features(struct ifc
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+-void ifcvf_read_net_config(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u64 offset,
++u32 ifcvf_get_config_size(struct ifcvf_hw *hw)
++{
++ struct ifcvf_adapter *adapter;
++ u32 config_size;
++
++ adapter = vf_to_adapter(hw);
++ switch (hw->dev_type) {
++ case VIRTIO_ID_NET:
++ config_size = sizeof(struct virtio_net_config);
++ break;
++ case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK:
++ config_size = sizeof(struct virtio_blk_config);
++ break;
++ default:
++ config_size = 0;
++ IFCVF_ERR(adapter->pdev, "VIRTIO ID %u not supported\n", hw->dev_type);
++ }
++
++ return config_size;
++}
++
++void ifcvf_read_dev_config(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u64 offset,
+ void *dst, int length)
+ {
+ u8 old_gen, new_gen, *p;
+ int i;
+
+- WARN_ON(offset + length > sizeof(struct virtio_net_config));
++ WARN_ON(offset + length > hw->config_size);
+ do {
+ old_gen = ifc_ioread8(&hw->common_cfg->config_generation);
+ p = dst;
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+- *p++ = ifc_ioread8(hw->net_cfg + offset + i);
++ *p++ = ifc_ioread8(hw->dev_cfg + offset + i);
+
+ new_gen = ifc_ioread8(&hw->common_cfg->config_generation);
+ } while (old_gen != new_gen);
+ }
+
+-void ifcvf_write_net_config(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u64 offset,
++void ifcvf_write_dev_config(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u64 offset,
+ const void *src, int length)
+ {
+ const u8 *p;
+ int i;
+
+ p = src;
+- WARN_ON(offset + length > sizeof(struct virtio_net_config));
++ WARN_ON(offset + length > hw->config_size);
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+- ifc_iowrite8(*p++, hw->net_cfg + offset + i);
++ ifc_iowrite8(*p++, hw->dev_cfg + offset + i);
+ }
+
+ static void ifcvf_set_features(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u64 features)
+--- a/drivers/vdpa/ifcvf/ifcvf_base.h
++++ b/drivers/vdpa/ifcvf/ifcvf_base.h
+@@ -71,12 +71,14 @@ struct ifcvf_hw {
+ u64 hw_features;
+ u32 dev_type;
+ struct virtio_pci_common_cfg __iomem *common_cfg;
+- void __iomem *net_cfg;
++ void __iomem *dev_cfg;
+ struct vring_info vring[IFCVF_MAX_QUEUES];
+ void __iomem * const *base;
+ char config_msix_name[256];
+ struct vdpa_callback config_cb;
+ unsigned int config_irq;
++ /* virtio-net or virtio-blk device config size */
++ u32 config_size;
+ };
+
+ struct ifcvf_adapter {
+@@ -105,9 +107,9 @@ int ifcvf_init_hw(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, s
+ int ifcvf_start_hw(struct ifcvf_hw *hw);
+ void ifcvf_stop_hw(struct ifcvf_hw *hw);
+ void ifcvf_notify_queue(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u16 qid);
+-void ifcvf_read_net_config(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u64 offset,
++void ifcvf_read_dev_config(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u64 offset,
+ void *dst, int length);
+-void ifcvf_write_net_config(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u64 offset,
++void ifcvf_write_dev_config(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u64 offset,
+ const void *src, int length);
+ u8 ifcvf_get_status(struct ifcvf_hw *hw);
+ void ifcvf_set_status(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u8 status);
+@@ -120,4 +122,5 @@ u16 ifcvf_get_vq_state(struct ifcvf_hw *
+ int ifcvf_set_vq_state(struct ifcvf_hw *hw, u16 qid, u16 num);
+ struct ifcvf_adapter *vf_to_adapter(struct ifcvf_hw *hw);
+ int ifcvf_probed_virtio_net(struct ifcvf_hw *hw);
++u32 ifcvf_get_config_size(struct ifcvf_hw *hw);
+ #endif /* _IFCVF_H_ */
+--- a/drivers/vdpa/ifcvf/ifcvf_main.c
++++ b/drivers/vdpa/ifcvf/ifcvf_main.c
+@@ -366,24 +366,9 @@ static u32 ifcvf_vdpa_get_vq_align(struc
+
+ static size_t ifcvf_vdpa_get_config_size(struct vdpa_device *vdpa_dev)
+ {
+- struct ifcvf_adapter *adapter = vdpa_to_adapter(vdpa_dev);
+ struct ifcvf_hw *vf = vdpa_to_vf(vdpa_dev);
+- struct pci_dev *pdev = adapter->pdev;
+- size_t size;
+
+- switch (vf->dev_type) {
+- case VIRTIO_ID_NET:
+- size = sizeof(struct virtio_net_config);
+- break;
+- case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK:
+- size = sizeof(struct virtio_blk_config);
+- break;
+- default:
+- size = 0;
+- IFCVF_ERR(pdev, "VIRTIO ID %u not supported\n", vf->dev_type);
+- }
+-
+- return size;
++ return vf->config_size;
+ }
+
+ static void ifcvf_vdpa_get_config(struct vdpa_device *vdpa_dev,
+@@ -392,8 +377,7 @@ static void ifcvf_vdpa_get_config(struct
+ {
+ struct ifcvf_hw *vf = vdpa_to_vf(vdpa_dev);
+
+- WARN_ON(offset + len > sizeof(struct virtio_net_config));
+- ifcvf_read_net_config(vf, offset, buf, len);
++ ifcvf_read_dev_config(vf, offset, buf, len);
+ }
+
+ static void ifcvf_vdpa_set_config(struct vdpa_device *vdpa_dev,
+@@ -402,8 +386,7 @@ static void ifcvf_vdpa_set_config(struct
+ {
+ struct ifcvf_hw *vf = vdpa_to_vf(vdpa_dev);
+
+- WARN_ON(offset + len > sizeof(struct virtio_net_config));
+- ifcvf_write_net_config(vf, offset, buf, len);
++ ifcvf_write_dev_config(vf, offset, buf, len);
+ }
+
+ static void ifcvf_vdpa_set_config_cb(struct vdpa_device *vdpa_dev,
+@@ -541,6 +524,7 @@ static int ifcvf_vdpa_dev_add(struct vdp
+ vf->vring[i].irq = -EINVAL;
+
+ vf->hw_features = ifcvf_get_hw_features(vf);
++ vf->config_size = ifcvf_get_config_size(vf);
+
+ adapter->vdpa.mdev = &ifcvf_mgmt_dev->mdev;
+ ret = _vdpa_register_device(&adapter->vdpa, vf->nr_vring);
--- /dev/null
+From 0c031fd37f69deb0cd8c43bbfcfccd62ebd7e952 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2021 17:31:15 +0800
+Subject: md: Move alloc/free acct bioset in to personality
+
+From: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
+
+commit 0c031fd37f69deb0cd8c43bbfcfccd62ebd7e952 upstream.
+
+bioset acct is only needed for raid0 and raid5. Therefore, md_run only
+allocates it for raid0 and raid5. However, this does not cover
+personality takeover, which may cause uninitialized bioset. For example,
+the following repro steps:
+
+ mdadm -CR /dev/md0 -l1 -n2 /dev/loop0 /dev/loop1
+ mdadm --wait /dev/md0
+ mkfs.xfs /dev/md0
+ mdadm /dev/md0 --grow -l5
+ mount /dev/md0 /mnt
+
+causes panic like:
+
+[ 225.933939] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
+[ 225.934903] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
+[ 225.935639] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
+[ 225.936361] PGD 0 P4D 0
+[ 225.936677] Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
+[ 225.937525] CPU: 27 PID: 1133 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3+ #706
+[ 225.938416] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.module_el8.4.0+547+a85d02ba 04/01/2014
+[ 225.939922] RIP: 0010:0x0
+[ 225.940289] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.
+[ 225.941196] RSP: 0018:ffff88815897eff0 EFLAGS: 00010246
+[ 225.941897] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000092800 RCX: ffffffff81370a39
+[ 225.942813] RDX: dffffc0000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000092800
+[ 225.943772] RBP: 1ffff1102b12fe04 R08: fffffbfff0b43c01 R09: fffffbfff0b43c01
+[ 225.944807] R10: ffffffff85a1e007 R11: fffffbfff0b43c00 R12: ffff88810eaaaf58
+[ 225.945757] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88810eaaafb8 R15: ffff88815897f040
+[ 225.946709] FS: 00007ff3f2505080(0000) GS:ffff888fb5e00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
+[ 225.947814] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
+[ 225.948556] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000015aa5a006 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
+[ 225.949537] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
+[ 225.950455] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
+[ 225.951414] Call Trace:
+[ 225.951787] <TASK>
+[ 225.952120] mempool_alloc+0xe5/0x250
+[ 225.952625] ? mempool_resize+0x370/0x370
+[ 225.953187] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
+[ 225.953862] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
+[ 225.954464] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x15/0x120
+[ 225.955019] ? find_held_lock+0xac/0xd0
+[ 225.955564] bio_alloc_bioset+0x1ed/0x2a0
+[ 225.956080] ? lock_downgrade+0x3a0/0x3a0
+[ 225.956644] ? bvec_alloc+0xc0/0xc0
+[ 225.957135] bio_clone_fast+0x19/0x80
+[ 225.957651] raid5_make_request+0x1370/0x1b70
+[ 225.958286] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x15/0x120
+[ 225.958797] ? __lock_acquire+0x8b2/0x3510
+[ 225.959339] ? raid5_get_active_stripe+0xce0/0xce0
+[ 225.959986] ? lock_is_held_type+0xd8/0x130
+[ 225.960528] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0
+[ 225.961135] ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
+[ 225.961703] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x15/0x120
+[ 225.962232] ? lock_release+0x27a/0x6c0
+[ 225.962746] ? do_wait_intr_irq+0x130/0x130
+[ 225.963302] ? lock_downgrade+0x3a0/0x3a0
+[ 225.963815] ? lock_release+0x6c0/0x6c0
+[ 225.964348] md_handle_request+0x342/0x530
+[ 225.964888] ? set_in_sync+0x170/0x170
+[ 225.965397] ? blk_queue_split+0x133/0x150
+[ 225.965988] ? __blk_queue_split+0x8b0/0x8b0
+[ 225.966524] ? submit_bio_checks+0x3b2/0x9d0
+[ 225.967069] md_submit_bio+0x127/0x1c0
+[...]
+
+Fix this by moving alloc/free of acct bioset to pers->run and pers->free.
+
+While we are on this, properly handle md_integrity_register() error in
+raid0_run().
+
+Fixes: daee2024715d (md: check level before create and exit io_acct_set)
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Acked-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@linux.dev>
+Signed-off-by: Xiao Ni <xni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/md/md.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
+ drivers/md/md.h | 2 ++
+ drivers/md/raid0.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
+ drivers/md/raid5.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/md/md.c
++++ b/drivers/md/md.c
+@@ -5872,13 +5872,6 @@ int md_run(struct mddev *mddev)
+ if (err)
+ goto exit_bio_set;
+ }
+- if (mddev->level != 1 && mddev->level != 10 &&
+- !bioset_initialized(&mddev->io_acct_set)) {
+- err = bioset_init(&mddev->io_acct_set, BIO_POOL_SIZE,
+- offsetof(struct md_io_acct, bio_clone), 0);
+- if (err)
+- goto exit_sync_set;
+- }
+
+ spin_lock(&pers_lock);
+ pers = find_pers(mddev->level, mddev->clevel);
+@@ -6055,9 +6048,6 @@ bitmap_abort:
+ module_put(pers->owner);
+ md_bitmap_destroy(mddev);
+ abort:
+- if (mddev->level != 1 && mddev->level != 10)
+- bioset_exit(&mddev->io_acct_set);
+-exit_sync_set:
+ bioset_exit(&mddev->sync_set);
+ exit_bio_set:
+ bioset_exit(&mddev->bio_set);
+@@ -8590,6 +8580,23 @@ void md_submit_discard_bio(struct mddev
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(md_submit_discard_bio);
+
++int acct_bioset_init(struct mddev *mddev)
++{
++ int err = 0;
++
++ if (!bioset_initialized(&mddev->io_acct_set))
++ err = bioset_init(&mddev->io_acct_set, BIO_POOL_SIZE,
++ offsetof(struct md_io_acct, bio_clone), 0);
++ return err;
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(acct_bioset_init);
++
++void acct_bioset_exit(struct mddev *mddev)
++{
++ bioset_exit(&mddev->io_acct_set);
++}
++EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(acct_bioset_exit);
++
+ static void md_end_io_acct(struct bio *bio)
+ {
+ struct md_io_acct *md_io_acct = bio->bi_private;
+--- a/drivers/md/md.h
++++ b/drivers/md/md.h
+@@ -721,6 +721,8 @@ extern void md_error(struct mddev *mddev
+ extern void md_finish_reshape(struct mddev *mddev);
+ void md_submit_discard_bio(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev,
+ struct bio *bio, sector_t start, sector_t size);
++int acct_bioset_init(struct mddev *mddev);
++void acct_bioset_exit(struct mddev *mddev);
+ void md_account_bio(struct mddev *mddev, struct bio **bio);
+
+ extern bool __must_check md_flush_request(struct mddev *mddev, struct bio *bio);
+--- a/drivers/md/raid0.c
++++ b/drivers/md/raid0.c
+@@ -356,7 +356,21 @@ static sector_t raid0_size(struct mddev
+ return array_sectors;
+ }
+
+-static void raid0_free(struct mddev *mddev, void *priv);
++static void free_conf(struct mddev *mddev, struct r0conf *conf)
++{
++ kfree(conf->strip_zone);
++ kfree(conf->devlist);
++ kfree(conf);
++ mddev->private = NULL;
++}
++
++static void raid0_free(struct mddev *mddev, void *priv)
++{
++ struct r0conf *conf = priv;
++
++ free_conf(mddev, conf);
++ acct_bioset_exit(mddev);
++}
+
+ static int raid0_run(struct mddev *mddev)
+ {
+@@ -370,11 +384,16 @@ static int raid0_run(struct mddev *mddev
+ if (md_check_no_bitmap(mddev))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ if (acct_bioset_init(mddev)) {
++ pr_err("md/raid0:%s: alloc acct bioset failed.\n", mdname(mddev));
++ return -ENOMEM;
++ }
++
+ /* if private is not null, we are here after takeover */
+ if (mddev->private == NULL) {
+ ret = create_strip_zones(mddev, &conf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+- return ret;
++ goto exit_acct_set;
+ mddev->private = conf;
+ }
+ conf = mddev->private;
+@@ -413,17 +432,16 @@ static int raid0_run(struct mddev *mddev
+ dump_zones(mddev);
+
+ ret = md_integrity_register(mddev);
++ if (ret)
++ goto free;
+
+ return ret;
+-}
+
+-static void raid0_free(struct mddev *mddev, void *priv)
+-{
+- struct r0conf *conf = priv;
+-
+- kfree(conf->strip_zone);
+- kfree(conf->devlist);
+- kfree(conf);
++free:
++ free_conf(mddev, conf);
++exit_acct_set:
++ acct_bioset_exit(mddev);
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ static void raid0_handle_discard(struct mddev *mddev, struct bio *bio)
+--- a/drivers/md/raid5.c
++++ b/drivers/md/raid5.c
+@@ -7446,12 +7446,19 @@ static int raid5_run(struct mddev *mddev
+ struct md_rdev *rdev;
+ struct md_rdev *journal_dev = NULL;
+ sector_t reshape_offset = 0;
+- int i;
++ int i, ret = 0;
+ long long min_offset_diff = 0;
+ int first = 1;
+
+- if (mddev_init_writes_pending(mddev) < 0)
++ if (acct_bioset_init(mddev)) {
++ pr_err("md/raid456:%s: alloc acct bioset failed.\n", mdname(mddev));
+ return -ENOMEM;
++ }
++
++ if (mddev_init_writes_pending(mddev) < 0) {
++ ret = -ENOMEM;
++ goto exit_acct_set;
++ }
+
+ if (mddev->recovery_cp != MaxSector)
+ pr_notice("md/raid:%s: not clean -- starting background reconstruction\n",
+@@ -7482,7 +7489,8 @@ static int raid5_run(struct mddev *mddev
+ (mddev->bitmap_info.offset || mddev->bitmap_info.file)) {
+ pr_notice("md/raid:%s: array cannot have both journal and bitmap\n",
+ mdname(mddev));
+- return -EINVAL;
++ ret = -EINVAL;
++ goto exit_acct_set;
+ }
+
+ if (mddev->reshape_position != MaxSector) {
+@@ -7507,13 +7515,15 @@ static int raid5_run(struct mddev *mddev
+ if (journal_dev) {
+ pr_warn("md/raid:%s: don't support reshape with journal - aborting.\n",
+ mdname(mddev));
+- return -EINVAL;
++ ret = -EINVAL;
++ goto exit_acct_set;
+ }
+
+ if (mddev->new_level != mddev->level) {
+ pr_warn("md/raid:%s: unsupported reshape required - aborting.\n",
+ mdname(mddev));
+- return -EINVAL;
++ ret = -EINVAL;
++ goto exit_acct_set;
+ }
+ old_disks = mddev->raid_disks - mddev->delta_disks;
+ /* reshape_position must be on a new-stripe boundary, and one
+@@ -7529,7 +7539,8 @@ static int raid5_run(struct mddev *mddev
+ if (sector_div(here_new, chunk_sectors * new_data_disks)) {
+ pr_warn("md/raid:%s: reshape_position not on a stripe boundary\n",
+ mdname(mddev));
+- return -EINVAL;
++ ret = -EINVAL;
++ goto exit_acct_set;
+ }
+ reshape_offset = here_new * chunk_sectors;
+ /* here_new is the stripe we will write to */
+@@ -7551,7 +7562,8 @@ static int raid5_run(struct mddev *mddev
+ else if (mddev->ro == 0) {
+ pr_warn("md/raid:%s: in-place reshape must be started in read-only mode - aborting\n",
+ mdname(mddev));
+- return -EINVAL;
++ ret = -EINVAL;
++ goto exit_acct_set;
+ }
+ } else if (mddev->reshape_backwards
+ ? (here_new * chunk_sectors + min_offset_diff <=
+@@ -7561,7 +7573,8 @@ static int raid5_run(struct mddev *mddev
+ /* Reading from the same stripe as writing to - bad */
+ pr_warn("md/raid:%s: reshape_position too early for auto-recovery - aborting.\n",
+ mdname(mddev));
+- return -EINVAL;
++ ret = -EINVAL;
++ goto exit_acct_set;
+ }
+ pr_debug("md/raid:%s: reshape will continue\n", mdname(mddev));
+ /* OK, we should be able to continue; */
+@@ -7585,8 +7598,10 @@ static int raid5_run(struct mddev *mddev
+ else
+ conf = mddev->private;
+
+- if (IS_ERR(conf))
+- return PTR_ERR(conf);
++ if (IS_ERR(conf)) {
++ ret = PTR_ERR(conf);
++ goto exit_acct_set;
++ }
+
+ if (test_bit(MD_HAS_JOURNAL, &mddev->flags)) {
+ if (!journal_dev) {
+@@ -7786,7 +7801,10 @@ abort:
+ free_conf(conf);
+ mddev->private = NULL;
+ pr_warn("md/raid:%s: failed to run raid set.\n", mdname(mddev));
+- return -EIO;
++ ret = -EIO;
++exit_acct_set:
++ acct_bioset_exit(mddev);
++ return ret;
+ }
+
+ static void raid5_free(struct mddev *mddev, void *priv)
+@@ -7794,6 +7812,7 @@ static void raid5_free(struct mddev *mdd
+ struct r5conf *conf = priv;
+
+ free_conf(conf);
++ acct_bioset_exit(mddev);
+ mddev->to_remove = &raid5_attrs_group;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 7620ad0bdfac1efff4a1228cd36ae62a9d8206b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 24 Nov 2021 22:01:04 +0300
+Subject: mfd: tps65910: Set PWR_OFF bit during driver probe
+
+From: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
+
+commit 7620ad0bdfac1efff4a1228cd36ae62a9d8206b0 upstream.
+
+The PWR_OFF bit needs to be set in order to power off properly, without
+hanging PMIC. This bit needs to be set early in order to allow thermal
+protection of NVIDIA Terga SoCs to power off hardware properly, otherwise
+a battery re-plug may be needed on some devices to recover after the hang.
+
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Svyatoslav Ryhel <clamor95@gmail.com> # ASUS TF201
+Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211124190104.23554-1-digetx@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/mfd/tps65910.c | 22 +++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/mfd/tps65910.c
++++ b/drivers/mfd/tps65910.c
+@@ -436,15 +436,6 @@ static void tps65910_power_off(void)
+
+ tps65910 = dev_get_drvdata(&tps65910_i2c_client->dev);
+
+- /*
+- * The PWR_OFF bit needs to be set separately, before transitioning
+- * to the OFF state. It enables the "sequential" power-off mode on
+- * TPS65911, it's a NO-OP on TPS65910.
+- */
+- if (regmap_set_bits(tps65910->regmap, TPS65910_DEVCTRL,
+- DEVCTRL_PWR_OFF_MASK) < 0)
+- return;
+-
+ regmap_update_bits(tps65910->regmap, TPS65910_DEVCTRL,
+ DEVCTRL_DEV_OFF_MASK | DEVCTRL_DEV_ON_MASK,
+ DEVCTRL_DEV_OFF_MASK);
+@@ -504,6 +495,19 @@ static int tps65910_i2c_probe(struct i2c
+ tps65910_sleepinit(tps65910, pmic_plat_data);
+
+ if (pmic_plat_data->pm_off && !pm_power_off) {
++ /*
++ * The PWR_OFF bit needs to be set separately, before
++ * transitioning to the OFF state. It enables the "sequential"
++ * power-off mode on TPS65911, it's a NO-OP on TPS65910.
++ */
++ ret = regmap_set_bits(tps65910->regmap, TPS65910_DEVCTRL,
++ DEVCTRL_PWR_OFF_MASK);
++ if (ret) {
++ dev_err(&i2c->dev, "failed to set power-off mode: %d\n",
++ ret);
++ return ret;
++ }
++
+ tps65910_i2c_client = i2c;
+ pm_power_off = tps65910_power_off;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 8066c615cb69b7da8a94f59379847b037b3a5e46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Arnaud Pouliquen <arnaud.pouliquen@foss.st.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 20:07:58 +0100
+Subject: rpmsg: core: Clean up resources on announce_create failure.
+
+From: Arnaud Pouliquen <arnaud.pouliquen@foss.st.com>
+
+commit 8066c615cb69b7da8a94f59379847b037b3a5e46 upstream.
+
+During the rpmsg_dev_probe, if rpdev->ops->announce_create returns an
+error, the rpmsg device and default endpoint should be freed before
+exiting the function.
+
+Fixes: 5e619b48677c ("rpmsg: Split rpmsg core and virtio backend")
+Suggested-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Arnaud Pouliquen <arnaud.pouliquen@foss.st.com>
+Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
+Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211206190758.10004-1-arnaud.pouliquen@foss.st.com
+Signed-off-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_core.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_core.c
++++ b/drivers/rpmsg/rpmsg_core.c
+@@ -519,13 +519,25 @@ static int rpmsg_dev_probe(struct device
+ err = rpdrv->probe(rpdev);
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(dev, "%s: failed: %d\n", __func__, err);
+- if (ept)
+- rpmsg_destroy_ept(ept);
+- goto out;
++ goto destroy_ept;
+ }
+
+- if (ept && rpdev->ops->announce_create)
++ if (ept && rpdev->ops->announce_create) {
+ err = rpdev->ops->announce_create(rpdev);
++ if (err) {
++ dev_err(dev, "failed to announce creation\n");
++ goto remove_rpdev;
++ }
++ }
++
++ return 0;
++
++remove_rpdev:
++ if (rpdrv->remove)
++ rpdrv->remove(rpdev);
++destroy_ept:
++ if (ept)
++ rpmsg_destroy_ept(ept);
+ out:
+ return err;
+ }
seg6-export-get_srh-for-icmp-handling.patch
icmp-icmpv6-examine-invoking-packet-for-segment-rout.patch
udp6-use-segment-routing-header-for-dest-address-if-.patch
+rpmsg-core-clean-up-resources-on-announce_create-failure.patch
+ifcvf-vdpa-fix-misuse-virtio-net-device-config-size-for-blk-dev.patch
+crypto-omap-aes-fix-broken-pm_runtime_and_get-usage.patch
+crypto-stm32-crc32-fix-kernel-bug-triggered-in-probe.patch
+crypto-caam-replace-this_cpu_ptr-with-raw_cpu_ptr.patch
+ubifs-error-path-in-ubifs_remount_rw-seems-to-wrongly-free-write-buffers.patch
+tpm-fix-potential-null-pointer-access-in-tpm_del_char_device.patch
+tpm-fix-npe-on-probe-for-missing-device.patch
+mfd-tps65910-set-pwr_off-bit-during-driver-probe.patch
+spi-uniphier-fix-a-bug-that-doesn-t-point-to-private-data-correctly.patch
+xen-gntdev-fix-unmap-notification-order.patch
+md-move-alloc-free-acct-bioset-in-to-personality.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 80bb73a9fbcde4ecc55e12f10c73fabbe68a24d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kunihiko Hayashi <hayashi.kunihiko@socionext.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Dec 2021 13:48:12 +0900
+Subject: spi: uniphier: Fix a bug that doesn't point to private data correctly
+
+From: Kunihiko Hayashi <hayashi.kunihiko@socionext.com>
+
+commit 80bb73a9fbcde4ecc55e12f10c73fabbe68a24d1 upstream.
+
+In uniphier_spi_remove(), there is a wrong code to get private data from
+the platform device, so the driver can't be removed properly.
+
+The driver should get spi_master from the platform device and retrieve
+the private data from it.
+
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Fixes: 5ba155a4d4cc ("spi: add SPI controller driver for UniPhier SoC")
+Signed-off-by: Kunihiko Hayashi <hayashi.kunihiko@socionext.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1640148492-32178-1-git-send-email-hayashi.kunihiko@socionext.com
+Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/spi/spi-uniphier.c | 11 ++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/spi/spi-uniphier.c
++++ b/drivers/spi/spi-uniphier.c
+@@ -767,12 +767,13 @@ out_master_put:
+
+ static int uniphier_spi_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
+ {
+- struct uniphier_spi_priv *priv = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
++ struct spi_master *master = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
++ struct uniphier_spi_priv *priv = spi_master_get_devdata(master);
+
+- if (priv->master->dma_tx)
+- dma_release_channel(priv->master->dma_tx);
+- if (priv->master->dma_rx)
+- dma_release_channel(priv->master->dma_rx);
++ if (master->dma_tx)
++ dma_release_channel(master->dma_tx);
++ if (master->dma_rx)
++ dma_release_channel(master->dma_rx);
+
+ clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk);
+
--- /dev/null
+From 84cc69589700b90a4c8d27b481a51fce8cca6051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Patrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz>
+Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2021 09:49:31 -0600
+Subject: tpm: fix NPE on probe for missing device
+
+From: Patrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz>
+
+commit 84cc69589700b90a4c8d27b481a51fce8cca6051 upstream.
+
+When using the tpm_tis-spi driver on a system missing the physical TPM,
+a null pointer exception was observed.
+
+ [ 0.938677] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000004
+ [ 0.939020] pgd = 10c753cb
+ [ 0.939237] [00000004] *pgd=00000000
+ [ 0.939808] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM
+ [ 0.940157] CPU: 0 PID: 48 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 5.15.10-dd1e40c #1
+ [ 0.940364] Hardware name: Generic DT based system
+ [ 0.940601] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
+ [ 0.941048] PC is at tpm_tis_remove+0x28/0xb4
+ [ 0.941196] LR is at tpm_tis_core_init+0x170/0x6ac
+
+This is due to an attempt in 'tpm_tis_remove' to use the drvdata, which
+was not initialized in 'tpm_tis_core_init' prior to the first error.
+
+Move the initialization of drvdata earlier so 'tpm_tis_remove' has
+access to it.
+
+Signed-off-by: Patrick Williams <patrick@stwcx.xyz>
+Fixes: 79ca6f74dae0 ("tpm: fix Atmel TPM crash caused by too frequent queries")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
++++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
+@@ -950,6 +950,8 @@ int tpm_tis_core_init(struct device *dev
+ priv->timeout_max = TPM_TIMEOUT_USECS_MAX;
+ priv->phy_ops = phy_ops;
+
++ dev_set_drvdata(&chip->dev, priv);
++
+ rc = tpm_tis_read32(priv, TPM_DID_VID(0), &vendor);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+@@ -962,8 +964,6 @@ int tpm_tis_core_init(struct device *dev
+ priv->timeout_max = TIS_TIMEOUT_MAX_ATML;
+ }
+
+- dev_set_drvdata(&chip->dev, priv);
+-
+ if (is_bsw()) {
+ priv->ilb_base_addr = ioremap(INTEL_LEGACY_BLK_BASE_ADDR,
+ ILB_REMAP_SIZE);
--- /dev/null
+From eabad7ba2c752392ae50f24a795093fb115b686d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lino Sanfilippo <LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de>
+Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2021 16:06:35 +0100
+Subject: tpm: fix potential NULL pointer access in tpm_del_char_device
+
+From: Lino Sanfilippo <LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de>
+
+commit eabad7ba2c752392ae50f24a795093fb115b686d upstream.
+
+Some SPI controller drivers unregister the controller in the shutdown
+handler (e.g. BCM2835). If such a controller is used with a TPM 2 slave
+chip->ops may be accessed when it is already NULL:
+
+At system shutdown the pre-shutdown handler tpm_class_shutdown() shuts down
+TPM 2 and sets chip->ops to NULL. Then at SPI controller unregistration
+tpm_tis_spi_remove() is called and eventually calls tpm_del_char_device()
+which tries to shut down TPM 2 again. Thereby it accesses chip->ops again:
+(tpm_del_char_device calls tpm_chip_start which calls tpm_clk_enable which
+calls chip->ops->clk_enable).
+
+Avoid the NULL pointer access by testing if chip->ops is valid and skipping
+the TPM 2 shutdown procedure in case it is NULL.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Lino Sanfilippo <LinoSanfilippo@gmx.de>
+Fixes: 39d0099f9439 ("powerpc/pseries: Add shutdown() to vio_driver and vio_bus")
+Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
++++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c
+@@ -474,13 +474,21 @@ static void tpm_del_char_device(struct t
+
+ /* Make the driver uncallable. */
+ down_write(&chip->ops_sem);
+- if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
+- if (!tpm_chip_start(chip)) {
+- tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_CLEAR);
+- tpm_chip_stop(chip);
++
++ /*
++ * Check if chip->ops is still valid: In case that the controller
++ * drivers shutdown handler unregisters the controller in its
++ * shutdown handler we are called twice and chip->ops to NULL.
++ */
++ if (chip->ops) {
++ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) {
++ if (!tpm_chip_start(chip)) {
++ tpm2_shutdown(chip, TPM2_SU_CLEAR);
++ tpm_chip_stop(chip);
++ }
+ }
++ chip->ops = NULL;
+ }
+- chip->ops = NULL;
+ up_write(&chip->ops_sem);
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 3fea4d9d160186617ff40490ae01f4f4f36b28ff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Cvachoucek <cvachoucek@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 21:20:37 +0200
+Subject: ubifs: Error path in ubifs_remount_rw() seems to wrongly free write buffers
+
+From: Petr Cvachoucek <cvachoucek@gmail.com>
+
+commit 3fea4d9d160186617ff40490ae01f4f4f36b28ff upstream.
+
+it seems freeing the write buffers in the error path of the
+ubifs_remount_rw() is wrong. It leads later to a kernel oops like this:
+
+[10016.431274] UBIFS (ubi0:0): start fixing up free space
+[10090.810042] UBIFS (ubi0:0): free space fixup complete
+[10090.814623] UBIFS error (ubi0:0 pid 512): ubifs_remount_fs: cannot
+spawn "ubifs_bgt0_0", error -4
+[10101.915108] UBIFS (ubi0:0): background thread "ubifs_bgt0_0" started,
+PID 517
+[10105.275498] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
+virtual address 0000000000000030
+[10105.284352] Mem abort info:
+[10105.287160] ESR = 0x96000006
+[10105.290252] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
+[10105.295592] SET = 0, FnV = 0
+[10105.298652] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
+[10105.301848] Data abort info:
+[10105.304723] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006
+[10105.308573] CM = 0, WnR = 0
+[10105.311564] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000f03d1000
+[10105.318034] [0000000000000030] pgd=00000000f6cee003,
+pud=00000000f4884003, pmd=0000000000000000
+[10105.326783] Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
+[10105.332355] Modules linked in: ath10k_pci ath10k_core ath mac80211
+libarc4 cfg80211 nvme nvme_core cryptodev(O)
+[10105.342468] CPU: 3 PID: 518 Comm: touch Tainted: G O
+5.4.3 #1
+[10105.349517] Hardware name: HYPEX CPU (DT)
+[10105.353525] pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO)
+[10105.358324] pc : atomic64_try_cmpxchg_acquire.constprop.22+0x8/0x34
+[10105.364596] lr : mutex_lock+0x1c/0x34
+[10105.368253] sp : ffff000075633aa0
+[10105.371563] x29: ffff000075633aa0 x28: 0000000000000001
+[10105.376874] x27: ffff000076fa80c8 x26: 0000000000000004
+[10105.382185] x25: 0000000000000030 x24: 0000000000000000
+[10105.387495] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000038
+[10105.392807] x21: 000000000000000c x20: ffff000076fa80c8
+[10105.398119] x19: ffff000076fa8000 x18: 0000000000000000
+[10105.403429] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
+[10105.408741] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: fefefefefefefeff
+[10105.414052] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000fe0
+[10105.419364] x11: 0000000000000fe0 x10: ffff000076709020
+[10105.424675] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 00000000000000a0
+[10105.429986] x7 : ffff000076fa80f4 x6 : 0000000000000030
+[10105.435297] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
+[10105.440609] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : ffff00006f276040
+[10105.445920] x1 : ffff000075633ab8 x0 : 0000000000000030
+[10105.451232] Call trace:
+[10105.453676] atomic64_try_cmpxchg_acquire.constprop.22+0x8/0x34
+[10105.459600] ubifs_garbage_collect+0xb4/0x334
+[10105.463956] ubifs_budget_space+0x398/0x458
+[10105.468139] ubifs_create+0x50/0x180
+[10105.471712] path_openat+0x6a0/0x9b0
+[10105.475284] do_filp_open+0x34/0x7c
+[10105.478771] do_sys_open+0x78/0xe4
+[10105.482170] __arm64_sys_openat+0x1c/0x24
+[10105.486180] el0_svc_handler+0x84/0xc8
+[10105.489928] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
+[10105.492808] Code: 52800013 17fffffb d2800003 f9800011 (c85ffc05)
+[10105.498903] ---[ end trace 46b721d93267a586 ]---
+
+To reproduce the problem:
+
+1. Filesystem initially mounted read-only, free space fixup flag set.
+
+2. mount -o remount,rw <mountpoint>
+
+3. it takes some time (free space fixup running)
+ ... try to terminate running mount by CTRL-C
+ ... does not respond, only after free space fixup is complete
+ ... then "ubifs_remount_fs: cannot spawn "ubifs_bgt0_0", error -4"
+
+4. mount -o remount,rw <mountpoint>
+ ... now finished instantly (fixup already done).
+
+5. Create file or just unmount the filesystem and we get the oops.
+
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Fixes: b50b9f408502 ("UBIFS: do not free write-buffers when in R/O mode")
+Signed-off-by: Petr Cvachoucek <cvachoucek@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/ubifs/super.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ubifs/super.c
++++ b/fs/ubifs/super.c
+@@ -1853,7 +1853,6 @@ out:
+ kthread_stop(c->bgt);
+ c->bgt = NULL;
+ }
+- free_wbufs(c);
+ kfree(c->write_reserve_buf);
+ c->write_reserve_buf = NULL;
+ vfree(c->ileb_buf);
--- /dev/null
+From ce2f46f3531a03781181b7f4bd1ff9f8c5086e7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@epam.com>
+Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2021 11:28:17 +0200
+Subject: xen/gntdev: fix unmap notification order
+
+From: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@epam.com>
+
+commit ce2f46f3531a03781181b7f4bd1ff9f8c5086e7e upstream.
+
+While working with Xen's libxenvchan library I have faced an issue with
+unmap notifications sent in wrong order if both UNMAP_NOTIFY_SEND_EVENT
+and UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE were requested: first we send an event channel
+notification and then clear the notification byte which renders in the below
+inconsistency (cli_live is the byte which was requested to be cleared on unmap):
+
+[ 444.514243] gntdev_put_map UNMAP_NOTIFY_SEND_EVENT map->notify.event 6
+libxenvchan_is_open cli_live 1
+[ 444.515239] __unmap_grant_pages UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE at 14
+
+Thus it is not possible to reliably implement the checks like
+- wait for the notification (UNMAP_NOTIFY_SEND_EVENT)
+- check the variable (UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE)
+because it is possible that the variable gets checked before it is cleared
+by the kernel.
+
+To fix that we need to re-order the notifications, so the variable is first
+gets cleared and then the event channel notification is sent.
+With this fix I can see the correct order of execution:
+
+[ 54.522611] __unmap_grant_pages UNMAP_NOTIFY_CLEAR_BYTE at 14
+[ 54.537966] gntdev_put_map UNMAP_NOTIFY_SEND_EVENT map->notify.event 6
+libxenvchan_is_open cli_live 0
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@epam.com>
+Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211210092817.580718-1-andr2000@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/xen/gntdev.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/xen/gntdev.c
++++ b/drivers/xen/gntdev.c
+@@ -250,13 +250,13 @@ void gntdev_put_map(struct gntdev_priv *
+ if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&map->users))
+ return;
+
++ if (map->pages && !use_ptemod)
++ unmap_grant_pages(map, 0, map->count);
++
+ if (map->notify.flags & UNMAP_NOTIFY_SEND_EVENT) {
+ notify_remote_via_evtchn(map->notify.event);
+ evtchn_put(map->notify.event);
+ }
+-
+- if (map->pages && !use_ptemod)
+- unmap_grant_pages(map, 0, map->count);
+ gntdev_free_map(map);
+ }
+
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
