const uint8_t *extension_data;
size_t extension_len;
int has_rsa_sig = 0, has_ecdsa_sig = 0;
-
- char *wildp = NULL;
+ struct sni_ctx *sni_ctx;
const char *servername;
size_t servername_len;
- struct ebmb_node *node, *n, *node_ecdsa = NULL, *node_rsa = NULL, *node_anonymous = NULL;
int allow_early = 0;
int i;
}
}
- for (i = 0; i < trash.size && i < servername_len; i++) {
+ /* we need to transform this a NULL-ended string in lowecase */
+ for (i = 0; i < trash.size && i < servername_len; i++)
trash.area[i] = tolower(servername[i]);
- if (!wildp && (trash.area[i] == '.'))
- wildp = &trash.area[i];
- }
trash.area[i] = 0;
servername = trash.area;
HA_RWLOCK_RDLOCK(SNI_LOCK, &s->sni_lock);
-
- /* Look for an ECDSA, RSA and DSA certificate, first in the single
- * name and if not found in the wildcard */
- for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
- if (i == 0) /* lookup in full qualified names */
- node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_ctx, servername);
- else if (i == 1 && wildp) /* lookup in wildcards names */
- node = ebst_lookup(&s->sni_w_ctx, wildp);
- else
- break;
-
- for (n = node; n; n = ebmb_next_dup(n)) {
-
- /* lookup a not neg filter */
- if (!container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->neg) {
- struct sni_ctx *sni, *sni_tmp;
- int skip = 0;
-
- if (i == 1 && wildp) { /* wildcard */
- /* If this is a wildcard, look for an exclusion on the same crt-list line */
- sni = container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name);
- list_for_each_entry(sni_tmp, &sni->ckch_inst->sni_ctx, by_ckch_inst) {
- if (sni_tmp->neg && (strcmp((const char *)sni_tmp->name.key, servername) == 0)) {
- skip = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (skip)
- continue;
- }
-
- switch(container_of(n, struct sni_ctx, name)->kinfo.sig) {
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- if (!node_ecdsa)
- node_ecdsa = n;
- break;
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- if (!node_rsa)
- node_rsa = n;
- break;
- default: /* TLSEXT_signature_anonymous|dsa */
- if (!node_anonymous)
- node_anonymous = n;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- }
- /* Once the certificates are found, select them depending on what is
- * supported in the client and by key_signature priority order: EDSA >
- * RSA > DSA */
- if (has_ecdsa_sig && node_ecdsa)
- node = node_ecdsa;
- else if (has_rsa_sig && node_rsa)
- node = node_rsa;
- else if (node_anonymous)
- node = node_anonymous;
- else if (node_ecdsa)
- node = node_ecdsa; /* no ecdsa signature case (< TLSv1.2) */
- else
- node = node_rsa; /* no rsa signature case (far far away) */
-
- if (node) {
+ sni_ctx = ssl_sock_chose_sni_ctx(s, servername, has_rsa_sig, has_ecdsa_sig);
+ if (sni_ctx) {
/* switch ctx */
- struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->conf;
- ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, container_of(node, struct sni_ctx, name)->ctx);
+ struct ssl_bind_conf *conf = sni_ctx->conf;
+ ssl_sock_switchctx_set(ssl, sni_ctx->ctx);
if (conf) {
methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.min].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MIN);
methodVersions[conf->ssl_methods.max].ssl_set_version(ssl, SET_MAX);