*extension_dir = NULL, *host_os_release_stage = NULL;
const char *root_dir = NULL, *root_image = NULL, *tmp_dir = NULL, *var_tmp_dir = NULL;
char **read_write_paths;
- NamespaceInfo ns_info;
bool needs_sandboxing, setup_os_release_symlink;
BindMount *bind_mounts = NULL;
size_t n_bind_mounts = 0;
needs_sandboxing = (params->flags & EXEC_APPLY_SANDBOXING) && !(command_flags & EXEC_COMMAND_FULLY_PRIVILEGED);
if (needs_sandboxing) {
- /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp,
- * which is non-accessible to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp
- * that is sticky, and that's the one we want to use here.
- * This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */
+ /* The runtime struct only contains the parent of the private /tmp, which is non-accessible
+ * to world users. Inside of it there's a /tmp that is sticky, and that's the one we want to
+ * use here. This does not apply when we are using /run/systemd/empty as fallback. */
if (context->private_tmp && runtime && runtime->shared) {
if (streq_ptr(runtime->shared->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY))
else if (runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir)
var_tmp_dir = strjoina(runtime->shared->var_tmp_dir, "/tmp");
}
-
- ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {
- .ignore_protect_paths = false,
- .private_dev = context->private_devices,
- .protect_control_groups = context->protect_control_groups,
- .protect_kernel_tunables = context->protect_kernel_tunables,
- .protect_kernel_modules = context->protect_kernel_modules,
- .protect_kernel_logs = context->protect_kernel_logs,
- .protect_hostname = context->protect_hostname,
- .mount_apivfs = exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context),
- .protect_home = context->protect_home,
- .protect_system = context->protect_system,
- .protect_proc = context->protect_proc,
- .proc_subset = context->proc_subset,
- .private_network = exec_needs_network_namespace(context),
- .private_ipc = exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context),
- /* If NNP is on, we can turn on MS_NOSUID, since it won't have any effect anymore. */
- .mount_nosuid = context->no_new_privileges && !mac_selinux_use(),
- };
- } else if (!context->dynamic_user && root_dir)
- /*
- * If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed
- * sandbox info, otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and
- * fail if we are enable to apply the sandbox inside the mount namespace.
- */
- ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {
- .ignore_protect_paths = true,
- };
- else
- ns_info = (NamespaceInfo) {};
+ }
/* Symlinks (exec dirs, os-release) are set up after other mounts, before they are made read-only. */
- setup_os_release_symlink = ns_info.mount_apivfs && (root_dir || root_image);
+ setup_os_release_symlink = needs_sandboxing && exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context) && (root_dir || root_image);
r = compile_symlinks(context, params, setup_os_release_symlink, &symlinks);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return r;
}
- r = setup_namespace(
- root_dir,
- root_image,
- context->root_image_options,
- context->root_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service,
- &ns_info,
- read_write_paths,
- needs_sandboxing ? context->read_only_paths : NULL,
- needs_sandboxing ? context->inaccessible_paths : NULL,
- needs_sandboxing ? context->exec_paths : NULL,
- needs_sandboxing ? context->no_exec_paths : NULL,
- empty_directories,
- symlinks,
- bind_mounts,
- n_bind_mounts,
- context->temporary_filesystems,
- context->n_temporary_filesystems,
- context->mount_images,
- context->n_mount_images,
- context->mount_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service,
- tmp_dir,
- var_tmp_dir,
- creds_path,
- context->log_namespace,
- context->mount_propagation_flag,
- &verity,
- context->extension_images,
- context->n_extension_images,
- context->extension_image_policy ?: &image_policy_sysext,
- context->extension_directories,
- propagate_dir,
- incoming_dir,
- extension_dir,
- root_dir || root_image ? params->notify_socket : NULL,
- host_os_release_stage,
- params->runtime_scope,
- error_path);
+ NamespaceParameters parameters = {
+ .runtime_scope = params->runtime_scope,
+
+ .root_directory = root_dir,
+ .root_image = root_image,
+ .root_image_options = context->root_image_options,
+ .root_image_policy = context->root_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service,
+
+ .read_write_paths = read_write_paths,
+ .read_only_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->read_only_paths : NULL,
+ .inaccessible_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->inaccessible_paths : NULL,
+
+ .exec_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->exec_paths : NULL,
+ .no_exec_paths = needs_sandboxing ? context->no_exec_paths : NULL,
+
+ .empty_directories = empty_directories,
+ .symlinks = symlinks,
+
+ .bind_mounts = bind_mounts,
+ .n_bind_mounts = n_bind_mounts,
+
+ .temporary_filesystems = context->temporary_filesystems,
+ .n_temporary_filesystems = context->n_temporary_filesystems,
+
+ .mount_images = context->mount_images,
+ .n_mount_images = context->n_mount_images,
+ .mount_image_policy = context->mount_image_policy ?: &image_policy_service,
+
+ .tmp_dir = tmp_dir,
+ .var_tmp_dir = var_tmp_dir,
+
+ .creds_path = creds_path,
+ .log_namespace = context->log_namespace,
+ .mount_propagation_flag = context->mount_propagation_flag,
+
+ .verity = &verity,
+
+ .extension_images = context->extension_images,
+ .n_extension_images = context->n_extension_images,
+ .extension_image_policy = context->extension_image_policy ?: &image_policy_sysext,
+ .extension_directories = context->extension_directories,
+
+ .propagate_dir = propagate_dir,
+ .incoming_dir = incoming_dir,
+ .extension_dir = extension_dir,
+ .notify_socket = root_dir || root_image ? params->notify_socket : NULL,
+ .host_os_release_stage = host_os_release_stage,
+
+ /* If DynamicUser=no and RootDirectory= is set then lets pass a relaxed sandbox info,
+ * otherwise enforce it, don't ignore protected paths and fail if we are enable to apply the
+ * sandbox inside the mount namespace. */
+ .ignore_protect_paths = !needs_sandboxing && !context->dynamic_user && root_dir,
+
+ .protect_control_groups = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_control_groups,
+ .protect_kernel_tunables = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_tunables,
+ .protect_kernel_modules = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_modules,
+ .protect_kernel_logs = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_kernel_logs,
+ .protect_hostname = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_hostname,
+
+ .private_dev = needs_sandboxing && context->private_devices,
+ .private_network = needs_sandboxing && exec_needs_network_namespace(context),
+ .private_ipc = needs_sandboxing && exec_needs_ipc_namespace(context),
+
+ .mount_apivfs = needs_sandboxing && exec_context_get_effective_mount_apivfs(context),
+
+ /* If NNP is on, we can turn on MS_NOSUID, since it won't have any effect anymore. */
+ .mount_nosuid = needs_sandboxing && context->no_new_privileges && !mac_selinux_use(),
+
+ .protect_home = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_home,
+ .protect_system = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_system,
+ .protect_proc = needs_sandboxing && context->protect_proc,
+ .proc_subset = needs_sandboxing && context->proc_subset,
+ };
+ r = setup_namespace(¶meters, error_path);
/* If we couldn't set up the namespace this is probably due to a missing capability. setup_namespace() reports
* that with a special, recognizable error ENOANO. In this case, silently proceed, but only if exclusively
* sandboxing options were used, i.e. nothing such as RootDirectory= or BindMount= that would result in a
return 0;
}
-static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
+static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceParameters *p) {
_cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL;
const char *entry_path;
int r, n;
assert(m);
- assert(ns_info);
+ assert(p);
- if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
- ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
+ if (p->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
+ p->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) {
/* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it
* pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it
* per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was
* added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */
- const char *hpv = ns_info->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ?
+ const char *hpv = p->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ?
"off" :
- protect_proc_to_string(ns_info->protect_proc);
+ protect_proc_to_string(p->protect_proc);
/* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in
* 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when
return -ENOMEM;
}
- if (ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID &&
+ if (p->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID &&
mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid") != 0)
if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid"))
return -ENOMEM;
static int apply_one_mount(
const char *root_directory,
MountEntry *m,
- const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy,
- const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy,
- const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
- RuntimeScope scope) {
+ const NamespaceParameters *p) {
_cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL;
bool rbind = true, make = false;
int r;
assert(m);
- assert(ns_info);
+ assert(p);
log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m));
break;
case PRIVATE_DEV:
- return mount_private_dev(m, scope);
+ return mount_private_dev(m, p->runtime_scope);
case BIND_DEV:
return mount_bind_dev(m);
return mount_bind_sysfs(m);
case PROCFS:
- return mount_procfs(m, ns_info);
+ return mount_procfs(m, p);
case RUN:
return mount_run(m);
return mount_mqueuefs(m);
case MOUNT_IMAGES:
- return mount_image(m, NULL, mount_image_policy);
+ return mount_image(m, NULL, p->mount_image_policy);
case EXTENSION_IMAGES:
- return mount_image(m, root_directory, extension_image_policy);
+ return mount_image(m, root_directory, p->extension_image_policy);
case OVERLAY_MOUNT:
return mount_overlay(m);
return 0;
}
-static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) {
- assert(ns_info);
+static bool namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceParameters *p) {
+ assert(p);
/*
* ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=,
* first place...
*/
- return ns_info->mount_apivfs ||
- ns_info->protect_control_groups ||
- ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ||
- ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
- ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
+ return p->mount_apivfs ||
+ p->protect_control_groups ||
+ p->protect_kernel_tunables ||
+ p->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ||
+ p->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL;
}
static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts(
- const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
- char** read_write_paths,
- char** read_only_paths,
- char** inaccessible_paths,
- char** exec_paths,
- char** no_exec_paths,
- char** empty_directories,
- size_t n_bind_mounts,
- size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
- size_t n_mount_images,
- size_t n_extension_images,
- size_t n_extension_directories,
- size_t n_hierarchies,
- const char* tmp_dir,
- const char* var_tmp_dir,
- const char *creds_path,
- const char* log_namespace,
- bool setup_propagate,
- const char* notify_socket,
- const char* host_os_release) {
+ const NamespaceParameters *p,
+ char **hierarchies,
+ bool setup_propagate) {
size_t protect_home_cnt;
size_t protect_system_cnt =
- (ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
+ (p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) :
- ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
+ ((p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) :
- ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
+ ((p->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0)));
protect_home_cnt =
- (ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
+ (p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) :
- ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
+ ((p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) :
- ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
+ ((p->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0)));
- return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir +
- strv_length(read_write_paths) +
- strv_length(read_only_paths) +
- strv_length(inaccessible_paths) +
- strv_length(exec_paths) +
- strv_length(no_exec_paths) +
- strv_length(empty_directories) +
- n_bind_mounts +
- n_mount_images +
- (n_extension_images > 0 || n_extension_directories > 0 ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */
- n_hierarchies + n_extension_images + n_extension_directories: 0) +
- n_temporary_filesystems +
- ns_info->private_dev +
- (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ?
+ return !!p->tmp_dir + !!p->var_tmp_dir +
+ strv_length(p->read_write_paths) +
+ strv_length(p->read_only_paths) +
+ strv_length(p->inaccessible_paths) +
+ strv_length(p->exec_paths) +
+ strv_length(p->no_exec_paths) +
+ strv_length(p->empty_directories) +
+ p->n_bind_mounts +
+ p->n_mount_images +
+ (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories) ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */
+ strv_length(hierarchies) + p->n_extension_images + strv_length(p->extension_directories) : 0) +
+ p->n_temporary_filesystems +
+ p->private_dev +
+ (p->protect_kernel_tunables ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table) : 0) +
- (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
- (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ?
+ (p->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) +
+ (p->protect_kernel_logs ?
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table) : 0) +
- (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
+ (p->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) +
protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt +
- (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
- (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
- (creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
- !!log_namespace +
+ (p->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) +
+ (namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(p) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) +
+ (p->creds_path ? 2 : 1) +
+ !!p->log_namespace +
setup_propagate + /* /run/systemd/incoming */
- !!notify_socket +
- !!host_os_release +
- ns_info->private_network + /* /sys */
- ns_info->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */
+ !!p->notify_socket +
+ !!p->host_os_release_stage +
+ p->private_network + /* /sys */
+ p->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */
}
/* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all
static int apply_mounts(
const char *root,
- const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy,
- const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy,
- const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
+ const NamespaceParameters *p,
MountEntry *mounts,
size_t *n_mounts,
- RuntimeScope scope,
- char **symlinks,
char **error_path) {
_cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL;
break;
}
- r = apply_one_mount(root, m, mount_image_policy, extension_image_policy, ns_info, scope);
+ r = apply_one_mount(root, m, p);
if (r < 0) {
mount_entry_path_debug_string(root, m, error_path);
return r;
* read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs and other symlinks.
* Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already
* exist, which means this will be a no-op. */
- r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, symlinks);
+ r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, p->symlinks);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up symlinks inside mount namespace: %m");
}
/* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */
- if (ns_info->mount_nosuid)
+ if (p->mount_nosuid)
for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) {
r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo);
if (r < 0) {
return false;
}
-int setup_namespace(
- const char* root_directory,
- const char* root_image,
- const MountOptions *root_image_mount_options,
- const ImagePolicy *root_image_policy,
- const NamespaceInfo *ns_info,
- char** read_write_paths,
- char** read_only_paths,
- char** inaccessible_paths,
- char** exec_paths,
- char** no_exec_paths,
- char** empty_directories,
- char** symlinks,
- const BindMount *bind_mounts,
- size_t n_bind_mounts,
- const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems,
- size_t n_temporary_filesystems,
- const MountImage *mount_images,
- size_t n_mount_images,
- const ImagePolicy *mount_image_policy,
- const char* tmp_dir,
- const char* var_tmp_dir,
- const char *creds_path,
- const char *log_namespace,
- unsigned long mount_propagation_flag,
- VeritySettings *verity,
- const MountImage *extension_images,
- size_t n_extension_images,
- const ImagePolicy *extension_image_policy,
- char **extension_directories,
- const char *propagate_dir,
- const char *incoming_dir,
- const char *extension_dir,
- const char *notify_socket,
- const char *host_os_release_stage,
- RuntimeScope scope,
- char **error_path) {
+int setup_namespace(const NamespaceParameters *p, char **error_path) {
_cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL;
_cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL;
_cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL;
MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL;
- bool require_prefix = false, setup_propagate = false;
+ bool require_prefix = false;
const char *root;
DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags =
DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT |
size_t n_mounts;
int r;
- assert(ns_info);
+ assert(p);
/* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes
* we configure take effect */
BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000);
- if (!isempty(propagate_dir) && !isempty(incoming_dir))
- setup_propagate = true;
-
- if (mount_propagation_flag == 0)
- mount_propagation_flag = MS_SHARED;
+ bool setup_propagate = !isempty(p->propagate_dir) && !isempty(p->incoming_dir);
+ unsigned long mount_propagation_flag = p->mount_propagation_flag != 0 ? p->mount_propagation_flag : MS_SHARED;
- if (root_image) {
+ if (p->root_image) {
/* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */
- if (root_read_only(read_only_paths,
- ns_info->protect_system) &&
- home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories,
- bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems,
- ns_info->protect_home) &&
- strv_isempty(read_write_paths))
+ if (root_read_only(p->read_only_paths,
+ p->protect_system) &&
+ home_read_only(p->read_only_paths, p->inaccessible_paths, p->empty_directories,
+ p->bind_mounts, p->n_bind_mounts, p->temporary_filesystems, p->n_temporary_filesystems,
+ p->protect_home) &&
+ strv_isempty(p->read_write_paths))
dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY;
- SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, verity && verity->data_path);
+ SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, p->verity && p->verity->data_path);
r = loop_device_make_by_path(
- root_image,
+ p->root_image,
FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */,
/* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX,
FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN,
r = dissect_loop_device(
loop_device,
- verity,
- root_image_mount_options,
- root_image_policy,
+ p->verity,
+ p->root_image_options,
+ p->root_image_policy,
dissect_image_flags,
&dissected_image);
if (r < 0)
r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition(
dissected_image,
loop_device->fd,
- verity);
+ p->verity);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = dissected_image_decrypt(
dissected_image,
NULL,
- verity,
+ p->verity,
dissect_image_flags);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m");
}
- if (root_directory)
- root = root_directory;
+ if (p->root_directory)
+ root = p->root_directory;
else {
/* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like
* when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure
require_prefix = true;
}
- if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories)) {
+ if (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories)) {
/* Hierarchy population needs to be done for sysext and confext extension images */
r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies, "SYSTEMD_SYSEXT_AND_CONFEXT_HIERARCHIES");
if (r < 0)
}
n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts(
- ns_info,
- read_write_paths,
- read_only_paths,
- inaccessible_paths,
- exec_paths,
- no_exec_paths,
- empty_directories,
- n_bind_mounts,
- n_temporary_filesystems,
- n_mount_images,
- n_extension_images,
- strv_length(extension_directories),
- strv_length(hierarchies),
- tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir,
- creds_path,
- log_namespace,
- setup_propagate,
- notify_socket,
- host_os_release_stage);
+ p,
+ hierarchies,
+ setup_propagate);
if (n_mounts > 0) {
m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts);
if (!mounts)
return -ENOMEM;
- r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
+ r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
+ r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
+ r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- r = append_access_mounts(&m, exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix);
+ r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- r = append_access_mounts(&m, no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix);
+ r = append_access_mounts(&m, p->no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories);
+ r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, p->empty_directories);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts);
+ r = append_bind_mounts(&m, p->bind_mounts, p->n_bind_mounts);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems);
+ r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, p->temporary_filesystems, p->n_temporary_filesystems);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- if (tmp_dir) {
- bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
+ if (p->tmp_dir) {
+ bool ro = streq(p->tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/tmp",
.mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
- .source_const = tmp_dir,
+ .source_const = p->tmp_dir,
};
}
- if (var_tmp_dir) {
- bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
+ if (p->var_tmp_dir) {
+ bool ro = streq(p->var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY);
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/var/tmp",
.mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP,
- .source_const = var_tmp_dir,
+ .source_const = p->var_tmp_dir,
};
}
- r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images);
+ r = append_mount_images(&m, p->mount_images, p->n_mount_images);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- r = append_extensions(&m, root, extension_dir, hierarchies, extension_images, n_extension_images, extension_directories);
+ r = append_extensions(&m, root, p->extension_dir, hierarchies, p->extension_images, p->n_extension_images, p->extension_directories);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- if (ns_info->private_dev)
+ if (p->private_dev)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/dev",
.mode = PRIVATE_DEV,
/* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the
protective mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have
failed gracefully, so let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */
- bool ignore_protect_proc = ns_info->ignore_protect_paths || ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID;
- if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) {
+ bool ignore_protect_proc = p->ignore_protect_paths || p->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID;
+ if (p->protect_kernel_tunables) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table),
r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table),
- ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
+ p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
}
- if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) {
+ if (p->protect_kernel_modules) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_modules_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table),
- ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
+ p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
}
- if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) {
+ if (p->protect_kernel_logs) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_logs_proc_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table),
r = append_static_mounts(&m,
protect_kernel_logs_dev_table,
ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table),
- ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
+ p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
}
- if (ns_info->protect_control_groups)
+ if (p->protect_control_groups)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup",
.mode = READONLY,
};
- r = append_protect_home(&m, ns_info->protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
+ r = append_protect_home(&m, p->protect_home, p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- r = append_protect_system(&m, ns_info->protect_system, false);
+ r = append_protect_system(&m, p->protect_system, false);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
- if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) {
+ if (namespace_parameters_mount_apivfs(p)) {
r = append_static_mounts(&m,
apivfs_table,
ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table),
- ns_info->ignore_protect_paths);
+ p->ignore_protect_paths);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
}
/* Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then neither of the
* two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by
* the mount option. */
- if (ns_info->protect_hostname) {
+ if (p->protect_hostname) {
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
.mode = READONLY,
};
}
- if (ns_info->private_network)
+ if (p->private_network)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/sys",
.mode = PRIVATE_SYSFS,
};
- if (ns_info->private_ipc)
+ if (p->private_ipc)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/dev/mqueue",
.mode = MQUEUEFS,
.flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME,
};
- if (creds_path) {
+ if (p->creds_path) {
/* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide
* everything else. */
};
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
- .path_const = creds_path,
+ .path_const = p->creds_path,
.mode = BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = true,
- .source_const = creds_path,
+ .source_const = p->creds_path,
.ignore = true,
};
} else {
};
}
- if (log_namespace) {
+ if (p->log_namespace) {
_cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL;
- q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace);
+ q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", p->log_namespace);
if (!q) {
r = -ENOMEM;
goto finish;
/* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */
if (setup_propagate)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
- .source_const = propagate_dir,
- .path_const = incoming_dir,
+ .source_const = p->propagate_dir,
+ .path_const = p->incoming_dir,
.mode = BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = true,
};
- if (notify_socket)
+ if (p->notify_socket)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
- .path_const = notify_socket,
- .source_const = notify_socket,
+ .path_const = p->notify_socket,
+ .source_const = p->notify_socket,
.mode = BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = true,
};
- if (host_os_release_stage)
+ if (p->host_os_release_stage)
*(m++) = (MountEntry) {
.path_const = "/run/host/.os-release-stage/",
- .source_const = host_os_release_stage,
+ .source_const = p->host_os_release_stage,
.mode = BIND_MOUNT,
.read_only = true,
.ignore = true, /* Live copy, don't hard-fail if it goes missing */
/* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */
if (setup_propagate)
- (void) mkdir_p(propagate_dir, 0600);
+ (void) mkdir_p(p->propagate_dir, 0600);
- if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories))
+ if (p->n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(p->extension_directories))
/* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the
* mounts to create, so have the parent ready */
- (void) mkdir_p(extension_dir, 0600);
+ (void) mkdir_p(p->extension_dir, 0600);
/* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace
* shows up in the parent */
goto finish;
}
- if (root_image) {
+ if (p->root_image) {
/* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */
r = dissected_image_mount(
dissected_image,
goto finish;
}
- } else if (root_directory) {
+ } else if (p->root_directory) {
/* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */
r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW);
}
/* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */
- if (root_image || root_directory)
+ if (p->root_image || p->root_directory)
(void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID);
/* Now make the magic happen */
r = apply_mounts(root,
- mount_image_policy,
- extension_image_policy,
- ns_info,
+ p,
mounts, &n_mounts,
- scope,
- symlinks,
error_path);
if (r < 0)
goto finish;
/* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */
r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0);
- if (r == -EINVAL && root_directory) {
+ if (r == -EINVAL && p->root_directory) {
/* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user
* namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace,
* MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than
/* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only
* supported for non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */
if (setup_propagate) {
- r = mount(NULL, incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL);
+ r = mount(NULL, p->incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL);
if (r < 0) {
- log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", incoming_dir);
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", p->incoming_dir);
goto finish;
}
}
projects / thirdparty / systemd.git / commitdiff
