Implement inlining of crl files

While crl files can change regulary and it is usually not a good idea to
statically include them into config files, handling multiple files and
updating files on mobile devices is tiresome/problematic. Inlining a static
version of the crl file is better in these use cases than to use no crl at
all.

OpenVPN 3 already supports inlining crl-verify, so <crl-verify> is already
used in config files.

V2: Fixed PolarSSL and made formatting respect the 80 column limit
V3: Accidentally reverted one change too much in V2
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Message-Id: <1457293149-10526-1-git-send-email-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.network.openvpn.devel/11337

Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>

diff --git a/doc/openvpn.8 b/doc/openvpn.8
index 628d8772fbaf6500a6973ff8e1a157a41ee5978a..decffc776854206dff97abb122fda9ff8c8c898e 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/openvpn.8
+++ b/doc/openvpn.8
@@ -6490,7 +6490,8 @@ X509_1_C=KG
 .\"*********************************************************
 .SH INLINE FILE SUPPORT
 OpenVPN allows including files in the main configuration for the
-.B \-\-ca, \-\-cert, \-\-dh, \-\-extra\-certs, \-\-key, \-\-pkcs12, \-\-secret
+.B \-\-ca, \-\-cert, \-\-dh, \-\-extra\-certs, \-\-key, \-\-pkcs12, \-\-secret,
+.B \-\-crl-verify
 and
 .B \-\-tls\-auth
 options.

diff --git a/src/openvpn/init.c b/src/openvpn/init.c
index 7f54c3ca783cfe0287f9fcefa775468030a74b8d..84fac0783f79813d2c009684744505e27e55353a 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/init.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/init.c
@@ -2323,6 +2323,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls (struct context *c, const unsigned int flags)
   to.verify_x509_type = (options->verify_x509_type & 0xff);
   to.verify_x509_name = options->verify_x509_name;
   to.crl_file = options->crl_file;
+  to.crl_file_inline = options->crl_file_inline;
   to.ssl_flags = options->ssl_flags;
   to.ns_cert_type = options->ns_cert_type;
   memmove (to.remote_cert_ku, options->remote_cert_ku, sizeof (to.remote_cert_ku));

diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.c b/src/openvpn/options.c
index 02def3a82718929811d7b25857b4623ddb22b746..57f3dc536af7c7185dd4630b85bf20d4ff688a69 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/options.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/options.c
@@ -2747,8 +2747,8 @@ options_postprocess_filechecks (struct options *options)
     errs |= check_file_access_chroot (options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE, options->crl_file, R_OK|X_OK,
                                "--crl-verify directory");
   else
-    errs |= check_file_access_chroot (options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE, options->crl_file, R_OK,
-                               "--crl-verify");
+    errs |= check_file_access_chroot (options->chroot_dir, CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_INLINE,
+                                      options->crl_file, R_OK, "--crl-verify");
 
   errs |= check_file_access (CHKACC_FILE|CHKACC_INLINE, options->tls_auth_file, R_OK,
                              "--tls-auth");
@@ -6783,12 +6783,17 @@ add_option (struct options *options,
       VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL);
       options->cipher_list = p[1];
     }
-  else if (streq (p[0], "crl-verify") && p[1] && ((p[2] && streq(p[2], "dir")) || !p[2]) && !p[3])
+  else if (streq (p[0], "crl-verify") && p[1] && ((p[2] && streq(p[2], "dir"))
+                 || (p[2] && streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) ) || !p[2]) && !p[3])
     {
       VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL);
       if (p[2] && streq(p[2], "dir"))
        options->ssl_flags |= SSLF_CRL_VERIFY_DIR;
       options->crl_file = p[1];
+      if (streq (p[1], INLINE_FILE_TAG) && p[2])
+       {
+         options->crl_file_inline = p[2];
+       }
     }
   else if (streq (p[0], "tls-verify") && p[1])
     {

diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.h b/src/openvpn/options.h
index 23d3992e0ef97f434f18280d090ed4edfc30aea7..8a26e14779942ebe2254af77e213619cfbe581b8 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/options.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/options.h
@@ -511,6 +511,7 @@ struct options
   const char *ca_file_inline;
   const char *cert_file_inline;
   const char *extra_certs_file_inline;
+  const char *crl_file_inline;
   char *priv_key_file_inline;
   const char *dh_file_inline;
   const char *pkcs12_file_inline; /* contains the base64 encoding of pkcs12 file */

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
index eaf4a919fdab880fe75e480f7daba730cf1f50fb..334ccb0739c70c61751f7f9e6aff2748fa5c494f 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ struct tls_options
   int verify_x509_type;
   const char *verify_x509_name;
   const char *crl_file;
+  const char *crl_file_inline;
   int ns_cert_type;
   unsigned remote_cert_ku[MAX_PARMS];
   const char *remote_cert_eku;

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
index ccfa9d26256cec5d01de3eb86d1f46ad15fb0897..ea381f83462392e6d63f60fdff8878145e99ba0a 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
@@ -690,7 +690,7 @@ verify_cert(struct tls_session *session, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, int cert_dep
       }
       else
       {
-       if (SUCCESS != x509_verify_crl(opt->crl_file, cert, subject))
+       if (SUCCESS != x509_verify_crl(opt->crl_file, opt->crl_file_inline, cert, subject))
          goto cleanup;
       }
     }

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h
index 4e9ad60f714c5d85a642e3a1d1cb567a8d8f8f4e..17e88fb36fe2a690142db61c73a491d84e0aefe5 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h
@@ -248,13 +248,14 @@ result_t x509_write_pem(FILE *peercert_file, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peercert);
  *
  * @param crl_file     File name of the CRL file
  * @param cert         Certificate to verify
+ * @param crl_inline   Contents of the crl file if it is inlined
  * @param subject      Subject of the given certificate
  *
  * @return             \c SUCCESS if the CRL was not signed by the issuer of the
  *                     certificate or does not contain an entry for it.
  *                     \c FAILURE otherwise.
  */
-result_t x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert,
-    const char *subject);
+result_t x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, const char *crl_inline,
+                         openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, const char *subject);
 
 #endif /* SSL_VERIFY_BACKEND_H_ */

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
index 7046f02a21898604bc18f0c1ed2cba239343652b..4020fb9e847a1d587715e150f21a5b54513245a1 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c
@@ -613,7 +613,8 @@ x509_write_pem(FILE *peercert_file, X509 *peercert)
  * check peer cert against CRL
  */
 result_t
-x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, X509 *peer_cert, const char *subject)
+x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, const char* crl_inline,
+                X509 *peer_cert, const char *subject)
 {
   X509_CRL *crl=NULL;
   X509_REVOKED *revoked;
@@ -623,7 +624,10 @@ x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, X509 *peer_cert, const char *subject)
   struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
   char *serial;
 
-  in = BIO_new_file (crl_file, "r");
+  if (!strcmp (crl_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && crl_inline)
+    in = BIO_new_mem_buf ((char *)crl_inline, -1);
+  else
+    in = BIO_new_file (crl_file, "r");
 
   if (in == NULL) {
     msg (M_WARN, "CRL: cannot read: %s", crl_file);

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c
index a2e6a8ec017383b5a4f393ea2040d4b8951256be..d1b9f02fb48691c893131e2d3597396e97495422 100644 (file)
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_polarssl.c
@@ -359,18 +359,30 @@ x509_write_pem(FILE *peercert_file, x509_crt *peercert)
  * check peer cert against CRL
  */
 result_t
-x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, x509_crt *cert, const char *subject)
+x509_verify_crl(const char *crl_file, const char* crl_inline,
+                x509_crt *cert, const char *subject)
 {
   result_t retval = FAILURE;
   x509_crl crl = {0};
   struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
   char *serial;
 
-  if (!polar_ok(x509_crl_parse_file(&crl, crl_file)))
+  if (!strcmp (crl_file, INLINE_FILE_TAG) && crl_inline)
     {
-      msg (M_WARN, "CRL: cannot read CRL from file %s", crl_file);
-      goto end;
+      if (!polar_ok(x509_crl_parse(&crl, crl_inline, strlen(crl_inline))))
+        {
+           msg (M_WARN, "CRL: cannot parse inline CRL");
+           goto end;
+        }
     }
+  else
+    {
+      if (!polar_ok(x509_crl_parse_file(&crl, crl_file)))
+      {
+          msg (M_WARN, "CRL: cannot read CRL from file %s", crl_file);
+          goto end;
+      }
+  }
 
   if(cert->issuer_raw.len != crl.issuer_raw.len ||
       memcmp(crl.issuer_raw.p, cert->issuer_raw.p, crl.issuer_raw.len) != 0)