--- /dev/null
+From 8fa73ee44daefc884c53a25158c25a4107eb5a94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Shubham Panwar <shubiisp8@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2024 15:20:46 +0530
+Subject: ACPI: button: Add DMI quirk for Samsung Galaxy Book2 to fix initial lid detection issue
+
+From: Shubham Panwar <shubiisp8@gmail.com>
+
+commit 8fa73ee44daefc884c53a25158c25a4107eb5a94 upstream.
+
+Add a DMI quirk for Samsung Galaxy Book2 to fix an initial lid state
+detection issue.
+
+The _LID device incorrectly returns the lid status as "closed" during
+boot, causing the system to enter a suspend loop right after booting.
+
+The quirk ensures that the correct lid state is reported initially,
+preventing the system from immediately suspending after startup. It
+only addresses the initial lid state detection and ensures proper
+system behavior upon boot.
+
+Signed-off-by: Shubham Panwar <shubiisp8@gmail.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241020095045.6036-2-shubiisp8@gmail.com
+[ rjw: Changelog edits ]
+Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/acpi/button.c | 11 +++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/acpi/button.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/button.c
+@@ -130,6 +130,17 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id dmi_li
+ },
+ .driver_data = (void *)(long)ACPI_BUTTON_LID_INIT_OPEN,
+ },
++ {
++ /*
++ * Samsung galaxybook2 ,initial _LID device notification returns
++ * lid closed.
++ */
++ .matches = {
++ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD."),
++ DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "750XED"),
++ },
++ .driver_data = (void *)(long)ACPI_BUTTON_LID_INIT_OPEN,
++ },
+ {}
+ };
+
--- /dev/null
+From 088984c8d54c0053fc4ae606981291d741c5924b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Koba Ko <kobak@nvidia.com>
+Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2024 04:50:10 +0800
+Subject: ACPI: PRM: Find EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME block for PRM handler and context
+
+From: Koba Ko <kobak@nvidia.com>
+
+commit 088984c8d54c0053fc4ae606981291d741c5924b upstream.
+
+PRMT needs to find the correct type of block to translate the PA-VA
+mapping for EFI runtime services.
+
+The issue arises because the PRMT is finding a block of type
+EFI_CONVENTIONAL_MEMORY, which is not appropriate for runtime services
+as described in Section 2.2.2 (Runtime Services) of the UEFI
+Specification [1]. Since the PRM handler is a type of runtime service,
+this causes an exception when the PRM handler is called.
+
+ [Firmware Bug]: Unable to handle paging request in EFI runtime service
+ WARNING: CPU: 22 PID: 4330 at drivers/firmware/efi/runtime-wrappers.c:341
+ __efi_queue_work+0x11c/0x170
+ Call trace:
+
+Let PRMT find a block with EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME for PRM handler and PRM
+context.
+
+If no suitable block is found, a warning message will be printed, but
+the procedure continues to manage the next PRM handler.
+
+However, if the PRM handler is actually called without proper allocation,
+it would result in a failure during error handling.
+
+By using the correct memory types for runtime services, ensure that the
+PRM handler and the context are properly mapped in the virtual address
+space during runtime, preventing the paging request error.
+
+The issue is really that only memory that has been remapped for runtime
+by the firmware can be used by the PRM handler, and so the region needs
+to have the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute.
+
+Link: https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/UEFI_Spec_2_10_Aug29.pdf # [1]
+Fixes: cefc7ca46235 ("ACPI: PRM: implement OperationRegion handler for the PlatformRtMechanism subtype")
+Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Koba Ko <kobak@nvidia.com>
+Reviewed-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mochs@nvidia.com>
+Reviewed-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241012205010.4165798-1-kobak@nvidia.com
+[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ]
+Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/acpi/prmt.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/acpi/prmt.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/prmt.c
+@@ -72,17 +72,21 @@ struct prm_module_info {
+ struct prm_handler_info handlers[] __counted_by(handler_count);
+ };
+
+-static u64 efi_pa_va_lookup(u64 pa)
++static u64 efi_pa_va_lookup(efi_guid_t *guid, u64 pa)
+ {
+ efi_memory_desc_t *md;
+ u64 pa_offset = pa & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ u64 page = pa & PAGE_MASK;
+
+ for_each_efi_memory_desc(md) {
+- if (md->phys_addr < pa && pa < md->phys_addr + PAGE_SIZE * md->num_pages)
++ if ((md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME) &&
++ (md->phys_addr < pa && pa < md->phys_addr + PAGE_SIZE * md->num_pages)) {
+ return pa_offset + md->virt_addr + page - md->phys_addr;
++ }
+ }
+
++ pr_warn("Failed to find VA for GUID: %pUL, PA: 0x%llx", guid, pa);
++
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+@@ -148,9 +152,15 @@ acpi_parse_prmt(union acpi_subtable_head
+ th = &tm->handlers[cur_handler];
+
+ guid_copy(&th->guid, (guid_t *)handler_info->handler_guid);
+- th->handler_addr = (void *)efi_pa_va_lookup(handler_info->handler_address);
+- th->static_data_buffer_addr = efi_pa_va_lookup(handler_info->static_data_buffer_address);
+- th->acpi_param_buffer_addr = efi_pa_va_lookup(handler_info->acpi_param_buffer_address);
++ th->handler_addr =
++ (void *)efi_pa_va_lookup(&th->guid, handler_info->handler_address);
++
++ th->static_data_buffer_addr =
++ efi_pa_va_lookup(&th->guid, handler_info->static_data_buffer_address);
++
++ th->acpi_param_buffer_addr =
++ efi_pa_va_lookup(&th->guid, handler_info->acpi_param_buffer_address);
++
+ } while (++cur_handler < tm->handler_count && (handler_info = get_next_handler(handler_info)));
+
+ return 0;
+@@ -253,6 +263,13 @@ static acpi_status acpi_platformrt_space
+ if (!handler || !module)
+ goto invalid_guid;
+
++ if (!handler->handler_addr ||
++ !handler->static_data_buffer_addr ||
++ !handler->acpi_param_buffer_addr) {
++ buffer->prm_status = PRM_HANDLER_ERROR;
++ return AE_OK;
++ }
++
+ ACPI_COPY_NAMESEG(context.signature, "PRMC");
+ context.revision = 0x0;
+ context.reserved = 0x0;
--- /dev/null
+From 53f1a907d36fb3aa02a4d34073bcec25823a6c74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Heusel <christian@heusel.eu>
+Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 13:16:26 +0200
+Subject: ACPI: resource: Add LG 16T90SP to irq1_level_low_skip_override[]
+
+From: Christian Heusel <christian@heusel.eu>
+
+commit 53f1a907d36fb3aa02a4d34073bcec25823a6c74 upstream.
+
+The LG Gram Pro 16 2-in-1 (2024) the 16T90SP has its keybopard IRQ (1)
+described as ActiveLow in the DSDT, which the kernel overrides to EdgeHigh
+which breaks the keyboard.
+
+Add the 16T90SP to the irq1_level_low_skip_override[] quirk table to fix
+this.
+
+Reported-by: Dirk Holten <dirk.holten@gmx.de>
+Closes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219382
+Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Suggested-by: Dirk Holten <dirk.holten@gmx.de>
+Signed-off-by: Christian Heusel <christian@heusel.eu>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241017-lg-gram-pro-keyboard-v2-1-7c8fbf6ff718@heusel.eu
+Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/acpi/resource.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/acpi/resource.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/resource.c
+@@ -538,6 +538,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id irq1_l
+ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "17U70P"),
+ },
+ },
++ {
++ /* LG Electronics 16T90SP */
++ .matches = {
++ DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LG Electronics"),
++ DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "16T90SP"),
++ },
++ },
+ { }
+ };
+
--- /dev/null
+From 35fdc6e1c16099078bcbd73a6c8f1733ae7f1909 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Jos=C3=A9=20Relvas?= <josemonsantorelvas@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2024 11:27:56 +0100
+Subject: ALSA: hda/realtek: Add subwoofer quirk for Acer Predator G9-593
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: José Relvas <josemonsantorelvas@gmail.com>
+
+commit 35fdc6e1c16099078bcbd73a6c8f1733ae7f1909 upstream.
+
+The Acer Predator G9-593 has a 2+1 speaker system which isn't probed
+correctly.
+This patch adds a quirk with the proper pin connections.
+
+Note that I do not own this laptop, so I cannot guarantee that this
+fixes the issue.
+Testing was done by other users here:
+https://discussion.fedoraproject.org/t/-/118482
+
+This model appears to have two different dev IDs...
+
+- 0x1177 (as seen on the forum link above)
+- 0x1178 (as seen on https://linux-hardware.org/?probe=127df9999f)
+
+I don't think the audio system was changed between model revisions, so
+the patch applies for both IDs.
+
+Signed-off-by: José Relvas <josemonsantorelvas@gmail.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241020102756.225258-1-josemonsantorelvas@gmail.com
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
++++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c
+@@ -7631,6 +7631,7 @@ enum {
+ ALC286_FIXUP_ACER_AIO_HEADSET_MIC,
+ ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MIC,
+ ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_MIC_NO_PRESENCE,
++ ALC255_FIXUP_PREDATOR_SUBWOOFER,
+ ALC299_FIXUP_PREDATOR_SPK,
+ ALC256_FIXUP_MEDION_HEADSET_NO_PRESENCE,
+ ALC289_FIXUP_DELL_SPK1,
+@@ -9047,6 +9048,13 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc269_fix
+ .chained = true,
+ .chain_id = ALC256_FIXUP_ASUS_HEADSET_MODE
+ },
++ [ALC255_FIXUP_PREDATOR_SUBWOOFER] = {
++ .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS,
++ .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) {
++ { 0x17, 0x90170151 }, /* use as internal speaker (LFE) */
++ { 0x1b, 0x90170152 } /* use as internal speaker (back) */
++ }
++ },
+ [ALC299_FIXUP_PREDATOR_SPK] = {
+ .type = HDA_FIXUP_PINS,
+ .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl[]) {
+@@ -10138,6 +10146,8 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk alc269
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x110e, "Acer Aspire ES1-432", ALC255_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1166, "Acer Veriton N4640G", ALC269_FIXUP_LIFEBOOK),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1167, "Acer Veriton N6640G", ALC269_FIXUP_LIFEBOOK),
++ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1177, "Acer Predator G9-593", ALC255_FIXUP_PREDATOR_SUBWOOFER),
++ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1178, "Acer Predator G9-593", ALC255_FIXUP_PREDATOR_SUBWOOFER),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1246, "Acer Predator Helios 500", ALC299_FIXUP_PREDATOR_SPK),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1247, "Acer vCopperbox", ALC269VC_FIXUP_ACER_VCOPPERBOX_PINS),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1025, 0x1248, "Acer Veriton N4660G", ALC269VC_FIXUP_ACER_MIC_NO_PRESENCE),
--- /dev/null
+From 86c96e7289c5758284b562ac7b5c94429f48d2d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Sun, 20 Oct 2024 10:56:24 -0700
+Subject: ALSA: hda/tas2781: select CRC32 instead of CRC32_SARWATE
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit 86c96e7289c5758284b562ac7b5c94429f48d2d9 upstream.
+
+Fix the kconfig option for the tas2781 HDA driver to select CRC32 rather
+than CRC32_SARWATE. CRC32_SARWATE is an option from the kconfig
+'choice' that selects the specific CRC32 implementation. Selecting a
+'choice' option seems to have no effect, but even if it did work, it
+would be incorrect for a random driver to override the user's choice.
+CRC32 is the correct option to select for crc32() to be available.
+
+Fixes: 5be27f1e3ec9 ("ALSA: hda/tas2781: Add tas2781 HDA driver")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241020175624.7095-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ sound/pci/hda/Kconfig | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/sound/pci/hda/Kconfig
++++ b/sound/pci/hda/Kconfig
+@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ config SND_HDA_SCODEC_TAS2781_I2C
+ depends on SND_SOC
+ select SND_SOC_TAS2781_COMLIB
+ select SND_SOC_TAS2781_FMWLIB
+- select CRC32_SARWATE
++ select CRC32
+ help
+ Say Y or M here to include TAS2781 I2C HD-audio side codec support
+ in snd-hda-intel driver, such as ALC287.
--- /dev/null
+From 3510e684b8f6a569c2f8b86870da116e2ffeec2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
+Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2024 16:14:18 +0100
+Subject: btrfs: clear force-compress on remount when compress mount option is given
+
+From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
+
+commit 3510e684b8f6a569c2f8b86870da116e2ffeec2d upstream.
+
+After the migration to use fs context for processing mount options we had
+a slight change in the semantics for remounting a filesystem that was
+mounted with compress-force. Before we could clear compress-force by
+passing only "-o compress[=algo]" during a remount, but after that change
+that does not work anymore, force-compress is still present and one needs
+to pass "-o compress-force=no,compress[=algo]" to the mount command.
+
+Example, when running on a kernel 6.8+:
+
+ $ mount -o compress-force=zlib:9 /dev/sdi /mnt/sdi
+ $ mount | grep sdi
+ /dev/sdi on /mnt/sdi type btrfs (rw,relatime,compress-force=zlib:9,discard=async,space_cache=v2,subvolid=5,subvol=/)
+
+ $ mount -o remount,compress=zlib:5 /mnt/sdi
+ $ mount | grep sdi
+ /dev/sdi on /mnt/sdi type btrfs (rw,relatime,compress-force=zlib:5,discard=async,space_cache=v2,subvolid=5,subvol=/)
+
+On a 6.7 kernel (or older):
+
+ $ mount -o compress-force=zlib:9 /dev/sdi /mnt/sdi
+ $ mount | grep sdi
+ /dev/sdi on /mnt/sdi type btrfs (rw,relatime,compress-force=zlib:9,discard=async,space_cache=v2,subvolid=5,subvol=/)
+
+ $ mount -o remount,compress=zlib:5 /mnt/sdi
+ $ mount | grep sdi
+ /dev/sdi on /mnt/sdi type btrfs (rw,relatime,compress=zlib:5,discard=async,space_cache=v2,subvolid=5,subvol=/)
+
+So update btrfs_parse_param() to clear "compress-force" when "compress" is
+given, providing the same semantics as kernel 6.7 and older.
+
+Reported-by: Roman Mamedov <rm@romanrm.net>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20241014182416.13d0f8b0@nvm/
+CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.8+
+Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/btrfs/super.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c
+index 98fa0f382480..3f8673f97432 100644
+--- a/fs/btrfs/super.c
++++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c
+@@ -340,6 +340,15 @@ static int btrfs_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+ fallthrough;
+ case Opt_compress:
+ case Opt_compress_type:
++ /*
++ * Provide the same semantics as older kernels that don't use fs
++ * context, specifying the "compress" option clears
++ * "force-compress" without the need to pass
++ * "compress-force=[no|none]" before specifying "compress".
++ */
++ if (opt != Opt_compress_force && opt != Opt_compress_force_type)
++ btrfs_clear_opt(ctx->mount_opt, FORCE_COMPRESS);
++
+ if (opt == Opt_compress || opt == Opt_compress_force) {
+ ctx->compress_type = BTRFS_COMPRESS_ZLIB;
+ ctx->compress_level = BTRFS_ZLIB_DEFAULT_LEVEL;
+--
+2.47.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 75f49c3dc7b7423d3734f2e4dabe3dac8d064338 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
+Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2024 17:52:08 +0800
+Subject: btrfs: fix passing 0 to ERR_PTR in btrfs_search_dir_index_item()
+
+From: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
+
+commit 75f49c3dc7b7423d3734f2e4dabe3dac8d064338 upstream.
+
+The ret may be zero in btrfs_search_dir_index_item() and should not
+passed to ERR_PTR(). Now btrfs_unlink_subvol() is the only caller to
+this, reconstructed it to check ERR_PTR(-ENOENT) while ret >= 0.
+
+This fixes smatch warnings:
+
+fs/btrfs/dir-item.c:353
+ btrfs_search_dir_index_item() warn: passing zero to 'ERR_PTR'
+
+Fixes: 9dcbe16fccbb ("btrfs: use btrfs_for_each_slot in btrfs_search_dir_index_item")
+CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
+Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
+Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/btrfs/dir-item.c | 4 ++--
+ fs/btrfs/inode.c | 7 ++-----
+ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/btrfs/dir-item.c
++++ b/fs/btrfs/dir-item.c
+@@ -347,8 +347,8 @@ btrfs_search_dir_index_item(struct btrfs
+ return di;
+ }
+ /* Adjust return code if the key was not found in the next leaf. */
+- if (ret > 0)
+- ret = 0;
++ if (ret >= 0)
++ ret = -ENOENT;
+
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+--- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c
++++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c
+@@ -4344,11 +4344,8 @@ static int btrfs_unlink_subvol(struct bt
+ */
+ if (btrfs_ino(inode) == BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID) {
+ di = btrfs_search_dir_index_item(root, path, dir_ino, &fname.disk_name);
+- if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(di)) {
+- if (!di)
+- ret = -ENOENT;
+- else
+- ret = PTR_ERR(di);
++ if (IS_ERR(di)) {
++ ret = PTR_ERR(di);
+ btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret);
+ goto out;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 7a2339058ed71f54c1e12e1b3c25aab1b1ba7943 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
+Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 15:44:34 -0700
+Subject: btrfs: fix read corruption due to race with extent map merging
+
+From: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
+
+commit 7a2339058ed71f54c1e12e1b3c25aab1b1ba7943 upstream.
+
+In debugging some corrupt squashfs files, we observed symptoms of
+corrupt page cache pages but correct on-disk contents. Further
+investigation revealed that the exact symptom was a correct page
+followed by an incorrect, duplicate, page. This got us thinking about
+extent maps.
+
+commit ac05ca913e9f ("Btrfs: fix race between using extent maps and merging them")
+enforces a reference count on the primary `em` extent_map being merged,
+as that one gets modified.
+
+However, since,
+commit 3d2ac9922465 ("btrfs: introduce new members for extent_map")
+both 'em' and 'merge' get modified, which started modifying 'merge'
+and thus introduced the same race.
+
+We were able to reproduce this by looping the affected squashfs workload
+in parallel on a bunch of separate btrfs-es while also dropping caches.
+We are still working on a simple enough reproducer to make into an fstest.
+
+The simplest fix is to stop modifying 'merge', which is not essential,
+as it is dropped immediately after the merge. This behavior is simply
+a consequence of the order of the two extent maps being important in
+computing the new values. Modify merge_ondisk_extents to take prev and
+next by const* and also take a third merged parameter that it puts the
+results in. Note that this introduces the rather odd behavior of passing
+'em' to merge_ondisk_extents as a const * and as a regular ptr.
+
+Fixes: 3d2ac9922465 ("btrfs: introduce new members for extent_map")
+CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.11+
+Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
+Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
+Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/btrfs/extent_map.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/btrfs/extent_map.c
++++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_map.c
+@@ -240,13 +240,19 @@ static bool mergeable_maps(const struct
+ /*
+ * Handle the on-disk data extents merge for @prev and @next.
+ *
++ * @prev: left extent to merge
++ * @next: right extent to merge
++ * @merged: the extent we will not discard after the merge; updated with new values
++ *
++ * After this, one of the two extents is the new merged extent and the other is
++ * removed from the tree and likely freed. Note that @merged is one of @prev/@next
++ * so there is const/non-const aliasing occurring here.
++ *
+ * Only touches disk_bytenr/disk_num_bytes/offset/ram_bytes.
+ * For now only uncompressed regular extent can be merged.
+- *
+- * @prev and @next will be both updated to point to the new merged range.
+- * Thus one of them should be removed by the caller.
+ */
+-static void merge_ondisk_extents(struct extent_map *prev, struct extent_map *next)
++static void merge_ondisk_extents(const struct extent_map *prev, const struct extent_map *next,
++ struct extent_map *merged)
+ {
+ u64 new_disk_bytenr;
+ u64 new_disk_num_bytes;
+@@ -281,15 +287,10 @@ static void merge_ondisk_extents(struct
+ new_disk_bytenr;
+ new_offset = prev->disk_bytenr + prev->offset - new_disk_bytenr;
+
+- prev->disk_bytenr = new_disk_bytenr;
+- prev->disk_num_bytes = new_disk_num_bytes;
+- prev->ram_bytes = new_disk_num_bytes;
+- prev->offset = new_offset;
+-
+- next->disk_bytenr = new_disk_bytenr;
+- next->disk_num_bytes = new_disk_num_bytes;
+- next->ram_bytes = new_disk_num_bytes;
+- next->offset = new_offset;
++ merged->disk_bytenr = new_disk_bytenr;
++ merged->disk_num_bytes = new_disk_num_bytes;
++ merged->ram_bytes = new_disk_num_bytes;
++ merged->offset = new_offset;
+ }
+
+ static void dump_extent_map(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *prefix,
+@@ -358,7 +359,7 @@ static void try_merge_map(struct btrfs_i
+ em->generation = max(em->generation, merge->generation);
+
+ if (em->disk_bytenr < EXTENT_MAP_LAST_BYTE)
+- merge_ondisk_extents(merge, em);
++ merge_ondisk_extents(merge, em, em);
+ em->flags |= EXTENT_FLAG_MERGED;
+
+ validate_extent_map(fs_info, em);
+@@ -375,7 +376,7 @@ static void try_merge_map(struct btrfs_i
+ if (rb && can_merge_extent_map(merge) && mergeable_maps(em, merge)) {
+ em->len += merge->len;
+ if (em->disk_bytenr < EXTENT_MAP_LAST_BYTE)
+- merge_ondisk_extents(em, merge);
++ merge_ondisk_extents(em, merge, em);
+ validate_extent_map(fs_info, em);
+ rb_erase(&merge->rb_node, &tree->root);
+ RB_CLEAR_NODE(&merge->rb_node);
--- /dev/null
+From 5f9062a48db260fd6b53d86ecfb4d5dc59266316 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2024 15:21:04 +0930
+Subject: btrfs: qgroup: set a more sane default value for subtree drop threshold
+
+From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
+
+commit 5f9062a48db260fd6b53d86ecfb4d5dc59266316 upstream.
+
+Since commit 011b46c30476 ("btrfs: skip subtree scan if it's too high to
+avoid low stall in btrfs_commit_transaction()"), btrfs qgroup can
+automatically skip large subtree scan at the cost of marking qgroup
+inconsistent.
+
+It's designed to address the final performance problem of snapshot drop
+with qgroup enabled, but to be safe the default value is
+BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL, requiring a user space daemon to set a different value
+to make it work.
+
+I'd say it's not a good idea to rely on user space tool to set this
+default value, especially when some operations (snapshot dropping) can
+be triggered immediately after mount, leaving a very small window to
+that that sysfs interface.
+
+So instead of disabling this new feature by default, enable it with a
+low threshold (3), so that large subvolume tree drop at mount time won't
+cause huge qgroup workload.
+
+CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1
+Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
+Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 2 +-
+ fs/btrfs/qgroup.c | 2 +-
+ fs/btrfs/qgroup.h | 2 ++
+ 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
++++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+@@ -1960,7 +1960,7 @@ static void btrfs_init_qgroup(struct btr
+ fs_info->qgroup_seq = 1;
+ fs_info->qgroup_ulist = NULL;
+ fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = false;
+- fs_info->qgroup_drop_subtree_thres = BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL;
++ fs_info->qgroup_drop_subtree_thres = BTRFS_QGROUP_DROP_SUBTREE_THRES_DEFAULT;
+ mutex_init(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock);
+ }
+
+--- a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c
++++ b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c
+@@ -1407,7 +1407,7 @@ int btrfs_quota_disable(struct btrfs_fs_
+ fs_info->quota_root = NULL;
+ fs_info->qgroup_flags &= ~BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_ON;
+ fs_info->qgroup_flags &= ~BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_SIMPLE_MODE;
+- fs_info->qgroup_drop_subtree_thres = BTRFS_MAX_LEVEL;
++ fs_info->qgroup_drop_subtree_thres = BTRFS_QGROUP_DROP_SUBTREE_THRES_DEFAULT;
+ spin_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock);
+
+ btrfs_free_qgroup_config(fs_info);
+--- a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.h
++++ b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.h
+@@ -121,6 +121,8 @@ struct btrfs_inode;
+ #define BTRFS_QGROUP_RUNTIME_FLAG_CANCEL_RESCAN (1ULL << 63)
+ #define BTRFS_QGROUP_RUNTIME_FLAG_NO_ACCOUNTING (1ULL << 62)
+
++#define BTRFS_QGROUP_DROP_SUBTREE_THRES_DEFAULT (3)
++
+ /*
+ * Record a dirty extent, and info qgroup to update quota on it
+ */
--- /dev/null
+From 3c36a72c1d27de6618c1c480c793d9924640f5bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
+Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 20:18:11 +0930
+Subject: btrfs: reject ro->rw reconfiguration if there are hard ro requirements
+
+From: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
+
+commit 3c36a72c1d27de6618c1c480c793d9924640f5bb upstream.
+
+[BUG]
+Syzbot reports the following crash:
+
+ BTRFS info (device loop0 state MCS): disabling free space tree
+ BTRFS info (device loop0 state MCS): clearing compat-ro feature flag for FREE_SPACE_TREE (0x1)
+ BTRFS info (device loop0 state MCS): clearing compat-ro feature flag for FREE_SPACE_TREE_VALID (0x2)
+ Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
+ KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f]
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
+ RIP: 0010:backup_super_roots fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1691 [inline]
+ RIP: 0010:write_all_supers+0x97a/0x40f0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4041
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ btrfs_commit_transaction+0x1eae/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2530
+ btrfs_delete_free_space_tree+0x383/0x730 fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1312
+ btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xf28/0x1300 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3012
+ btrfs_remount_rw fs/btrfs/super.c:1309 [inline]
+ btrfs_reconfigure+0xae6/0x2d40 fs/btrfs/super.c:1534
+ btrfs_reconfigure_for_mount fs/btrfs/super.c:2020 [inline]
+ btrfs_get_tree_subvol fs/btrfs/super.c:2079 [inline]
+ btrfs_get_tree+0x918/0x1920 fs/btrfs/super.c:2115
+ vfs_get_tree+0x90/0x2b0 fs/super.c:1800
+ do_new_mount+0x2be/0xb40 fs/namespace.c:3472
+ do_mount fs/namespace.c:3812 [inline]
+ __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4020 [inline]
+ __se_sys_mount+0x2d6/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3997
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
+
+[CAUSE]
+To support mounting different subvolume with different RO/RW flags for
+the new mount APIs, btrfs introduced two workaround to support this feature:
+
+- Skip mount option/feature checks if we are mounting a different
+ subvolume
+
+- Reconfigure the fs to RW if the initial mount is RO
+
+Combining these two, we can have the following sequence:
+
+- Mount the fs ro,rescue=all,clear_cache,space_cache=v1
+ rescue=all will mark the fs as hard read-only, so no v2 cache clearing
+ will happen.
+
+- Mount a subvolume rw of the same fs.
+ We go into btrfs_get_tree_subvol(), but fc_mount() returns EBUSY
+ because our new fc is RW, different from the original fs.
+
+ Now we enter btrfs_reconfigure_for_mount(), which switches the RO flag
+ first so that we can grab the existing fs_info.
+ Then we reconfigure the fs to RW.
+
+- During reconfiguration, option/features check is skipped
+ This means we will restart the v2 cache clearing, and convert back to
+ v1 cache.
+ This will trigger fs writes, and since the original fs has "rescue=all"
+ option, it skips the csum tree read.
+
+ And eventually causing NULL pointer dereference in super block
+ writeback.
+
+[FIX]
+For reconfiguration caused by different subvolume RO/RW flags, ensure we
+always run btrfs_check_options() to ensure we have proper hard RO
+requirements met.
+
+In fact the function btrfs_check_options() doesn't really do many
+complex checks, but hard RO requirement and some feature dependency
+checks, thus there is no special reason not to do the check for mount
+reconfiguration.
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+56360f93efa90ff15870@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/0000000000008c5d090621cb2770@google.com/
+Fixes: f044b318675f ("btrfs: handle the ro->rw transition for mounting different subvolumes")
+CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.8+
+Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
+Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/btrfs/super.c | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/btrfs/super.c b/fs/btrfs/super.c
+index 3f8673f97432..926d7a9ed99d 100644
+--- a/fs/btrfs/super.c
++++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c
+@@ -1507,8 +1507,7 @@ static int btrfs_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
+ sync_filesystem(sb);
+ set_bit(BTRFS_FS_STATE_REMOUNTING, &fs_info->fs_state);
+
+- if (!mount_reconfigure &&
+- !btrfs_check_options(fs_info, &ctx->mount_opt, fc->sb_flags))
++ if (!btrfs_check_options(fs_info, &ctx->mount_opt, fc->sb_flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = btrfs_check_features(fs_info, !(fc->sb_flags & SB_RDONLY));
+--
+2.47.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From bf9821ba4792a0d9a2e72803ae7b4341faf3d532 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
+Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2024 17:03:32 +0900
+Subject: btrfs: zoned: fix zone unusable accounting for freed reserved extent
+
+From: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
+
+commit bf9821ba4792a0d9a2e72803ae7b4341faf3d532 upstream.
+
+When btrfs reserves an extent and does not use it (e.g, by an error), it
+calls btrfs_free_reserved_extent() to free the reserved extent. In the
+process, it calls btrfs_add_free_space() and then it accounts the region
+bytes as block_group->zone_unusable.
+
+However, it leaves the space_info->bytes_zone_unusable side not updated. As
+a result, ENOSPC can happen while a space_info reservation succeeded. The
+reservation is fine because the freed region is not added in
+space_info->bytes_zone_unusable, leaving that space as "free". OTOH,
+corresponding block group counts it as zone_unusable and its allocation
+pointer is not rewound, we cannot allocate an extent from that block group.
+That will also negate space_info's async/sync reclaim process, and cause an
+ENOSPC error from the extent allocation process.
+
+Fix that by returning the space to space_info->bytes_zone_unusable.
+Ideally, since a bio is not submitted for this reserved region, we should
+return the space to free space and rewind the allocation pointer. But, it
+needs rework on extent allocation handling, so let it work in this way for
+now.
+
+Fixes: 169e0da91a21 ("btrfs: zoned: track unusable bytes for zones")
+CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15+
+Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
+Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
+Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/btrfs/block-group.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/btrfs/block-group.c
++++ b/fs/btrfs/block-group.c
+@@ -3819,6 +3819,8 @@ void btrfs_free_reserved_bytes(struct bt
+ spin_lock(&cache->lock);
+ if (cache->ro)
+ space_info->bytes_readonly += num_bytes;
++ else if (btrfs_is_zoned(cache->fs_info))
++ space_info->bytes_zone_unusable += num_bytes;
+ cache->reserved -= num_bytes;
+ space_info->bytes_reserved -= num_bytes;
+ space_info->max_extent_size = 0;
--- /dev/null
+From ba1959f71117b27f3099ee789e0815360b4081dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 15:12:33 -0600
+Subject: drm/amd/display: Disable PSR-SU on Parade 08-01 TCON too
+
+From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
+
+commit ba1959f71117b27f3099ee789e0815360b4081dd upstream.
+
+Stuart Hayhurst has found that both at bootup and fullscreen VA-API video
+is leading to black screens for around 1 second and kernel WARNING [1] traces
+when calling dmub_psr_enable() with Parade 08-01 TCON.
+
+These symptoms all go away with PSR-SU disabled for this TCON, so disable
+it for now while DMUB traces [2] from the failure can be analyzed and the failure
+state properly root caused.
+
+Cc: Marc Rossi <Marc.Rossi@amd.com>
+Cc: Hamza Mahfooz <Hamza.Mahfooz@amd.com>
+Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/uploads/a832dd515b571ee171b3e3b566e99a13/dmesg.log [1]
+Link: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/uploads/8f13ff3b00963c833e23e68aa8116959/output.log [2]
+Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/2645
+Reviewed-by: Leo Li <sunpeng.li@amd.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240205211233.2601-1-mario.limonciello@amd.com
+Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
+(cherry picked from commit afb634a6823d8d9db23c5fb04f79c5549349628b)
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/power/power_helpers.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/power/power_helpers.c
++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/modules/power/power_helpers.c
+@@ -841,6 +841,8 @@ bool is_psr_su_specific_panel(struct dc_
+ isPSRSUSupported = false;
+ else if (dpcd_caps->sink_dev_id_str[1] == 0x08 && dpcd_caps->sink_dev_id_str[0] == 0x03)
+ isPSRSUSupported = false;
++ else if (dpcd_caps->sink_dev_id_str[1] == 0x08 && dpcd_caps->sink_dev_id_str[0] == 0x01)
++ isPSRSUSupported = false;
+ else if (dpcd_caps->psr_info.force_psrsu_cap == 0x1)
+ isPSRSUSupported = true;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From bf58f03931fdcf7b3c45cb76ac13244477a60f44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 12:23:15 -0500
+Subject: drm/amd: Guard against bad data for ATIF ACPI method
+
+From: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
+
+commit bf58f03931fdcf7b3c45cb76ac13244477a60f44 upstream.
+
+If a BIOS provides bad data in response to an ATIF method call
+this causes a NULL pointer dereference in the caller.
+
+```
+? show_regs (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 (discriminator 1))
+? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:423 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434)
+? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:544 (discriminator 2) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:705 (discriminator 2))
+? do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:440 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1232 (discriminator 1))
+? acpi_ut_update_object_reference (drivers/acpi/acpica/utdelete.c:642)
+? exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1542)
+? asm_exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623)
+? amdgpu_atif_query_backlight_caps.constprop.0 (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:387 (discriminator 2)) amdgpu
+? amdgpu_atif_query_backlight_caps.constprop.0 (drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c:386 (discriminator 1)) amdgpu
+```
+
+It has been encountered on at least one system, so guard for it.
+
+Fixes: d38ceaf99ed0 ("drm/amdgpu: add core driver (v4)")
+Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello <mario.limonciello@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
+(cherry picked from commit c9b7c809b89f24e9372a4e7f02d64c950b07fdee)
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c
++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_acpi.c
+@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ static union acpi_object *amdgpu_atif_ca
+ struct acpi_buffer *params)
+ {
+ acpi_status status;
++ union acpi_object *obj;
+ union acpi_object atif_arg_elements[2];
+ struct acpi_object_list atif_arg;
+ struct acpi_buffer buffer = { ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL };
+@@ -169,16 +170,24 @@ static union acpi_object *amdgpu_atif_ca
+
+ status = acpi_evaluate_object(atif->handle, NULL, &atif_arg,
+ &buffer);
++ obj = (union acpi_object *)buffer.pointer;
+
+- /* Fail only if calling the method fails and ATIF is supported */
++ /* Fail if calling the method fails and ATIF is supported */
+ if (ACPI_FAILURE(status) && status != AE_NOT_FOUND) {
+ DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("failed to evaluate ATIF got %s\n",
+ acpi_format_exception(status));
+- kfree(buffer.pointer);
++ kfree(obj);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+- return buffer.pointer;
++ if (obj->type != ACPI_TYPE_BUFFER) {
++ DRM_DEBUG_DRIVER("bad object returned from ATIF: %d\n",
++ obj->type);
++ kfree(obj);
++ return NULL;
++ }
++
++ return obj;
+ }
+
+ /**
--- /dev/null
+From 85e444a68126a631221ae32c63fce882bb18a262 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org>
+Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 15:49:34 +0300
+Subject: drm/bridge: Fix assignment of the of_node of the parent to aux bridge
+
+From: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org>
+
+commit 85e444a68126a631221ae32c63fce882bb18a262 upstream.
+
+The assignment of the of_node to the aux bridge needs to mark the
+of_node as reused as well, otherwise resource providers like pinctrl will
+report a gpio as already requested by a different device when both pinconf
+and gpios property are present.
+Fix that by using the device_set_of_node_from_dev() helper instead.
+
+Fixes: 6914968a0b52 ("drm/bridge: properly refcount DT nodes in aux bridge drivers")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.8
+Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
+Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241018-drm-aux-bridge-mark-of-node-reused-v2-1-aeed1b445c7d@linaro.org
+Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
+Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20241018-drm-aux-bridge-mark-of-node-reused-v2-1-aeed1b445c7d@linaro.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/aux-bridge.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/aux-bridge.c
++++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/aux-bridge.c
+@@ -58,9 +58,10 @@ int drm_aux_bridge_register(struct devic
+ adev->id = ret;
+ adev->name = "aux_bridge";
+ adev->dev.parent = parent;
+- adev->dev.of_node = of_node_get(parent->of_node);
+ adev->dev.release = drm_aux_bridge_release;
+
++ device_set_of_node_from_dev(&adev->dev, parent);
++
+ ret = auxiliary_device_init(adev);
+ if (ret) {
+ ida_free(&drm_aux_bridge_ida, adev->id);
--- /dev/null
+From f6a6780e0b9bbcf311a727afed06fee533a5e957 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
+Date: Fri, 25 Oct 2024 12:41:37 +0900
+Subject: firewire: core: fix invalid port index for parent device
+
+From: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
+
+commit f6a6780e0b9bbcf311a727afed06fee533a5e957 upstream.
+
+In a commit 24b7f8e5cd65 ("firewire: core: use helper functions for self
+ID sequence"), the enumeration over self ID sequence was refactored with
+some helper functions with KUnit tests. These helper functions are
+guaranteed to work expectedly by the KUnit tests, however their application
+includes a mistake to assign invalid value to the index of port connected
+to parent device.
+
+This bug affects the case that any extra node devices which has three or
+more ports are connected to 1394 OHCI controller. In the case, the path
+to update the tree cache could hits WARN_ON(), and gets general protection
+fault due to the access to invalid address computed by the invalid value.
+
+This commit fixes the bug to assign correct port index.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Edmund Raile <edmund.raile@proton.me>
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/8a9902a4ece9329af1e1e42f5fea76861f0bf0e8.camel@proton.me/
+Fixes: 24b7f8e5cd65 ("firewire: core: use helper functions for self ID sequence")
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241025034137.99317-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp
+Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/firewire/core-topology.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/firewire/core-topology.c b/drivers/firewire/core-topology.c
+index 6adadb11962e..892b94cfd626 100644
+--- a/drivers/firewire/core-topology.c
++++ b/drivers/firewire/core-topology.c
+@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static struct fw_node *build_tree(struct fw_card *card, const u32 *sid, int self
+ // the node->ports array where the parent node should be. Later,
+ // when we handle the parent node, we fix up the reference.
+ ++parent_count;
+- node->color = i;
++ node->color = port_index;
+ break;
+
+ case PHY_PACKET_SELF_ID_PORT_STATUS_CHILD:
+--
+2.47.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 229fd15908fe1f99b1de4cde3326e62d1e892611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2024 19:49:48 +0200
+Subject: fs: don't try and remove empty rbtree node
+
+From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
+
+commit 229fd15908fe1f99b1de4cde3326e62d1e892611 upstream.
+
+When copying a namespace we won't have added the new copy into the
+namespace rbtree until after the copy succeeded. Calling free_mnt_ns()
+will try to remove the copy from the rbtree which is invalid. Simply
+free the namespace skeleton directly.
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241016-adapter-seilwinde-83c508a7bde1@brauner
+Fixes: 1901c92497bd ("fs: keep an index of current mount namespaces")
+Tested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.11+
+Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
+Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/namespace.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/namespace.c
++++ b/fs/namespace.c
+@@ -3917,7 +3917,9 @@ struct mnt_namespace *copy_mnt_ns(unsign
+ new = copy_tree(old, old->mnt.mnt_root, copy_flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(new)) {
+ namespace_unlock();
+- free_mnt_ns(new_ns);
++ ns_free_inum(&new_ns->ns);
++ dec_mnt_namespaces(new_ns->ucounts);
++ mnt_ns_release(new_ns);
+ return ERR_CAST(new);
+ }
+ if (user_ns != ns->user_ns) {
--- /dev/null
+From 4c262801ea60c518b5bebc22a09f5b78b3147da2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
+Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2024 11:25:22 -0700
+Subject: hv_netvsc: Fix VF namespace also in synthetic NIC NETDEV_REGISTER event
+
+From: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
+
+commit 4c262801ea60c518b5bebc22a09f5b78b3147da2 upstream.
+
+The existing code moves VF to the same namespace as the synthetic NIC
+during netvsc_register_vf(). But, if the synthetic device is moved to a
+new namespace after the VF registration, the VF won't be moved together.
+
+To make the behavior more consistent, add a namespace check for synthetic
+NIC's NETDEV_REGISTER event (generated during its move), and move the VF
+if it is not in the same namespace.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: c0a41b887ce6 ("hv_netvsc: move VF to same namespace as netvsc device")
+Suggested-by: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
+Signed-off-by: Haiyang Zhang <haiyangz@microsoft.com>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
+Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1729275922-17595-1-git-send-email-haiyangz@microsoft.com
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
++++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c
+@@ -2797,6 +2797,31 @@ static struct hv_driver netvsc_drv = {
+ },
+ };
+
++/* Set VF's namespace same as the synthetic NIC */
++static void netvsc_event_set_vf_ns(struct net_device *ndev)
++{
++ struct net_device_context *ndev_ctx = netdev_priv(ndev);
++ struct net_device *vf_netdev;
++ int ret;
++
++ vf_netdev = rtnl_dereference(ndev_ctx->vf_netdev);
++ if (!vf_netdev)
++ return;
++
++ if (!net_eq(dev_net(ndev), dev_net(vf_netdev))) {
++ ret = dev_change_net_namespace(vf_netdev, dev_net(ndev),
++ "eth%d");
++ if (ret)
++ netdev_err(vf_netdev,
++ "Cannot move to same namespace as %s: %d\n",
++ ndev->name, ret);
++ else
++ netdev_info(vf_netdev,
++ "Moved VF to namespace with: %s\n",
++ ndev->name);
++ }
++}
++
+ /*
+ * On Hyper-V, every VF interface is matched with a corresponding
+ * synthetic interface. The synthetic interface is presented first
+@@ -2809,6 +2834,11 @@ static int netvsc_netdev_event(struct no
+ struct net_device *event_dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
+ int ret = 0;
+
++ if (event_dev->netdev_ops == &device_ops && event == NETDEV_REGISTER) {
++ netvsc_event_set_vf_ns(event_dev);
++ return NOTIFY_DONE;
++ }
++
+ ret = check_dev_is_matching_vf(event_dev);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
--- /dev/null
+From df5fd75ee305cb5927e0b1a0b46cc988ad8db2b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 19:36:03 +0100
+Subject: KVM: arm64: Don't eagerly teardown the vgic on init error
+
+From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
+
+commit df5fd75ee305cb5927e0b1a0b46cc988ad8db2b1 upstream.
+
+As there is very little ordering in the KVM API, userspace can
+instanciate a half-baked GIC (missing its memory map, for example)
+at almost any time.
+
+This means that, with the right timing, a thread running vcpu-0
+can enter the kernel without a GIC configured and get a GIC created
+behind its back by another thread. Amusingly, it will pick up
+that GIC and start messing with the data structures without the
+GIC having been fully initialised.
+
+Similarly, a thread running vcpu-1 can enter the kernel, and try
+to init the GIC that was previously created. Since this GIC isn't
+properly configured (no memory map), it fails to correctly initialise.
+
+And that's the point where we decide to teardown the GIC, freeing all
+its resources. Behind vcpu-0's back. Things stop pretty abruptly,
+with a variety of symptoms. Clearly, this isn't good, we should be
+a bit more careful about this.
+
+It is obvious that this guest is not viable, as it is missing some
+important part of its configuration. So instead of trying to tear
+bits of it down, let's just mark it as *dead*. It means that any
+further interaction from userspace will result in -EIO. The memory
+will be released on the "normal" path, when userspace gives up.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009183603.3221824-1-maz@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 3 +++
+ arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c | 6 +++---
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+@@ -996,6 +996,9 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_suspend(struct kvm_v
+ static int check_vcpu_requests(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+ {
+ if (kvm_request_pending(vcpu)) {
++ if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_VM_DEAD, vcpu))
++ return -EIO;
++
+ if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_SLEEP, vcpu))
+ kvm_vcpu_sleep(vcpu);
+
+--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c
+@@ -556,10 +556,10 @@ int kvm_vgic_map_resources(struct kvm *k
+ out:
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->arch.config_lock);
+ out_slots:
+- mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+-
+ if (ret)
+- kvm_vgic_destroy(kvm);
++ kvm_vm_dead(kvm);
++
++ mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From c6c167afa090ea0451f91814e1318755a8fb8bb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ilkka Koskinen <ilkka@os.amperecomputing.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2024 19:57:01 -0700
+Subject: KVM: arm64: Fix shift-out-of-bounds bug
+
+From: Ilkka Koskinen <ilkka@os.amperecomputing.com>
+
+commit c6c167afa090ea0451f91814e1318755a8fb8bb9 upstream.
+
+Fix a shift-out-of-bounds bug reported by UBSAN when running
+VM with MTE enabled host kernel.
+
+UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c:1988:14
+shift exponent 33 is too large for 32-bit type 'int'
+CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 7629 Comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 6.12.0-rc2 #34
+Hardware name: IEI NF5280R7/Mitchell MB, BIOS 00.00. 2024-10-12 09:28:54 10/14/2024
+Call trace:
+ dump_backtrace+0xa0/0x128
+ show_stack+0x20/0x38
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0x90
+ dump_stack+0x18/0x28
+ __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0xf8/0x1e0
+ reset_clidr+0x10c/0x1c8
+ kvm_reset_sys_regs+0x50/0x1c8
+ kvm_reset_vcpu+0xec/0x2b0
+ __kvm_vcpu_set_target+0x84/0x158
+ kvm_vcpu_set_target+0x138/0x168
+ kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_vcpu_init+0x40/0x2b0
+ kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x28c/0x4b8
+ kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x4bc/0x7a8
+ __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xb4/0x100
+ invoke_syscall+0x70/0x100
+ el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
+ do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
+ el0_svc+0x3c/0x158
+ el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
+ el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
+
+Fixes: 7af0c2534f4c ("KVM: arm64: Normalize cache configuration")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ilkka Koskinen <ilkka@os.amperecomputing.com>
+Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241017025701.67936-1-ilkka@os.amperecomputing.com
+Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c
+@@ -1977,7 +1977,7 @@ static u64 reset_clidr(struct kvm_vcpu *
+ * one cache line.
+ */
+ if (kvm_has_mte(vcpu->kvm))
+- clidr |= 2 << CLIDR_TTYPE_SHIFT(loc);
++ clidr |= 2ULL << CLIDR_TTYPE_SHIFT(loc);
+
+ __vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, r->reg) = clidr;
+
--- /dev/null
+From ae8f8b37610269009326f4318df161206c59843e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
+Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2024 22:39:09 +0000
+Subject: KVM: arm64: Unregister redistributor for failed vCPU creation
+
+From: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
+
+commit ae8f8b37610269009326f4318df161206c59843e upstream.
+
+Alex reports that syzkaller has managed to trigger a use-after-free when
+tearing down a VM:
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in kvm_put_kvm+0x300/0xe68 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5769
+ Read of size 8 at addr ffffff801c6890d0 by task syz.3.2219/10758
+
+ CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 10758 Comm: syz.3.2219 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-dirty #64
+ Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
+ Call trace:
+ dump_backtrace+0x17c/0x1a8 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:317
+ show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:324
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x94/0xc0 lib/dump_stack.c:119
+ print_report+0x144/0x7a4 mm/kasan/report.c:377
+ kasan_report+0xcc/0x128 mm/kasan/report.c:601
+ __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:381
+ kvm_put_kvm+0x300/0xe68 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:5769
+ kvm_vm_release+0x4c/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1409
+ __fput+0x198/0x71c fs/file_table.c:422
+ ____fput+0x20/0x30 fs/file_table.c:450
+ task_work_run+0x1cc/0x23c kernel/task_work.c:228
+ do_notify_resume+0x144/0x1a0 include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50
+ el0_svc+0x64/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:169
+ el0t_64_sync_handler+0x90/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
+ el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
+
+Upon closer inspection, it appears that we do not properly tear down the
+MMIO registration for a vCPU that fails creation late in the game, e.g.
+a vCPU w/ the same ID already exists in the VM.
+
+It is important to consider the context of commit that introduced this bug
+by moving the unregistration out of __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(). That
+change correctly sought to avoid an srcu v. config_lock inversion by
+breaking up the vCPU teardown into two parts, one guarded by the
+config_lock.
+
+Fix the use-after-free while avoiding lock inversion by adding a
+special-cased unregistration to __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(). This is safe
+because failed vCPUs are torn down outside of the config_lock.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: f616506754d3 ("KVM: arm64: vgic: Don't hold config_lock while unregistering redistributors")
+Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241007223909.2157336-1-oliver.upton@linux.dev
+Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c
+index e7c53e8af3d1..57aedf7b2b76 100644
+--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c
++++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c
+@@ -417,8 +417,28 @@ static void __kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+ kfree(vgic_cpu->private_irqs);
+ vgic_cpu->private_irqs = NULL;
+
+- if (vcpu->kvm->arch.vgic.vgic_model == KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V3)
++ if (vcpu->kvm->arch.vgic.vgic_model == KVM_DEV_TYPE_ARM_VGIC_V3) {
++ /*
++ * If this vCPU is being destroyed because of a failed creation
++ * then unregister the redistributor to avoid leaving behind a
++ * dangling pointer to the vCPU struct.
++ *
++ * vCPUs that have been successfully created (i.e. added to
++ * kvm->vcpu_array) get unregistered in kvm_vgic_destroy(), as
++ * this function gets called while holding kvm->arch.config_lock
++ * in the VM teardown path and would otherwise introduce a lock
++ * inversion w.r.t. kvm->srcu.
++ *
++ * vCPUs that failed creation are torn down outside of the
++ * kvm->arch.config_lock and do not get unregistered in
++ * kvm_vgic_destroy(), meaning it is both safe and necessary to
++ * do so here.
++ */
++ if (kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(vcpu->kvm, vcpu->vcpu_id) != vcpu)
++ vgic_unregister_redist_iodev(vcpu);
++
+ vgic_cpu->rd_iodev.base_addr = VGIC_ADDR_UNDEF;
++ }
+ }
+
+ void kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+--
+2.47.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From f559b2e9c5c5308850544ab59396b7d53cfc67bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 07:08:38 -0700
+Subject: KVM: nSVM: Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory
+
+From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+
+commit f559b2e9c5c5308850544ab59396b7d53cfc67bd upstream.
+
+Ignore nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory for nested SVM, as bits
+4:0 of CR3 are ignored when PAE paging is used, and thus VMRUN doesn't
+enforce 32-byte alignment of nCR3.
+
+In the absolute worst case scenario, failure to ignore bits 4:0 can result
+in an out-of-bounds read, e.g. if the target page is at the end of a
+memslot, and the VMM isn't using guard pages.
+
+Per the APM:
+
+ The CR3 register points to the base address of the page-directory-pointer
+ table. The page-directory-pointer table is aligned on a 32-byte boundary,
+ with the low 5 address bits 4:0 assumed to be 0.
+
+And the SDM's much more explicit:
+
+ 4:0 Ignored
+
+Note, KVM gets this right when loading PDPTRs, it's only the nSVM flow
+that is broken.
+
+Fixes: e4e517b4be01 ("KVM: MMU: Do not unconditionally read PDPTE from guest memory")
+Reported-by: Kirk Swidowski <swidowski@google.com>
+Cc: Andy Nguyen <theflow@google.com>
+Cc: 3pvd <3pvd@google.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Message-ID: <20241009140838.1036226-1-seanjc@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/nested.c
+@@ -63,8 +63,12 @@ static u64 nested_svm_get_tdp_pdptr(stru
+ u64 pdpte;
+ int ret;
+
++ /*
++ * Note, nCR3 is "assumed" to be 32-byte aligned, i.e. the CPU ignores
++ * nCR3[4:0] when loading PDPTEs from memory.
++ */
+ ret = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(cr3), &pdpte,
+- offset_in_page(cr3) + index * 8, 8);
++ (cr3 & GENMASK(11, 5)) + index * 8, 8);
+ if (ret)
+ return 0;
+ return pdpte;
--- /dev/null
+From 69cc6fad5df4ce652d969be69acc60e269e5eea1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
+Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 22:11:19 +0800
+Subject: LoongArch: Enable IRQ if do_ale() triggered in irq-enabled context
+
+From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
+
+commit 69cc6fad5df4ce652d969be69acc60e269e5eea1 upstream.
+
+Unaligned access exception can be triggered in irq-enabled context such
+as user mode, in this case do_ale() may call get_user() which may cause
+sleep. Then we will get:
+
+ BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/loongarch/kernel/access-helper.h:7
+ in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 129, name: modprobe
+ preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
+ RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
+ CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 129 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 6.12.0-rc1+ #1723
+ Tainted: [W]=WARN
+ Stack : 9000000105e0bd48 0000000000000000 9000000003803944 9000000105e08000
+ 9000000105e0bc70 9000000105e0bc78 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
+ 9000000105e0bc78 0000000000000001 9000000185e0ba07 9000000105e0b890
+ ffffffffffffffff 9000000105e0bc78 73924b81763be05b 9000000100194500
+ 000000000000020c 000000000000000a 0000000000000000 0000000000000003
+ 00000000000023f0 00000000000e1401 00000000072f8000 0000007ffbb0e260
+ 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000005437650 90000000055d5000
+ 0000000000000000 0000000000000003 0000007ffbb0e1f0 0000000000000000
+ 0000005567b00490 0000000000000000 9000000003803964 0000007ffbb0dfec
+ 00000000000000b0 0000000000000007 0000000000000003 0000000000071c1d
+ ...
+ Call Trace:
+ [<9000000003803964>] show_stack+0x64/0x1a0
+ [<9000000004c57464>] dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0xb0
+ [<9000000003861ab4>] __might_resched+0x154/0x1a0
+ [<900000000380c96c>] emulate_load_store_insn+0x6c/0xf60
+ [<9000000004c58118>] do_ale+0x78/0x180
+ [<9000000003801bc8>] handle_ale+0x128/0x1e0
+
+So enable IRQ if unaligned access exception is triggered in irq-enabled
+context to fix it.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Binbin Zhou <zhoubinbin@loongson.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.c
++++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/traps.c
+@@ -555,6 +555,9 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr do_ale(struct pt
+ #else
+ unsigned int *pc;
+
++ if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE)
++ local_irq_enable();
++
+ perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_ALIGNMENT_FAULTS, 1, regs, regs->csr_badvaddr);
+
+ /*
+@@ -579,6 +582,8 @@ sigbus:
+ die_if_kernel("Kernel ale access", regs);
+ force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, (void __user *)regs->csr_badvaddr);
+ out:
++ if (regs->csr_prmd & CSR_PRMD_PIE)
++ local_irq_disable();
+ #endif
+ irqentry_exit(regs, state);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From b7296f9d5bf99330063d4bbecc43c9b33fed0137 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
+Date: Mon, 21 Oct 2024 22:11:18 +0800
+Subject: LoongArch: Get correct cores_per_package for SMT systems
+
+From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
+
+commit b7296f9d5bf99330063d4bbecc43c9b33fed0137 upstream.
+
+In loongson_sysconf, The "core" of cores_per_node and cores_per_package
+stands for a logical core, which means in a SMT system it stands for a
+thread indeed. This information is gotten from SMBIOS Type4 Structure,
+so in order to get a correct cores_per_package for both SMT and non-SMT
+systems in parse_cpu_table() we should use SMBIOS_THREAD_PACKAGE_OFFSET
+instead of SMBIOS_CORE_PACKAGE_OFFSET.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-by: Chao Li <lichao@loongson.cn>
+Tested-by: Chao Li <lichao@loongson.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h | 4 ++++
+ arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h
++++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/bootinfo.h
+@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ struct loongson_board_info {
+
+ #define NR_WORDS DIV_ROUND_UP(NR_CPUS, BITS_PER_LONG)
+
++/*
++ * The "core" of cores_per_node and cores_per_package stands for a
++ * logical core, which means in a SMT system it stands for a thread.
++ */
+ struct loongson_system_configuration {
+ int nr_cpus;
+ int nr_nodes;
+--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c
++++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/setup.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
+ #define SMBIOS_FREQHIGH_OFFSET 0x17
+ #define SMBIOS_FREQLOW_MASK 0xFF
+ #define SMBIOS_CORE_PACKAGE_OFFSET 0x23
++#define SMBIOS_THREAD_PACKAGE_OFFSET 0x25
+ #define LOONGSON_EFI_ENABLE (1 << 3)
+
+ unsigned long fw_arg0, fw_arg1, fw_arg2;
+@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ static void __init parse_cpu_table(const
+ cpu_clock_freq = freq_temp * 1000000;
+
+ loongson_sysconf.cpuname = (void *)dmi_string_parse(dm, dmi_data[16]);
+- loongson_sysconf.cores_per_package = *(dmi_data + SMBIOS_CORE_PACKAGE_OFFSET);
++ loongson_sysconf.cores_per_package = *(dmi_data + SMBIOS_THREAD_PACKAGE_OFFSET);
+
+ pr_info("CpuClock = %llu\n", cpu_clock_freq);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 3c252263be801f937f56b4bcd8e8e2b5307c1ce5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
+Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2024 22:15:30 +0800
+Subject: LoongArch: Make KASAN usable for variable cpu_vabits
+
+From: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
+
+commit 3c252263be801f937f56b4bcd8e8e2b5307c1ce5 upstream.
+
+Currently, KASAN on LoongArch assume the CPU VA bits is 48, which is
+true for Loongson-3 series, but not for Loongson-2 series (only 40 or
+lower), this patch fix that issue and make KASAN usable for variable
+cpu_vabits.
+
+Solution is very simple: Just define XRANGE_SHADOW_SHIFT which means
+valid address length from VA_BITS to min(cpu_vabits, VA_BITS).
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Kanglong Wang <wangkanglong@loongson.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/loongarch/include/asm/kasan.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kasan.h
++++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/kasan.h
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ #define XRANGE_SHIFT (48)
+
+ /* Valid address length */
+-#define XRANGE_SHADOW_SHIFT (PGDIR_SHIFT + PAGE_SHIFT - 3)
++#define XRANGE_SHADOW_SHIFT min(cpu_vabits, VA_BITS)
+ /* Used for taking out the valid address */
+ #define XRANGE_SHADOW_MASK GENMASK_ULL(XRANGE_SHADOW_SHIFT - 1, 0)
+ /* One segment whole address space size */
--- /dev/null
+From 825711e00117fc686ab89ac36a9a7b252dc349c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
+Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2024 09:49:14 +0800
+Subject: md/raid10: fix null ptr dereference in raid10_size()
+
+From: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
+
+commit 825711e00117fc686ab89ac36a9a7b252dc349c6 upstream.
+
+In raid10_run() if raid10_set_queue_limits() succeed, the return value
+is set to zero, and if following procedures failed raid10_run() will
+return zero while mddev->private is still NULL, causing null ptr
+dereference in raid10_size().
+
+Fix the problem by only overwrite the return value if
+raid10_set_queue_limits() failed.
+
+Fixes: 3d8466ba68d4 ("md/raid10: use the atomic queue limit update APIs")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Reported-and-tested-by: ValdikSS <iam@valdikss.org.ru>
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0dd96820-fe52-4841-bc58-dbf14d6bfcc8@valdikss.org.ru/
+Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
+Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241009014914.1682037-1-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com
+Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/md/raid10.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/md/raid10.c
++++ b/drivers/md/raid10.c
+@@ -4055,9 +4055,12 @@ static int raid10_run(struct mddev *mdde
+ }
+
+ if (!mddev_is_dm(conf->mddev)) {
+- ret = raid10_set_queue_limits(mddev);
+- if (ret)
++ int err = raid10_set_queue_limits(mddev);
++
++ if (err) {
++ ret = err;
+ goto out_free_conf;
++ }
+ }
+
+ /* need to check that every block has at least one working mirror */
--- /dev/null
+From 6ed469df0bfbef3e4b44fca954a781919db9f7ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2024 06:32:07 +0900
+Subject: nilfs2: fix kernel bug due to missing clearing of buffer delay flag
+
+From: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+
+commit 6ed469df0bfbef3e4b44fca954a781919db9f7ab upstream.
+
+Syzbot reported that after nilfs2 reads a corrupted file system image
+and degrades to read-only, the BUG_ON check for the buffer delay flag
+in submit_bh_wbc() may fail, causing a kernel bug.
+
+This is because the buffer delay flag is not cleared when clearing the
+buffer state flags to discard a page/folio or a buffer head. So, fix
+this.
+
+This became necessary when the use of nilfs2's own page clear routine
+was expanded. This state inconsistency does not occur if the buffer
+is written normally by log writing.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241015213300.7114-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com
+Fixes: 8c26c4e2694a ("nilfs2: fix issue with flush kernel thread after remount in RO mode because of driver's internal error or metadata corruption")
+Reported-by: syzbot+985ada84bf055a575c07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=985ada84bf055a575c07
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/nilfs2/page.c | 6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nilfs2/page.c
++++ b/fs/nilfs2/page.c
+@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ void nilfs_forget_buffer(struct buffer_h
+ const unsigned long clear_bits =
+ (BIT(BH_Uptodate) | BIT(BH_Dirty) | BIT(BH_Mapped) |
+ BIT(BH_Async_Write) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Volatile) |
+- BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected));
++ BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected) |
++ BIT(BH_Delay));
+
+ lock_buffer(bh);
+ set_mask_bits(&bh->b_state, clear_bits, 0);
+@@ -414,7 +415,8 @@ void nilfs_clear_folio_dirty(struct foli
+ const unsigned long clear_bits =
+ (BIT(BH_Uptodate) | BIT(BH_Dirty) | BIT(BH_Mapped) |
+ BIT(BH_Async_Write) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Volatile) |
+- BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected));
++ BIT(BH_NILFS_Checked) | BIT(BH_NILFS_Redirected) |
++ BIT(BH_Delay));
+
+ bh = head;
+ do {
--- /dev/null
+From f92f0a1b05698340836229d791b3ffecc71b265a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 07:40:36 +1100
+Subject: openat2: explicitly return -E2BIG for (usize > PAGE_SIZE)
+
+From: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
+
+commit f92f0a1b05698340836229d791b3ffecc71b265a upstream.
+
+While we do currently return -EFAULT in this case, it seems prudent to
+follow the behaviour of other syscalls like clone3. It seems quite
+unlikely that anyone depends on this error code being EFAULT, but we can
+always revert this if it turns out to be an issue.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.6+
+Fixes: fddb5d430ad9 ("open: introduce openat2(2) syscall")
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241010-extensible-structs-check_fields-v3-3-d2833dfe6edd@cyphar.com
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/open.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/open.c
++++ b/fs/open.c
+@@ -1458,6 +1458,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(openat2, int, dfd, const
+
+ if (unlikely(usize < OPEN_HOW_SIZE_VER0))
+ return -EINVAL;
++ if (unlikely(usize > PAGE_SIZE))
++ return -E2BIG;
+
+ err = copy_struct_from_user(&tmp, sizeof(tmp), how, usize);
+ if (err)
pci-pwrctl-add-wcn6855-support.patch
pci-pwrctl-abandon-qcom-wcn-probe-on-pre-pwrseq-devi.patch
cpufreq-cppc-fix-perf_to_khz-khz_to_perf-conversion-.patch
+btrfs-qgroup-set-a-more-sane-default-value-for-subtree-drop-threshold.patch
+btrfs-clear-force-compress-on-remount-when-compress-mount-option-is-given.patch
+btrfs-fix-passing-0-to-err_ptr-in-btrfs_search_dir_index_item.patch
+btrfs-reject-ro-rw-reconfiguration-if-there-are-hard-ro-requirements.patch
+btrfs-zoned-fix-zone-unusable-accounting-for-freed-reserved-extent.patch
+btrfs-fix-read-corruption-due-to-race-with-extent-map-merging.patch
+drm-amd-guard-against-bad-data-for-atif-acpi-method.patch
+acpi-resource-add-lg-16t90sp-to-irq1_level_low_skip_override.patch
+acpi-prm-find-efi_memory_runtime-block-for-prm-handler-and-context.patch
+acpi-button-add-dmi-quirk-for-samsung-galaxy-book2-to-fix-initial-lid-detection-issue.patch
+nilfs2-fix-kernel-bug-due-to-missing-clearing-of-buffer-delay-flag.patch
+fs-don-t-try-and-remove-empty-rbtree-node.patch
+xfs-don-t-fail-repairs-on-metadata-files-with-no-attr-fork.patch
+openat2-explicitly-return-e2big-for-usize-page_size.patch
+kvm-nsvm-ignore-ncr3-when-loading-pdptes-from-memory.patch
+kvm-arm64-unregister-redistributor-for-failed-vcpu-creation.patch
+kvm-arm64-fix-shift-out-of-bounds-bug.patch
+kvm-arm64-don-t-eagerly-teardown-the-vgic-on-init-error.patch
+firewire-core-fix-invalid-port-index-for-parent-device.patch
+x86-lam-disable-address_masking-in-most-cases.patch
+x86-sev-ensure-that-rmp-table-fixups-are-reserved.patch
+alsa-hda-tas2781-select-crc32-instead-of-crc32_sarwate.patch
+alsa-hda-realtek-add-subwoofer-quirk-for-acer-predator-g9-593.patch
+loongarch-get-correct-cores_per_package-for-smt-systems.patch
+loongarch-enable-irq-if-do_ale-triggered-in-irq-enabled-context.patch
+loongarch-make-kasan-usable-for-variable-cpu_vabits.patch
+xfrm-fix-one-more-kernel-infoleak-in-algo-dumping.patch
+hv_netvsc-fix-vf-namespace-also-in-synthetic-nic-netdev_register-event.patch
+md-raid10-fix-null-ptr-dereference-in-raid10_size.patch
+drm-bridge-fix-assignment-of-the-of_node-of-the-parent-to-aux-bridge.patch
+drm-amd-display-disable-psr-su-on-parade-08-01-tcon-too.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 3267cb6d3a174ff83d6287dcd5b0047bbd912452 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 19:55:21 -0800
+Subject: x86/lam: Disable ADDRESS_MASKING in most cases
+
+From: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
+
+commit 3267cb6d3a174ff83d6287dcd5b0047bbd912452 upstream.
+
+Linear Address Masking (LAM) has a weakness related to transient
+execution as described in the SLAM paper[1]. Unless Linear Address
+Space Separation (LASS) is enabled this weakness may be exploitable.
+
+Until kernel adds support for LASS[2], only allow LAM for COMPILE_TEST,
+or when speculation mitigations have been disabled at compile time,
+otherwise keep LAM disabled.
+
+There are no processors in market that support LAM yet, so currently
+nobody is affected by this issue.
+
+[1] SLAM: https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf
+[2] LASS: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230609183632.48706-1-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com/
+
+[ dhansen: update SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS -> CPU_MITIGATIONS ]
+
+Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
+Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
+Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/5373262886f2783f054256babdf5a98545dc986b.1706068222.git.pawan.kumar.gupta%40linux.intel.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
++++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
+@@ -2260,6 +2260,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING
+ config ADDRESS_MASKING
+ bool "Linear Address Masking support"
+ depends on X86_64
++ depends on COMPILE_TEST || !CPU_MITIGATIONS # wait for LASS
+ help
+ Linear Address Masking (LAM) modifies the checking that is applied
+ to 64-bit linear addresses, allowing software to use of the
--- /dev/null
+From 88a921aa3c6b006160d6a46a231b8b32227e8196 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
+Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 22:16:30 +0000
+Subject: x86/sev: Ensure that RMP table fixups are reserved
+
+From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
+
+commit 88a921aa3c6b006160d6a46a231b8b32227e8196 upstream.
+
+The BIOS reserves RMP table memory via e820 reservations. This can still lead
+to RMP page faults during kexec if the host tries to access memory within the
+same 2MB region.
+
+Commit
+
+ 400fea4b9651 ("x86/sev: Add callback to apply RMP table fixups for kexec"
+
+adjusts the e820 reservations for the RMP table so that the entire 2MB range
+at the start/end of the RMP table is marked reserved.
+
+The e820 reservations are then passed to firmware via SNP_INIT where they get
+marked HV-Fixed.
+
+The RMP table fixups are done after the e820 ranges have been added to
+memblock, allowing the fixup ranges to still be allocated and used by the
+system.
+
+The problem is that this memory range is now marked reserved in the e820
+tables and during SNP initialization these reserved ranges are marked as
+HV-Fixed. This means that the pages cannot be used by an SNP guest, only by
+the hypervisor.
+
+However, the memory management subsystem does not make this distinction and
+can allocate one of those pages to an SNP guest. This will ultimately result
+in RMPUPDATE failures associated with the guest, causing it to fail to start
+or terminate when accessing the HV-Fixed page.
+
+The issue is captured below with memblock=debug:
+
+ [ 0.000000] SEV-SNP: *** DEBUG: snp_probe_rmptable_info:352 - rmp_base=0x280d4800000, rmp_end=0x28357efffff
+ ...
+ [ 0.000000] BIOS-provided physical RAM map:
+ ...
+ [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x00000280d4800000-0x0000028357efffff] reserved
+ [ 0.000000] BIOS-e820: [mem 0x0000028357f00000-0x0000028357ffffff] usable
+ ...
+ ...
+ [ 0.183593] memblock add: [0x0000028357f00000-0x0000028357ffffff] e820__memblock_setup+0x74/0xb0
+ ...
+ [ 0.203179] MEMBLOCK configuration:
+ [ 0.207057] memory size = 0x0000027d0d194000 reserved size = 0x0000000009ed2c00
+ [ 0.215299] memory.cnt = 0xb
+ ...
+ [ 0.311192] memory[0x9] [0x0000028357f00000-0x0000028357ffffff], 0x0000000000100000 bytes flags: 0x0
+ ...
+ ...
+ [ 0.419110] SEV-SNP: Reserving start/end of RMP table on a 2MB boundary [0x0000028357e00000]
+ [ 0.428514] e820: update [mem 0x28357e00000-0x28357ffffff] usable ==> reserved
+ [ 0.428517] e820: update [mem 0x28357e00000-0x28357ffffff] usable ==> reserved
+ [ 0.428520] e820: update [mem 0x28357e00000-0x28357ffffff] usable ==> reserved
+ ...
+ ...
+ [ 5.604051] MEMBLOCK configuration:
+ [ 5.607922] memory size = 0x0000027d0d194000 reserved size = 0x0000000011faae02
+ [ 5.616163] memory.cnt = 0xe
+ ...
+ [ 5.754525] memory[0xc] [0x0000028357f00000-0x0000028357ffffff], 0x0000000000100000 bytes on node 0 flags: 0x0
+ ...
+ ...
+ [ 10.080295] Early memory node ranges[ 10.168065]
+ ...
+ node 0: [mem 0x0000028357f00000-0x0000028357ffffff]
+ ...
+ ...
+ [ 8149.348948] SEV-SNP: RMPUPDATE failed for PFN 28357f7c, pg_level: 1, ret: 2
+
+As shown above, the memblock allocations show 1MB after the end of the RMP as
+available for allocation, which is what the RMP table fixups have reserved.
+This memory range subsequently gets allocated as SNP guest memory, resulting
+in an RMPUPDATE failure.
+
+This can potentially be fixed by not reserving the memory range in the e820
+table, but that causes kexec failures when using the KEXEC_FILE_LOAD syscall.
+
+The solution is to use memblock_reserve() to mark the memory reserved for the
+system, ensuring that it cannot be allocated to an SNP guest.
+
+Since HV-Fixed memory is still readable/writable by the host, this only ends
+up being a problem if the memory in this range requires a page state change,
+which generally will only happen when allocating memory in this range to be
+used for running SNP guests, which is now possible with the SNP hypervisor
+support in kernel 6.11.
+
+Backporter note:
+
+Fixes tag points to a 6.9 change but as the last paragraph above explains,
+this whole thing can happen after 6.11 received SNP HV support, therefore
+backporting to 6.9 is not really necessary.
+
+ [ bp: Massage commit message. ]
+
+Fixes: 400fea4b9651 ("x86/sev: Add callback to apply RMP table fixups for kexec")
+Suggested-by: Thomas Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
+Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
+Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # 6.11, see Backporter note above.
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240815221630.131133-1-Ashish.Kalra@amd.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
++++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c
+@@ -173,6 +173,8 @@ static void __init __snp_fixup_e820_tabl
+ e820__range_update(pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
+ e820__range_update_table(e820_table_kexec, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
+ e820__range_update_table(e820_table_firmware, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
++ if (!memblock_is_region_reserved(pa, PMD_SIZE))
++ memblock_reserve(pa, PMD_SIZE);
+ }
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 6889cd2a93e1e3606b3f6e958aa0924e836de4d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Vaganov <p.vaganov@ideco.ru>
+Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2024 14:02:58 +0500
+Subject: xfrm: fix one more kernel-infoleak in algo dumping
+
+From: Petr Vaganov <p.vaganov@ideco.ru>
+
+commit 6889cd2a93e1e3606b3f6e958aa0924e836de4d2 upstream.
+
+During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:
+
+BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30
+ _copy_to_iter+0x598/0x2a30
+ __skb_datagram_iter+0x168/0x1060
+ skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5b/0x220
+ netlink_recvmsg+0x362/0x1700
+ sock_recvmsg+0x2dc/0x390
+ __sys_recvfrom+0x381/0x6d0
+ __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x130/0x200
+ x64_sys_call+0x32c8/0x3cc0
+ do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
+
+Uninit was stored to memory at:
+ copy_to_user_state_extra+0xcc1/0x1e00
+ dump_one_state+0x28c/0x5f0
+ xfrm_state_walk+0x548/0x11e0
+ xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e0/0x840
+ netlink_dump+0x943/0x1c40
+ __netlink_dump_start+0x746/0xdb0
+ xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x429/0xc00
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x613/0x780
+ xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x77/0xc0
+ netlink_unicast+0xe90/0x1280
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x126d/0x1490
+ __sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0
+ ____sys_sendmsg+0x863/0xc30
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x2d6/0x560
+ x64_sys_call+0x1316/0x3cc0
+ do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
+
+Uninit was created at:
+ __kmalloc+0x571/0xd30
+ attach_auth+0x106/0x3e0
+ xfrm_add_sa+0x2aa0/0x4230
+ xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x832/0xc00
+ netlink_rcv_skb+0x613/0x780
+ xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x77/0xc0
+ netlink_unicast+0xe90/0x1280
+ netlink_sendmsg+0x126d/0x1490
+ __sock_sendmsg+0x332/0x3d0
+ ____sys_sendmsg+0x863/0xc30
+ ___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0
+ __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x2d6/0x560
+ x64_sys_call+0x1316/0x3cc0
+ do_syscall_64+0xd8/0x1c0
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x79/0x81
+
+Bytes 328-379 of 732 are uninitialized
+Memory access of size 732 starts at ffff88800e18e000
+Data copied to user address 00007ff30f48aff0
+
+CPU: 2 PID: 18167 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.11 #1
+Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
+
+Fixes copying of xfrm algorithms where some random
+data of the structure fields can end up in userspace.
+Padding in structures may be filled with random (possibly sensitve)
+data and should never be given directly to user-space.
+
+A similar issue was resolved in the commit
+8222d5910dae ("xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encap")
+
+Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
+
+Fixes: c7a5899eb26e ("xfrm: redact SA secret with lockdown confidentiality")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Co-developed-by: Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa@ideco.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Boris Tonofa <b.tonofa@ideco.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <p.vaganov@ideco.ru>
+Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
++++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+@@ -1102,7 +1102,9 @@ static int copy_to_user_auth(struct xfrm
+ if (!nla)
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+ ap = nla_data(nla);
+- memcpy(ap, auth, sizeof(struct xfrm_algo_auth));
++ strscpy_pad(ap->alg_name, auth->alg_name, sizeof(ap->alg_name));
++ ap->alg_key_len = auth->alg_key_len;
++ ap->alg_trunc_len = auth->alg_trunc_len;
+ if (redact_secret && auth->alg_key_len)
+ memset(ap->alg_key, 0, (auth->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);
+ else
--- /dev/null
+From af8512c5277d17aae09be5305daa9118d2fa8881 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2024 11:58:10 -0700
+Subject: xfs: don't fail repairs on metadata files with no attr fork
+
+From: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
+
+commit af8512c5277d17aae09be5305daa9118d2fa8881 upstream.
+
+Fix a minor bug where we fail repairs on metadata files that do not have
+attr forks because xrep_metadata_inode_subtype doesn't filter ENOENT.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8
+Fixes: 5a8e07e799721b ("xfs: repair the inode core and forks of a metadata inode")
+Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
+Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/xfs/scrub/repair.c | 8 +++++---
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/xfs/scrub/repair.c
++++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/repair.c
+@@ -1084,9 +1084,11 @@ xrep_metadata_inode_forks(
+ return error;
+
+ /* Make sure the attr fork looks ok before we delete it. */
+- error = xrep_metadata_inode_subtype(sc, XFS_SCRUB_TYPE_BMBTA);
+- if (error)
+- return error;
++ if (xfs_inode_hasattr(sc->ip)) {
++ error = xrep_metadata_inode_subtype(sc, XFS_SCRUB_TYPE_BMBTA);
++ if (error)
++ return error;
++ }
+
+ /* Clear the reflink flag since metadata never shares. */
+ if (xfs_is_reflink_inode(sc->ip)) {
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
