--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+Date: Tue, 5 Jan 2016 10:46:00 +0100
+Subject: bridge: Only call /sbin/bridge-stp for the initial network namespace
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 1472
+Lines: 42
+
+From: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit ff62198553e43cdffa9d539f6165d3e83f8a42bc ]
+
+[I stole this patch from Eric Biederman. He wrote:]
+
+> There is no defined mechanism to pass network namespace information
+> into /sbin/bridge-stp therefore don't even try to invoke it except
+> for bridge devices in the initial network namespace.
+>
+> It is possible for unprivileged users to cause /sbin/bridge-stp to be
+> invoked for any network device name which if /sbin/bridge-stp does not
+> guard against unreasonable arguments or being invoked twice on the
+> same network device could cause problems.
+
+[Hannes: changed patch using netns_eq]
+
+Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/bridge/br_stp_if.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/bridge/br_stp_if.c
++++ b/net/bridge/br_stp_if.c
+@@ -128,7 +128,10 @@ static void br_stp_start(struct net_brid
+ char *argv[] = { BR_STP_PROG, br->dev->name, "start", NULL };
+ char *envp[] = { NULL };
+
+- r = call_usermodehelper(BR_STP_PROG, argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_PROC);
++ if (net_eq(dev_net(br->dev), &init_net))
++ r = call_usermodehelper(BR_STP_PROG, argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_PROC);
++ else
++ r = -ENOENT;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&br->lock);
+
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2015 14:26:33 +0100
+Subject: connector: bump skb->users before callback invocation
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 1407
+Lines: 51
+
+From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+
+[ Upstream commit 55285bf09427c5abf43ee1d54e892f352092b1f1 ]
+
+Dmitry reports memleak with syskaller program.
+Problem is that connector bumps skb usecount but might not invoke callback.
+
+So move skb_get to where we invoke the callback.
+
+Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/connector/connector.c | 11 +++--------
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/connector/connector.c
++++ b/drivers/connector/connector.c
+@@ -154,26 +154,21 @@ static int cn_call_callback(struct sk_bu
+ *
+ * It checks skb, netlink header and msg sizes, and calls callback helper.
+ */
+-static void cn_rx_skb(struct sk_buff *__skb)
++static void cn_rx_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+ {
+ struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+- struct sk_buff *skb;
+ int len, err;
+
+- skb = skb_get(__skb);
+-
+ if (skb->len >= NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
+ nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
+ len = nlmsg_len(nlh);
+
+ if (len < (int)sizeof(struct cn_msg) ||
+ skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len ||
+- len > CONNECTOR_MAX_MSG_SIZE) {
+- kfree_skb(skb);
++ len > CONNECTOR_MAX_MSG_SIZE)
+ return;
+- }
+
+- err = cn_call_callback(skb);
++ err = cn_call_callback(skb_get(skb));
+ if (err < 0)
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
+Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2015 12:54:45 +0300
+Subject: ipv6/addrlabel: fix ip6addrlbl_get()
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 1182
+Lines: 33
+
+From: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit e459dfeeb64008b2d23bdf600f03b3605dbb8152 ]
+
+ip6addrlbl_get() has never worked. If ip6addrlbl_hold() succeeded,
+ip6addrlbl_get() will exit with '-ESRCH'. If ip6addrlbl_hold() failed,
+ip6addrlbl_get() will use about to be free ip6addrlbl_entry pointer.
+
+Fix this by inverting ip6addrlbl_hold() check.
+
+Fixes: 2a8cc6c89039 ("[IPV6] ADDRCONF: Support RFC3484 configurable address selection policy table.")
+Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
+Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
+Acked-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/addrlabel.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/addrlabel.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/addrlabel.c
+@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ static int ip6addrlbl_get(struct sk_buff
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ p = __ipv6_addr_label(net, addr, ipv6_addr_type(addr), ifal->ifal_index);
+- if (p && ip6addrlbl_hold(p))
++ if (p && !ip6addrlbl_hold(p))
+ p = NULL;
+ lseq = ip6addrlbl_table.seq;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 16:21:24 +0000
+Subject: isdn_ppp: Add checks for allocation failure in isdn_ppp_open()
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 996
+Lines: 37
+
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+
+[ Upstream commit 0baa57d8dc32db78369d8b5176ef56c5e2e18ab3 ]
+
+Compile-tested only.
+
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/isdn/i4l/isdn_ppp.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/isdn/i4l/isdn_ppp.c
++++ b/drivers/isdn/i4l/isdn_ppp.c
+@@ -301,6 +301,8 @@ isdn_ppp_open(int min, struct file *file
+ is->compflags = 0;
+
+ is->reset = isdn_ppp_ccp_reset_alloc(is);
++ if (!is->reset)
++ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ is->lp = NULL;
+ is->mp_seqno = 0; /* MP sequence number */
+@@ -320,6 +322,10 @@ isdn_ppp_open(int min, struct file *file
+ * VJ header compression init
+ */
+ is->slcomp = slhc_init(16, 16); /* not necessary for 2. link in bundle */
++ if (!is->slcomp) {
++ isdn_ppp_ccp_reset_free(is);
++ return -ENOMEM;
++ }
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IPPP_FILTER
+ is->pass_filter = NULL;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@aristanetworks.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 Jan 2016 00:18:48 -0800
+Subject: net: possible use after free in dst_release
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 1116
+Lines: 36
+
+From: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@aristanetworks.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 07a5d38453599052aff0877b16bb9c1585f08609 ]
+
+dst_release should not access dst->flags after decrementing
+__refcnt to 0. The dst_entry may be in dst_busy_list and
+dst_gc_task may dst_destroy it before dst_release gets a chance
+to access dst->flags.
+
+Fixes: d69bbf88c8d0 ("net: fix a race in dst_release()")
+Fixes: 27b75c95f10d ("net: avoid RCU for NOCACHE dst")
+Signed-off-by: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@arista.com>
+Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/core/dst.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/core/dst.c
++++ b/net/core/dst.c
+@@ -280,10 +280,11 @@ void dst_release(struct dst_entry *dst)
+ {
+ if (dst) {
+ int newrefcnt;
++ unsigned short nocache = dst->flags & DST_NOCACHE;
+
+ newrefcnt = atomic_dec_return(&dst->__refcnt);
+ WARN_ON(newrefcnt < 0);
+- if (!newrefcnt && unlikely(dst->flags & DST_NOCACHE))
++ if (!newrefcnt && unlikely(nocache))
+ call_rcu(&dst->rcu_head, dst_destroy_rcu);
+ }
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Date: Tue, 12 Jan 2016 08:58:00 -0800
+Subject: phonet: properly unshare skbs in phonet_rcv()
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 1319
+Lines: 42
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 7aaed57c5c2890634cfadf725173c7c68ea4cb4f ]
+
+Ivaylo Dimitrov reported a regression caused by commit 7866a621043f
+("dev: add per net_device packet type chains").
+
+skb->dev becomes NULL and we crash in __netif_receive_skb_core().
+
+Before above commit, different kind of bugs or corruptions could happen
+without major crash.
+
+But the root cause is that phonet_rcv() can queue skb without checking
+if skb is shared or not.
+
+Many thanks to Ivaylo Dimitrov for his help, diagnosis and tests.
+
+Reported-by: Ivaylo Dimitrov <ivo.g.dimitrov.75@gmail.com>
+Tested-by: Ivaylo Dimitrov <ivo.g.dimitrov.75@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Cc: Remi Denis-Courmont <courmisch@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/phonet/af_phonet.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/net/phonet/af_phonet.c
++++ b/net/phonet/af_phonet.c
+@@ -377,6 +377,10 @@ static int phonet_rcv(struct sk_buff *sk
+ struct sockaddr_pn sa;
+ u16 len;
+
++ skb = skb_share_check(skb, GFP_ATOMIC);
++ if (!skb)
++ return NET_RX_DROP;
++
+ /* check we have at least a full Phonet header */
+ if (!pskb_pull(skb, sizeof(struct phonethdr)))
+ goto out;
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 16:22:53 +0000
+Subject: ppp, slip: Validate VJ compression slot parameters completely
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 4165
+Lines: 133
+
+From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+
+[ Upstream commit 4ab42d78e37a294ac7bc56901d563c642e03c4ae ]
+
+Currently slhc_init() treats out-of-range values of rslots and tslots
+as equivalent to 0, except that if tslots is too large it will
+dereference a null pointer (CVE-2015-7799).
+
+Add a range-check at the top of the function and make it return an
+ERR_PTR() on error instead of NULL. Change the callers accordingly.
+
+Compile-tested only.
+
+Reported-by: 郭永刚 <guoyonggang@360.cn>
+References: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.security.oss.general/17908
+Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/isdn/i4l/isdn_ppp.c | 10 ++++------
+ drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 6 ++----
+ drivers/net/slip/slhc.c | 12 ++++++++----
+ drivers/net/slip/slip.c | 2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/isdn/i4l/isdn_ppp.c
++++ b/drivers/isdn/i4l/isdn_ppp.c
+@@ -322,9 +322,9 @@ isdn_ppp_open(int min, struct file *file
+ * VJ header compression init
+ */
+ is->slcomp = slhc_init(16, 16); /* not necessary for 2. link in bundle */
+- if (!is->slcomp) {
++ if (IS_ERR(is->slcomp)) {
+ isdn_ppp_ccp_reset_free(is);
+- return -ENOMEM;
++ return PTR_ERR(is->slcomp);
+ }
+ #endif
+ #ifdef CONFIG_IPPP_FILTER
+@@ -574,10 +574,8 @@ isdn_ppp_ioctl(int min, struct file *fil
+ is->maxcid = val;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_ISDN_PPP_VJ
+ sltmp = slhc_init(16, val);
+- if (!sltmp) {
+- printk(KERN_ERR "ippp, can't realloc slhc struct\n");
+- return -ENOMEM;
+- }
++ if (IS_ERR(sltmp))
++ return PTR_ERR(sltmp);
+ if (is->slcomp)
+ slhc_free(is->slcomp);
+ is->slcomp = sltmp;
+--- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c
+@@ -716,10 +716,8 @@ static long ppp_ioctl(struct file *file,
+ val &= 0xffff;
+ }
+ vj = slhc_init(val2+1, val+1);
+- if (!vj) {
+- netdev_err(ppp->dev,
+- "PPP: no memory (VJ compressor)\n");
+- err = -ENOMEM;
++ if (IS_ERR(vj)) {
++ err = PTR_ERR(vj);
+ break;
+ }
+ ppp_lock(ppp);
+--- a/drivers/net/slip/slhc.c
++++ b/drivers/net/slip/slhc.c
+@@ -84,8 +84,9 @@ static long decode(unsigned char **cpp);
+ static unsigned char * put16(unsigned char *cp, unsigned short x);
+ static unsigned short pull16(unsigned char **cpp);
+
+-/* Initialize compression data structure
++/* Allocate compression data structure
+ * slots must be in range 0 to 255 (zero meaning no compression)
++ * Returns pointer to structure or ERR_PTR() on error.
+ */
+ struct slcompress *
+ slhc_init(int rslots, int tslots)
+@@ -94,11 +95,14 @@ slhc_init(int rslots, int tslots)
+ register struct cstate *ts;
+ struct slcompress *comp;
+
++ if (rslots < 0 || rslots > 255 || tslots < 0 || tslots > 255)
++ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
++
+ comp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct slcompress), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (! comp)
+ goto out_fail;
+
+- if ( rslots > 0 && rslots < 256 ) {
++ if (rslots > 0) {
+ size_t rsize = rslots * sizeof(struct cstate);
+ comp->rstate = kzalloc(rsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (! comp->rstate)
+@@ -106,7 +110,7 @@ slhc_init(int rslots, int tslots)
+ comp->rslot_limit = rslots - 1;
+ }
+
+- if ( tslots > 0 && tslots < 256 ) {
++ if (tslots > 0) {
+ size_t tsize = tslots * sizeof(struct cstate);
+ comp->tstate = kzalloc(tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (! comp->tstate)
+@@ -141,7 +145,7 @@ out_free2:
+ out_free:
+ kfree(comp);
+ out_fail:
+- return NULL;
++ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+
+--- a/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
++++ b/drivers/net/slip/slip.c
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int sl_alloc_bufs(struct slip *sl
+ if (cbuff == NULL)
+ goto err_exit;
+ slcomp = slhc_init(16, 16);
+- if (slcomp == NULL)
++ if (IS_ERR(slcomp))
+ goto err_exit;
+ #endif
+ spin_lock_bh(&sl->lock);
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2015 17:49:25 +0800
+Subject: sctp: sctp should release assoc when sctp_make_abort_user return NULL in sctp_close
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 2604
+Lines: 68
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 068d8bd338e855286aea54e70d1c101569284b21 ]
+
+In sctp_close, sctp_make_abort_user may return NULL because of memory
+allocation failure. If this happens, it will bypass any state change
+and never free the assoc. The assoc has no chance to be freed and it
+will be kept in memory with the state it had even after the socket is
+closed by sctp_close().
+
+So if sctp_make_abort_user fails to allocate memory, we should abort
+the asoc via sctp_primitive_ABORT as well. Just like the annotation in
+sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_abort and sctp_sf_do_9_1_prm_abort said,
+"Even if we can't send the ABORT due to low memory delete the TCB.
+This is a departure from our typical NOMEM handling".
+
+But then the chunk is NULL (low memory) and the SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd would
+dereference the chunk pointer, and system crash. So we should add
+SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd only when the chunk is not NULL, just like other
+places where it adds SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd.
+
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 6 ++++--
+ net/sctp/socket.c | 3 +--
+ 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
++++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c
+@@ -4835,7 +4835,8 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_do_9_1_prm_ab
+
+ retval = SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
+
+- sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
++ if (abort)
++ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
+
+ /* Even if we can't send the ABORT due to low memory delete the
+ * TCB. This is a departure from our typical NOMEM handling.
+@@ -4972,7 +4973,8 @@ sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_cookie_wait_p
+ SCTP_TO(SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT));
+ retval = SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME;
+
+- sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
++ if (abort)
++ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_REPLY, SCTP_CHUNK(abort));
+
+ sctp_add_cmd_sf(commands, SCTP_CMD_NEW_STATE,
+ SCTP_STATE(SCTP_STATE_CLOSED));
+--- a/net/sctp/socket.c
++++ b/net/sctp/socket.c
+@@ -1533,8 +1533,7 @@ SCTP_STATIC void sctp_close(struct sock
+ struct sctp_chunk *chunk;
+
+ chunk = sctp_make_abort_user(asoc, NULL, 0);
+- if (chunk)
+- sctp_primitive_ABORT(net, asoc, chunk);
++ sctp_primitive_ABORT(net, asoc, chunk);
+ } else
+ sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN(net, asoc, NULL);
+ }
usb-ipaq.c-fix-a-timeout-loop.patch
usb-cp210x-add-id-for-elv-marble-sound-board-1.patch
xhci-refuse-loading-if-nousb-is-used.patch
+utf-8-q-veth-20don-e2-80-99t-20modify-20ip-5fsum-utf-8-q-med-20doing-20so-20treats-20packets-20with-20bad-20checksums-utf-8-q-20as-20good.patch
+ipv6-addrlabel-fix-ip6addrlbl_get.patch
+sctp-sctp-should-release-assoc-when-sctp_make_abort_user-return-null-in-sctp_close.patch
+connector-bump-skb-users-before-callback-invocation.patch
+unix-properly-account-for-fds-passed-over-unix-sockets.patch
+bridge-only-call-sbin-bridge-stp-for-the-initial-network-namespace.patch
+net-possible-use-after-free-in-dst_release.patch
+tcp_yeah-don-t-set-ssthresh-below-2.patch
+phonet-properly-unshare-skbs-in-phonet_rcv.patch
+isdn_ppp-add-checks-for-allocation-failure-in-isdn_ppp_open.patch
+ppp-slip-validate-vj-compression-slot-parameters-completely.patch
+team-replace-rcu_read_lock-with-a-mutex-in-team_vlan_rx_kill_vid.patch
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 13:42:43 -0500
+Subject: tcp_yeah: don't set ssthresh below 2
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 1587
+Lines: 43
+
+From: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 83d15e70c4d8909d722c0d64747d8fb42e38a48f ]
+
+For tcp_yeah, use an ssthresh floor of 2, the same floor used by Reno
+and CUBIC, per RFC 5681 (equation 4).
+
+tcp_yeah_ssthresh() was sometimes returning a 0 or negative ssthresh
+value if the intended reduction is as big or bigger than the current
+cwnd. Congestion control modules should never return a zero or
+negative ssthresh. A zero ssthresh generally results in a zero cwnd,
+causing the connection to stall. A negative ssthresh value will be
+interpreted as a u32 and will set a target cwnd for PRR near 4
+billion.
+
+Oleksandr Natalenko reported that a system using tcp_yeah with ECN
+could see a warning about a prior_cwnd of 0 in
+tcp_cwnd_reduction(). Testing verified that this was due to
+tcp_yeah_ssthresh() misbehaving in this way.
+
+Reported-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name>
+Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_yeah.c
+@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static u32 tcp_yeah_ssthresh(struct sock
+ yeah->fast_count = 0;
+ yeah->reno_count = max(yeah->reno_count>>1, 2U);
+
+- return tp->snd_cwnd - reduction;
++ return max_t(int, tp->snd_cwnd - reduction, 2);
+ }
+
+ static struct tcp_congestion_ops tcp_yeah __read_mostly = {
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 17:30:22 +0200
+Subject: team: Replace rcu_read_lock with a mutex in team_vlan_rx_kill_vid
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 1200
+Lines: 36
+
+From: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 60a6531bfe49555581ccd65f66a350cc5693fcde ]
+
+We can't be within an RCU read-side critical section when deleting
+VLANs, as underlying drivers might sleep during the hardware operation.
+Therefore, replace the RCU critical section with a mutex. This is
+consistent with team_vlan_rx_add_vid.
+
+Fixes: 3d249d4ca7d0 ("net: introduce ethernet teaming device")
+Acked-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/team/team.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/team/team.c
++++ b/drivers/net/team/team.c
+@@ -1636,10 +1636,10 @@ static int team_vlan_rx_kill_vid(struct
+ struct team *team = netdev_priv(dev);
+ struct team_port *port;
+
+- rcu_read_lock();
+- list_for_each_entry_rcu(port, &team->port_list, list)
++ mutex_lock(&team->lock);
++ list_for_each_entry(port, &team->port_list, list)
+ vlan_vid_del(port->dev, proto, vid);
+- rcu_read_unlock();
++ mutex_unlock(&team->lock);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: willy tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2016 07:54:56 +0100
+Subject: unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 4253
+Lines: 136
+
+From: willy tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+
+[ Upstream commit 712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593 ]
+
+It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than
+the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them
+to keep the process' fd count low.
+
+This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs
+in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having
+more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit.
+
+Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com
+Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
+Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+)
+Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
+Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
+ net/unix/af_unix.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
+ net/unix/garbage.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
+ 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/sched.h
++++ b/include/linux/sched.h
+@@ -670,6 +670,7 @@ struct user_struct {
+ unsigned long mq_bytes; /* How many bytes can be allocated to mqueue? */
+ #endif
+ unsigned long locked_shm; /* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */
++ unsigned long unix_inflight; /* How many files in flight in unix sockets */
+
+ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ struct key *uid_keyring; /* UID specific keyring */
+--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
++++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
+@@ -1483,6 +1483,21 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_
+ sock_wfree(skb);
+ }
+
++/*
++ * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
++ * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
++ * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
++ * it across threads. Tough.
++ */
++static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
++{
++ struct user_struct *user = current_user();
++
++ if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
++ return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
++ return false;
++}
++
+ #define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4
+
+ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
+@@ -1491,6 +1506,9 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_co
+ unsigned char max_level = 0;
+ int unix_sock_count = 0;
+
++ if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
++ return -ETOOMANYREFS;
++
+ for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+
+@@ -1512,10 +1530,8 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_co
+ if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+- if (unix_sock_count) {
+- for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+- }
++ for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++ unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
+ return max_level;
+ }
+
+--- a/net/unix/garbage.c
++++ b/net/unix/garbage.c
+@@ -125,9 +125,12 @@ struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file
+ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+ {
+ struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
++
++ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
++
+ if (s) {
+ struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
+- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
++
+ if (atomic_long_inc_return(&u->inflight) == 1) {
+ BUG_ON(!list_empty(&u->link));
+ list_add_tail(&u->link, &gc_inflight_list);
+@@ -135,22 +138,27 @@ void unix_inflight(struct file *fp)
+ BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
+ }
+ unix_tot_inflight++;
+- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ }
++ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight++;
++ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ }
+
+ void unix_notinflight(struct file *fp)
+ {
+ struct sock *s = unix_get_socket(fp);
++
++ spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
++
+ if (s) {
+ struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(s);
+- spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
++
+ BUG_ON(list_empty(&u->link));
+ if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&u->inflight))
+ list_del_init(&u->link);
+ unix_tot_inflight--;
+- spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ }
++ fp->f_cred->user->unix_inflight--;
++ spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+ }
+
+ static void scan_inflight(struct sock *x, void (*func)(struct unix_sock *),
--- /dev/null
+From foo@baz Tue Jan 26 22:24:47 PST 2016
+From: Vijay Pandurangan <vijayp@vijayp.ca>
+Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2015 14:34:59 -0500
+Subject: =?UTF-8?q?veth:=20don=E2=80=99t=20modify=20ip=5Fsum?= =?UTF-8?q?med;=20doing=20so=20treats=20packets=20with=20bad=20checksums?= =?UTF-8?q?=20as=20good.?=
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+Status: RO
+Content-Length: 2983
+Lines: 66
+
+From: Vijay Pandurangan <vijayp@vijayp.ca>
+
+[ Upstream commit ce8c839b74e3017996fad4e1b7ba2e2625ede82f ]
+
+Packets that arrive from real hardware devices have ip_summed ==
+CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY if the hardware verified the checksums, or
+CHECKSUM_NONE if the packet is bad or it was unable to verify it. The
+current version of veth will replace CHECKSUM_NONE with
+CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY, which causes corrupt packets routed from hardware to
+a veth device to be delivered to the application. This caused applications
+at Twitter to receive corrupt data when network hardware was corrupting
+packets.
+
+We believe this was added as an optimization to skip computing and
+verifying checksums for communication between containers. However, locally
+generated packets have ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL, so the code as
+written does nothing for them. As far as we can tell, after removing this
+code, these packets are transmitted from one stack to another unmodified
+(tcpdump shows invalid checksums on both sides, as expected), and they are
+delivered correctly to applications. We didn’t test every possible network
+configuration, but we tried a few common ones such as bridging containers,
+using NAT between the host and a container, and routing from hardware
+devices to containers. We have effectively deployed this in production at
+Twitter (by disabling RX checksum offloading on veth devices).
+
+This code dates back to the first version of the driver, commit
+<e314dbdc1c0dc6a548ecf> ("[NET]: Virtual ethernet device driver"), so I
+suspect this bug occurred mostly because the driver API has evolved
+significantly since then. Commit <0b7967503dc97864f283a> ("net/veth: Fix
+packet checksumming") (in December 2010) fixed this for packets that get
+created locally and sent to hardware devices, by not changing
+CHECKSUM_PARTIAL. However, the same issue still occurs for packets coming
+in from hardware devices.
+
+Co-authored-by: Evan Jones <ej@evanjones.ca>
+Signed-off-by: Evan Jones <ej@evanjones.ca>
+Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
+Cc: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc>
+Cc: Toshiaki Makita <makita.toshiaki@lab.ntt.co.jp>
+Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Vijay Pandurangan <vijayp@vijayp.ca>
+Acked-by: Cong Wang <cwang@twopensource.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/veth.c | 6 ------
+ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/veth.c
++++ b/drivers/net/veth.c
+@@ -116,12 +116,6 @@ static netdev_tx_t veth_xmit(struct sk_b
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ goto drop;
+ }
+- /* don't change ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL, as that
+- * will cause bad checksum on forwarded packets
+- */
+- if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_NONE &&
+- rcv->features & NETIF_F_RXCSUM)
+- skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
+
+ if (likely(dev_forward_skb(rcv, skb) == NET_RX_SUCCESS)) {
+ struct pcpu_vstats *stats = this_cpu_ptr(dev->vstats);
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
