AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, ASN1_STRING_get0_data, [
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_ASN1_STRING_GET0_DATA,, [Build with ASN1_STRING_get0_data() support])
],, $SSL_LIBS)
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, HMAC_CTX_new, [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_HMAC_CTX_NEW,, [Build with HMAC_CTX_new() support])
+ ],, $SSL_LIBS)
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, EVP_MD_CTX_new, [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW,, [Build with EVP_MD_CTX_new() support])
+ ],, $SSL_LIBS)
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, OBJ_length, [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OBJ_LENGTH,, [Build with OBJ_length() support])
+ ],, $SSL_LIBS)
+ AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA, [
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_EVP_PKEY_get0,, [Build with EVP_PKEY_get0_*() support])
+ ],, $SSL_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, [EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id], [have_evp_pkey_ctx_new_id="yes"],, $SSL_LIBS)
AC_CHECK_LIB(ssl, [EC_KEY_new], [have_ec_key_new="yes"],, $SSL_LIBS)
if test "$have_evp_pkey_ctx_new_id" = "yes" && test "$have_ec_key_new" = "yes"; then
2<tab>key algo oid<tab>1<tab>symmetric algo name<tab>salt<tab>hash algo<tab>rounds<tab>E(RSA = i2d_PrivateKey, EC=Private Point)<tab>key id
**/
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_get0
#define EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(x) x->pkey.ec
#define EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(x) x->pkey.rsa
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OBJ_LENGTH
#define OBJ_length(o) ((o)->length)
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW
# define EVP_MD_CTX_new() EVP_MD_CTX_create()
# define EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx) EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx)
#endif
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
+#ifndef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_NEW
# define HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, key_len, md, impl) \
HMAC_Init_ex(&(ctx), key, key_len, md, impl)
# define HMAC_Update(ctx, data, len) HMAC_Update(&(ctx), data, len)
struct dcrypt_context_hmac {
pool_t pool;
const EVP_MD *md;
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+#ifdef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_NEW
HMAC_CTX *ctx;
#else
HMAC_CTX ctx;
{
int ec;
i_assert(ctx->md != NULL);
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
+#ifdef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_NEW
ctx->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (ctx->ctx == NULL) return dcrypt_openssl_error(error_r);
#endif