AddGlobalToList(relevant_globals, g);
}
-// Check ODR violation for given global G by checking if it's already poisoned.
-// We use this method in case compiler doesn't use private aliases for global
-// variables.
-static void CheckODRViolationViaPoisoning(const Global *g)
- SANITIZER_REQUIRES(mu_for_globals) {
- if (__asan_region_is_poisoned(g->beg, g->size_with_redzone)) {
- // This check may not be enough: if the first global is much larger
- // the entire redzone of the second global may be within the first global.
- for (const auto &l : list_of_all_globals) {
- if (g->beg == l.g->beg &&
- (flags()->detect_odr_violation >= 2 || g->size != l.g->size) &&
- !IsODRViolationSuppressed(g->name)) {
- ReportODRViolation(g, FindRegistrationSite(g), l.g,
- FindRegistrationSite(l.g));
- }
- }
- }
-}
-
// Clang provides two different ways for global variables protection:
// it can poison the global itself or its private alias. In former
// case we may poison same symbol multiple times, that can help us to
// where two globals with the same name are defined in different modules.
if (UseODRIndicator(g))
CheckODRViolationViaIndicator(g);
- else
- CheckODRViolationViaPoisoning(g);
}
if (CanPoisonMemory())
PoisonRedZones(*g);
#if ASAN_HAS_EXCEPTIONS && !SANITIZER_SOLARIS && !SANITIZER_NETBSD && \
(!SANITIZER_WINDOWS || (defined(__MINGW32__) && defined(__i386__)))
# define ASAN_INTERCEPT___CXA_THROW 1
-# define ASAN_INTERCEPT___CXA_RETHROW_PRIMARY_EXCEPTION 1
+# if ! defined(ASAN_HAS_CXA_RETHROW_PRIMARY_EXCEPTION) \
+ || ASAN_HAS_CXA_RETHROW_PRIMARY_EXCEPTION
+# define ASAN_INTERCEPT___CXA_RETHROW_PRIMARY_EXCEPTION 1
+# else
+# define ASAN_INTERCEPT___CXA_RETHROW_PRIMARY_EXCEPTION 0
+# endif
# if defined(_GLIBCXX_SJLJ_EXCEPTIONS) || (SANITIZER_IOS && defined(__arm__))
# define ASAN_INTERCEPT__UNWIND_SJLJ_RAISEEXCEPTION 1
# else
# elif defined(__aarch64__)
# define ASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET_CONST 0x0000001000000000
# elif defined(__powerpc64__)
-# define ASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET_CONST 0x0000100000000000
+# define ASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET_CONST 0x0000020000000000
# elif defined(__s390x__)
# define ASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET_CONST 0x0010000000000000
# elif SANITIZER_FREEBSD
# elif SANITIZER_SOLARIS
return sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN);
# else
+# if defined(CPU_COUNT)
cpu_set_t CPUs;
CHECK_EQ(sched_getaffinity(0, sizeof(cpu_set_t), &CPUs), 0);
return CPU_COUNT(&CPUs);
+# else
+ return 1;
+# endif
# endif
}
// With old kernels (and even new kernels on powerpc) asm/stat.h uses types that
// are not defined anywhere in userspace headers. Fake them. This seems to work
-// fine with newer headers, too.
+// fine with newer headers, too. Beware that with <sys/stat.h>, struct stat
+// takes the form of struct stat64 on 32-bit platforms if _FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64.
+// Also, for some platforms (e.g. mips) there are additional members in the
+// <sys/stat.h> struct stat:s.
#include <linux/posix_types.h>
# if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__mips__) || defined(__hexagon__)
# include <sys/stat.h>
// Nope, this does not look right either. This means the frame after next does
// not have a valid frame pointer, but we can still extract the caller PC.
// Unfortunately, there is no way to decide between GCC and LLVM frame
- // layouts. Assume LLVM.
- return bp_prev;
+ // layouts. Assume GCC.
+ return bp_prev - 1;
#else
return (uhwptr*)bp;
#endif
IsAligned((uptr)frame, sizeof(*frame)) &&
size < max_depth) {
#ifdef __powerpc__
- // PowerPC ABIs specify that the return address is saved at offset
- // 16 of the *caller's* stack frame. Thus we must dereference the
- // back chain to find the caller frame before extracting it.
+ // PowerPC ABIs specify that the return address is saved on the
+ // *caller's* stack frame. Thus we must dereference the back chain
+ // to find the caller frame before extracting it.
uhwptr *caller_frame = (uhwptr*)frame[0];
if (!IsValidFrame((uptr)caller_frame, stack_top, bottom) ||
!IsAligned((uptr)caller_frame, sizeof(uhwptr)))
break;
+ // For most ABIs the offset where the return address is saved is two
+ // register sizes. The exception is the SVR4 ABI, which uses an
+ // offset of only one register size.
+#ifdef _CALL_SYSV
+ uhwptr pc1 = caller_frame[1];
+#else
uhwptr pc1 = caller_frame[2];
+#endif
#elif defined(__s390__)
uhwptr pc1 = frame[14];
#elif defined(__loongarch__) || defined(__riscv)
return true;
if (file && internal_strstr(file, "\\compiler-rt\\lib\\"))
return true;
+ if (file && internal_strstr(file, "\\libsanitizer\\"))
+ return true;
if (module && (internal_strstr(module, "libclang_rt.")))
return true;
if (module && (internal_strstr(module, "clang_rt.")))
return true;
+ if (module && (internal_strstr(module, "libtsan.")
+ || internal_strstr(module, "libhwasan.")
+ || internal_strstr(module, "liblsan.")
+ || internal_strstr(module, "libasan.")
+ || internal_strstr(module, "libubsan.")))
+ return true;
return false;
}
#include "tsan_ppc_regs.h"
+ .machine altivec
.section .text
.hidden __tsan_setjmp
.globl _setjmp
{
CommonFlags cf;
cf.CopyFrom(*common_flags());
+ cf.print_summary = false;
cf.external_symbolizer_path = GetFlag("UBSAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH");
OverrideCommonFlags(cf);
}
} // namespace __ubsan
+void __ubsan::__ubsan_handle_cfi_bad_icall(CFIBadIcallData *CallData,
+ ValueHandle Function) {
+ GET_REPORT_OPTIONS(false);
+ CFICheckFailData Data = {CFITCK_ICall, CallData->Loc, CallData->Type};
+ handleCFIBadIcall(&Data, Function, Opts);
+}
+
+void __ubsan::__ubsan_handle_cfi_bad_icall_abort(CFIBadIcallData *CallData,
+ ValueHandle Function) {
+ GET_REPORT_OPTIONS(true);
+ CFICheckFailData Data = {CFITCK_ICall, CallData->Loc, CallData->Type};
+ handleCFIBadIcall(&Data, Function, Opts);
+ Die();
+}
+
void __ubsan::__ubsan_handle_cfi_check_fail(CFICheckFailData *Data,
ValueHandle Value,
uptr ValidVtable) {
CFITCK_VMFCall,
};
+struct CFIBadIcallData {
+ SourceLocation Loc;
+ const TypeDescriptor &Type;
+};
+
struct CFICheckFailData {
CFITypeCheckKind CheckKind;
SourceLocation Loc;
const TypeDescriptor &Type;
};
+/// \brief Handle control flow integrity failure for indirect function calls.
+RECOVERABLE(cfi_bad_icall, CFIBadIcallData *Data, ValueHandle Function)
+
/// \brief Handle control flow integrity failures.
RECOVERABLE(cfi_check_fail, CFICheckFailData *Data, ValueHandle Function,
uptr VtableIsValid)
Diag(Loc, DL_Note, ET, "check failed in %0, vtable located in %1")
<< SrcModule << DstModule;
}
+
+static bool handleFunctionTypeMismatch(FunctionTypeMismatchData *Data,
+ ValueHandle Function,
+ ValueHandle calleeRTTI,
+ ValueHandle fnRTTI, ReportOptions Opts) {
+ if (checkTypeInfoEquality(reinterpret_cast<void *>(calleeRTTI),
+ reinterpret_cast<void *>(fnRTTI)))
+ return false;
+
+ SourceLocation CallLoc = Data->Loc.acquire();
+ ErrorType ET = ErrorType::FunctionTypeMismatch;
+
+ if (ignoreReport(CallLoc, Opts, ET))
+ return true;
+
+ ScopedReport R(Opts, CallLoc, ET);
+
+ SymbolizedStackHolder FLoc(getSymbolizedLocation(Function));
+ const char *FName = FLoc.get()->info.function;
+ if (!FName)
+ FName = "(unknown)";
+
+ Diag(CallLoc, DL_Error, ET,
+ "call to function %0 through pointer to incorrect function type %1")
+ << FName << Data->Type;
+ Diag(FLoc, DL_Note, ET, "%0 defined here") << FName;
+ return true;
+}
+
+void __ubsan_handle_function_type_mismatch_v1(FunctionTypeMismatchData *Data,
+ ValueHandle Function,
+ ValueHandle calleeRTTI,
+ ValueHandle fnRTTI) {
+ GET_REPORT_OPTIONS(false);
+ handleFunctionTypeMismatch(Data, Function, calleeRTTI, fnRTTI, Opts);
+}
+
+void __ubsan_handle_function_type_mismatch_v1_abort(
+ FunctionTypeMismatchData *Data, ValueHandle Function,
+ ValueHandle calleeRTTI, ValueHandle fnRTTI) {
+ GET_REPORT_OPTIONS(true);
+ if (handleFunctionTypeMismatch(Data, Function, calleeRTTI, fnRTTI, Opts))
+ Die();
+}
} // namespace __ubsan
#endif // CAN_SANITIZE_UB
extern "C" SANITIZER_INTERFACE_ATTRIBUTE
void __ubsan_handle_dynamic_type_cache_miss_abort(
DynamicTypeCacheMissData *Data, ValueHandle Pointer, ValueHandle Hash);
+
+struct FunctionTypeMismatchData;
+
+extern "C" SANITIZER_INTERFACE_ATTRIBUTE void
+__ubsan_handle_function_type_mismatch_v1(FunctionTypeMismatchData *Data,
+ ValueHandle Val,
+ ValueHandle calleeRTTI,
+ ValueHandle fnRTTI);
+extern "C" SANITIZER_INTERFACE_ATTRIBUTE void
+__ubsan_handle_function_type_mismatch_v1_abort(FunctionTypeMismatchData *Data,
+ ValueHandle Val,
+ ValueHandle calleeRTTI,
+ ValueHandle fnRTTI);
}
#endif // UBSAN_HANDLERS_CXX_H
INTERFACE_FUNCTION(__ubsan_handle_dynamic_type_cache_miss_abort)
INTERFACE_FUNCTION(__ubsan_handle_float_cast_overflow)
INTERFACE_FUNCTION(__ubsan_handle_float_cast_overflow_abort)
+INTERFACE_FUNCTION(__ubsan_handle_function_type_mismatch_v1)
+INTERFACE_FUNCTION(__ubsan_handle_function_type_mismatch_v1_abort)
INTERFACE_FUNCTION(__ubsan_handle_function_type_mismatch)
INTERFACE_FUNCTION(__ubsan_handle_function_type_mismatch_abort)
INTERFACE_FUNCTION(__ubsan_handle_implicit_conversion)
#ifndef UBSAN_PLATFORM_H
#define UBSAN_PLATFORM_H
+#ifndef CAN_SANITIZE_UB
// Other platforms should be easy to add, and probably work as-is.
#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) || \
defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) || \
#else
# define CAN_SANITIZE_UB 0
#endif
+#endif //CAN_SANITIZE_UB
#endif
projects / thirdparty / gcc.git / commitdiff
