Harden BN_GF2m_poly2arr against misuse.

The BN_GF2m_poly2arr() function converts characteristic-2 field
(GF_{2^m}) Galois polynomials from a representation as a BIGNUM bitmask,
to a compact array with just the exponents of the non-zero terms.

These polynomials are then used in BN_GF2m_mod_arr() to perform modular
reduction.  A precondition of calling BN_GF2m_mod_arr() is that the
polynomial must have a non-zero constant term (i.e. the array has `0` as
its final element).

Internally, callers of BN_GF2m_poly2arr() did not verify that
precondition, and binary EC curve parameters with an invalid polynomial
could lead to out of bounds memory reads and writes in BN_GF2m_mod_arr().

The precondition is always true for polynomials that arise from the
standard form of EC parameters for characteristic-two fields (X9.62).
See the "Finite Field Identification" section of:

    https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/formal-language/itu-t/x/x894/2018-cor1/ANSI-X9-62.html

The OpenSSL GF(2^m) code supports only the trinomial and pentanomial
basis X9.62 forms.

This commit updates BN_GF2m_poly2arr() to return `0` (failure) when
the constant term is zero (i.e. the input bitmask BIGNUM is not odd).

Additionally, the return value is made unambiguous when there is not
enough space to also pad the array with a final `-1` sentinel value.
The return value is now always the number of elements (including the
final `-1`) that would be filled when the output array is sufficiently
large.  Previously the same count was returned both when the array has
just enough room for the final `-1` and when it had only enough space
for non-sentinel values.

Finally, BN_GF2m_poly2arr() is updated to reject polynomials whose
degree exceeds `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against
CPU exhausition attacks via excessively large inputs.

The above issues do not arise in processing X.509 certificates.  These
generally have EC keys from "named curves", and RFC5840 (Section 2.1.1)
disallows explicit EC parameters.  The TLS code in OpenSSL enforces this
constraint only after the certificate is decoded, but, even if explicit
parameters are specified, they are in X9.62 form, which cannot represent
problem values as noted above.

Initially reported as oss-fuzz issue 71623.

A closely related issue was earlier reported in
<https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/19826>.

Severity: Low, CVE-2024-9143

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25639)

diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
index 444c5ca7a37554f24b3d9cca83a330c7b5e1757e..ae7e9d751c29cefa3703b380edbfc0303eca5623 100644 (file)
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include "bn_local.h"
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
 
 /*
  * Maximum number of iterations before BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr should
@@ -1130,16 +1131,26 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
 /*
  * Convert the bit-string representation of a polynomial ( \sum_{i=0}^n a_i *
  * x^i) into an array of integers corresponding to the bits with non-zero
- * coefficient.  Array is terminated with -1. Up to max elements of the array
- * will be filled.  Return value is total number of array elements that would
- * be filled if array was large enough.
+ * coefficient.  The array is intended to be suitable for use with
+ * `BN_GF2m_mod_arr()`, and so the constant term of the polynomial must not be
+ * zero.  This translates to a requirement that the input BIGNUM `a` is odd.
+ *
+ * Given sufficient room, the array is terminated with -1.  Up to max elements
+ * of the array will be filled.
+ *
+ * The return value is total number of array elements that would be filled if
+ * array was large enough, including the terminating `-1`.  It is `0` when `a`
+ * is not odd or the constant term is zero contrary to requirement.
+ *
+ * The return value is also `0` when the leading exponent exceeds
+ * `OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS`, this guards against CPU exhaustion attacks,
  */
 int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
 {
     int i, j, k = 0;
     BN_ULONG mask;
 
-    if (BN_is_zero(a))
+    if (!BN_is_odd(a))
         return 0;
 
     for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
@@ -1157,12 +1168,13 @@ int BN_GF2m_poly2arr(const BIGNUM *a, int p[], int max)
         }
     }
 
-    if (k < max) {
+    if (k > 0 && p[0] > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (k < max)
         p[k] = -1;
-        k++;
-    }
 
-    return k;
+    return k + 1;
 }
 
 /*

diff --git a/test/ec_internal_test.c b/test/ec_internal_test.c
index e5bbd3632c8f158d4342ce7c6751742e7588e56a..0268142ae7fda7359e6f1dadf21f3fc12c0115e3 100644 (file)
--- a/test/ec_internal_test.c
+++ b/test/ec_internal_test.c
@@ -156,6 +156,56 @@ static int field_tests_ecp_mont(void)
 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+/* Test that decoding of invalid GF2m field parameters fails. */
+static int ec2m_field_sanity(void)
+{
+    int ret = 0;
+    BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+    BIGNUM *p, *a, *b;
+    EC_GROUP *group1 = NULL, *group2 = NULL, *group3 = NULL;
+
+    TEST_info("Testing GF2m hardening\n");
+
+    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+    p = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+    if (!TEST_ptr(b = BN_CTX_get(ctx))
+        || !TEST_true(BN_one(a))
+        || !TEST_true(BN_one(b)))
+        goto out;
+
+    /* Even pentanomial value should be rejected */
+    if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf2)))
+        goto out;
+    if (!TEST_ptr_null(group1 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
+        TEST_error("Zero constant term accepted in GF2m polynomial");
+
+    /* Odd hexanomial should also be rejected */
+    if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0xf3)))
+        goto out;
+    if (!TEST_ptr_null(group2 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
+        TEST_error("Hexanomial accepted as GF2m polynomial");
+
+    /* Excessive polynomial degree should also be rejected */
+    if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(p, 0x71))
+        || !TEST_true(BN_set_bit(p, OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS + 1)))
+        goto out;
+    if (!TEST_ptr_null(group3 = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)))
+        TEST_error("GF2m polynomial degree > %d accepted",
+                   OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS);
+
+    ret = group1 == NULL && group2 == NULL && group3 == NULL;
+
+ out:
+    EC_GROUP_free(group1);
+    EC_GROUP_free(group2);
+    EC_GROUP_free(group3);
+    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
 /* test EC_GF2m_simple_method directly */
 static int field_tests_ec2_simple(void)
 {
@@ -506,6 +556,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
     ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_simple);
     ADD_TEST(field_tests_ecp_mont);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
+    ADD_TEST(ec2m_field_sanity);
     ADD_TEST(field_tests_ec2_simple);
 #endif
     ADD_ALL_TESTS(field_tests_default, crv_len);