[3.14] gh-146581: Update docs for dangerous filenames in ZIP files (GH-149994) (GH...

(cherry picked from commit ba0aca3bffce431fe2fbd53ca4cd6a717a2e2c19)

Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka <storchaka@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Sebastian Gassner <sebastian.gassner@gmail.com>

diff --git a/Doc/library/shutil.rst b/Doc/library/shutil.rst
index 8564a5b72d979475d038b11c873f14062866f11f..e65b96f2e8f07e9ee5bcec0fa952d14a8b03cba9 100644 (file)
--- a/Doc/library/shutil.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/shutil.rst
@@ -745,8 +745,8 @@ provided.  They rely on the :mod:`zipfile` and :mod:`tarfile` modules.
 
       Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection.
       It is possible that files are created outside of the path specified in
-      the *extract_dir* argument, e.g. members that have absolute filenames
-      starting with "/" or filenames with two dots "..".
+      the *extract_dir* argument, for example, members that have absolute filenames
+      or filenames with ".." components.
 
       Since Python 3.14, the defaults for both built-in formats (zip and tar
       files) will prevent the most dangerous of such security issues,

diff --git a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst
index b1a2c820bea11faa03f66afaecff7ee76252cf8a..36043c355818b12f7ac755b3bf227a56b88cf295 100644 (file)
--- a/Doc/library/zipfile.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/zipfile.rst
@@ -414,9 +414,9 @@ ZipFile objects
    .. warning::
 
       Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection.
-      It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, e.g. members
-      that have absolute filenames starting with ``"/"`` or filenames with two
-      dots ``".."``.  This module attempts to prevent that.
+      It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, for example, members
+      that have absolute filenames or filenames with ".." components.
+      This module attempts to prevent that.
       See :meth:`extract` note.
 
    .. versionchanged:: 3.6
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ Path objects
       The :class:`Path` class does not sanitize filenames within the ZIP archive. Unlike
       the :meth:`ZipFile.extract` and :meth:`ZipFile.extractall` methods, it is the
       caller's responsibility to validate or sanitize filenames to prevent path traversal
-      vulnerabilities (e.g., filenames containing ".." or absolute paths). When handling
+      vulnerabilities (for example, absolute paths or paths with ".." components). When handling
       untrusted archives, consider resolving filenames using :func:`os.path.abspath`
       and checking against the target directory with :func:`os.path.commonpath`.