Using strncpy meant that if listenaddress were ever >=
sizeof(sockaddr_un.sun_path), we would fail to nul-terminate
sun_path. This isn't a big deal: we never read sun_path, and the
kernel is smart enough to reject the sockaddr_un if it isn't
nul-terminated. Nonetheless, it's a dumb failure mode. Instead, we
should reject addresses that don't fit in sockaddr_un.sun_path.
Coverity found this; it's CID 428. Bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
--- /dev/null
+ o Minor bugfixes:
+ - Always NUL-terminate the sun_path field of a sockaddr_un before
+ passing it to the kernel. (Not a security issue: kernels are
+ smart enough to reject bad sockaddr_uns.) Found by Coverity; CID
+ # 428. Bugfix on Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha.
sockaddr = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
sockaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strncpy(sockaddr->sun_path, listenaddress, sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path));
+ if (strlcpy(sockaddr->sun_path, listenaddress, sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path))
+ >= sizeof(sockaddr->sun_path)) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unix socket path '%s' is too long to fit.",
+ escaped(listenaddress));
+ tor_free(sockaddr);
+ return NULL;
+ }
if (readable_address)
*readable_address = tor_strdup(listenaddress);