--- /dev/null
+From 70daf68521d8d0933c917e68c32ae83db8053f31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 13:30:40 +0000
+Subject: ipv4: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget in ip_metrics_convert()
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1d1d63b612801b3f0a39b7d4467cad0abd60e5c8 ]
+
+if (!type)
+ continue;
+ if (type > RTAX_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ...
+ metrics[type - 1] = val;
+
+@type being used as an array index, we need to prevent
+cpu speculation or risk leaking kernel memory content.
+
+Fixes: 6cf9dfd3bd62 ("net: fib: move metrics parsing to a helper")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120133040.3623463-1-edumazet@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/ipv4/metrics.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/ipv4/metrics.c b/net/ipv4/metrics.c
+index 04311f7067e2..9a6b01d85cd0 100644
+--- a/net/ipv4/metrics.c
++++ b/net/ipv4/metrics.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
+ #include <linux/netlink.h>
++#include <linux/nospec.h>
+ #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+ #include <linux/types.h>
+ #include <net/ip.h>
+@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ int ip_metrics_convert(struct net *net, struct nlattr *fc_mx, int fc_mx_len,
+ if (type > RTAX_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
++ type = array_index_nospec(type, RTAX_MAX + 1);
+ if (type == RTAX_CC_ALGO) {
+ char tmp[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
+
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 1141f92920cd4ca75cf493156256b697a22c44f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 19:55:45 +0100
+Subject: net: fix UaF in netns ops registration error path
+
+From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 71ab9c3e2253619136c31c89dbb2c69305cc89b1 ]
+
+If net_assign_generic() fails, the current error path in ops_init() tries
+to clear the gen pointer slot. Anyway, in such error path, the gen pointer
+itself has not been modified yet, and the existing and accessed one is
+smaller than the accessed index, causing an out-of-bounds error:
+
+ BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ops_init+0x2de/0x320
+ Write of size 8 at addr ffff888109124978 by task modprobe/1018
+
+ CPU: 2 PID: 1018 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2.mptcp_ae5ac65fbed5+ #1641
+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
+ Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x9f
+ print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x2b5
+ print_report+0x11b/0x1fb
+ kasan_report+0x87/0xc0
+ ops_init+0x2de/0x320
+ register_pernet_operations+0x2e4/0x750
+ register_pernet_subsys+0x24/0x40
+ tcf_register_action+0x9f/0x560
+ do_one_initcall+0xf9/0x570
+ do_init_module+0x190/0x650
+ load_module+0x1fa5/0x23c0
+ __do_sys_finit_module+0x10d/0x1b0
+ do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
+ RIP: 0033:0x7f42518f778d
+ Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48
+ 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
+ ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d cb 56 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
+ RSP: 002b:00007fff96869688 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
+ RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005568ef7f7c90 RCX: 00007f42518f778d
+ RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005568ef41d796 RDI: 0000000000000003
+ RBP: 00005568ef41d796 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+ R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
+ R13: 00005568ef7f7d30 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 0000000000000000
+ </TASK>
+
+This change addresses the issue by skipping the gen pointer
+de-reference in the mentioned error-path.
+
+Found by code inspection and verified with explicit error injection
+on a kasan-enabled kernel.
+
+Fixes: d266935ac43d ("net: fix UAF issue in nfqnl_nf_hook_drop() when ops_init() failed")
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/cec4e0f3bb2c77ac03a6154a8508d3930beb5f0f.1674154348.git.pabeni@redhat.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/core/net_namespace.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c
+index 56c240c98a56..a87774424829 100644
+--- a/net/core/net_namespace.c
++++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c
+@@ -132,12 +132,12 @@ static int ops_init(const struct pernet_operations *ops, struct net *net)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ops->id && ops->size) {
+-cleanup:
+ ng = rcu_dereference_protected(net->gen,
+ lockdep_is_held(&pernet_ops_rwsem));
+ ng->ptr[*ops->id] = NULL;
+ }
+
++cleanup:
+ kfree(data);
+
+ out:
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 1e5ed7269260567ae2ccfc1e28cc0a8d1fc1566b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 09:02:11 +0900
+Subject: net: ravb: Fix possible hang if RIS2_QFF1 happen
+
+From: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit f3c07758c9007a6bfff5290d9e19d3c41930c897 ]
+
+Since this driver enables the interrupt by RIC2_QFE1, this driver
+should clear the interrupt flag if it happens. Otherwise, the interrupt
+causes to hang the system.
+
+Note that this also fix a minor coding style (a comment indentation)
+around the fixed code.
+
+Fixes: c156633f1353 ("Renesas Ethernet AVB driver proper")
+Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com>
+Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c
+index ff374d0d80a7..a1906804c139 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c
+@@ -738,14 +738,14 @@ static void ravb_error_interrupt(struct net_device *ndev)
+ ravb_write(ndev, ~(EIS_QFS | EIS_RESERVED), EIS);
+ if (eis & EIS_QFS) {
+ ris2 = ravb_read(ndev, RIS2);
+- ravb_write(ndev, ~(RIS2_QFF0 | RIS2_RFFF | RIS2_RESERVED),
++ ravb_write(ndev, ~(RIS2_QFF0 | RIS2_QFF1 | RIS2_RFFF | RIS2_RESERVED),
+ RIS2);
+
+ /* Receive Descriptor Empty int */
+ if (ris2 & RIS2_QFF0)
+ priv->stats[RAVB_BE].rx_over_errors++;
+
+- /* Receive Descriptor Empty int */
++ /* Receive Descriptor Empty int */
+ if (ris2 & RIS2_QFF1)
+ priv->stats[RAVB_NC].rx_over_errors++;
+
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 6c45fd8472ed235c0a8d400ca5733f12301560f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 13:53:39 -0500
+Subject: net/tg3: resolve deadlock in tg3_reset_task() during EEH
+
+From: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 6c4ca03bd890566d873e3593b32d034bf2f5a087 ]
+
+During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3
+driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding
+reset tasks:
+
+crash> foreach UN bt
+...
+PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067c6000 CPU: 8 COMMAND: "eehd"
+...
+ #5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18
+ #6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3]
+ #7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c
+...
+
+PID: 290 TASK: c000000036e5f800 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1"
+...
+ #4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
+ #5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
+ #6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
+...
+
+PID: 296 TASK: c000000037a65800 CPU: 21 COMMAND: "kworker/21:1"
+...
+ #4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
+ #5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
+ #6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
+...
+
+PID: 655 TASK: c000000036f49000 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "kworker/16:2"
+...:1
+
+ #4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
+ #5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3]
+ #6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
+...
+
+Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and
+tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of
+their code blocks. If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between
+the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and
+tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur.
+
+Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior
+to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another
+deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER
+tg3_io_error_detected() has executed:
+
+crash> foreach UN bt
+PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067d2000 CPU: 9 COMMAND: "eehd"
+...
+ #4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
+ #5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3]
+ #6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88
+...
+PID: 363 TASK: c000000037564000 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1"
+...
+ #3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c
+ #4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848
+ #5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3]
+ #6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
+...
+
+This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error
+recovery is already in progress.
+
+Fixes: db84bf43ef23 ("tg3: tg3_reset_task() needs to use rtnl_lock to synchronize")
+Signed-off-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230124185339.225806-1-drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
+index d1ca3d3f51a7..2cf144bbef3e 100644
+--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
++++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c
+@@ -11189,7 +11189,7 @@ static void tg3_reset_task(struct work_struct *work)
+ rtnl_lock();
+ tg3_full_lock(tp, 0);
+
+- if (!netif_running(tp->dev)) {
++ if (tp->pcierr_recovery || !netif_running(tp->dev)) {
+ tg3_flag_clear(tp, RESET_TASK_PENDING);
+ tg3_full_unlock(tp);
+ rtnl_unlock();
+@@ -18240,6 +18240,9 @@ static pci_ers_result_t tg3_io_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev,
+
+ netdev_info(netdev, "PCI I/O error detected\n");
+
++ /* Want to make sure that the reset task doesn't run */
++ tg3_reset_task_cancel(tp);
++
+ rtnl_lock();
+
+ /* Could be second call or maybe we don't have netdev yet */
+@@ -18256,9 +18259,6 @@ static pci_ers_result_t tg3_io_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev,
+
+ tg3_timer_stop(tp);
+
+- /* Want to make sure that the reset task doesn't run */
+- tg3_reset_task_cancel(tp);
+-
+ netif_device_detach(netdev);
+
+ /* Clean up software state, even if MMIO is blocked */
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From c2dfaed5a7e97a50275d89aaf4ee79c650abeeeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 02:47:19 +0100
+Subject: netfilter: conntrack: fix bug in for_each_sctp_chunk
+
+From: Sriram Yagnaraman <sriram.yagnaraman@est.tech>
+
+[ Upstream commit 98ee0077452527f971567db01386de3c3d97ce13 ]
+
+skb_header_pointer() will return NULL if offset + sizeof(_sch) exceeds
+skb->len, so this offset < skb->len test is redundant.
+
+if sch->length == 0, this will end up in an infinite loop, add a check
+for sch->length > 0
+
+Fixes: 9fb9cbb1082d ("[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem.")
+Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
+Signed-off-by: Sriram Yagnaraman <sriram.yagnaraman@est.tech>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c
+index cadeb22a48f2..08ed6402ba1e 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c
+@@ -163,8 +163,8 @@ static void sctp_print_conntrack(struct seq_file *s, struct nf_conn *ct)
+
+ #define for_each_sctp_chunk(skb, sch, _sch, offset, dataoff, count) \
+ for ((offset) = (dataoff) + sizeof(struct sctphdr), (count) = 0; \
+- (offset) < (skb)->len && \
+- ((sch) = skb_header_pointer((skb), (offset), sizeof(_sch), &(_sch))); \
++ ((sch) = skb_header_pointer((skb), (offset), sizeof(_sch), &(_sch))) && \
++ (sch)->length; \
+ (offset) += (ntohs((sch)->length) + 3) & ~3, (count)++)
+
+ /* Some validity checks to make sure the chunks are fine */
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From b5acb2e75f00dd7b7320a513969d9275a1ebc1a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 02:47:18 +0100
+Subject: netfilter: conntrack: fix vtag checks for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE
+
+From: Sriram Yagnaraman <sriram.yagnaraman@est.tech>
+
+[ Upstream commit a9993591fa94246b16b444eea55d84c54608282a ]
+
+RFC 9260, Sec 8.5.1 states that for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE, the chunk
+MUST be accepted if the vtag of the packet matches its own tag and the
+T bit is not set OR if it is set to its peer's vtag and the T bit is set
+in chunk flags. Otherwise the packet MUST be silently dropped.
+
+Update vtag verification for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE based on the above
+description.
+
+Fixes: 9fb9cbb1082d ("[NETFILTER]: Add nf_conntrack subsystem.")
+Signed-off-by: Sriram Yagnaraman <sriram.yagnaraman@est.tech>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c
+index 8cb62805fd68..cadeb22a48f2 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c
+@@ -317,22 +317,29 @@ static int sctp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
+ for_each_sctp_chunk (skb, sch, _sch, offset, dataoff, count) {
+ /* Special cases of Verification tag check (Sec 8.5.1) */
+ if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_INIT) {
+- /* Sec 8.5.1 (A) */
++ /* (A) vtag MUST be zero */
+ if (sh->vtag != 0)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ } else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_ABORT) {
+- /* Sec 8.5.1 (B) */
+- if (sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir] &&
+- sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir])
++ /* (B) vtag MUST match own vtag if T flag is unset OR
++ * MUST match peer's vtag if T flag is set
++ */
++ if ((!(sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
++ sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir]) ||
++ ((sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
++ sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir]))
+ goto out_unlock;
+ } else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE) {
+- /* Sec 8.5.1 (C) */
+- if (sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir] &&
+- sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] &&
+- sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T)
++ /* (C) vtag MUST match own vtag if T flag is unset OR
++ * MUST match peer's vtag if T flag is set
++ */
++ if ((!(sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
++ sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir]) ||
++ ((sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
++ sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir]))
+ goto out_unlock;
+ } else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO) {
+- /* Sec 8.5.1 (D) */
++ /* (D) vtag must be same as init_vtag as found in INIT_ACK */
+ if (sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir])
+ goto out_unlock;
+ } else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT) {
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 3b92c6a8f1c9d42d65f1149d02812200baccab49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Sat, 14 Jan 2023 23:49:46 +0100
+Subject: netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: skip elements in transaction from garbage
+ collection
+
+From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+
+[ Upstream commit 5d235d6ce75c12a7fdee375eb211e4116f7ab01b ]
+
+Skip interference with an ongoing transaction, do not perform garbage
+collection on inactive elements. Reset annotated previous end interval
+if the expired element is marked as busy (control plane removed the
+element right before expiration).
+
+Fixes: 8d8540c4f5e0 ("netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: add timeout support")
+Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c
+index 84d317418d18..78a0f4283787 100644
+--- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c
+@@ -375,23 +375,37 @@ static void nft_rbtree_gc(struct work_struct *work)
+ struct nft_rbtree *priv;
+ struct rb_node *node;
+ struct nft_set *set;
++ struct net *net;
++ u8 genmask;
+
+ priv = container_of(work, struct nft_rbtree, gc_work.work);
+ set = nft_set_container_of(priv);
++ net = read_pnet(&set->net);
++ genmask = nft_genmask_cur(net);
+
+ write_lock_bh(&priv->lock);
+ write_seqcount_begin(&priv->count);
+ for (node = rb_first(&priv->root); node != NULL; node = rb_next(node)) {
+ rbe = rb_entry(node, struct nft_rbtree_elem, node);
+
++ if (!nft_set_elem_active(&rbe->ext, genmask))
++ continue;
++
++ /* elements are reversed in the rbtree for historical reasons,
++ * from highest to lowest value, that is why end element is
++ * always visited before the start element.
++ */
+ if (nft_rbtree_interval_end(rbe)) {
+ rbe_end = rbe;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!nft_set_elem_expired(&rbe->ext))
+ continue;
+- if (nft_set_elem_mark_busy(&rbe->ext))
++
++ if (nft_set_elem_mark_busy(&rbe->ext)) {
++ rbe_end = NULL;
+ continue;
++ }
+
+ if (rbe_prev) {
+ rb_erase(&rbe_prev->node, &priv->root);
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 8f9542f9af592094ee2cf01784a45c5526c6862d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 12:59:54 +0000
+Subject: netlink: annotate data races around dst_portid and dst_group
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 004db64d185a5f23dfb891d7701e23713b2420ee ]
+
+netlink_getname(), netlink_sendmsg() and netlink_getsockbyportid()
+can read nlk->dst_portid and nlk->dst_group while another
+thread is changing them.
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+index 52bf99ed7093..5c630506b7cd 100644
+--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
++++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+@@ -1091,8 +1091,9 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+
+ if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
+ sk->sk_state = NETLINK_UNCONNECTED;
+- nlk->dst_portid = 0;
+- nlk->dst_group = 0;
++ /* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
++ WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, 0);
++ WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, 0);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (addr->sa_family != AF_NETLINK)
+@@ -1114,8 +1115,9 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+
+ if (err == 0) {
+ sk->sk_state = NETLINK_CONNECTED;
+- nlk->dst_portid = nladdr->nl_pid;
+- nlk->dst_group = ffs(nladdr->nl_groups);
++ /* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
++ WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, nladdr->nl_pid);
++ WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, ffs(nladdr->nl_groups));
+ }
+
+ return err;
+@@ -1132,8 +1134,9 @@ static int netlink_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+ nladdr->nl_pad = 0;
+
+ if (peer) {
+- nladdr->nl_pid = nlk->dst_portid;
+- nladdr->nl_groups = netlink_group_mask(nlk->dst_group);
++ /* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_connect() */
++ nladdr->nl_pid = READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid);
++ nladdr->nl_groups = netlink_group_mask(READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_group));
+ } else {
+ /* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */
+ nladdr->nl_pid = READ_ONCE(nlk->portid);
+@@ -1163,8 +1166,9 @@ static struct sock *netlink_getsockbyportid(struct sock *ssk, u32 portid)
+
+ /* Don't bother queuing skb if kernel socket has no input function */
+ nlk = nlk_sk(sock);
++ /* dst_portid can be changed in netlink_connect() */
+ if (sock->sk_state == NETLINK_CONNECTED &&
+- nlk->dst_portid != nlk_sk(ssk)->portid) {
++ READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid) != nlk_sk(ssk)->portid) {
+ sock_put(sock);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+ }
+@@ -1876,8 +1880,9 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
+ goto out;
+ netlink_skb_flags |= NETLINK_SKB_DST;
+ } else {
+- dst_portid = nlk->dst_portid;
+- dst_group = nlk->dst_group;
++ /* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_connect() */
++ dst_portid = READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid);
++ dst_group = READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_group);
+ }
+
+ /* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From bc4941ec3091aeb32d180d1f3d711e9dc171cddf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 12:59:53 +0000
+Subject: netlink: annotate data races around nlk->portid
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit c1bb9484e3b05166880da8574504156ccbd0549e ]
+
+syzbot reminds us netlink_getname() runs locklessly [1]
+
+This first patch annotates the race against nlk->portid.
+
+Following patches take care of the remaining races.
+
+[1]
+BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_getname / netlink_insert
+
+write to 0xffff88814176d310 of 4 bytes by task 2315 on cpu 1:
+netlink_insert+0xf1/0x9a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:583
+netlink_autobind+0xae/0x180 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:856
+netlink_sendmsg+0x444/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1895
+sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
+sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
+____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2476
+___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2530 [inline]
+__sys_sendmsg+0x19a/0x230 net/socket.c:2559
+__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2568 [inline]
+__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2566 [inline]
+__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2566
+do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
+do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
+entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
+
+read to 0xffff88814176d310 of 4 bytes by task 2316 on cpu 0:
+netlink_getname+0xcd/0x1a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1144
+__sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2026
+__do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2041 [inline]
+__se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2038 [inline]
+__x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:2038
+do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
+do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
+entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
+
+value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0xc9a49780
+
+Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
+CPU: 0 PID: 2316 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00030-ge8f60cd7db24-dirty #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 7 +++++--
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+index 966c709c3831..52bf99ed7093 100644
+--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
++++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+@@ -578,7 +578,9 @@ static int netlink_insert(struct sock *sk, u32 portid)
+ if (nlk_sk(sk)->bound)
+ goto err;
+
+- nlk_sk(sk)->portid = portid;
++ /* portid can be read locklessly from netlink_getname(). */
++ WRITE_ONCE(nlk_sk(sk)->portid, portid);
++
+ sock_hold(sk);
+
+ err = __netlink_insert(table, sk);
+@@ -1133,7 +1135,8 @@ static int netlink_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+ nladdr->nl_pid = nlk->dst_portid;
+ nladdr->nl_groups = netlink_group_mask(nlk->dst_group);
+ } else {
+- nladdr->nl_pid = nlk->portid;
++ /* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */
++ nladdr->nl_pid = READ_ONCE(nlk->portid);
+ netlink_lock_table();
+ nladdr->nl_groups = nlk->groups ? nlk->groups[0] : 0;
+ netlink_unlock_table();
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 89256f8d1cfbb411f02e141b5da45b182d1615ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 12:59:55 +0000
+Subject: netlink: annotate data races around sk_state
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 9b663b5cbb15b494ef132a3c937641c90646eb73 ]
+
+netlink_getsockbyportid() reads sk_state while a concurrent
+netlink_connect() can change its value.
+
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 10 ++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+index 5c630506b7cd..6a49c0aa55bd 100644
+--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
++++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+@@ -1090,7 +1090,8 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
+- sk->sk_state = NETLINK_UNCONNECTED;
++ /* paired with READ_ONCE() in netlink_getsockbyportid() */
++ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, NETLINK_UNCONNECTED);
+ /* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
+ WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, 0);
+ WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, 0);
+@@ -1114,7 +1115,8 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
+ err = netlink_autobind(sock);
+
+ if (err == 0) {
+- sk->sk_state = NETLINK_CONNECTED;
++ /* paired with READ_ONCE() in netlink_getsockbyportid() */
++ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, NETLINK_CONNECTED);
+ /* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
+ WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, nladdr->nl_pid);
+ WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, ffs(nladdr->nl_groups));
+@@ -1166,8 +1168,8 @@ static struct sock *netlink_getsockbyportid(struct sock *ssk, u32 portid)
+
+ /* Don't bother queuing skb if kernel socket has no input function */
+ nlk = nlk_sk(sock);
+- /* dst_portid can be changed in netlink_connect() */
+- if (sock->sk_state == NETLINK_CONNECTED &&
++ /* dst_portid and sk_state can be changed in netlink_connect() */
++ if (READ_ONCE(sock->sk_state) == NETLINK_CONNECTED &&
+ READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid) != nlk_sk(ssk)->portid) {
+ sock_put(sock);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED);
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From cf480de4d9c8f5e63a97d470d48f8f25f2e7a01c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 11 Sep 2018 09:05:01 +0800
+Subject: netlink: remove hash::nelems check in netlink_insert
+
+From: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 0041195d55bc38df6b574cc8c36dcf2266fbee39 ]
+
+The type of hash::nelems has been changed from size_t to atom_t
+which in fact is int, so not need to check if BITS_PER_LONG, that
+is bit number of size_t, is bigger than 32
+
+and rht_grow_above_max() will be called to check if hashtable is
+too big, ensure it can not bigger than 1<<31
+
+Signed-off-by: Zhang Yu <zhangyu31@baidu.com>
+Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing@baidu.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Stable-dep-of: c1bb9484e3b0 ("netlink: annotate data races around nlk->portid")
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 5 -----
+ 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+index 6ffa83319d08..966c709c3831 100644
+--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
++++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+@@ -578,11 +578,6 @@ static int netlink_insert(struct sock *sk, u32 portid)
+ if (nlk_sk(sk)->bound)
+ goto err;
+
+- err = -ENOMEM;
+- if (BITS_PER_LONG > 32 &&
+- unlikely(atomic_read(&table->hash.nelems) >= UINT_MAX))
+- goto err;
+-
+ nlk_sk(sk)->portid = portid;
+ sock_hold(sk);
+
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 365dd0bbf5fe7a4013aa81778c630d86b013414d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2023 15:19:27 -0800
+Subject: netrom: Fix use-after-free of a listening socket.
+
+From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 409db27e3a2eb5e8ef7226ca33be33361b3ed1c9 ]
+
+syzbot reported a use-after-free in do_accept(), precisely nr_accept()
+as sk_prot_alloc() allocated the memory and sock_put() frees it. [0]
+
+The issue could happen if the heartbeat timer is fired and
+nr_heartbeat_expiry() calls nr_destroy_socket(), where a socket
+has SOCK_DESTROY or a listening socket has SOCK_DEAD.
+
+In this case, the first condition cannot be true. SOCK_DESTROY is
+flagged in nr_release() only when the file descriptor is close()d,
+but accept() is being called for the listening socket, so the second
+condition must be true.
+
+Usually, the AF_NETROM listener neither starts timers nor sets
+SOCK_DEAD. However, the condition is met if connect() fails before
+listen(). connect() starts the t1 timer and heartbeat timer, and
+t1timer calls nr_disconnect() when timeout happens. Then, SOCK_DEAD
+is set, and if we call listen(), the heartbeat timer calls
+nr_destroy_socket().
+
+ nr_connect
+ nr_establish_data_link(sk)
+ nr_start_t1timer(sk)
+ nr_start_heartbeat(sk)
+ nr_t1timer_expiry
+ nr_disconnect(sk, ETIMEDOUT)
+ nr_sk(sk)->state = NR_STATE_0
+ sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE
+ sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)
+nr_listen
+ if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
+ sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN
+ nr_heartbeat_expiry
+ switch (nr->state)
+ case NR_STATE_0
+ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN &&
+ sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
+ nr_destroy_socket(sk)
+
+This path seems expected, and nr_destroy_socket() is called to clean
+up resources. Initially, there was sock_hold() before nr_destroy_socket()
+so that the socket would not be freed, but the commit 517a16b1a88b
+("netrom: Decrease sock refcount when sock timers expire") accidentally
+removed it.
+
+To fix use-after-free, let's add sock_hold().
+
+[0]:
+BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_accept+0x483/0x510 net/socket.c:1848
+Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807978d398 by task syz-executor.3/5315
+
+CPU: 0 PID: 5315 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00165-gd9fc1511728c #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
+Call Trace:
+ <TASK>
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
+ dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
+ print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline]
+ print_report+0x15e/0x461 mm/kasan/report.c:417
+ kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:517
+ do_accept+0x483/0x510 net/socket.c:1848
+ __sys_accept4_file net/socket.c:1897 [inline]
+ __sys_accept4+0x9a/0x120 net/socket.c:1927
+ __do_sys_accept net/socket.c:1944 [inline]
+ __se_sys_accept net/socket.c:1941 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_accept+0x75/0xb0 net/socket.c:1941
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
+RIP: 0033:0x7fa436a8c0c9
+Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
+RSP: 002b:00007fa437784168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002b
+RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa436bac050 RCX: 00007fa436a8c0c9
+RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005
+RBP: 00007fa436ae7ae9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
+R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
+R13: 00007ffebc6700df R14: 00007fa437784300 R15: 0000000000022000
+ </TASK>
+
+Allocated by task 5294:
+ kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
+ kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
+ ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:371 [inline]
+ ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:330 [inline]
+ __kasan_kmalloc+0xa3/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380
+ kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
+ __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline]
+ __kmalloc+0x5a/0xd0 mm/slab_common.c:981
+ kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline]
+ sk_prot_alloc+0x140/0x290 net/core/sock.c:2038
+ sk_alloc+0x3a/0x7a0 net/core/sock.c:2091
+ nr_create+0xb6/0x5f0 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:433
+ __sock_create+0x359/0x790 net/socket.c:1515
+ sock_create net/socket.c:1566 [inline]
+ __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1603 [inline]
+ __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1588 [inline]
+ __sys_socket+0x133/0x250 net/socket.c:1636
+ __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1649 [inline]
+ __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1647 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1647
+ do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
+ do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
+
+Freed by task 14:
+ kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
+ kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
+ kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:518
+ ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
+ ____kasan_slab_free+0x13b/0x1a0 mm/kasan/common.c:200
+ kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
+ __cache_free mm/slab.c:3394 [inline]
+ __do_kmem_cache_free mm/slab.c:3580 [inline]
+ __kmem_cache_free+0xcd/0x3b0 mm/slab.c:3587
+ sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2074 [inline]
+ __sk_destruct+0x5df/0x750 net/core/sock.c:2166
+ sk_destruct net/core/sock.c:2181 [inline]
+ __sk_free+0x175/0x460 net/core/sock.c:2192
+ sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2203
+ sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline]
+ nr_heartbeat_expiry+0x1d7/0x460 net/netrom/nr_timer.c:148
+ call_timer_fn+0x1da/0x7c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1700
+ expire_timers+0x2c6/0x5c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1751
+ __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2022 [inline]
+ __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1995 [inline]
+ run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910 kernel/time/timer.c:2035
+ __do_softirq+0x1fb/0xadc kernel/softirq.c:571
+
+Fixes: 517a16b1a88b ("netrom: Decrease sock refcount when sock timers expire")
+Reported-by: syzbot+5fafd5cfe1fc91f6b352@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230120231927.51711-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/netrom/nr_timer.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/netrom/nr_timer.c b/net/netrom/nr_timer.c
+index 426d49609524..2bf99bd5be58 100644
+--- a/net/netrom/nr_timer.c
++++ b/net/netrom/nr_timer.c
+@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static void nr_heartbeat_expiry(struct timer_list *t)
+ is accepted() it isn't 'dead' so doesn't get removed. */
+ if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DESTROY) ||
+ (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN && sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))) {
++ sock_hold(sk);
+ bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+ nr_destroy_socket(sk);
+ goto out;
+--
+2.39.0
+
--- /dev/null
+From 3bc6e2c45ccb6f3bdbb770dd88f0ddfc673467a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2023 14:59:33 -0300
+Subject: sctp: fail if no bound addresses can be used for a given scope
+
+From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 458e279f861d3f61796894cd158b780765a1569f ]
+
+Currently, if you bind the socket to something like:
+ servaddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ servaddr.sin6_port = htons(0);
+ servaddr.sin6_scope_id = 0;
+ inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &servaddr.sin6_addr);
+
+And then request a connect to:
+ connaddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ connaddr.sin6_port = htons(20000);
+ connaddr.sin6_scope_id = if_nametoindex("lo");
+ inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe88::1", &connaddr.sin6_addr);
+
+What the stack does is:
+ - bind the socket
+ - create a new asoc
+ - to handle the connect
+ - copy the addresses that can be used for the given scope
+ - try to connect
+
+But the copy returns 0 addresses, and the effect is that it ends up
+trying to connect as if the socket wasn't bound, which is not the
+desired behavior. This unexpected behavior also allows KASLR leaks
+through SCTP diag interface.
+
+The fix here then is, if when trying to copy the addresses that can
+be used for the scope used in connect() it returns 0 addresses, bail
+out. This is what TCP does with a similar reproducer.
+
+Reported-by: Pietro Borrello <borrello@diag.uniroma1.it>
+Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
+Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9fcd182f1099f86c6661f3717f63712ddd1c676c.1674496737.git.marcelo.leitner@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/sctp/bind_addr.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/sctp/bind_addr.c b/net/sctp/bind_addr.c
+index f8a283245672..d723942e5e65 100644
+--- a/net/sctp/bind_addr.c
++++ b/net/sctp/bind_addr.c
+@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@ int sctp_bind_addr_copy(struct net *net, struct sctp_bind_addr *dest,
+ }
+ }
+
++ /* If somehow no addresses were found that can be used with this
++ * scope, it's an error.
++ */
++ if (list_empty(&dest->address_list))
++ error = -ENETUNREACH;
++
+ out:
+ if (error)
+ sctp_bind_addr_clean(dest);
+--
+2.39.0
+
cifs-fix-oops-due-to-uncleared-server-smbd_conn-in-r.patch
arm-9280-1-mm-fix-warning-on-phys_addr_t-to-void-pointer-assignment.patch
edac-device-respect-any-driver-supplied-workqueue-polling-value.patch
+net-fix-uaf-in-netns-ops-registration-error-path.patch
+netfilter-nft_set_rbtree-skip-elements-in-transactio.patch
+netlink-remove-hash-nelems-check-in-netlink_insert.patch
+netlink-annotate-data-races-around-nlk-portid.patch
+netlink-annotate-data-races-around-dst_portid-and-ds.patch
+netlink-annotate-data-races-around-sk_state.patch
+ipv4-prevent-potential-spectre-v1-gadget-in-ip_metri.patch
+netfilter-conntrack-fix-vtag-checks-for-abort-shutdo.patch
+netfilter-conntrack-fix-bug-in-for_each_sctp_chunk.patch
+netrom-fix-use-after-free-of-a-listening-socket.patch
+sctp-fail-if-no-bound-addresses-can-be-used-for-a-gi.patch
+net-ravb-fix-possible-hang-if-ris2_qff1-happen.patch
+net-tg3-resolve-deadlock-in-tg3_reset_task-during-ee.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
