--- /dev/null
+From 03531606ef4cda25b629f500d1ffb6173b805c05 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Francois Gervais <fgervais@distech-controls.com>
+Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2021 16:10:26 -0500
+Subject: rtc: pcf85063: fallback to parent of_node
+
+From: Francois Gervais <fgervais@distech-controls.com>
+
+commit 03531606ef4cda25b629f500d1ffb6173b805c05 upstream.
+
+The rtc device node is always NULL.
+
+Since v5.12-rc1-dontuse/3c9ea42802a1fbf7ef29660ff8c6e526c58114f6 this
+will lead to a NULL pointer dereference.
+
+To fix this use the parent node which is the i2c client node as set by
+devm_rtc_allocate_device().
+
+Using the i2c client node seems to be what other similar drivers do
+e.g. rtc-pcf8563.c.
+
+Signed-off-by: Francois Gervais <fgervais@distech-controls.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210310211026.27299-1-fgervais@distech-controls.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf85063.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf85063.c
++++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-pcf85063.c
+@@ -486,6 +486,7 @@ static struct clk *pcf85063_clkout_regis
+ {
+ struct clk *clk;
+ struct clk_init_data init;
++ struct device_node *node = pcf85063->rtc->dev.parent->of_node;
+
+ init.name = "pcf85063-clkout";
+ init.ops = &pcf85063_clkout_ops;
+@@ -495,15 +496,13 @@ static struct clk *pcf85063_clkout_regis
+ pcf85063->clkout_hw.init = &init;
+
+ /* optional override of the clockname */
+- of_property_read_string(pcf85063->rtc->dev.of_node,
+- "clock-output-names", &init.name);
++ of_property_read_string(node, "clock-output-names", &init.name);
+
+ /* register the clock */
+ clk = devm_clk_register(&pcf85063->rtc->dev, &pcf85063->clkout_hw);
+
+ if (!IS_ERR(clk))
+- of_clk_add_provider(pcf85063->rtc->dev.of_node,
+- of_clk_src_simple_get, clk);
++ of_clk_add_provider(node, of_clk_src_simple_get, clk);
+
+ return clk;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From fef81c86262879d4b1176ef51a834c15b805ebb9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2021 13:38:23 +0100
+Subject: x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in the 32-bit boot-path
+
+From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+
+commit fef81c86262879d4b1176ef51a834c15b805ebb9 upstream.
+
+Check whether the hypervisor reported the correct C-bit when running
+as an SEV guest. Using a wrong C-bit position could be used to leak
+sensitive data from the guest to the hypervisor.
+
+Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210312123824.306-8-joro@8bytes.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
++++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
+@@ -172,11 +172,21 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32)
+ */
+ call get_sev_encryption_bit
+ xorl %edx, %edx
++#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ testl %eax, %eax
+ jz 1f
+ subl $32, %eax /* Encryption bit is always above bit 31 */
+ bts %eax, %edx /* Set encryption mask for page tables */
++ /*
++ * Mark SEV as active in sev_status so that startup32_check_sev_cbit()
++ * will do a check. The sev_status memory will be fully initialized
++ * with the contents of MSR_AMD_SEV_STATUS later in
++ * set_sev_encryption_mask(). For now it is sufficient to know that SEV
++ * is active.
++ */
++ movl $1, rva(sev_status)(%ebp)
+ 1:
++#endif
+
+ /* Initialize Page tables to 0 */
+ leal rva(pgtable)(%ebx), %edi
+@@ -261,6 +271,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32)
+ movl %esi, %edx
+ 1:
+ #endif
++ /* Check if the C-bit position is correct when SEV is active */
++ call startup32_check_sev_cbit
++
+ pushl $__KERNEL_CS
+ pushl %eax
+
+@@ -787,6 +800,78 @@ SYM_DATA_END(loaded_image_proto)
+ #endif
+
+ /*
++ * Check for the correct C-bit position when the startup_32 boot-path is used.
++ *
++ * The check makes use of the fact that all memory is encrypted when paging is
++ * disabled. The function creates 64 bits of random data using the RDRAND
++ * instruction. RDRAND is mandatory for SEV guests, so always available. If the
++ * hypervisor violates that the kernel will crash right here.
++ *
++ * The 64 bits of random data are stored to a memory location and at the same
++ * time kept in the %eax and %ebx registers. Since encryption is always active
++ * when paging is off the random data will be stored encrypted in main memory.
++ *
++ * Then paging is enabled. When the C-bit position is correct all memory is
++ * still mapped encrypted and comparing the register values with memory will
++ * succeed. An incorrect C-bit position will map all memory unencrypted, so that
++ * the compare will use the encrypted random data and fail.
++ */
++ __HEAD
++ .code32
++SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
++#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
++ pushl %eax
++ pushl %ebx
++ pushl %ecx
++ pushl %edx
++
++ /* Check for non-zero sev_status */
++ movl rva(sev_status)(%ebp), %eax
++ testl %eax, %eax
++ jz 4f
++
++ /*
++ * Get two 32-bit random values - Don't bail out if RDRAND fails
++ * because it is better to prevent forward progress if no random value
++ * can be gathered.
++ */
++1: rdrand %eax
++ jnc 1b
++2: rdrand %ebx
++ jnc 2b
++
++ /* Store to memory and keep it in the registers */
++ movl %eax, rva(sev_check_data)(%ebp)
++ movl %ebx, rva(sev_check_data+4)(%ebp)
++
++ /* Enable paging to see if encryption is active */
++ movl %cr0, %edx /* Backup %cr0 in %edx */
++ movl $(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %ecx /* Enable Paging and Protected mode */
++ movl %ecx, %cr0
++
++ cmpl %eax, rva(sev_check_data)(%ebp)
++ jne 3f
++ cmpl %ebx, rva(sev_check_data+4)(%ebp)
++ jne 3f
++
++ movl %edx, %cr0 /* Restore previous %cr0 */
++
++ jmp 4f
++
++3: /* Check failed - hlt the machine */
++ hlt
++ jmp 3b
++
++4:
++ popl %edx
++ popl %ecx
++ popl %ebx
++ popl %eax
++#endif
++ ret
++SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_check_sev_cbit)
++
++/*
+ * Stack and heap for uncompression
+ */
+ .bss
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
