--- /dev/null
+From 5e34af4142ffe68f01c8a9acae83300f8911e20c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
+Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:25:38 -0800
+Subject: net: ipv6: fix skb_over_panic in __ip6_append_data
+
+From: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
+
+commit 5e34af4142ffe68f01c8a9acae83300f8911e20c upstream.
+
+Syzbot found a kernel bug in the ipv6 stack:
+LINK: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=205d6f11d72329ab8d62a610c44c5e7e25415580
+The reproducer triggers it by sending a crafted message via sendmmsg()
+call, which triggers skb_over_panic, and crashes the kernel:
+
+skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff84647fb4 len:65575 put:65575
+head:ffff888109ff0000 data:ffff888109ff0088 tail:0x100af end:0xfec0
+dev:<NULL>
+
+Update the check that prevents an invalid packet with MTU equal
+to the fregment header size to eat up all the space for payload.
+
+The reproducer can be found here:
+LINK: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=1648c83fb00000
+
+Reported-by: syzbot+e223cf47ec8ae183f2a0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org>
+Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220310232538.1044947-1-tadeusz.struk@linaro.org
+Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
++++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_output.c
+@@ -1476,8 +1476,8 @@ static int __ip6_append_data(struct sock
+ sizeof(struct frag_hdr) : 0) +
+ rt->rt6i_nfheader_len;
+
+- if (mtu < fragheaderlen ||
+- ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen < sizeof(struct frag_hdr))
++ if (mtu <= fragheaderlen ||
++ ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen <= sizeof(struct frag_hdr))
+ goto emsgsize;
+
+ maxfraglen = ((mtu - fragheaderlen) & ~7) + fragheaderlen -
--- /dev/null
+From 4fbcc1a4cb20fe26ad0225679c536c80f1648221 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
+Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2022 17:44:51 +0100
+Subject: nfc: st21nfca: Fix potential buffer overflows in EVT_TRANSACTION
+
+From: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
+
+commit 4fbcc1a4cb20fe26ad0225679c536c80f1648221 upstream.
+
+It appears that there are some buffer overflows in EVT_TRANSACTION.
+This happens because the length parameters that are passed to memcpy
+come directly from skb->data and are not guarded in any way.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jordy Zomer <jordy@pwning.systems>
+Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@canonical.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <denis.e.efremov@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c | 10 ++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c
++++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/se.c
+@@ -320,6 +320,11 @@ int st21nfca_connectivity_event_received
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ transaction->aid_len = skb->data[1];
++
++ /* Checking if the length of the AID is valid */
++ if (transaction->aid_len > sizeof(transaction->aid))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ memcpy(transaction->aid, &skb->data[2],
+ transaction->aid_len);
+
+@@ -329,6 +334,11 @@ int st21nfca_connectivity_event_received
+ return -EPROTO;
+
+ transaction->params_len = skb->data[transaction->aid_len + 3];
++
++ /* Total size is allocated (skb->len - 2) minus fixed array members */
++ if (transaction->params_len > ((skb->len - 2) - sizeof(struct nfc_evt_transaction)))
++ return -EINVAL;
++
+ memcpy(transaction->params, skb->data +
+ transaction->aid_len + 4, transaction->params_len);
+