--- /dev/null
+From 2b02c20ce0c28974b44e69a2e2f5ddc6a470ad6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Enrico Mioso <mrkiko.rs@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2017 17:21:52 +0200
+Subject: cdc_ncm: Set NTB format again after altsetting switch for Huawei devices
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Enrico Mioso <mrkiko.rs@gmail.com>
+
+commit 2b02c20ce0c28974b44e69a2e2f5ddc6a470ad6f upstream.
+
+Some firmwares in Huawei E3372H devices have been observed to switch back
+to NTB 32-bit format after altsetting switch.
+This patch implements a driver flag to check for the device settings and
+set NTB format to 16-bit again if needed.
+The flag has been activated for devices controlled by the huawei_cdc_ncm.c
+driver.
+
+V1->V2:
+- fixed broken error checks
+- some corrections to the commit message
+V2->V3:
+- variable name changes, to clarify what's happening
+- check (and possibly set) the NTB format later in the common bind code path
+
+Signed-off-by: Enrico Mioso <mrkiko.rs@gmail.com>
+Reported-and-tested-by: Christian Panton <christian@panton.org>
+Reviewed-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
+CC: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
+CC: Christian Panton <christian@panton.org>
+CC: linux-usb@vger.kernel.org
+CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
+CC: Oliver Neukum <oliver@neukum.org>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Cc: Porto Rio <porto.rio@gmx.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ drivers/net/usb/huawei_cdc_ncm.c | 6 ++++++
+ include/linux/usb/cdc_ncm.h | 1 +
+ 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c
++++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc_ncm.c
+@@ -769,8 +769,10 @@ int cdc_ncm_bind_common(struct usbnet *d
+ u8 *buf;
+ int len;
+ int temp;
++ int err;
+ u8 iface_no;
+ struct usb_cdc_parsed_header hdr;
++ u16 curr_ntb_format;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+@@ -875,6 +877,32 @@ int cdc_ncm_bind_common(struct usbnet *d
+ goto error2;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * Some Huawei devices have been observed to come out of reset in NDP32 mode.
++ * Let's check if this is the case, and set the device to NDP16 mode again if
++ * needed.
++ */
++ if (ctx->drvflags & CDC_NCM_FLAG_RESET_NTB16) {
++ err = usbnet_read_cmd(dev, USB_CDC_GET_NTB_FORMAT,
++ USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
++ 0, iface_no, &curr_ntb_format, 2);
++ if (err < 0) {
++ goto error2;
++ }
++
++ if (curr_ntb_format == USB_CDC_NCM_NTB32_FORMAT) {
++ dev_info(&intf->dev, "resetting NTB format to 16-bit");
++ err = usbnet_write_cmd(dev, USB_CDC_SET_NTB_FORMAT,
++ USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_OUT
++ | USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
++ USB_CDC_NCM_NTB16_FORMAT,
++ iface_no, NULL, 0);
++
++ if (err < 0)
++ goto error2;
++ }
++ }
++
+ cdc_ncm_find_endpoints(dev, ctx->data);
+ cdc_ncm_find_endpoints(dev, ctx->control);
+ if (!dev->in || !dev->out || !dev->status) {
+--- a/drivers/net/usb/huawei_cdc_ncm.c
++++ b/drivers/net/usb/huawei_cdc_ncm.c
+@@ -80,6 +80,12 @@ static int huawei_cdc_ncm_bind(struct us
+ * be at the end of the frame.
+ */
+ drvflags |= CDC_NCM_FLAG_NDP_TO_END;
++
++ /* Additionally, it has been reported that some Huawei E3372H devices, with
++ * firmware version 21.318.01.00.541, come out of reset in NTB32 format mode, hence
++ * needing to be set to the NTB16 one again.
++ */
++ drvflags |= CDC_NCM_FLAG_RESET_NTB16;
+ ret = cdc_ncm_bind_common(usbnet_dev, intf, 1, drvflags);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+--- a/include/linux/usb/cdc_ncm.h
++++ b/include/linux/usb/cdc_ncm.h
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
+ /* Driver flags */
+ #define CDC_NCM_FLAG_NDP_TO_END 0x02 /* NDP is placed at end of frame */
+ #define CDC_MBIM_FLAG_AVOID_ALTSETTING_TOGGLE 0x04 /* Avoid altsetting toggle during init */
++#define CDC_NCM_FLAG_RESET_NTB16 0x08 /* set NDP16 one more time after altsetting switch */
+
+ #define cdc_ncm_comm_intf_is_mbim(x) ((x)->desc.bInterfaceSubClass == USB_CDC_SUBCLASS_MBIM && \
+ (x)->desc.bInterfaceProtocol == USB_CDC_PROTO_NONE)
--- /dev/null
+From a3c812f7cfd80cf51e8f5b7034f7418f6beb56c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 2 Nov 2017 00:47:12 +0000
+Subject: KEYS: trusted: fix writing past end of buffer in trusted_read()
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit a3c812f7cfd80cf51e8f5b7034f7418f6beb56c1 upstream.
+
+When calling keyctl_read() on a key of type "trusted", if the
+user-supplied buffer was too small, the kernel ignored the buffer length
+and just wrote past the end of the buffer, potentially corrupting
+userspace memory. Fix it by instead returning the size required, as per
+the documentation for keyctl_read().
+
+We also don't even fill the buffer at all in this case, as this is
+slightly easier to implement than doing a short read, and either
+behavior appears to be permitted. It also makes it match the behavior
+of the "encrypted" key type.
+
+Fixes: d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")
+Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/keys/trusted.c | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
++++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
+@@ -1147,20 +1147,21 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct ke
+ p = rcu_dereference_key(key);
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+- if (!buffer || buflen <= 0)
+- return 2 * p->blob_len;
+- ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+- if (!ascii_buf)
+- return -ENOMEM;
+
+- bufp = ascii_buf;
+- for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+- bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+- if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
++ if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) {
++ ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL);
++ if (!ascii_buf)
++ return -ENOMEM;
++
++ bufp = ascii_buf;
++ for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
++ bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
++ if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) {
++ kzfree(ascii_buf);
++ return -EFAULT;
++ }
+ kzfree(ascii_buf);
+- return -EFAULT;
+ }
+- kzfree(ascii_buf);
+ return 2 * p->blob_len;
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From ee618b4619b72527aaed765f0f0b74072b281159 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 14:49:18 +0100
+Subject: KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit ee618b4619b72527aaed765f0f0b74072b281159 upstream.
+
+As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any
+potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it
+is freed. Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which
+the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing
+the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths.
+
+Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/keys/trusted.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
+ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
++++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
+- kfree(sdesc);
++ kzfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *di
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
+ out:
+- kfree(sdesc);
++ kzfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *d
+ paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
+ TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
+ out:
+- kfree(sdesc);
++ kzfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char
+ if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ out:
+- kfree(sdesc);
++ kzfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char
+ if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ out:
+- kfree(sdesc);
++ kzfree(sdesc);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
+ *bloblen = storedsize;
+ }
+ out:
+- kfree(td);
++ kzfree(td);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_p
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+
+- kfree(tb);
++ kzfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key
+ /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
+ p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
+
+- kfree(tb);
++ kzfree(tb);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -1037,12 +1037,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct ke
+ if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
+ ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+ out:
+- kfree(datablob);
+- kfree(options);
++ kzfree(datablob);
++ kzfree(options);
+ if (!ret)
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
+ else
+- kfree(payload);
++ kzfree(payload);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -1051,8 +1051,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+
+ p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
+- memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+- kfree(p);
++ kzfree(p);
+ }
+
+ /*
+@@ -1094,13 +1093,13 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke
+ ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
+ if (ret != Opt_update) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+- kfree(new_p);
++ kzfree(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!new_o->keyhandle) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+- kfree(new_p);
++ kzfree(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+@@ -1114,22 +1113,22 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke
+ ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+- kfree(new_p);
++ kzfree(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (new_o->pcrlock) {
+ ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
+- kfree(new_p);
++ kzfree(new_p);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
+ call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
+ out:
+- kfree(datablob);
+- kfree(new_o);
++ kzfree(datablob);
++ kzfree(new_o);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+@@ -1158,24 +1157,19 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct ke
+ for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++)
+ bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]);
+ if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) {
+- kfree(ascii_buf);
++ kzfree(ascii_buf);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+- kfree(ascii_buf);
++ kzfree(ascii_buf);
+ return 2 * p->blob_len;
+ }
+
+ /*
+- * trusted_destroy - before freeing the key, clear the decrypted data
++ * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload
+ */
+ static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
+ {
+- struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0];
+-
+- if (!p)
+- return;
+- memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+- kfree(key->payload.data[0]);
++ kzfree(key->payload.data[0]);
+ }
+
+ struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
--- /dev/null
+From 298747b7579f5bbbced793d997b333fd10a24921 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Carlo Caione <carlo@endlessm.com>
+Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2017 15:56:08 +0200
+Subject: platform/x86: hp-wmi: Fix detection for dock and tablet mode
+
+From: Carlo Caione <carlo@endlessm.com>
+
+commit 298747b7579f5bbbced793d997b333fd10a24921 upstream.
+
+The current driver code is not checking for the error values returned by
+'hp_wmi_dock_state()' and 'hp_wmi_tablet_state()' before passing the
+returned values down to 'input_report_switch()'. This error code is
+being translated to '1' in the input subsystem, reporting the wrong
+status.
+
+The biggest problem caused by this issue is that several laptops are
+wrongly reported by the driver as docked, preventing them to be put to
+sleep using the LID (and in most cases they are not even dockable).
+
+With this patch we create the report switches only if we are able to
+read the dock and tablet mode status correctly from ACPI.
+
+Signed-off-by: Carlo Caione <carlo@endlessm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Darren Hart (VMware) <dvhart@infradead.org>
+Cc: Philip Müller <philm@manjaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c
++++ b/drivers/platform/x86/hp-wmi.c
+@@ -572,10 +572,12 @@ static void hp_wmi_notify(u32 value, voi
+
+ switch (event_id) {
+ case HPWMI_DOCK_EVENT:
+- input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK,
+- hp_wmi_dock_state());
+- input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE,
+- hp_wmi_tablet_state());
++ if (test_bit(SW_DOCK, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit))
++ input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK,
++ hp_wmi_dock_state());
++ if (test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit))
++ input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE,
++ hp_wmi_tablet_state());
+ input_sync(hp_wmi_input_dev);
+ break;
+ case HPWMI_PARK_HDD:
+@@ -644,6 +646,7 @@ static int __init hp_wmi_input_setup(voi
+ {
+ acpi_status status;
+ int err;
++ int val;
+
+ hp_wmi_input_dev = input_allocate_device();
+ if (!hp_wmi_input_dev)
+@@ -654,17 +657,26 @@ static int __init hp_wmi_input_setup(voi
+ hp_wmi_input_dev->id.bustype = BUS_HOST;
+
+ __set_bit(EV_SW, hp_wmi_input_dev->evbit);
+- __set_bit(SW_DOCK, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit);
+- __set_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit);
++
++ /* Dock */
++ val = hp_wmi_dock_state();
++ if (!(val < 0)) {
++ __set_bit(SW_DOCK, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit);
++ input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK, val);
++ }
++
++ /* Tablet mode */
++ val = hp_wmi_tablet_state();
++ if (!(val < 0)) {
++ __set_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit);
++ input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE, val);
++ }
+
+ err = sparse_keymap_setup(hp_wmi_input_dev, hp_wmi_keymap, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_free_dev;
+
+ /* Set initial hardware state */
+- input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK, hp_wmi_dock_state());
+- input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE,
+- hp_wmi_tablet_state());
+ input_sync(hp_wmi_input_dev);
+
+ if (!hp_wmi_bios_2009_later() && hp_wmi_bios_2008_later())
+@@ -950,10 +962,12 @@ static int hp_wmi_resume_handler(struct
+ * changed.
+ */
+ if (hp_wmi_input_dev) {
+- input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK,
+- hp_wmi_dock_state());
+- input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE,
+- hp_wmi_tablet_state());
++ if (test_bit(SW_DOCK, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit))
++ input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_DOCK,
++ hp_wmi_dock_state());
++ if (test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, hp_wmi_input_dev->swbit))
++ input_report_switch(hp_wmi_input_dev, SW_TABLET_MODE,
++ hp_wmi_tablet_state());
+ input_sync(hp_wmi_input_dev);
+ }
+
ib-rxe-fix-reference-leaks-in-memory-key-invalidation-code.patch
clk-mvebu-adjust-ap806-cpu-clock-frequencies-to-production-chip.patch
net-dsa-select-net_switchdev.patch
+platform-x86-hp-wmi-fix-detection-for-dock-and-tablet-mode.patch
+cdc_ncm-set-ntb-format-again-after-altsetting-switch-for-huawei-devices.patch
+keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch
+keys-trusted-fix-writing-past-end-of-buffer-in-trusted_read.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
