*/
vmcb_mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!VALID_PAGE(svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa))
+ return;
- /*
- * Invoked as part of svm_vcpu_reset() processing of an init event.
- */
- void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
- {
- struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
- int ret;
+ gfn = gpa_to_gfn(svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa);
+ svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
- if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm))
+ slot = gfn_to_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
+ if (!slot)
return;
- mutex_lock(&svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
+ /*
+ * The new VMSA will be private memory guest memory, so retrieve the
+ * PFN from the gmem backend.
+ */
+ if (kvm_gmem_get_pfn(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL))
+ return;
- if (!svm->sev_es.snp_ap_waiting_for_reset)
- goto unlock;
+ /*
+ * From this point forward, the VMSA will always be a guest-mapped page
+ * rather than the initial one allocated by KVM in svm->sev_es.vmsa. In
+ * theory, svm->sev_es.vmsa could be free'd and cleaned up here, but
+ * that involves cleanups like wbinvd_on_all_cpus() which would ideally
+ * be handled during teardown rather than guest boot. Deferring that
+ * also allows the existing logic for SEV-ES VMSAs to be re-used with
+ * minimal SNP-specific changes.
+ */
+ svm->sev_es.snp_has_guest_vmsa = true;
- svm->sev_es.snp_ap_waiting_for_reset = false;
+ /* Use the new VMSA */
+ svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = pfn_to_hpa(pfn);
- ret = __sev_snp_update_protected_guest_state(vcpu);
- if (ret)
- vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "snp: AP state update on init failed\n");
+ /* Mark the vCPU as runnable */
- vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = false;
- vcpu->arch.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
++ kvm_set_mp_state(vcpu, KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE);
- unlock:
- mutex_unlock(&svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
+ /*
+ * gmem pages aren't currently migratable, but if this ever changes
+ * then care should be taken to ensure svm->sev_es.vmsa is pinned
+ * through some other means.
+ */
+ kvm_release_page_clean(page);
}
static int sev_snp_ap_creation(struct vcpu_svm *svm)