--- /dev/null
+From c1d11fc2c8320871b40730991071dd0a0b405bc8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Date: Mon, 8 Apr 2024 09:46:01 +0200
+Subject: irqflags: Explicitly ignore lockdep_hrtimer_exit() argument
+
+From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+
+commit c1d11fc2c8320871b40730991071dd0a0b405bc8 upstream.
+
+When building with 'make W=1' but CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS=n, the
+unused argument to lockdep_hrtimer_exit() causes a warning:
+
+kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1655:14: error: variable 'expires_in_hardirq' set but not used [-Werror=unused-but-set-variable]
+
+This is intentional behavior, so add a cast to void to shut up the warning.
+
+Fixes: 73d20564e0dc ("hrtimer: Don't dereference the hrtimer pointer after the callback")
+Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240408074609.3170807-1-arnd@kernel.org
+Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311191229.55QXHVc6-lkp@intel.com/
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ include/linux/irqflags.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/irqflags.h
++++ b/include/linux/irqflags.h
+@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ do { \
+ # define lockdep_softirq_enter() do { } while (0)
+ # define lockdep_softirq_exit() do { } while (0)
+ # define lockdep_hrtimer_enter(__hrtimer) false
+-# define lockdep_hrtimer_exit(__context) do { } while (0)
++# define lockdep_hrtimer_exit(__context) do { (void)(__context); } while (0)
+ # define lockdep_posixtimer_enter() do { } while (0)
+ # define lockdep_posixtimer_exit() do { } while (0)
+ # define lockdep_irq_work_enter(__work) do { } while (0)
--- /dev/null
+From dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 22:40:45 -0700
+Subject: x86/bugs: Fix BHI documentation
+
+From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
+
+commit dfe648903f42296866d79f10d03f8c85c9dfba30 upstream.
+
+Fix up some inaccuracies in the BHI documentation.
+
+Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
+Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
+Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/8c84f7451bfe0dd08543c6082a383f390d4aa7e2.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 15 ++++++++-------
+ Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +++++++-----
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+@@ -439,11 +439,11 @@ The possible values in this file are:
+ - System is protected by retpoline
+ * - BHI: BHI_DIS_S
+ - System is protected by BHI_DIS_S
+- * - BHI: SW loop; KVM SW loop
++ * - BHI: SW loop, KVM SW loop
+ - System is protected by software clearing sequence
+ * - BHI: Syscall hardening
+ - Syscalls are hardened against BHI
+- * - BHI: Syscall hardening; KVM: SW loop
++ * - BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop
+ - System is protected from userspace attacks by syscall hardening; KVM is protected by software clearing sequence
+
+ Full mitigation might require a microcode update from the CPU
+@@ -666,13 +666,14 @@ kernel command line.
+ of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB clearing sequence.
+
+ on
+- unconditionally enable.
++ (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation as
++ needed.
+ off
+- unconditionally disable.
++ Disable the mitigation.
+ auto
+- enable if hardware mitigation
+- control(BHI_DIS_S) is available, otherwise
+- enable alternate mitigation in KVM.
++ Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
++ *don't* enable the SW mitigation except for KVM.
++ The system may be vulnerable.
+
+ For spectre_v2_user see Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+
+--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
++++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+@@ -3343,6 +3343,7 @@
+ reg_file_data_sampling=off [X86]
+ retbleed=off [X86]
+ spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
++ spectre_bhi=off [X86]
+ spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+ srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
+ ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
+@@ -5926,11 +5927,12 @@
+ deployment of the HW BHI control and the SW BHB
+ clearing sequence.
+
+- on - unconditionally enable.
+- off - unconditionally disable.
+- auto - (default) enable hardware mitigation
+- (BHI_DIS_S) if available, otherwise enable
+- alternate mitigation in KVM.
++ on - (default) Enable the HW or SW mitigation
++ as needed.
++ off - Disable the mitigation.
++ auto - Enable the HW mitigation if needed, but
++ *don't* enable the SW mitigation except
++ for KVM. The system may be vulnerable.
+
+ spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.