--- /dev/null
+From 2ba33a4e9e22ac4dda928d3e9b5978a3a2ded4e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2020 17:59:40 +0300
+Subject: ACPI: watchdog: Fix gas->access_width usage
+
+From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
+
+commit 2ba33a4e9e22ac4dda928d3e9b5978a3a2ded4e0 upstream.
+
+ACPI Generic Address Structure (GAS) access_width field is not in bytes
+as the driver seems to expect in few places so fix this by using the
+newly introduced macro ACPI_ACCESS_BYTE_WIDTH().
+
+Fixes: b1abf6fc4982 ("ACPI / watchdog: Fix off-by-one error at resource assignment")
+Fixes: 058dfc767008 ("ACPI / watchdog: Add support for WDAT hardware watchdog")
+Reported-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Cc: 4.16+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.16+
+Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/acpi/acpi_watchdog.c | 3 +--
+ drivers/watchdog/wdat_wdt.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/acpi/acpi_watchdog.c
++++ b/drivers/acpi/acpi_watchdog.c
+@@ -129,12 +129,11 @@ void __init acpi_watchdog_init(void)
+ gas = &entries[i].register_region;
+
+ res.start = gas->address;
++ res.end = res.start + ACPI_ACCESS_BYTE_WIDTH(gas->access_width) - 1;
+ if (gas->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY) {
+ res.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM;
+- res.end = res.start + ALIGN(gas->access_width, 4) - 1;
+ } else if (gas->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_IO) {
+ res.flags = IORESOURCE_IO;
+- res.end = res.start + gas->access_width - 1;
+ } else {
+ pr_warn("Unsupported address space: %u\n",
+ gas->space_id);
+--- a/drivers/watchdog/wdat_wdt.c
++++ b/drivers/watchdog/wdat_wdt.c
+@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static int wdat_wdt_probe(struct platfor
+
+ memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
+ r.start = gas->address;
+- r.end = r.start + gas->access_width - 1;
++ r.end = r.start + ACPI_ACCESS_BYTE_WIDTH(gas->access_width) - 1;
+ if (gas->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_MEMORY) {
+ r.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM;
+ } else if (gas->space_id == ACPI_ADR_SPACE_SYSTEM_IO) {
--- /dev/null
+From 1dade3a7048ccfc675650cd2cf13d578b095e5fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2020 17:59:39 +0300
+Subject: ACPICA: Introduce ACPI_ACCESS_BYTE_WIDTH() macro
+
+From: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
+
+commit 1dade3a7048ccfc675650cd2cf13d578b095e5fb upstream.
+
+Sometimes it is useful to find the access_width field value in bytes and
+not in bits so add a helper that can be used for this purpose.
+
+Suggested-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
+Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
+Cc: 4.16+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.16+
+Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ include/acpi/actypes.h | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/include/acpi/actypes.h
++++ b/include/acpi/actypes.h
+@@ -556,11 +556,12 @@ typedef u64 acpi_integer;
+ #define ACPI_MAKE_RSDP_SIG(dest) (memcpy (ACPI_CAST_PTR (char, (dest)), ACPI_SIG_RSDP, 8))
+
+ /*
+- * Algorithm to obtain access bit width.
++ * Algorithm to obtain access bit or byte width.
+ * Can be used with access_width of struct acpi_generic_address and access_size of
+ * struct acpi_resource_generic_register.
+ */
+ #define ACPI_ACCESS_BIT_WIDTH(size) (1 << ((size) + 2))
++#define ACPI_ACCESS_BYTE_WIDTH(size) (1 << ((size) - 1))
+
+ /*******************************************************************************
+ *
--- /dev/null
+From 2ad3e17ebf94b7b7f3f64c050ff168f9915345eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Date: Sat, 22 Feb 2020 20:36:47 -0500
+Subject: audit: fix error handling in audit_data_to_entry()
+
+From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+
+commit 2ad3e17ebf94b7b7f3f64c050ff168f9915345eb upstream.
+
+Commit 219ca39427bf ("audit: use union for audit_field values since
+they are mutually exclusive") combined a number of separate fields in
+the audit_field struct into a single union. Generally this worked
+just fine because they are generally mutually exclusive.
+Unfortunately in audit_data_to_entry() the overlap can be a problem
+when a specific error case is triggered that causes the error path
+code to attempt to cleanup an audit_field struct and the cleanup
+involves attempting to free a stored LSM string (the lsm_str field).
+Currently the code always has a non-NULL value in the
+audit_field.lsm_str field as the top of the for-loop transfers a
+value into audit_field.val (both .lsm_str and .val are part of the
+same union); if audit_data_to_entry() fails and the audit_field
+struct is specified to contain a LSM string, but the
+audit_field.lsm_str has not yet been properly set, the error handling
+code will attempt to free the bogus audit_field.lsm_str value that
+was set with audit_field.val at the top of the for-loop.
+
+This patch corrects this by ensuring that the audit_field.val is only
+set when needed (it is cleared when the audit_field struct is
+allocated with kcalloc()). It also corrects a few other issues to
+ensure that in case of error the proper error code is returned.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 219ca39427bf ("audit: use union for audit_field values since they are mutually exclusive")
+Reported-by: syzbot+1f4d90ead370d72e450b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ kernel/auditfilter.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
+ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
++++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
+@@ -435,6 +435,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
+ bufp = data->buf;
+ for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
++ u32 f_val;
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+
+@@ -443,12 +444,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
+ goto exit_free;
+
+ f->type = data->fields[i];
+- f->val = data->values[i];
++ f_val = data->values[i];
+
+ /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */
+- if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
++ if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f_val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) {
+ f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET;
+- f->val = 0;
++ f_val = 0;
+ entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY;
+ }
+
+@@ -464,7 +465,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
+ case AUDIT_SUID:
+ case AUDIT_FSUID:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_UID:
+- f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
++ f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f_val);
+ if (!uid_valid(f->uid))
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
+@@ -473,12 +474,13 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
+ case AUDIT_SGID:
+ case AUDIT_FSGID:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_GID:
+- f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val);
++ f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f_val);
+ if (!gid_valid(f->gid))
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
+ case AUDIT_ARCH:
++ f->val = f_val;
+ entry->rule.arch_f = f;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+@@ -491,11 +493,13 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+- str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+- if (IS_ERR(str))
++ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val);
++ if (IS_ERR(str)) {
++ err = PTR_ERR(str);
+ goto exit_free;
+- entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+-
++ }
++ entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
++ f->lsm_str = str;
+ err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+ (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+ /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
+@@ -504,68 +508,71 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
+ pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n",
+ str);
+ err = 0;
+- }
+- if (err) {
+- kfree(str);
++ } else if (err)
+ goto exit_free;
+- } else
+- f->lsm_str = str;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_WATCH:
+- str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+- if (IS_ERR(str))
++ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val);
++ if (IS_ERR(str)) {
++ err = PTR_ERR(str);
+ goto exit_free;
+- entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+-
+- err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op);
++ }
++ err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f_val, f->op);
+ if (err) {
+ kfree(str);
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
++ entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_DIR:
+- str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+- if (IS_ERR(str))
++ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val);
++ if (IS_ERR(str)) {
++ err = PTR_ERR(str);
+ goto exit_free;
+- entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+-
++ }
+ err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op);
+ kfree(str);
+ if (err)
+ goto exit_free;
++ entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_INODE:
++ f->val = f_val;
+ err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f);
+ if (err)
+ goto exit_free;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+- if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
++ if (entry->rule.filterkey || f_val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN)
+ goto exit_free;
+- str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+- if (IS_ERR(str))
++ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val);
++ if (IS_ERR(str)) {
++ err = PTR_ERR(str);
+ goto exit_free;
+- entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
++ }
++ entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
+ entry->rule.filterkey = str;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_EXE:
+- if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX)
++ if (entry->rule.exe || f_val > PATH_MAX)
+ goto exit_free;
+- str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
++ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f_val);
+ if (IS_ERR(str)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(str);
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+- entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+-
+- audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f->val);
++ audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f_val);
+ if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) {
+ kfree(str);
+ err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark);
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
++ entry->rule.buflen += f_val;
+ entry->rule.exe = audit_mark;
+ break;
++ default:
++ f->val = f_val;
++ break;
+ }
+ }
+
--- /dev/null
+From 37b0b6b8b99c0e1c1f11abbe7cf49b6d03795b3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 12:22:56 +0300
+Subject: ext4: potential crash on allocation error in ext4_alloc_flex_bg_array()
+
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+
+commit 37b0b6b8b99c0e1c1f11abbe7cf49b6d03795b3f upstream.
+
+If sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated is zero and the first allocation fails
+then this code will crash. The problem is that "i--" will set "i" to
+-1 but when we compare "i >= sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated" then the -1
+is type promoted to unsigned and becomes UINT_MAX. Since UINT_MAX
+is more than zero, the condition is true so we call kvfree(new_groups[-1]).
+The loop will carry on freeing invalid memory until it crashes.
+
+Fixes: 7c990728b99e ("ext4: fix potential race between s_flex_groups online resizing and access")
+Reviewed-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <surajjs@amazon.com>
+Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Cc: stable@kernel.org
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200228092142.7irbc44yaz3by7nb@kili.mountain
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/ext4/super.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/super.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/super.c
+@@ -2238,7 +2238,7 @@ int ext4_alloc_flex_bg_array(struct supe
+ {
+ struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
+ struct flex_groups **old_groups, **new_groups;
+- int size, i;
++ int size, i, j;
+
+ if (!sbi->s_log_groups_per_flex)
+ return 0;
+@@ -2259,8 +2259,8 @@ int ext4_alloc_flex_bg_array(struct supe
+ sizeof(struct flex_groups)),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new_groups[i]) {
+- for (i--; i >= sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated; i--)
+- kvfree(new_groups[i]);
++ for (j = sbi->s_flex_groups_allocated; j < i; j++)
++ kvfree(new_groups[j]);
+ kvfree(new_groups);
+ ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR,
+ "not enough memory for %d flex groups", size);
--- /dev/null
+From 5ebdffd25098898aff1249ae2f7dbfddd76d8f8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johan Korsnes <jkorsnes@cisco.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 13:08:35 +0100
+Subject: HID: core: fix off-by-one memset in hid_report_raw_event()
+
+From: Johan Korsnes <jkorsnes@cisco.com>
+
+commit 5ebdffd25098898aff1249ae2f7dbfddd76d8f8f upstream.
+
+In case a report is greater than HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE, it is truncated,
+but the report-number byte is not correctly handled. This results in a
+off-by-one in the following memset, causing a kernel Oops and ensuing
+system crash.
+
+Note: With commit 8ec321e96e05 ("HID: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in
+hid_field_extract") I no longer hit the kernel Oops as we instead fail
+"controlled" at probe if there is a report too long in the HID
+report-descriptor. hid_report_raw_event() is an exported symbol, so
+presumabely we cannot always rely on this being the case.
+
+Fixes: 966922f26c7f ("HID: fix a crash in hid_report_raw_event()
+ function.")
+Signed-off-by: Johan Korsnes <jkorsnes@cisco.com>
+Cc: Armando Visconti <armando.visconti@st.com>
+Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
+Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
++++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c
+@@ -1567,7 +1567,9 @@ int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_devi
+
+ rsize = ((report->size - 1) >> 3) + 1;
+
+- if (rsize > HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE)
++ if (report_enum->numbered && rsize >= HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE)
++ rsize = HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE - 1;
++ else if (rsize > HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE)
+ rsize = HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE;
+
+ if (csize < rsize) {
--- /dev/null
+From 84a4062632462c4320704fcdf8e99e89e94c0aba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Johan Korsnes <jkorsnes@cisco.com>
+Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2020 13:08:36 +0100
+Subject: HID: core: increase HID report buffer size to 8KiB
+
+From: Johan Korsnes <jkorsnes@cisco.com>
+
+commit 84a4062632462c4320704fcdf8e99e89e94c0aba upstream.
+
+We have a HID touch device that reports its opens and shorts test
+results in HID buffers of size 8184 bytes. The maximum size of the HID
+buffer is currently set to 4096 bytes, causing probe of this device to
+fail. With this patch we increase the maximum size of the HID buffer to
+8192 bytes, making device probe and acquisition of said buffers succeed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Johan Korsnes <jkorsnes@cisco.com>
+Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
+Cc: Armando Visconti <armando.visconti@st.com>
+Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ include/linux/hid.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/include/linux/hid.h
++++ b/include/linux/hid.h
+@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ struct hid_report_enum {
+ };
+
+ #define HID_MIN_BUFFER_SIZE 64 /* make sure there is at least a packet size of space */
+-#define HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE 4096 /* 4kb */
++#define HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE 8192 /* 8kb */
+ #define HID_CONTROL_FIFO_SIZE 256 /* to init devices with >100 reports */
+ #define HID_OUTPUT_FIFO_SIZE 64
+
--- /dev/null
+From beae56192a2570578ae45050e73c5ff9254f63e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
+Date: Sat, 1 Feb 2020 12:56:48 +0100
+Subject: HID: ite: Only bind to keyboard USB interface on Acer SW5-012 keyboard dock
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
+
+commit beae56192a2570578ae45050e73c5ff9254f63e6 upstream.
+
+Commit 8f18eca9ebc5 ("HID: ite: Add USB id match for Acer SW5-012 keyboard
+dock") added the USB id for the Acer SW5-012's keyboard dock to the
+hid-ite driver to fix the rfkill driver not working.
+
+Most keyboard docks with an ITE 8595 keyboard/touchpad controller have the
+"Wireless Radio Control" bits which need the special hid-ite driver on the
+second USB interface (the mouse interface) and their touchpad only supports
+mouse emulation, so using generic hid-input handling for anything but
+the "Wireless Radio Control" bits is fine. On these devices we simply bind
+to all USB interfaces.
+
+But unlike other ITE8595 using keyboard docks, the Acer Aspire Switch 10
+(SW5-012)'s touchpad not only does mouse emulation it also supports
+HID-multitouch and all the keys including the "Wireless Radio Control"
+bits have been moved to the first USB interface (the keyboard intf).
+
+So we need hid-ite to handle the first (keyboard) USB interface and have
+it NOT bind to the second (mouse) USB interface so that that can be
+handled by hid-multitouch.c and we get proper multi-touch support.
+
+This commit changes the hid_device_id for the SW5-012 keyboard dock to
+only match on hid devices from the HID_GROUP_GENERIC group, this way
+hid-ite will not bind the the mouse/multi-touch interface which has
+HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8 as group.
+This fixes the regression to mouse-emulation mode introduced by adding
+the keyboard dock USB id.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 8f18eca9ebc5 ("HID: ite: Add USB id match for Acer SW5-012 keyboard dock")
+Reported-by: Zdeněk Rampas <zdenda.rampas@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/hid/hid-ite.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/hid/hid-ite.c
++++ b/drivers/hid/hid-ite.c
+@@ -44,8 +44,9 @@ static const struct hid_device_id ite_de
+ { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ITE, USB_DEVICE_ID_ITE8595) },
+ { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_258A, USB_DEVICE_ID_258A_6A88) },
+ /* ITE8595 USB kbd ctlr, with Synaptics touchpad connected to it. */
+- { HID_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_SYNAPTICS,
+- USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_SWITCH5_012) },
++ { HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
++ USB_VENDOR_ID_SYNAPTICS,
++ USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_SWITCH5_012) },
+ { }
+ };
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hid, ite_devices);
--- /dev/null
+From 86f7e90ce840aa1db407d3ea6e9b3a52b2ce923c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
+Date: Sat, 29 Feb 2020 11:30:14 -0800
+Subject: KVM: VMX: check descriptor table exits on instruction emulation
+
+From: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
+
+commit 86f7e90ce840aa1db407d3ea6e9b3a52b2ce923c upstream.
+
+KVM emulates UMIP on hardware that doesn't support it by setting the
+'descriptor table exiting' VM-execution control and performing
+instruction emulation. When running nested, this emulation is broken as
+KVM refuses to emulate L2 instructions by default.
+
+Correct this regression by allowing the emulation of descriptor table
+instructions if L1 hasn't requested 'descriptor table exiting'.
+
+Fixes: 07721feee46b ("KVM: nVMX: Don't emulate instructions in guest mode")
+Reported-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@web.de>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+@@ -12370,6 +12370,7 @@ static int vmx_check_intercept_io(struct
+ else
+ intercept = nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(vcpu, port, size);
+
++ /* FIXME: produce nested vmexit and return X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED. */
+ return intercept ? X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE : X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+@@ -12399,6 +12400,20 @@ static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kv
+ case x86_intercept_outs:
+ return vmx_check_intercept_io(vcpu, info);
+
++ case x86_intercept_lgdt:
++ case x86_intercept_lidt:
++ case x86_intercept_lldt:
++ case x86_intercept_ltr:
++ case x86_intercept_sgdt:
++ case x86_intercept_sidt:
++ case x86_intercept_sldt:
++ case x86_intercept_str:
++ if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC))
++ return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
++
++ /* FIXME: produce nested vmexit and return X86EMUL_INTERCEPTED. */
++ break;
++
+ /* TODO: check more intercepts... */
+ default:
+ break;
--- /dev/null
+From 66d0e797bf095d407479c89952d42b1d96ef0a7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Orson Zhai <orson.unisoc@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2020 01:37:04 +0800
+Subject: Revert "PM / devfreq: Modify the device name as devfreq(X) for sysfs"
+
+From: Orson Zhai <orson.unisoc@gmail.com>
+
+commit 66d0e797bf095d407479c89952d42b1d96ef0a7f upstream.
+
+This reverts commit 4585fbcb5331fc910b7e553ad3efd0dd7b320d14.
+
+The name changing as devfreq(X) breaks some user space applications,
+such as Android HAL from Unisoc and Hikey [1].
+The device name will be changed unexpectly after every boot depending
+on module init sequence. It will make trouble to setup some system
+configuration like selinux for Android.
+
+So we'd like to revert it back to old naming rule before any better
+way being found.
+
+[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/5/8/1042
+
+Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Orson Zhai <orson.unisoc@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Chanwoo Choi <cw00.choi@samsung.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/devfreq/devfreq.c | 4 +---
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/devfreq/devfreq.c
++++ b/drivers/devfreq/devfreq.c
+@@ -513,7 +513,6 @@ struct devfreq *devfreq_add_device(struc
+ {
+ struct devfreq *devfreq;
+ struct devfreq_governor *governor;
+- static atomic_t devfreq_no = ATOMIC_INIT(-1);
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (!dev || !profile || !governor_name) {
+@@ -556,8 +555,7 @@ struct devfreq *devfreq_add_device(struc
+ mutex_lock(&devfreq->lock);
+ }
+
+- dev_set_name(&devfreq->dev, "devfreq%d",
+- atomic_inc_return(&devfreq_no));
++ dev_set_name(&devfreq->dev, "%s", dev_name(dev));
+ err = device_register(&devfreq->dev);
+ if (err) {
+ mutex_unlock(&devfreq->lock);
ipv6-fix-route-replacement-with-dev-only-route.patch
qede-fix-race-between-rdma-destroy-workqueue-and-link-change-event.patch
net-sched-correct-flower-port-blocking.patch
+ext4-potential-crash-on-allocation-error-in-ext4_alloc_flex_bg_array.patch
+audit-fix-error-handling-in-audit_data_to_entry.patch
+acpica-introduce-acpi_access_byte_width-macro.patch
+acpi-watchdog-fix-gas-access_width-usage.patch
+kvm-vmx-check-descriptor-table-exits-on-instruction-emulation.patch
+hid-ite-only-bind-to-keyboard-usb-interface-on-acer-sw5-012-keyboard-dock.patch
+hid-core-fix-off-by-one-memset-in-hid_report_raw_event.patch
+hid-core-increase-hid-report-buffer-size-to-8kib.patch
+tracing-disable-trace_printk-on-post-poned-tests.patch
+revert-pm-devfreq-modify-the-device-name-as-devfreq-x-for-sysfs.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 78041c0c9e935d9ce4086feeff6c569ed88ddfd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2020 15:38:01 -0500
+Subject: tracing: Disable trace_printk() on post poned tests
+
+From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+
+commit 78041c0c9e935d9ce4086feeff6c569ed88ddfd4 upstream.
+
+The tracing seftests checks various aspects of the tracing infrastructure,
+and one is filtering. If trace_printk() is active during a self test, it can
+cause the filtering to fail, which will disable that part of the trace.
+
+To keep the selftests from failing because of trace_printk() calls,
+trace_printk() checks the variable tracing_selftest_running, and if set, it
+does not write to the tracing buffer.
+
+As some tracers were registered earlier in boot, the selftest they triggered
+would fail because not all the infrastructure was set up for the full
+selftest. Thus, some of the tests were post poned to when their
+infrastructure was ready (namely file system code). The postpone code did
+not set the tracing_seftest_running variable, and could fail if a
+trace_printk() was added and executed during their run.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Fixes: 9afecfbb95198 ("tracing: Postpone tracer start-up tests till the system is more robust")
+Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ kernel/trace/trace.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
++++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
+@@ -1543,6 +1543,7 @@ static __init int init_trace_selftests(v
+
+ pr_info("Running postponed tracer tests:\n");
+
++ tracing_selftest_running = true;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &postponed_selftests, list) {
+ ret = run_tracer_selftest(p->type);
+ /* If the test fails, then warn and remove from available_tracers */
+@@ -1561,6 +1562,7 @@ static __init int init_trace_selftests(v
+ list_del(&p->list);
+ kfree(p);
+ }
++ tracing_selftest_running = false;
+
+ out:
+ mutex_unlock(&trace_types_lock);
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
