--- /dev/null
+From 76c47183224c86e4011048b80f0e2d0d166f01c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
+Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 22:57:29 +0100
+Subject: ALSA: ctxfi: Fix out-of-range access
+
+From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
+
+commit 76c47183224c86e4011048b80f0e2d0d166f01c2 upstream.
+
+The master and next_conj of rcs_ops are used for iterating the
+resource list entries, and currently those are supposed to return the
+current value. The problem is that next_conf may go over the last
+entry before the loop abort condition is evaluated, and it may return
+the "current" value that is beyond the array size. It was caught
+recently as a GPF, for example.
+
+Those return values are, however, never actually evaluated, hence
+basically we don't have to consider the current value as the return at
+all. By dropping those return values, the potential out-of-range
+access above is also fixed automatically.
+
+This patch changes the return type of master and next_conj callbacks
+to void and drop the superfluous code accordingly.
+
+BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=214985
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211118215729.26257-1-tiwai@suse.de
+Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ sound/pci/ctxfi/ctamixer.c | 14 ++++++--------
+ sound/pci/ctxfi/ctdaio.c | 16 ++++++++--------
+ sound/pci/ctxfi/ctresource.c | 7 +++----
+ sound/pci/ctxfi/ctresource.h | 4 ++--
+ sound/pci/ctxfi/ctsrc.c | 7 +++----
+ 5 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctamixer.c
++++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctamixer.c
+@@ -27,16 +27,15 @@
+
+ #define BLANK_SLOT 4094
+
+-static int amixer_master(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void amixer_master(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+ rsc->conj = 0;
+- return rsc->idx = container_of(rsc, struct amixer, rsc)->idx[0];
++ rsc->idx = container_of(rsc, struct amixer, rsc)->idx[0];
+ }
+
+-static int amixer_next_conj(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void amixer_next_conj(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+ rsc->conj++;
+- return container_of(rsc, struct amixer, rsc)->idx[rsc->conj];
+ }
+
+ static int amixer_index(const struct rsc *rsc)
+@@ -335,16 +334,15 @@ int amixer_mgr_destroy(struct amixer_mgr
+
+ /* SUM resource management */
+
+-static int sum_master(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void sum_master(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+ rsc->conj = 0;
+- return rsc->idx = container_of(rsc, struct sum, rsc)->idx[0];
++ rsc->idx = container_of(rsc, struct sum, rsc)->idx[0];
+ }
+
+-static int sum_next_conj(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void sum_next_conj(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+ rsc->conj++;
+- return container_of(rsc, struct sum, rsc)->idx[rsc->conj];
+ }
+
+ static int sum_index(const struct rsc *rsc)
+--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctdaio.c
++++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctdaio.c
+@@ -55,12 +55,12 @@ static struct daio_rsc_idx idx_20k2[NUM_
+ [SPDIFIO] = {.left = 0x05, .right = 0x85},
+ };
+
+-static int daio_master(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void daio_master(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+ /* Actually, this is not the resource index of DAIO.
+ * For DAO, it is the input mapper index. And, for DAI,
+ * it is the output time-slot index. */
+- return rsc->conj = rsc->idx;
++ rsc->conj = rsc->idx;
+ }
+
+ static int daio_index(const struct rsc *rsc)
+@@ -68,19 +68,19 @@ static int daio_index(const struct rsc *
+ return rsc->conj;
+ }
+
+-static int daio_out_next_conj(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void daio_out_next_conj(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+- return rsc->conj += 2;
++ rsc->conj += 2;
+ }
+
+-static int daio_in_next_conj_20k1(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void daio_in_next_conj_20k1(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+- return rsc->conj += 0x200;
++ rsc->conj += 0x200;
+ }
+
+-static int daio_in_next_conj_20k2(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void daio_in_next_conj_20k2(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+- return rsc->conj += 0x100;
++ rsc->conj += 0x100;
+ }
+
+ static const struct rsc_ops daio_out_rsc_ops = {
+--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctresource.c
++++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctresource.c
+@@ -113,18 +113,17 @@ static int audio_ring_slot(const struct
+ return (rsc->conj << 4) + offset_in_audio_slot_block[rsc->type];
+ }
+
+-static int rsc_next_conj(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void rsc_next_conj(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+ unsigned int i;
+ for (i = 0; (i < 8) && (!(rsc->msr & (0x1 << i))); )
+ i++;
+ rsc->conj += (AUDIO_SLOT_BLOCK_NUM >> i);
+- return rsc->conj;
+ }
+
+-static int rsc_master(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void rsc_master(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+- return rsc->conj = rsc->idx;
++ rsc->conj = rsc->idx;
+ }
+
+ static const struct rsc_ops rsc_generic_ops = {
+--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctresource.h
++++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctresource.h
+@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@ struct rsc {
+ };
+
+ struct rsc_ops {
+- int (*master)(struct rsc *rsc); /* Move to master resource */
+- int (*next_conj)(struct rsc *rsc); /* Move to next conjugate resource */
++ void (*master)(struct rsc *rsc); /* Move to master resource */
++ void (*next_conj)(struct rsc *rsc); /* Move to next conjugate resource */
+ int (*index)(const struct rsc *rsc); /* Return the index of resource */
+ /* Return the output slot number */
+ int (*output_slot)(const struct rsc *rsc);
+--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctsrc.c
++++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctsrc.c
+@@ -594,16 +594,15 @@ int src_mgr_destroy(struct src_mgr *src_
+
+ /* SRCIMP resource manager operations */
+
+-static int srcimp_master(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void srcimp_master(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+ rsc->conj = 0;
+- return rsc->idx = container_of(rsc, struct srcimp, rsc)->idx[0];
++ rsc->idx = container_of(rsc, struct srcimp, rsc)->idx[0];
+ }
+
+-static int srcimp_next_conj(struct rsc *rsc)
++static void srcimp_next_conj(struct rsc *rsc)
+ {
+ rsc->conj++;
+- return container_of(rsc, struct srcimp, rsc)->idx[rsc->conj];
+ }
+
+ static int srcimp_index(const struct rsc *rsc)
--- /dev/null
+From c21a80ca0684ec2910344d72556c816cb8940c01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
+Date: Fri, 12 Nov 2021 10:07:20 -0800
+Subject: binder: fix test regression due to sender_euid change
+
+From: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
+
+commit c21a80ca0684ec2910344d72556c816cb8940c01 upstream.
+
+This is a partial revert of commit
+29bc22ac5e5b ("binder: use euid from cred instead of using task").
+Setting sender_euid using proc->cred caused some Android system test
+regressions that need further investigation. It is a partial
+reversion because subsequent patches rely on proc->cred.
+
+Fixes: 29bc22ac5e5b ("binder: use euid from cred instead of using task")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
+Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
+Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
+Change-Id: I9b1769a3510fed250bb21859ef8beebabe034c66
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211112180720.2858135-1-tkjos@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/android/binder.c
++++ b/drivers/android/binder.c
+@@ -2894,7 +2894,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct bi
+ t->from = thread;
+ else
+ t->from = NULL;
+- t->sender_euid = proc->cred->euid;
++ t->sender_euid = task_euid(proc->tsk);
+ t->to_proc = target_proc;
+ t->to_thread = target_thread;
+ t->code = tr->code;
--- /dev/null
+From 712a951025c0667ff00b25afc360f74e639dfabe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 11:10:37 +0100
+Subject: fuse: fix page stealing
+
+From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+
+commit 712a951025c0667ff00b25afc360f74e639dfabe upstream.
+
+It is possible to trigger a crash by splicing anon pipe bufs to the fuse
+device.
+
+The reason for this is that anon_pipe_buf_release() will reuse buf->page if
+the refcount is 1, but that page might have already been stolen and its
+flags modified (e.g. PG_lru added).
+
+This happens in the unlikely case of fuse_dev_splice_write() getting around
+to calling pipe_buf_release() after a page has been stolen, added to the
+page cache and removed from the page cache.
+
+Fix by calling pipe_buf_release() right after the page was inserted into
+the page cache. In this case the page has an elevated refcount so any
+release function will know that the page isn't reusable.
+
+Reported-by: Frank Dinoff <fdinoff@google.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAAmZXrsGg2xsP1CK+cbuEMumtrqdvD-NKnWzhNcvn71RV3c1yw@mail.gmail.com/
+Fixes: dd3bb14f44a6 ("fuse: support splice() writing to fuse device")
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v2.6.35
+Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ fs/fuse/dev.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/fuse/dev.c
++++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c
+@@ -897,6 +897,12 @@ static int fuse_try_move_page(struct fus
+ goto out_put_old;
+ }
+
++ /*
++ * Release while we have extra ref on stolen page. Otherwise
++ * anon_pipe_buf_release() might think the page can be reused.
++ */
++ pipe_buf_release(cs->pipe, buf);
++
+ get_page(newpage);
+
+ if (!(buf->flags & PIPE_BUF_FLAG_LRU))
+@@ -2046,8 +2052,12 @@ static ssize_t fuse_dev_splice_write(str
+
+ pipe_lock(pipe);
+ out_free:
+- for (idx = 0; idx < nbuf; idx++)
+- pipe_buf_release(pipe, &bufs[idx]);
++ for (idx = 0; idx < nbuf; idx++) {
++ struct pipe_buffer *buf = &bufs[idx];
++
++ if (buf->ops)
++ pipe_buf_release(pipe, buf);
++ }
+ pipe_unlock(pipe);
+
+ kfree(bufs);
--- /dev/null
+From 7fb0413baa7f8a04caef0c504df9af7e0623d296 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jason Gerecke <killertofu@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 16:31:01 -0800
+Subject: HID: wacom: Use "Confidence" flag to prevent reporting invalid contacts
+
+From: Jason Gerecke <killertofu@gmail.com>
+
+commit 7fb0413baa7f8a04caef0c504df9af7e0623d296 upstream.
+
+The HID descriptor of many of Wacom's touch input devices include a
+"Confidence" usage that signals if a particular touch collection contains
+useful data. The driver does not look at this flag, however, which causes
+even invalid contacts to be reported to userspace. A lucky combination of
+kernel event filtering and device behavior (specifically: contact ID 0 ==
+invalid, contact ID >0 == valid; and order all data so that all valid
+contacts are reported before any invalid contacts) spare most devices from
+any visibly-bad behavior.
+
+The DTH-2452 is one example of an unlucky device that misbehaves. It uses
+ID 0 for both the first valid contact and all invalid contacts. Because
+we report both the valid and invalid contacts, the kernel reports that
+contact 0 first goes down (valid) and then goes up (invalid) in every
+report. This causes ~100 clicks per second simply by touching the screen.
+
+This patch inroduces new `confidence` flag in our `hid_data` structure.
+The value is initially set to `true` at the start of a report and can be
+set to `false` if an invalid touch usage is seen.
+
+Link: https://github.com/linuxwacom/input-wacom/issues/270
+Fixes: f8b6a74719b5 ("HID: wacom: generic: Support multiple tools per report")
+Signed-off-by: Jason Gerecke <jason.gerecke@wacom.com>
+Tested-by: Joshua Dickens <joshua.dickens@wacom.com>
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c | 8 +++++++-
+ drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c
++++ b/drivers/hid/wacom_wac.c
+@@ -2433,6 +2433,9 @@ static void wacom_wac_finger_event(struc
+ struct wacom_features *features = &wacom->wacom_wac.features;
+
+ switch (equivalent_usage) {
++ case HID_DG_CONFIDENCE:
++ wacom_wac->hid_data.confidence = value;
++ break;
+ case HID_GD_X:
+ wacom_wac->hid_data.x = value;
+ break;
+@@ -2463,7 +2466,8 @@ static void wacom_wac_finger_event(struc
+
+
+ if (usage->usage_index + 1 == field->report_count) {
+- if (equivalent_usage == wacom_wac->hid_data.last_slot_field)
++ if (equivalent_usage == wacom_wac->hid_data.last_slot_field &&
++ wacom_wac->hid_data.confidence)
+ wacom_wac_finger_slot(wacom_wac, wacom_wac->touch_input);
+ }
+ }
+@@ -2476,6 +2480,8 @@ static void wacom_wac_finger_pre_report(
+ struct hid_data* hid_data = &wacom_wac->hid_data;
+ int i;
+
++ hid_data->confidence = true;
++
+ for (i = 0; i < report->maxfield; i++) {
+ struct hid_field *field = report->field[i];
+ int j;
+--- a/drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h
++++ b/drivers/hid/wacom_wac.h
+@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ struct hid_data {
+ bool inrange_state;
+ bool invert_state;
+ bool tipswitch;
++ bool confidence;
+ int x;
+ int y;
+ int pressure;
--- /dev/null
+From 13cbaa4c2b7bf9f8285e1164d005dbf08244ecd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
+Date: Tue, 2 Nov 2021 12:24:26 +0000
+Subject: media: cec: copy sequence field for the reply
+
+From: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
+
+commit 13cbaa4c2b7bf9f8285e1164d005dbf08244ecd5 upstream.
+
+When the reply for a non-blocking transmit arrives, the sequence
+field for that reply was never filled in, so userspace would have no
+way of associating the reply to the original transmit.
+
+Copy the sequence field to ensure that this is now possible.
+
+Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
+Fixes: 0dbacebede1e ([media] cec: move the CEC framework out of staging and to media)
+Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+--- a/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
++++ b/drivers/media/cec/cec-adap.c
+@@ -1135,6 +1135,7 @@ void cec_received_msg_ts(struct cec_adap
+ if (abort)
+ dst->rx_status |= CEC_RX_STATUS_FEATURE_ABORT;
+ msg->flags = dst->flags;
++ msg->sequence = dst->sequence;
+ /* Remove it from the wait_queue */
+ list_del_init(&data->list);
+
usb-serial-option-add-fibocom-fm101-gl-variants.patch
usb-hub-fix-usb-enumeration-issue-due-to-address0-race.patch
usb-hub-fix-locking-issues-with-address0_mutex.patch
+binder-fix-test-regression-due-to-sender_euid-change.patch
+alsa-ctxfi-fix-out-of-range-access.patch
+media-cec-copy-sequence-field-for-the-reply.patch
+hid-wacom-use-confidence-flag-to-prevent-reporting-invalid-contacts.patch
+staging-rtl8192e-fix-use-after-free-in-_rtl92e_pci_disconnect.patch
+fuse-fix-page-stealing.patch
--- /dev/null
+From b535917c51acc97fb0761b1edec85f1f3d02bda4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Date: Wed, 17 Nov 2021 10:20:16 +0300
+Subject: staging: rtl8192e: Fix use after free in _rtl92e_pci_disconnect()
+
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+
+commit b535917c51acc97fb0761b1edec85f1f3d02bda4 upstream.
+
+The free_rtllib() function frees the "dev" pointer so there is use
+after free on the next line. Re-arrange things to avoid that.
+
+Fixes: 66898177e7e5 ("staging: rtl8192e: Fix unload/reload problem")
+Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211117072016.GA5237@kili
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtl8192e/rtl_core.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtl8192e/rtl_core.c
++++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8192e/rtl8192e/rtl_core.c
+@@ -2582,13 +2582,14 @@ static void _rtl92e_pci_disconnect(struc
+ free_irq(dev->irq, dev);
+ priv->irq = 0;
+ }
+- free_rtllib(dev);
+
+ if (dev->mem_start != 0) {
+ iounmap((void __iomem *)dev->mem_start);
+ release_mem_region(pci_resource_start(pdev, 1),
+ pci_resource_len(pdev, 1));
+ }
++
++ free_rtllib(dev);
+ } else {
+ priv = rtllib_priv(dev);
+ }
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
