--- /dev/null
+From 8d5a803c6a6ce4ec258e31f76059ea5153ba46ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Thu, 12 Jul 2018 19:08:05 -0400
+Subject: ext4: check for allocation block validity with block group locked
+
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+
+commit 8d5a803c6a6ce4ec258e31f76059ea5153ba46ef upstream.
+
+With commit 044e6e3d74a3: "ext4: don't update checksum of new
+initialized bitmaps" the buffer valid bit will get set without
+actually setting up the checksum for the allocation bitmap, since the
+checksum will get calculated once we actually allocate an inode or
+block.
+
+If we are doing this, then we need to (re-)check the verified bit
+after we take the block group lock. Otherwise, we could race with
+another process reading and verifying the bitmap, which would then
+complain about the checksum being invalid.
+
+https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1780137
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Cc: stable@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/ext4/balloc.c | 3 +++
+ fs/ext4/ialloc.c | 3 +++
+ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/balloc.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/balloc.c
+@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@ static int ext4_validate_block_bitmap(st
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+
+ ext4_lock_group(sb, block_group);
++ if (buffer_verified(bh))
++ goto verified;
+ if (unlikely(!ext4_block_bitmap_csum_verify(sb, block_group,
+ desc, bh))) {
+ ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group);
+@@ -400,6 +402,7 @@ static int ext4_validate_block_bitmap(st
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
+ set_buffer_verified(bh);
++verified:
+ ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group);
+ return 0;
+ }
+--- a/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/ialloc.c
+@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ static int ext4_validate_inode_bitmap(st
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+
+ ext4_lock_group(sb, block_group);
++ if (buffer_verified(bh))
++ goto verified;
+ blk = ext4_inode_bitmap(sb, desc);
+ if (!ext4_inode_bitmap_csum_verify(sb, block_group, desc, bh,
+ EXT4_INODES_PER_GROUP(sb) / 8)) {
+@@ -105,6 +107,7 @@ static int ext4_validate_inode_bitmap(st
+ return -EFSBADCRC;
+ }
+ set_buffer_verified(bh);
++verified:
+ ext4_unlock_group(sb, block_group);
+ return 0;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 362eca70b53389bddf3143fe20f53dcce2cfdf61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 01:07:43 -0400
+Subject: ext4: fix inline data updates with checksums enabled
+
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+
+commit 362eca70b53389bddf3143fe20f53dcce2cfdf61 upstream.
+
+The inline data code was updating the raw inode directly; this is
+problematic since if metadata checksums are enabled,
+ext4_mark_inode_dirty() must be called to update the inode's checksum.
+In addition, the jbd2 layer requires that get_write_access() be called
+before the metadata buffer is modified. Fix both of these problems.
+
+https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=200443
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/ext4/inline.c | 19 +++++++++++--------
+ fs/ext4/inode.c | 16 +++++++---------
+ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/ext4/inline.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c
+@@ -678,6 +678,10 @@ int ext4_try_to_write_inline_data(struct
+ goto convert;
+ }
+
++ ret = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, iloc.bh);
++ if (ret)
++ goto out;
++
+ flags |= AOP_FLAG_NOFS;
+
+ page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, 0, flags);
+@@ -706,7 +710,7 @@ int ext4_try_to_write_inline_data(struct
+ out_up_read:
+ up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
+ out:
+- if (handle)
++ if (handle && (ret != 1))
+ ext4_journal_stop(handle);
+ brelse(iloc.bh);
+ return ret;
+@@ -748,6 +752,7 @@ int ext4_write_inline_data_end(struct in
+
+ ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand);
+ brelse(iloc.bh);
++ mark_inode_dirty(inode);
+ out:
+ return copied;
+ }
+@@ -894,7 +899,6 @@ retry_journal:
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+-
+ page = grab_cache_page_write_begin(mapping, 0, flags);
+ if (!page) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+@@ -912,6 +916,9 @@ retry_journal:
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_release_page;
+ }
++ ret = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, iloc.bh);
++ if (ret)
++ goto out_release_page;
+
+ up_read(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem);
+ *pagep = page;
+@@ -932,7 +939,6 @@ int ext4_da_write_inline_data_end(struct
+ unsigned len, unsigned copied,
+ struct page *page)
+ {
+- int i_size_changed = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ext4_write_inline_data_end(inode, pos, len, copied, page);
+@@ -950,10 +956,8 @@ int ext4_da_write_inline_data_end(struct
+ * But it's important to update i_size while still holding page lock:
+ * page writeout could otherwise come in and zero beyond i_size.
+ */
+- if (pos+copied > inode->i_size) {
++ if (pos+copied > inode->i_size)
+ i_size_write(inode, pos+copied);
+- i_size_changed = 1;
+- }
+ unlock_page(page);
+ page_cache_release(page);
+
+@@ -963,8 +967,7 @@ int ext4_da_write_inline_data_end(struct
+ * ordering of page lock and transaction start for journaling
+ * filesystems.
+ */
+- if (i_size_changed)
+- mark_inode_dirty(inode);
++ mark_inode_dirty(inode);
+
+ return copied;
+ }
+--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
++++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
+@@ -1164,9 +1164,10 @@ static int ext4_write_end(struct file *f
+ loff_t old_size = inode->i_size;
+ int ret = 0, ret2;
+ int i_size_changed = 0;
++ int inline_data = ext4_has_inline_data(inode);
+
+ trace_ext4_write_end(inode, pos, len, copied);
+- if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) {
++ if (inline_data) {
+ ret = ext4_write_inline_data_end(inode, pos, len,
+ copied, page);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+@@ -1194,7 +1195,7 @@ static int ext4_write_end(struct file *f
+ * ordering of page lock and transaction start for journaling
+ * filesystems.
+ */
+- if (i_size_changed)
++ if (i_size_changed || inline_data)
+ ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
+
+ if (pos + len > inode->i_size && ext4_can_truncate(inode))
+@@ -1268,6 +1269,7 @@ static int ext4_journalled_write_end(str
+ int partial = 0;
+ unsigned from, to;
+ int size_changed = 0;
++ int inline_data = ext4_has_inline_data(inode);
+
+ trace_ext4_journalled_write_end(inode, pos, len, copied);
+ from = pos & (PAGE_CACHE_SIZE - 1);
+@@ -1275,7 +1277,7 @@ static int ext4_journalled_write_end(str
+
+ BUG_ON(!ext4_handle_valid(handle));
+
+- if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) {
++ if (inline_data) {
+ ret = ext4_write_inline_data_end(inode, pos, len,
+ copied, page);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+@@ -1306,7 +1308,7 @@ static int ext4_journalled_write_end(str
+ if (old_size < pos)
+ pagecache_isize_extended(inode, old_size, pos);
+
+- if (size_changed) {
++ if (size_changed || inline_data) {
+ ret2 = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = ret2;
+@@ -1804,11 +1806,7 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(s
+ }
+
+ if (inline_data) {
+- BUFFER_TRACE(inode_bh, "get write access");
+- ret = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, inode_bh);
+-
+- err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, inode_bh);
+-
++ ret = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
+ } else {
+ ret = ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_bufs, 0, len, NULL,
+ do_journal_get_write_access);
--- /dev/null
+From 81e69df38e2911b642ec121dec319fad2a4782f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Date: Sat, 14 Jul 2018 23:55:57 -0400
+Subject: random: mix rdrand with entropy sent in from userspace
+
+From: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+
+commit 81e69df38e2911b642ec121dec319fad2a4782f3 upstream.
+
+Fedora has integrated the jitter entropy daemon to work around slow
+boot problems, especially on VM's that don't support virtio-rng:
+
+ https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1572944
+
+It's understandable why they did this, but the Jitter entropy daemon
+works fundamentally on the principle: "the CPU microarchitecture is
+**so** complicated and we can't figure it out, so it *must* be
+random". Yes, it uses statistical tests to "prove" it is secure, but
+AES_ENCRYPT(NSA_KEY, COUNTER++) will also pass statistical tests with
+flying colors.
+
+So if RDRAND is available, mix it into entropy submitted from
+userspace. It can't hurt, and if you believe the NSA has backdoored
+RDRAND, then they probably have enough details about the Intel
+microarchitecture that they can reverse engineer how the Jitter
+entropy daemon affects the microarchitecture, and attack its output
+stream. And if RDRAND is in fact an honest DRNG, it will immeasurably
+improve on what the Jitter entropy daemon might produce.
+
+This also provides some protection against someone who is able to read
+or set the entropy seed file.
+
+Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/char/random.c | 10 +++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/char/random.c
++++ b/drivers/char/random.c
+@@ -1503,14 +1503,22 @@ static int
+ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
+ {
+ size_t bytes;
+- __u32 buf[16];
++ __u32 t, buf[16];
+ const char __user *p = buffer;
+
+ while (count > 0) {
++ int b, i = 0;
++
+ bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
+ if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
++ for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) {
++ if (!arch_get_random_int(&t))
++ break;
++ buf[i] ^= t;
++ }
++
+ count -= bytes;
+ p += bytes;
+
scsi-megaraid_sas-increase-timeout-by-1-sec-for-non-raid-fastpath-ios.patch
media-si470x-fix-__be16-annotations.patch
drm-add-dp-psr2-sink-enable-bit.patch
+random-mix-rdrand-with-entropy-sent-in-from-userspace.patch
+squashfs-be-more-careful-about-metadata-corruption.patch
+ext4-fix-inline-data-updates-with-checksums-enabled.patch
+ext4-check-for-allocation-block-validity-with-block-group-locked.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 01cfb7937a9af2abb1136c7e89fbf3fd92952956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2018 12:44:46 -0700
+Subject: squashfs: be more careful about metadata corruption
+
+From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+
+commit 01cfb7937a9af2abb1136c7e89fbf3fd92952956 upstream.
+
+Anatoly Trosinenko reports that a corrupted squashfs image can cause a
+kernel oops. It turns out that squashfs can end up being confused about
+negative fragment lengths.
+
+The regular squashfs_read_data() does check for negative lengths, but
+squashfs_read_metadata() did not, and the fragment size code just
+blindly trusted the on-disk value. Fix both the fragment parsing and
+the metadata reading code.
+
+Reported-by: Anatoly Trosinenko <anatoly.trosinenko@gmail.com>
+Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
+Cc: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
+Cc: stable@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/squashfs/cache.c | 3 +++
+ fs/squashfs/file.c | 8 ++++++--
+ fs/squashfs/fragment.c | 4 +---
+ fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h | 6 ++++++
+ 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/fs/squashfs/cache.c
++++ b/fs/squashfs/cache.c
+@@ -350,6 +350,9 @@ int squashfs_read_metadata(struct super_
+
+ TRACE("Entered squashfs_read_metadata [%llx:%x]\n", *block, *offset);
+
++ if (unlikely(length < 0))
++ return -EIO;
++
+ while (length) {
+ entry = squashfs_cache_get(sb, msblk->block_cache, *block, 0);
+ if (entry->error) {
+--- a/fs/squashfs/file.c
++++ b/fs/squashfs/file.c
+@@ -194,7 +194,11 @@ static long long read_indexes(struct sup
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+- int size = le32_to_cpu(blist[i]);
++ int size = squashfs_block_size(blist[i]);
++ if (size < 0) {
++ err = size;
++ goto failure;
++ }
+ block += SQUASHFS_COMPRESSED_SIZE_BLOCK(size);
+ }
+ n -= blocks;
+@@ -367,7 +371,7 @@ static int read_blocklist(struct inode *
+ sizeof(size));
+ if (res < 0)
+ return res;
+- return le32_to_cpu(size);
++ return squashfs_block_size(size);
+ }
+
+ /* Copy data into page cache */
+--- a/fs/squashfs/fragment.c
++++ b/fs/squashfs/fragment.c
+@@ -61,9 +61,7 @@ int squashfs_frag_lookup(struct super_bl
+ return size;
+
+ *fragment_block = le64_to_cpu(fragment_entry.start_block);
+- size = le32_to_cpu(fragment_entry.size);
+-
+- return size;
++ return squashfs_block_size(fragment_entry.size);
+ }
+
+
+--- a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h
++++ b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h
+@@ -129,6 +129,12 @@
+
+ #define SQUASHFS_COMPRESSED_BLOCK(B) (!((B) & SQUASHFS_COMPRESSED_BIT_BLOCK))
+
++static inline int squashfs_block_size(__le32 raw)
++{
++ u32 size = le32_to_cpu(raw);
++ return (size >> 25) ? -EIO : size;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Inode number ops. Inodes consist of a compressed block number, and an
+ * uncompressed offset within that block
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
