]> git.ipfire.org Git - thirdparty/haproxy.git/commitdiff
MEDIUM: ssl: use cert_key_and_chain struct in ssl_sock_load_cert_file()
authorWilliam Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.com>
Wed, 15 May 2019 14:08:56 +0000 (16:08 +0200)
committerWilliam Lallemand <wlallemand@haproxy.org>
Mon, 29 Jul 2019 13:28:46 +0000 (15:28 +0200)
This structure was only used in the case of the multi-cert bundle.

Using these primitives everywhere when we load the file are a first step
in the deduplication of the code.

src/ssl_sock.c

index 0b9d8888398710e397fc3ba72784fcc9dee01a84..7411d73a9c7543eac3ae50fc525033089e5bdb8d 100644 (file)
@@ -3318,20 +3318,22 @@ static int ssl_sock_load_cert_file(const char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf
                                   char **sni_filter, int fcount, char **err)
 {
        SSL_CTX *ctx;
-       BIO *in;
-       X509 *x = NULL, *ca;
        int i;
        int ret = -1;
        int order = 0;
        X509_NAME *xname;
        char *str;
-       pem_password_cb *passwd_cb;
-       void *passwd_cb_userdata;
        EVP_PKEY *pkey;
        struct pkey_info kinfo = { .sig = TLSEXT_signature_anonymous, .bits = 0 };
 #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
        STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *names;
 #endif
+       struct cert_key_and_chain ckch;
+
+       memset(&ckch, 0, sizeof(ckch));
+
+       if (ssl_sock_load_crt_file_into_ckch(path, &ckch, err) == 1)
+               return 1;
 
        ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
        if (!ctx) {
@@ -3340,29 +3342,12 @@ static int ssl_sock_load_cert_file(const char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf
                return 1;
        }
 
-       if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, path, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
-               memprintf(err, "%sunable to load SSL private key from PEM file '%s'.\n",
-                         err && *err ? *err : "", path);
+       if (ssl_sock_put_ckch_into_ctx(path, &ckch, ctx, err) != 0) {
                SSL_CTX_free(ctx);
                return 1;
        }
 
-       in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
-       if (in == NULL)
-               goto end;
-
-       if (BIO_read_filename(in, path) <= 0)
-               goto end;
-
-
-       passwd_cb = SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(ctx);
-       passwd_cb_userdata = SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx);
-
-       x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL, passwd_cb, passwd_cb_userdata);
-       if (x == NULL)
-               goto end;
-
-       pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+       pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ckch.cert);
        if (pkey) {
                kinfo.bits = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
                switch(EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) {
@@ -3385,7 +3370,7 @@ static int ssl_sock_load_cert_file(const char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf
        }
        else {
 #ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
-               names = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+               names = X509_get_ext_d2i(ckch.cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
                if (names) {
                        for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(names); i++) {
                                GENERAL_NAME *name = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(names, i);
@@ -3399,7 +3384,7 @@ static int ssl_sock_load_cert_file(const char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf
                        sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(names, GENERAL_NAME_free);
                }
 #endif /* SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME */
-               xname = X509_get_subject_name(x);
+               xname = X509_get_subject_name(ckch.cert);
                i = -1;
                while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(xname, NID_commonName, i)) != -1) {
                        X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname, i);
@@ -3414,37 +3399,6 @@ static int ssl_sock_load_cert_file(const char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf
        }
 
        ret = 0; /* the caller must not free the SSL_CTX argument anymore */
-       if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x))
-               goto end;
-
-#ifdef SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs
-       SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(ctx);
-#else
-       if (ctx->extra_certs != NULL) {
-               sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free);
-               ctx->extra_certs = NULL;
-       }
-#endif
-
-       while ((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, passwd_cb, passwd_cb_userdata))) {
-               if (!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, ca)) {
-                       X509_free(ca);
-                       goto end;
-               }
-       }
-
-       i = ERR_get_error();
-       if (!i || (ERR_GET_LIB(i) == ERR_LIB_PEM && ERR_GET_REASON(i) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE)) {
-               /* we successfully reached the last cert in the file */
-               ret = 1;
-       }
-       ERR_clear_error();
-
-       if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx) <= 0) {
-               memprintf(err, "%sinconsistencies between private key and certificate loaded from PEM file '%s'.\n",
-                         err && *err ? *err : "", path);
-               return 1;
-       }
 
        /* we must not free the SSL_CTX anymore below, since it's already in
         * the tree, so it will be discovered and cleaned in time.
@@ -3502,14 +3456,6 @@ static int ssl_sock_load_cert_file(const char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf
        }
 
        return 0;
-end:
-       if (x)
-               X509_free(x);
-
-       if (in)
-               BIO_free(in);
-
-       return ret;
 }
 
 int ssl_sock_load_cert(char *path, struct bind_conf *bind_conf, char **err)