--- /dev/null
+From a69261e4470d680185a15f748d9cdafb37c57a33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 16:19:06 +0300
+Subject: cpufreq: s3c2416: double free on driver init error path
+
+From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+
+commit a69261e4470d680185a15f748d9cdafb37c57a33 upstream.
+
+The "goto err_armclk;" error path already does a clk_put(s3c_freq->hclk);
+so this is a double free.
+
+Fixes: 34ee55075265 ([CPUFREQ] Add S3C2416/S3C2450 cpufreq driver)
+Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
+Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/cpufreq/s3c2416-cpufreq.c | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/cpufreq/s3c2416-cpufreq.c
++++ b/drivers/cpufreq/s3c2416-cpufreq.c
+@@ -400,7 +400,6 @@ static int s3c2416_cpufreq_driver_init(s
+ rate = clk_get_rate(s3c_freq->hclk);
+ if (rate < 133 * 1000 * 1000) {
+ pr_err("cpufreq: HCLK not at 133MHz\n");
+- clk_put(s3c_freq->hclk);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_armclk;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 73dbd4a4230216b6a5540a362edceae0c9b4876b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
+Date: Sun, 23 Apr 2017 18:23:21 +0800
+Subject: iommu/amd: Fix incorrect error handling in amd_iommu_bind_pasid()
+
+From: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
+
+commit 73dbd4a4230216b6a5540a362edceae0c9b4876b upstream.
+
+In function amd_iommu_bind_pasid(), the control flow jumps
+to label out_free when pasid_state->mm and mm is NULL. And
+mmput(mm) is called. In function mmput(mm), mm is
+referenced without validation. This will result in a NULL
+dereference bug. This patch fixes the bug.
+
+Signed-off-by: Pan Bian <bianpan2016@163.com>
+Fixes: f0aac63b873b ('iommu/amd: Don't hold a reference to mm_struct')
+Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c
++++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_v2.c
+@@ -699,9 +699,9 @@ out_clear_state:
+
+ out_unregister:
+ mmu_notifier_unregister(&pasid_state->mn, mm);
++ mmput(mm);
+
+ out_free:
+- mmput(mm);
+ free_pasid_state(pasid_state);
+
+ out:
--- /dev/null
+From 797a8b4d768c58caac58ee3e8cb36a164d1b7751 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
+Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2017 12:58:07 +0000
+Subject: iommu: Handle default domain attach failure
+
+From: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
+
+commit 797a8b4d768c58caac58ee3e8cb36a164d1b7751 upstream.
+
+We wouldn't normally expect ops->attach_dev() to fail, but on IOMMUs
+with limited hardware resources, or generally misconfigured systems,
+it is certainly possible. We report failure correctly from the external
+iommu_attach_device() interface, but do not do so in iommu_group_add()
+when attaching to the default domain. The result of failure there is
+that the device, group and domain all get left in a broken,
+part-configured state which leads to weird errors and misbehaviour down
+the line when IOMMU API calls sort-of-but-don't-quite work.
+
+Check the return value of __iommu_attach_device() on the default domain,
+and refactor the error handling paths to cope with its failure and clean
+up correctly in such cases.
+
+Fixes: e39cb8a3aa98 ("iommu: Make sure a device is always attached to a domain")
+Reported-by: Punit Agrawal <punit.agrawal@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/iommu/iommu.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
++++ b/drivers/iommu/iommu.c
+@@ -391,36 +391,30 @@ int iommu_group_add_device(struct iommu_
+ device->dev = dev;
+
+ ret = sysfs_create_link(&dev->kobj, &group->kobj, "iommu_group");
+- if (ret) {
+- kfree(device);
+- return ret;
+- }
++ if (ret)
++ goto err_free_device;
+
+ device->name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s", kobject_name(&dev->kobj));
+ rename:
+ if (!device->name) {
+- sysfs_remove_link(&dev->kobj, "iommu_group");
+- kfree(device);
+- return -ENOMEM;
++ ret = -ENOMEM;
++ goto err_remove_link;
+ }
+
+ ret = sysfs_create_link_nowarn(group->devices_kobj,
+ &dev->kobj, device->name);
+ if (ret) {
+- kfree(device->name);
+ if (ret == -EEXIST && i >= 0) {
+ /*
+ * Account for the slim chance of collision
+ * and append an instance to the name.
+ */
++ kfree(device->name);
+ device->name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s.%d",
+ kobject_name(&dev->kobj), i++);
+ goto rename;
+ }
+-
+- sysfs_remove_link(&dev->kobj, "iommu_group");
+- kfree(device);
+- return ret;
++ goto err_free_name;
+ }
+
+ kobject_get(group->devices_kobj);
+@@ -432,8 +426,10 @@ rename:
+ mutex_lock(&group->mutex);
+ list_add_tail(&device->list, &group->devices);
+ if (group->domain)
+- __iommu_attach_device(group->domain, dev);
++ ret = __iommu_attach_device(group->domain, dev);
+ mutex_unlock(&group->mutex);
++ if (ret)
++ goto err_put_group;
+
+ /* Notify any listeners about change to group. */
+ blocking_notifier_call_chain(&group->notifier,
+@@ -444,6 +440,21 @@ rename:
+ pr_info("Adding device %s to group %d\n", dev_name(dev), group->id);
+
+ return 0;
++
++err_put_group:
++ mutex_lock(&group->mutex);
++ list_del(&device->list);
++ mutex_unlock(&group->mutex);
++ dev->iommu_group = NULL;
++ kobject_put(group->devices_kobj);
++err_free_name:
++ kfree(device->name);
++err_remove_link:
++ sysfs_remove_link(&dev->kobj, "iommu_group");
++err_free_device:
++ kfree(device);
++ pr_err("Failed to add device %s to group %d: %d\n", dev_name(dev), group->id, ret);
++ return ret;
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iommu_group_add_device);
+
--- /dev/null
+From f7116e115acdd74bc75a4daf6492b11d43505125 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Dillow <dillow@google.com>
+Date: Mon, 30 Jan 2017 19:11:11 -0800
+Subject: iommu/vt-d: Don't over-free page table directories
+
+From: David Dillow <dillow@google.com>
+
+commit f7116e115acdd74bc75a4daf6492b11d43505125 upstream.
+
+dma_pte_free_level() recurses down the IOMMU page tables and frees
+directory pages that are entirely contained in the given PFN range.
+Unfortunately, it incorrectly calculates the starting address covered
+by the PTE under consideration, which can lead to it clearing an entry
+that is still in use.
+
+This occurs if we have a scatterlist with an entry that has a length
+greater than 1026 MB and is aligned to 2 MB for both the IOMMU and
+physical addresses. For example, if __domain_mapping() is asked to map a
+two-entry scatterlist with 2 MB and 1028 MB segments to PFN 0xffff80000,
+it will ask if dma_pte_free_pagetable() is asked to PFNs from
+0xffff80200 to 0xffffc05ff, it will also incorrectly clear the PFNs from
+0xffff80000 to 0xffff801ff because of this issue. The current code will
+set level_pfn to 0xffff80200, and 0xffff80200-0xffffc01ff fits inside
+the range being cleared. Properly setting the level_pfn for the current
+level under consideration catches that this PTE is outside of the range
+being cleared.
+
+This patch also changes the value passed into dma_pte_free_level() when
+it recurses. This only affects the first PTE of the range being cleared,
+and is handled by the existing code that ensures we start our cursor no
+lower than start_pfn.
+
+This was found when using dma_map_sg() to map large chunks of contiguous
+memory, which immediatedly led to faults on the first access of the
+erroneously-deleted mappings.
+
+Fixes: 3269ee0bd668 ("intel-iommu: Fix leaks in pagetable freeing")
+Reviewed-by: Benjamin Serebrin <serebrin@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Dillow <dillow@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
++++ b/drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c
+@@ -1137,7 +1137,7 @@ static void dma_pte_free_level(struct dm
+ if (!dma_pte_present(pte) || dma_pte_superpage(pte))
+ goto next;
+
+- level_pfn = pfn & level_mask(level - 1);
++ level_pfn = pfn & level_mask(level);
+ level_pte = phys_to_virt(dma_pte_addr(pte));
+
+ if (level > 2)
--- /dev/null
+From d4912215d1031e4fb3d1038d2e1857218dba0d0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 5 Jun 2017 05:19:09 -0700
+Subject: KVM: nVMX: Fix exception injection
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
+
+commit d4912215d1031e4fb3d1038d2e1857218dba0d0a upstream.
+
+ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2840 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:10966 nested_vmx_vmexit+0xdcd/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
+ CPU: 3 PID: 2840 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G OE 4.12.0-rc3+ #23
+ RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0xdcd/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
+ Call Trace:
+ ? kvm_check_async_pf_completion+0xef/0x120 [kvm]
+ ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x79/0x80
+ vmx_queue_exception+0x104/0x160 [kvm_intel]
+ ? vmx_queue_exception+0x104/0x160 [kvm_intel]
+ kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1171/0x1ce0 [kvm]
+ ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x47/0x240 [kvm]
+ ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x62/0x240 [kvm]
+ kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
+ ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
+ ? __fget+0xf3/0x210
+ do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
+ ? __fget+0x114/0x210
+ SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
+ do_syscall_64+0x81/0x220
+ entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
+
+This is triggered occasionally by running both win7 and win2016 in L2, in
+addition, EPT is disabled on both L1 and L2. It can't be reproduced easily.
+
+Commit 0b6ac343fc (KVM: nVMX: Correct handling of exception injection) mentioned
+that "KVM wants to inject page-faults which it got to the guest. This function
+assumes it is called with the exit reason in vmcs02 being a #PF exception".
+Commit e011c663 (KVM: nVMX: Check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to
+L2) allows to check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2. However,
+there is no guarantee the exit reason is exception currently, when there is an
+external interrupt occurred on host, maybe a time interrupt for host which should
+not be injected to guest, and somewhere queues an exception, then the function
+nested_vmx_check_exception() will be called and the vmexit emulation codes will
+try to emulate the "Acknowledge interrupt on exit" behavior, the warning is
+triggered.
+
+Reusing the exit reason from the L2->L0 vmexit is wrong in this case,
+the reason must always be EXCEPTION_NMI when injecting an exception into
+L1 as a nested vmexit.
+
+Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
+Fixes: e011c663b9c7 ("KVM: nVMX: Check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2")
+Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+@@ -2264,7 +2264,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_exception(st
+ if (!(vmcs12->exception_bitmap & (1u << nr)))
+ return 0;
+
+- nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason,
++ nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI,
+ vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
+ vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
+ return 1;
--- /dev/null
+From 6ed071f051e12cf7baa1b69d3becb8f232fdfb7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Apr 2017 16:42:44 +0200
+Subject: KVM: x86: fix emulation of RSM and IRET instructions
+
+From: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
+
+commit 6ed071f051e12cf7baa1b69d3becb8f232fdfb7b upstream.
+
+On AMD, the effect of set_nmi_mask called by emulate_iret_real and em_rsm
+on hflags is reverted later on in x86_emulate_instruction where hflags are
+overwritten with ctxt->emul_flags (the kvm_set_hflags call). This manifests
+as a hang when rebooting Windows VMs with QEMU, OVMF, and >1 vcpu.
+
+Instead of trying to merge ctxt->emul_flags into vcpu->arch.hflags after
+an instruction is emulated, this commit deletes emul_flags altogether and
+makes the emulator access vcpu->arch.hflags using two new accessors. This
+way all changes, on the emulator side as well as in functions called from
+the emulator and accessing vcpu state with emul_to_vcpu, are preserved.
+
+More details on the bug and its manifestation with Windows and OVMF:
+
+ It's a KVM bug in the interaction between SMI/SMM and NMI, specific to AMD.
+ I believe that the SMM part explains why we started seeing this only with
+ OVMF.
+
+ KVM masks and unmasks NMI when entering and leaving SMM. When KVM emulates
+ the RSM instruction in em_rsm, the set_nmi_mask call doesn't stick because
+ later on in x86_emulate_instruction we overwrite arch.hflags with
+ ctxt->emul_flags, effectively reverting the effect of the set_nmi_mask call.
+ The AMD-specific hflag of interest here is HF_NMI_MASK.
+
+ When rebooting the system, Windows sends an NMI IPI to all but the current
+ cpu to shut them down. Only after all of them are parked in HLT will the
+ initiating cpu finish the restart. If NMI is masked, other cpus never get
+ the memo and the initiating cpu spins forever, waiting for
+ hal!HalpInterruptProcessorsStarted to drop. That's the symptom we observe.
+
+Fixes: a584539b24b8 ("KVM: x86: pass the whole hflags field to emulator and back")
+Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 4 +++-
+ arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 16 +++++++++-------
+ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
+ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
++++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+@@ -221,6 +221,9 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {
+ void (*get_cpuid)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
+ u32 *eax, u32 *ebx, u32 *ecx, u32 *edx);
+ void (*set_nmi_mask)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, bool masked);
++
++ unsigned (*get_hflags)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
++ void (*set_hflags)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned hflags);
+ };
+
+ typedef u32 __attribute__((vector_size(16))) sse128_t;
+@@ -290,7 +293,6 @@ struct x86_emulate_ctxt {
+
+ /* interruptibility state, as a result of execution of STI or MOV SS */
+ int interruptibility;
+- int emul_flags;
+
+ bool perm_ok; /* do not check permissions if true */
+ bool ud; /* inject an #UD if host doesn't support insn */
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+@@ -2531,7 +2531,7 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctx
+ u64 smbase;
+ int ret;
+
+- if ((ctxt->emul_flags & X86EMUL_SMM_MASK) == 0)
++ if ((ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) & X86EMUL_SMM_MASK) == 0)
+ return emulate_ud(ctxt);
+
+ /*
+@@ -2580,11 +2580,11 @@ static int em_rsm(struct x86_emulate_ctx
+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+ }
+
+- if ((ctxt->emul_flags & X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK) == 0)
++ if ((ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) & X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK) == 0)
+ ctxt->ops->set_nmi_mask(ctxt, false);
+
+- ctxt->emul_flags &= ~X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK;
+- ctxt->emul_flags &= ~X86EMUL_SMM_MASK;
++ ctxt->ops->set_hflags(ctxt, ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt) &
++ ~(X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK | X86EMUL_SMM_MASK));
+ return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+ }
+
+@@ -5296,6 +5296,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_
+ const struct x86_emulate_ops *ops = ctxt->ops;
+ int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+ int saved_dst_type = ctxt->dst.type;
++ unsigned emul_flags;
+
+ ctxt->mem_read.pos = 0;
+
+@@ -5310,6 +5311,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_
+ goto done;
+ }
+
++ emul_flags = ctxt->ops->get_hflags(ctxt);
+ if (unlikely(ctxt->d &
+ (No64|Undefined|Sse|Mmx|Intercept|CheckPerm|Priv|Prot|String))) {
+ if ((ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 && (ctxt->d & No64)) ||
+@@ -5343,7 +5345,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_
+ fetch_possible_mmx_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->dst);
+ }
+
+- if (unlikely(ctxt->emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && ctxt->intercept) {
++ if (unlikely(emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && ctxt->intercept) {
+ rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
+ X86_ICPT_PRE_EXCEPT);
+ if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+@@ -5372,7 +5374,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+- if (unlikely(ctxt->emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
++ if (unlikely(emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
+ rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
+ X86_ICPT_POST_EXCEPT);
+ if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+@@ -5426,7 +5428,7 @@ int x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_
+
+ special_insn:
+
+- if (unlikely(ctxt->emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
++ if (unlikely(emul_flags & X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK) && (ctxt->d & Intercept)) {
+ rc = emulator_check_intercept(ctxt, ctxt->intercept,
+ X86_ICPT_POST_MEMACCESS);
+ if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+@@ -4999,6 +4999,16 @@ static void emulator_set_nmi_mask(struct
+ kvm_x86_ops->set_nmi_mask(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), masked);
+ }
+
++static unsigned emulator_get_hflags(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
++{
++ return emul_to_vcpu(ctxt)->arch.hflags;
++}
++
++static void emulator_set_hflags(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, unsigned emul_flags)
++{
++ kvm_set_hflags(emul_to_vcpu(ctxt), emul_flags);
++}
++
+ static const struct x86_emulate_ops emulate_ops = {
+ .read_gpr = emulator_read_gpr,
+ .write_gpr = emulator_write_gpr,
+@@ -5038,6 +5048,8 @@ static const struct x86_emulate_ops emul
+ .intercept = emulator_intercept,
+ .get_cpuid = emulator_get_cpuid,
+ .set_nmi_mask = emulator_set_nmi_mask,
++ .get_hflags = emulator_get_hflags,
++ .set_hflags = emulator_set_hflags,
+ };
+
+ static void toggle_interruptibility(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 mask)
+@@ -5090,7 +5102,6 @@ static void init_emulate_ctxt(struct kvm
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(HF_GUEST_MASK != X86EMUL_GUEST_MASK);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(HF_SMM_MASK != X86EMUL_SMM_MASK);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK != X86EMUL_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK);
+- ctxt->emul_flags = vcpu->arch.hflags;
+
+ init_decode_cache(ctxt);
+ vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_from_vcpu = false;
+@@ -5486,8 +5497,6 @@ restart:
+ unsigned long rflags = kvm_x86_ops->get_rflags(vcpu);
+ toggle_interruptibility(vcpu, ctxt->interruptibility);
+ vcpu->arch.emulate_regs_need_sync_to_vcpu = false;
+- if (vcpu->arch.hflags != ctxt->emul_flags)
+- kvm_set_hflags(vcpu, ctxt->emul_flags);
+ kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip);
+ if (r == EMULATE_DONE)
+ kvm_vcpu_check_singlestep(vcpu, rflags, &r);
--- /dev/null
+From 34b0dadbdf698f9b277a31b2747b625b9a75ea1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Radim=20Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 18 May 2017 19:37:31 +0200
+Subject: KVM: x86/vPMU: fix undefined shift in intel_pmu_refresh()
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
+
+commit 34b0dadbdf698f9b277a31b2747b625b9a75ea1f upstream.
+
+Static analysis noticed that pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters can be 32
+(INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC) and therefore cannot be used to shift 'int'.
+
+I didn't add BUILD_BUG_ON for it as we have a better checker.
+
+Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Fixes: 25462f7f5295 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")
+Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/pmu_intel.c
+@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static void intel_pmu_refresh(struct kvm
+ ((u64)1 << edx.split.bit_width_fixed) - 1;
+ }
+
+- pmu->global_ctrl = ((1 << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1) |
++ pmu->global_ctrl = ((1ull << pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters) - 1) |
+ (((1ull << pmu->nr_arch_fixed_counters) - 1) << INTEL_PMC_IDX_FIXED);
+ pmu->global_ctrl_mask = ~pmu->global_ctrl;
+
--- /dev/null
+From f0367ee1d64d27fa08be2407df5c125442e885e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Radim=20Kr=C4=8Dm=C3=A1=C5=99?= <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 18 May 2017 19:37:30 +0200
+Subject: KVM: x86: zero base3 of unusable segments
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
+
+commit f0367ee1d64d27fa08be2407df5c125442e885e3 upstream.
+
+Static checker noticed that base3 could be used uninitialized if the
+segment was not present (useable). Random stack values probably would
+not pass VMCS entry checks.
+
+Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Fixes: 1aa366163b8b ("KVM: x86 emulator: consolidate segment accessors")
+Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+@@ -4844,6 +4844,8 @@ static bool emulator_get_segment(struct
+
+ if (var.unusable) {
+ memset(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc));
++ if (base3)
++ *base3 = 0;
+ return false;
+ }
+
x86-mpx-correctly-report-do_mpx_bt_fault-failures-to-user-space.patch
x86-mm-fix-flush_tlb_page-on-xen.patch
ocfs2-o2hb-revert-hb-threshold-to-keep-compatible.patch
+iommu-vt-d-don-t-over-free-page-table-directories.patch
+iommu-handle-default-domain-attach-failure.patch
+iommu-amd-fix-incorrect-error-handling-in-amd_iommu_bind_pasid.patch
+cpufreq-s3c2416-double-free-on-driver-init-error-path.patch
+kvm-x86-fix-emulation-of-rsm-and-iret-instructions.patch
+kvm-x86-vpmu-fix-undefined-shift-in-intel_pmu_refresh.patch
+kvm-x86-zero-base3-of-unusable-segments.patch
+kvm-nvmx-fix-exception-injection.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
