--- /dev/null
+From 93c1cfbe598f72cfa7be49e4a7d2a1d482e15119 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sujith Manoharan <c_manoha@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2013 07:21:08 +0530
+Subject: ath9k: Fix QuickDrop usage
+
+From: Sujith Manoharan <c_manoha@qca.qualcomm.com>
+
+commit 93c1cfbe598f72cfa7be49e4a7d2a1d482e15119 upstream.
+
+Bit 5 in the miscConfiguration field of the base EEPROM
+header denotes whether QuickDrop is enabled or not. Fix
+the incorrect usage of BIT(1) and also make sure that
+this is done only for the required chips.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sujith Manoharan <c_manoha@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c
+@@ -3937,18 +3937,20 @@ static void ar9003_hw_quick_drop_apply(s
+ int quick_drop;
+ s32 t[3], f[3] = {5180, 5500, 5785};
+
+- if (!(pBase->miscConfiguration & BIT(1)))
++ if (!(pBase->miscConfiguration & BIT(4)))
+ return;
+
+- if (freq < 4000)
+- quick_drop = eep->modalHeader2G.quick_drop;
+- else {
+- t[0] = eep->base_ext1.quick_drop_low;
+- t[1] = eep->modalHeader5G.quick_drop;
+- t[2] = eep->base_ext1.quick_drop_high;
+- quick_drop = ar9003_hw_power_interpolate(freq, f, t, 3);
++ if (AR_SREV_9300(ah) || AR_SREV_9580(ah) || AR_SREV_9340(ah)) {
++ if (freq < 4000) {
++ quick_drop = eep->modalHeader2G.quick_drop;
++ } else {
++ t[0] = eep->base_ext1.quick_drop_low;
++ t[1] = eep->modalHeader5G.quick_drop;
++ t[2] = eep->base_ext1.quick_drop_high;
++ quick_drop = ar9003_hw_power_interpolate(freq, f, t, 3);
++ }
++ REG_RMW_FIELD(ah, AR_PHY_AGC, AR_PHY_AGC_QUICK_DROP, quick_drop);
+ }
+- REG_RMW_FIELD(ah, AR_PHY_AGC, AR_PHY_AGC_QUICK_DROP, quick_drop);
+ }
+
+ static void ar9003_hw_txend_to_xpa_off_apply(struct ath_hw *ah, bool is2ghz)
--- /dev/null
+From a1783a7b0846fc6414483e6caf646db72023fffd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sujith Manoharan <c_manoha@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2013 07:21:39 +0530
+Subject: ath9k: Fix XLNA bias strength
+
+From: Sujith Manoharan <c_manoha@qca.qualcomm.com>
+
+commit a1783a7b0846fc6414483e6caf646db72023fffd upstream.
+
+The EEPROM parameter to determine whether the bias
+strength values for XLNA have to be applied is part
+of the miscConfiguration field and not featureEnable.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sujith Manoharan <c_manoha@qca.qualcomm.com>
+Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c
++++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ar9003_eeprom.c
+@@ -3990,7 +3990,7 @@ static void ar9003_hw_xlna_bias_strength
+ struct ar9300_eeprom *eep = &ah->eeprom.ar9300_eep;
+ u8 bias;
+
+- if (!(eep->baseEepHeader.featureEnable & 0x40))
++ if (!(eep->baseEepHeader.miscConfiguration & 0x40))
+ return;
+
+ if (!AR_SREV_9300(ah))
--- /dev/null
+From 2d3db210860f1df099a35b1dd54cca35454e0361 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com>
+Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2013 18:11:59 -0400
+Subject: Revert "mac80211: allow disable power save in mesh"
+
+From: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com>
+
+commit 2d3db210860f1df099a35b1dd54cca35454e0361 upstream.
+
+This reverts commit ee1f668136b2fb6640ee2d54c2a525ea41f98211.
+
+The aformentioned commit added a check to allow
+'iw wlan0 set power_save off' to work for mesh interfaces.
+
+However, this is problematic because it also allows
+'iw wlan0 set power_save on', which will crash in short order
+because all of the subsequent code manipulates sdata->u.mgd.
+
+The power-saving states for mesh interfaces can be manipulated
+through the mesh config, e.g:
+'iw wlan0 set mesh_param mesh_power_save=active' (which,
+despite the name, actualy disables power saving since the
+setting refers to the type of sleep the interface undergoes).
+
+Fixes: ee1f668136b2 ("mac80211: allow disable power save in mesh")
+Signed-off-by: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com>
+Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/mac80211/cfg.c | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c
++++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
+@@ -2356,8 +2356,7 @@ static int ieee80211_set_power_mgmt(stru
+ struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = IEEE80211_DEV_TO_SUB_IF(dev);
+ struct ieee80211_local *local = wdev_priv(dev->ieee80211_ptr);
+
+- if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION &&
+- sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT)
++ if (sdata->vif.type != NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ if (!(local->hw.flags & IEEE80211_HW_SUPPORTS_PS))
--- /dev/null
+From 47180068276a04ed31d24fe04c673138208b07a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2013 16:10:45 -0500
+Subject: selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()
+
+From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+
+commit 47180068276a04ed31d24fe04c673138208b07a9 upstream.
+
+In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
+socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
+work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
+the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
+socket represented by the request_sock struct.
+
+Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
+socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
+request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
+point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
+It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
+labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
+packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
+connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
+access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
+information leaks.
+
+Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
+Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/selinux/hooks.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
++++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
+ #include <net/sock.h>
+ #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
++#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
+ #include <net/net_namespace.h>
+ #include <net/netlabel.h>
+ #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+@@ -4621,6 +4622,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward
+ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family)
+ {
++ struct sock *sk;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ if (!netlbl_enabled())
+@@ -4629,8 +4631,27 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(st
+ /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
+ * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
+ * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
+- if (skb->sk) {
+- struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
++ sk = skb->sk;
++ if (sk) {
++ struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
++
++ if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
++ /* if the socket is the listening state then this
++ * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
++ * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
++ * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
++ * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
++ * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
++ * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
++ * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
++ * from the initial connection request (in the IP
++ * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
++ * security label in the packet itself this is the
++ * best we can do. */
++ return NF_ACCEPT;
++
++ /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
++ sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ sid = sksec->sid;
+ } else
+ sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
--- /dev/null
+From 446b802437f285de68ffb8d6fac3c44c3cab5b04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2013 16:10:51 -0500
+Subject: selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()
+
+From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+
+commit 446b802437f285de68ffb8d6fac3c44c3cab5b04 upstream.
+
+In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
+packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the
+packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
+cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
+the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
+not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when
+selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
+directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
+originally labeled the associated request_sock.
+
+See the inline comments for more explanation.
+
+Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
+Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/selinux/hooks.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
++++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
+@@ -3737,6 +3737,30 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struc
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++/**
++ * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
++ * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
++ * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
++ * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
++ *
++ * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
++ * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
++ * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
++ * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
++ *
++ */
++static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
++{
++ int err = 0;
++
++ if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
++ err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
++ else
++ *conn_sid = sk_sid;
++
++ return err;
++}
++
+ /* socket security operations */
+
+ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+@@ -4343,7 +4367,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ int err;
+ u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+- u32 newsid;
++ u32 connsid;
+ u32 peersid;
+
+ /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
+@@ -4353,16 +4377,11 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
+ err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+- if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
+- req->secid = sksec->sid;
+- req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
+- } else {
+- err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
+- if (err)
+- return err;
+- req->secid = newsid;
+- req->peer_secid = peersid;
+- }
++ err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
++ if (err)
++ return err;
++ req->secid = connsid;
++ req->peer_secid = peersid;
+
+ return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
+ }
+@@ -4736,12 +4755,12 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
+ if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+- /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
+- * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
+- * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
+- * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
+ sk = skb->sk;
+ if (sk == NULL) {
++ /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
++ * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
++ * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
++ * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
+ if (skb->skb_iif) {
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
+ if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
+@@ -4750,7 +4769,26 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+ peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ }
++ } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
++ /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
++ * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
++ * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
++ * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
++ * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
++ * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
++ * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
++ * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
++ * for similar problems. */
++ u32 skb_sid;
++ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
++ if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
++ return NF_DROP;
++ if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
++ return NF_DROP;
++ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
+ } else {
++ /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
++ * associated socket. */
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ peer_sid = sksec->sid;
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
powerpc-fix-pte-page-address-mismatch-in-pgtable-ctor-dtor.patch
drivers-rtc-rtc-at91rm9200.c-correct-alarm-over-day-month-wrap.patch
drm-i915-fix-pipe-csc-post-offset-calculation.patch
+ath9k-fix-quickdrop-usage.patch
+ath9k-fix-xlna-bias-strength.patch
+selinux-handle-tcp-syn-ack-packets-correctly-in-selinux_ip_output.patch
+selinux-handle-tcp-syn-ack-packets-correctly-in-selinux_ip_postroute.patch
+revert-mac80211-allow-disable-power-save-in-mesh.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
