--- /dev/null
+From 85dc6ee1237c8a4a7742e6abab96a20389b7d682 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@altera.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 19:49:18 +0100
+Subject: clocksource: dw_apb_timer_of: Fix read_sched_clock
+
+From: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@altera.com>
+
+commit 85dc6ee1237c8a4a7742e6abab96a20389b7d682 upstream.
+
+The read_sched_clock should return the ~value because the clock is a
+countdown implementation. read_sched_clock() should be the same as
+ __apbt_read_clocksource().
+
+Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@altera.com>
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ drivers/clocksource/dw_apb_timer_of.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/clocksource/dw_apb_timer_of.c
++++ b/drivers/clocksource/dw_apb_timer_of.c
+@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static void __iomem *sched_io_base;
+
+ static u32 read_sched_clock(void)
+ {
+- return __raw_readl(sched_io_base);
++ return ~__raw_readl(sched_io_base);
+ }
+
+ static const struct of_device_id sptimer_ids[] __initconst = {
--- /dev/null
+From 817eff718dca4e54d5721211ddde0914428fbb7c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 14:57:54 -0500
+Subject: selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets
+
+From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+
+commit 817eff718dca4e54d5721211ddde0914428fbb7c upstream.
+
+Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
+IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
+check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
+labels.
+
+Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 -
+ security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 9 +++---
+ security/selinux/xfrm.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
++++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
+@@ -3723,7 +3723,7 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struc
+ u32 nlbl_sid;
+ u32 nlbl_type;
+
+- selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
++ selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+ selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
+
+ err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
+--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
++++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, s
+ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 proto);
+ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
++int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
+
+ static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
+ {
+@@ -80,12 +81,12 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_se
+ static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
+ {
+ }
+-#endif
+
+-static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
++static inline int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+ {
+- int err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, sid, 0);
+- BUG_ON(err);
++ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
++ return 0;
+ }
++#endif
+
+ #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
+--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
++++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+@@ -152,21 +152,13 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(st
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+-/*
+- * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+- * incoming packet.
+- */
+-
+-int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
++static int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(struct sk_buff *skb,
++ u32 *sid, int ckall)
+ {
+- struct sec_path *sp;
++ struct sec_path *sp = skb->sp;
+
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+- if (skb == NULL)
+- return 0;
+-
+- sp = skb->sp;
+ if (sp) {
+ int i, sid_set = 0;
+
+@@ -190,6 +182,45 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct s
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++static u32 selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(struct sk_buff *skb)
++{
++ struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
++ struct xfrm_state *x;
++
++ if (dst == NULL)
++ return SECSID_NULL;
++ x = dst->xfrm;
++ if (x == NULL || !selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x))
++ return SECSID_NULL;
++
++ return x->security->ctx_sid;
++}
++
++/*
++ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
++ * incoming packet.
++ */
++
++int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
++{
++ if (skb == NULL) {
++ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
++ return 0;
++ }
++ return selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, ckall);
++}
++
++int selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
++{
++ int rc;
++
++ rc = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_ingress(skb, sid, 0);
++ if (rc == 0 && *sid == SECSID_NULL)
++ *sid = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid_egress(skb);
++
++ return rc;
++}
++
+ /*
+ * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
+ * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
--- /dev/null
+From c0828e50485932b7e019df377a6b0a8d1ebd3080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 Dec 2013 14:58:01 -0500
+Subject: selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in selinux_ip_postroute()
+
+From: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+
+commit c0828e50485932b7e019df377a6b0a8d1ebd3080 upstream.
+
+Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
+TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
+while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
+until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
+
+Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
+Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/selinux/hooks.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
++++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
+@@ -4742,22 +4742,32 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
+ * as fast and as clean as possible. */
+ if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+ return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
++
++ secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
++ peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
++ if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
++ return NF_ACCEPT;
++
++ sk = skb->sk;
++
+ #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
+ /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
+ * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
+ * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
+ * when the packet is on it's final way out.
+ * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
+- * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
+- if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
++ * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
++ * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
++ * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
++ * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
++ * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
++ * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
++ * connection. */
++ if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
++ !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+ #endif
+- secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
+- peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
+- if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
+- return NF_ACCEPT;
+
+- sk = skb->sk;
+ if (sk == NULL) {
+ /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
+ * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
+@@ -4785,6 +4795,25 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+ if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
++ /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
++ * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
++ * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
++ * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
++ * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
++ * pass the packet. */
++ if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
++ switch (family) {
++ case PF_INET:
++ if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
++ return NF_ACCEPT;
++ break;
++ case PF_INET6:
++ if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
++ return NF_ACCEPT;
++ default:
++ return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
++ }
++ }
+ if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
+ return NF_DROP;
+ secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
gpio-twl4030-fix-regression-for-twl-gpio-led-output.patch
gpio-msm-fix-irq-mask-unmask-by-writing-bits-instead-of-numbers.patch
sh-always-link-in-helper-functions-extracted-from-libgcc.patch
+selinux-look-for-ipsec-labels-on-both-inbound-and-outbound-packets.patch
+selinux-process-labeled-ipsec-tcp-syn-ack-packets-properly-in-selinux_ip_postroute.patch
+clocksource-dw_apb_timer_of-fix-read_sched_clock.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
