5.15-stable patches

added patches:
	keys-asymmetric-copy-sig-and-digest-in-public_key_verify_signature.patch
	regmap-account-for-register-length-when-chunking.patch

diff --git a/queue-5.15/keys-asymmetric-copy-sig-and-digest-in-public_key_verify_signature.patch b/queue-5.15/keys-asymmetric-copy-sig-and-digest-in-public_key_verify_signature.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..d55fe76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-5.15/keys-asymmetric-copy-sig-and-digest-in-public_key_verify_signature.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From c3d03e8e35e005e1a614e51bb59053eeb5857f76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2022 10:56:46 +0100
+Subject: KEYS: asymmetric: Copy sig and digest in public_key_verify_signature()
+
+From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+
+commit c3d03e8e35e005e1a614e51bb59053eeb5857f76 upstream.
+
+Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear
+mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the
+linear mapping area.
+
+However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced
+stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area,
+which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs
+adjacent pages.
+
+Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to
+store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it
+to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The
+buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area.
+
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x
+Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support")
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/
+Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
+Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
+Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c |   38 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
++++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+@@ -380,9 +380,10 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const st
+       struct crypto_wait cwait;
+       struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+       struct akcipher_request *req;
+-      struct scatterlist src_sg[2];
++      struct scatterlist src_sg;
+       char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+-      char *key, *ptr;
++      char *buf, *ptr;
++      size_t buf_len;
+       int ret;
+ 
+       pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+@@ -420,34 +421,37 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const st
+       if (!req)
+               goto error_free_tfm;
+ 
+-      key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
+-                    GFP_KERNEL);
+-      if (!key)
++      buf_len = max_t(size_t, pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
++                      sig->s_size + sig->digest_size);
++
++      buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
++      if (!buf)
+               goto error_free_req;
+ 
+-      memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
+-      ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
++      memcpy(buf, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
++      ptr = buf + pkey->keylen;
+       ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
+       ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
+       memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
+ 
+       if (pkey->key_is_private)
+-              ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
++              ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen);
+       else
+-              ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
++              ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen);
+       if (ret)
+-              goto error_free_key;
++              goto error_free_buf;
+ 
+       if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 && sig->data_size) {
+               ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm);
+               if (ret)
+-                      goto error_free_key;
++                      goto error_free_buf;
+       }
+ 
+-      sg_init_table(src_sg, 2);
+-      sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size);
+-      sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
+-      akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size,
++      memcpy(buf, sig->s, sig->s_size);
++      memcpy(buf + sig->s_size, sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
++
++      sg_init_one(&src_sg, buf, sig->s_size + sig->digest_size);
++      akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size,
+                                  sig->digest_size);
+       crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
+       akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+@@ -455,8 +459,8 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const st
+                                     crypto_req_done, &cwait);
+       ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait);
+ 
+-error_free_key:
+-      kfree(key);
++error_free_buf:
++      kfree(buf);
+ error_free_req:
+       akcipher_request_free(req);
+ error_free_tfm:

diff --git a/queue-5.15/regmap-account-for-register-length-when-chunking.patch b/queue-5.15/regmap-account-for-register-length-when-chunking.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..c0440d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-5.15/regmap-account-for-register-length-when-chunking.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 3981514180c987a79ea98f0ae06a7cbf58a9ac0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jim Wylder <jwylder@google.com>
+Date: Wed, 17 May 2023 10:20:11 -0500
+Subject: regmap: Account for register length when chunking
+
+From: Jim Wylder <jwylder@google.com>
+
+commit 3981514180c987a79ea98f0ae06a7cbf58a9ac0f upstream.
+
+Currently, when regmap_raw_write() splits the data, it uses the
+max_raw_write value defined for the bus.  For any bus that includes
+the target register address in the max_raw_write value, the chunked
+transmission will always exceed the maximum transmission length.
+To avoid this problem, subtract the length of the register and the
+padding from the maximum transmission.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jim Wylder <jwylder@google.com
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517152444.3690870-2-jwylder@google.com
+Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+---
+ drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c |    6 ++++--
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c
++++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c
+@@ -2041,6 +2041,8 @@ int _regmap_raw_write(struct regmap *map
+       size_t val_count = val_len / val_bytes;
+       size_t chunk_count, chunk_bytes;
+       size_t chunk_regs = val_count;
++      size_t max_data = map->max_raw_write - map->format.reg_bytes -
++                      map->format.pad_bytes;
+       int ret, i;
+ 
+       if (!val_count)
+@@ -2048,8 +2050,8 @@ int _regmap_raw_write(struct regmap *map
+ 
+       if (map->use_single_write)
+               chunk_regs = 1;
+-      else if (map->max_raw_write && val_len > map->max_raw_write)
+-              chunk_regs = map->max_raw_write / val_bytes;
++      else if (map->max_raw_write && val_len > max_data)
++              chunk_regs = max_data / val_bytes;
+ 
+       chunk_count = val_count / chunk_regs;
+       chunk_bytes = chunk_regs * val_bytes;

diff --git a/queue-5.15/series b/queue-5.15/series
index fdab58eea31cbae5f544e52cef45bd13a524ba66..1a40fff2f475921278f7578c9c422c5128eab4ee 100644 (file)
--- a/queue-5.15/series
+++ b/queue-5.15/series
@@ -146,3 +146,5 @@ test_firmware-fix-the-memory-leak-of-the-allocated-firmware-buffer.patch
 kvm-x86-account-fastpath-only-vm-exits-in-vcpu-stats.patch
 ksmbd-fix-credit-count-leakage.patch
 ksmbd-fix-incorrect-allocationsize-set-in-smb2_get_info.patch
+keys-asymmetric-copy-sig-and-digest-in-public_key_verify_signature.patch
+regmap-account-for-register-length-when-chunking.patch