Found by running the checkpatch.pl Linux script to enforce coding style.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21468)
if (opt_csr != NULL) {
CMP_err1("no -newkey option given with private key for POPO, -csr option only provides public key%s",
opt_key == NULL ? "" :
- ", and -key option superseded by by -csr");
+ ", and -key option superseded by -csr");
return 0;
}
if (opt_key == NULL) {
{
/*
* Since we pull only one environment variable, it's simpler to
- * to just ignore |name| and use equivalent wide-char L-literal.
+ * just ignore |name| and use equivalent wide-char L-literal.
* As well as to ignore excessively long values...
*/
static WCHAR value[48];
*/
/*
- * The volatile is used to to ensure that the compiler generates code that reads
+ * The volatile is used to ensure that the compiler generates code that reads
* all values from the array and doesn't try to optimize this away. The standard
* doesn't actually require this behavior if the original data pointed to is
* not volatile, but compilers do this in practice anyway.
goto ret;
}
/*
- * Generate random k and copy to param param block. RAND_priv_bytes_ex
+ * Generate random k and copy to param block. RAND_priv_bytes_ex
* is used instead of BN_priv_rand_range or BN_generate_dsa_nonce
* because kdsa instruction constructs an in-range, invertible nonce
* internally implementing counter-measures for RNG weakness.
do {
/*
* This does not necessarily catch the case when the full
- * HTTP response came in in more than a single TCP message.
+ * HTTP response came in more than a single TCP message.
*/
read_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUF_SIZE);
} while (read_len > 2);
* Read the MSBLOB header and get relevant data from it.
*
* |pisdss| and |pispub| have a double role, as they can be used for
- * discovery as well as to check the the blob meets expectations.
+ * discovery as well as to check the blob meets expectations.
* |*pisdss| is the indicator for whether the key is a DSA key or not.
* |*pispub| is the indicator for whether the key is public or not.
* In both cases, the following input values apply:
* See SP800-56Br1 6.3.1.3 (Step 6) Perform a pair-wise consistency test by
* verifying that: k = (k^e)^d mod n for some integer k where 1 < k < n-1.
*
- * Returns 1 if the RSA key passes the pairwise test or 0 it it fails.
+ * Returns 1 if the RSA key passes the pairwise test or 0 if it fails.
*/
int ossl_rsa_sp800_56b_pairwise_test(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
ctx->post_process_data = post_process_data;
/*
- * ossl_store_get0_loader_int will raise an error if the loader for the
+ * ossl_store_get0_loader_int will raise an error if the loader for
* the scheme cannot be retrieved. But if a loader was successfully
* fetched then we remove this error from the error stack.
*/
/*
* Reject when explicit trust EKU are set and none match.
*
- * Returning untrusted is enough for for full chains that end in
+ * Returning untrusted is enough for full chains that end in
* self-signed roots, because when explicit trust is specified it
* suppresses the default blanket trust of self-signed objects.
*
* Some options are purposely NOT defined per-platform
*
* OSSL_TFO_SYSCTL
- * Defined as a sysctlbyname() option to to determine if
+ * Defined as a sysctlbyname() option to determine if
* TFO is enabled in the kernel (macOS, FreeBSD)
*
* OSSL_TFO_SERVER_SOCKOPT
/*
* NO WINDOWS SUPPORT
*
- * But this is is what would be used on the server:
+ * But this is what would be used on the server:
*
* define OSSL_TFO_SERVER_SOCKOPT TCP_FASTOPEN
* define OSSL_TFO_SERVER_SOCKOPT_VALUE 1
* the RFC.
*
* The return value of this function transitions from 1 to 0 for a given PN once
- * that PN is passed to ossl_ackm_on_rx_packet, thus thus function must be used
+ * that PN is passed to ossl_ackm_on_rx_packet, thus this function must be used
* before calling ossl_ackm_on_rx_packet.
*/
int ossl_ackm_is_rx_pn_processable(OSSL_ACKM *ackm, QUIC_PN pn, int pkt_space);
* remain available until all the bytes from record are released via one or
* more release_record calls.
*
- * Internally the the OSSL_RECORD_METHOD the implementation may read/process
+ * Internally the OSSL_RECORD_METHOD implementation may read/process
* multiple records in one go and buffer them.
*/
int (*read_record)(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, void **rechandle, int *rversion,
/** Indicates if an EC_KEY can be used for signing.
* \param eckey the EC_KEY object
- * \return 1 if can can sign and 0 otherwise.
+ * \return 1 if can sign and 0 otherwise.
*/
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey);
return NULL;
/*
- * If a group name is selected then the type is group regardless of what the
+ * If a group name is selected then the type is group regardless of what
* the user selected. This overrides rather than errors for backwards
* compatibility.
*/
/*
* Ensure we have enough iovecs allocated (1 for the header, up to 2 for
- * the the stream data.)
+ * the stream data.)
*/
if (!txp_el_ensure_iovec(&txp->el[enc_level], h->num_iovec + 3))
return 0; /* alloc error */
/*
* Ensure we have enough iovecs allocated (1 for the header, up to 2 for
- * the the stream data.)
+ * the stream data.)
*/
if (!txp_el_ensure_iovec(&txp->el[enc_level], h->num_iovec + 3))
goto err; /* alloc error */
* we now have the following setup.
* client_random
* cipher_list - our preferred list of ciphers
- * ciphers - the clients preferred list of ciphers
+ * ciphers - the client's preferred list of ciphers
* compression - basically ignored right now
* ssl version is set - sslv3
* s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
/*
* If this picks the wrong signature without realizing it
* we can get a segfault or some internal error. At least watch
- * whether fake-rsa sign_init is is exercised by calling sign.
+ * whether fake-rsa sign_init is exercised by calling sign.
*/
if (!TEST_int_eq(EVP_PKEY_sign_init(ctx), 1))
goto end;
* Test session ordering and timeout
* Can't explicitly test performance of the new code,
* but can test to see if the ordering of the sessions
- * are correct, and they they are removed as expected
+ * are correct, and they are removed as expected
*/
SSL_SESSION *early = NULL;
SSL_SESSION *middle = NULL;
/*
* Start blatant code steal. Alternative: Open up d2i_X509_PUBKEY_INTERNAL
* as per https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/16697 (TBD)
- * Code from from openssl/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c as
+ * Code from openssl/crypto/x509/x_pubkey.c as
* ossl_d2i_X509_PUBKEY_INTERNAL is presently not public
*/
struct X509_pubkey_st {