And review fixup recommit.

git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@1647 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9

diff --git a/doc/Changelog b/doc/Changelog
index 9d035be03e32fecc822942fea6dfa89203163564..4ce11741bac4e7ced7a01e636e0ed619693f9fb0 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/Changelog
+++ b/doc/Changelog
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
          before chrooting.  This makes permissions on remote-control key 
          files easier to set up.  Fixes bug #251.
        - flush_type and flush_name remove msg cache entries.
+       - codereview - dp copy bogus setting fix.
 
 8 June 2009: Wouter
        - Removed RFC5011 REVOKE flag support. Partial 5011 support may cause

diff --git a/doc/TODO b/doc/TODO
index ef9cc4615e0a17231d857880746a3d598985ca07..733f8f555f73791f0ddd4bbe1660f5ea2ae86b52 100644 (file)
--- a/doc/TODO
+++ b/doc/TODO
@@ -62,6 +62,33 @@ o infra and lame cache: easier size config (in Mb), show usage in graphs.
        - check where queries go - otherwise reduce TTL on NS.
        - also make DS NSEC bogus. Also DS msg cache entry.
        - check BIT_DS in DS NSEC and do not take from cache if set.
+- mark bogus under stringent conditions
+       - if DS at parent and validly signed. Then DNSKEY must exist.
+       - Also for trust anchor points themselves. DNSKEY must exist.
+       - so if then DNSKEY keyprime fails
+         - then it is not simply a server that only answers qtype A.
+         - then parent is agreeing (somewhat) with the DS record
+         - but it could still be a lame domain, these exist 
+           The objective is to keep tries for genuinely lame domains to a
+           minimum, while detecting forgeries quickly. exponential backoff.
+       - for unbound we can check if we got something to verify while
+         building that chain of trust.  If so - not lame, agressive retry.
+         - but security-lame zones also exist and should not pose 
+           too high a burden. Exponential backoff again.
+           (fe. badly signed or dnskey reply too large fails).
+       - the delegation NS for the domain is bogus.
+         The referral retried, with exponential backoff.
+         This exponential backoff should go towards values which are close
+         to the TTLs that are used now (on lame delegations for example).
+         so that the extra traffic is manageable.
+       - for unbound, reset the TTL on the NS rrset. Let it timeout.
+         Set NS rrset bogus - no more queries to the domain are done.
+         Also set DNSKEY and DS (rrset, NSEC, msg) bogus and ttl like that.
+         (to the same absolute value, so a clean retry is done).
+         TTL of NS is (rounddown) timeout in seconds.
+         Until the NS times out and referral is done again.
+         Make sure multiple validations for chains of trust do not result
+         in a flood of queries or backoff too quickly.
 - bogus exponential backoff cache. hash(name,t,c), size(1M, 5%).
        TTL of 24h.  Backoff from 200msec to 24h.
        x2 on bogus(18 tries), x8 backoff on lameness(6 tries), 

diff --git a/iterator/iter_delegpt.c b/iterator/iter_delegpt.c
index 13bcdad47bca4559332950830cf4ab74dc73dab8..c5bc66385cd169038b1ca5cd598fdcf87eedb402 100644 (file)
--- a/iterator/iter_delegpt.c
+++ b/iterator/iter_delegpt.c
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct delegpt* delegpt_copy(struct delegpt* dp, struct regional* region)
                return NULL;
        if(!delegpt_set_name(copy, region, dp->name))
                return NULL;
+       copy->bogus = dp->bogus;
        for(ns = dp->nslist; ns; ns = ns->next) {
                if(!delegpt_add_ns(copy, region, ns->name))
                        return NULL;