3.18-stable patches

added patches:
	keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch

diff --git a/queue-3.18/keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch b/queue-3.18/keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..6d8dd11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-3.18/keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+From ee618b4619b72527aaed765f0f0b74072b281159 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Date: Thu, 8 Jun 2017 14:49:18 +0100
+Subject: KEYS: trusted: sanitize all key material
+
+From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+
+commit ee618b4619b72527aaed765f0f0b74072b281159 upstream.
+
+As the previous patch did for encrypted-keys, zero sensitive any
+potentially sensitive data related to the "trusted" key type before it
+is freed.  Notably, we were not zeroing the tpm_buf structures in which
+the actual key is stored for TPM seal and unseal, nor were we zeroing
+the trusted_key_payload in certain error paths.
+
+Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Cc: David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
+Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ security/keys/trusted.c |   35 +++++++++++++++++------------------
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
++++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
+@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char
+       }
+ 
+       ret = crypto_shash_digest(&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest);
+-      kfree(sdesc);
++      kzfree(sdesc);
+       return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *di
+       if (!ret)
+               ret = crypto_shash_final(&sdesc->shash, digest);
+ out:
+-      kfree(sdesc);
++      kzfree(sdesc);
+       return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *d
+                                 paramdigest, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h1,
+                                 TPM_NONCE_SIZE, h2, 1, &c, 0, 0);
+ out:
+-      kfree(sdesc);
++      kzfree(sdesc);
+       return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char
+       if (memcmp(testhmac, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+               ret = -EINVAL;
+ out:
+-      kfree(sdesc);
++      kzfree(sdesc);
+       return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char
+       if (memcmp(testhmac2, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE))
+               ret = -EINVAL;
+ out:
+-      kfree(sdesc);
++      kzfree(sdesc);
+       return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
+               *bloblen = storedsize;
+       }
+ out:
+-      kfree(td);
++      kzfree(td);
+       return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_p
+       if (ret < 0)
+               pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+ 
+-      kfree(tb);
++      kzfree(tb);
+       return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key
+               /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */
+               p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len];
+ 
+-      kfree(tb);
++      kzfree(tb);
+       return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -961,12 +961,12 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct ke
+       if (!ret && options->pcrlock)
+               ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock);
+ out:
+-      kfree(datablob);
+-      kfree(options);
++      kzfree(datablob);
++      kzfree(options);
+       if (!ret)
+               rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload);
+       else
+-              kfree(payload);
++              kzfree(payload);
+       return ret;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -975,8 +975,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_
+       struct trusted_key_payload *p;
+ 
+       p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu);
+-      memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
+-      kfree(p);
++      kzfree(p);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1018,7 +1017,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke
+       ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o);
+       if (ret != Opt_update) {
+               ret = -EINVAL;
+-              kfree(new_p);
++              kzfree(new_p);
+               goto out;
+       }
+       /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */
+@@ -1031,22 +1030,22 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *ke
+       ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o);
+       if (ret < 0) {
+               pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret);
+-              kfree(new_p);
++              kzfree(new_p);
+               goto out;
+       }
+       if (new_o->pcrlock) {
+               ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock);
+               if (ret < 0) {
+                       pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret);
+-                      kfree(new_p);
++                      kzfree(new_p);
+                       goto out;
+               }
+       }
+       rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p);
+       call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free);
+ out:
+-      kfree(datablob);
+-      kfree(new_o);
++      kzfree(datablob);
++      kzfree(new_o);
+       return ret;
+ }
+ 

diff --git a/queue-3.18/series b/queue-3.18/series
index 7ac5db65280652f347847a45ed33fafe299bacc3..9f5cd75741d8504a15d707653ea05cce6343c3b9 100644 (file)
--- a/queue-3.18/series
+++ b/queue-3.18/series
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ ipsec-do-not-ignore-crypto-err-in-ah4-input.patch
 input-mpr121-handle-multiple-bits-change-of-status-register.patch
 input-mpr121-set-missing-event-capability.patch
 ib-ipoib-change-list_del-to-list_del_init-in-the-tx-object.patch
+keys-trusted-sanitize-all-key-material.patch

diff --git a/queue-4.13/series b/queue-4.13/series
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..1965aab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/queue-4.13/series
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+netfilter-nat-revert-netfilter-nat-convert-nat-bysrc-hash-to-rhashtable.patch
+netfilter-nft_set_hash-disable-fast_ops-for-2-len-keys.patch