+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: Documentation: Document array_index_nospec
From: Mark Rutland mark.rutland@arm.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:16 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: KVM/SVM: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de
Date: Sat Feb 3 15:56:23 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: KVM/VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL
From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de
Date: Thu Feb 1 22:59:45 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: KVM/VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de
Date: Thu Feb 1 22:59:44 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: KVM: VMX: Make indirect call speculation safe
From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org
Date: Thu Jan 25 10:58:14 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: KVM: VMX: introduce alloc_loaded_vmcs
From: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com
Date: Thu Jan 11 12:16:15 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: KVM: VMX: make MSR bitmaps per-VCPU
From: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com
Date: Tue Jan 16 16:51:18 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: KVM: nVMX: Eliminate vmcs02 pool
From: Jim Mattson jmattson@google.com
Date: Mon Nov 27 17:22:25 2017 -0600
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: KVM: x86: Make indirect calls in emulator speculation safe
From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org
Date: Thu Jan 25 10:58:13 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: KVM/x86: Add IBPB support
From: Ashok Raj ashok.raj@intel.com
Date: Thu Feb 1 22:59:43 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: KVM/x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX
From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de
Date: Thu Feb 1 22:59:42 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:22 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module
From: Andi Kleen ak@linux.intel.com
Date: Thu Jan 25 15:50:28 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:03:15 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: objtool: Add support for alternatives at the end of a section
From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 22:00:40 2018 -0600
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: objtool: Improve retpoline alternative handling
From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 22:00:39 2018 -0600
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: objtool: Warn on stripped section symbol
From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 22:00:41 2018 -0600
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:03:05 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:28 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:39 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:33 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/alternative: Print unadorned pointers
From: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de
Date: Fri Jan 26 13:11:36 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/asm: Move 'status' from thread_struct to thread_info
From: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org
Date: Sun Jan 28 10:38:50 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/bugs: Drop one "mitigation" from dmesg
From: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de
Date: Fri Jan 26 13:11:39 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/cpu/bugs: Make retpoline module warning conditional
From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de
Date: Sat Jan 27 15:45:14 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2 microcodes
From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:14 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:11 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:09 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:10 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Date: Sat Jan 27 16:24:32 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel
From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Date: Tue Jan 30 14:30:23 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/entry/64: Push extra regs right away
From: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org
Date: Sun Jan 28 10:38:49 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/entry/64: Remove the SYSCALL64 fast path
From: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org
Date: Sun Jan 28 10:38:49 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:54 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/kvm: Update spectre-v1 mitigation
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Wed Jan 31 17:47:03 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/mm: Fix overlap of i386 CPU_ENTRY_AREA with FIX_BTMAP
From: William Grant william.grant@canonical.com
Date: Tue Jan 30 22:22:55 2018 +1100
-From: William Grant william.grant@canonical.com
+From: William Grant <william.grant@canonical.com>
commit 55f49fcb879fbeebf2a8c1ac7c9e6d90df55f798
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:12 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/nospec: Fix header guards names
From: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de
Date: Fri Jan 26 13:11:37 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline option
From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com
Date: Tue Jan 30 22:13:33 2018 -0600
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:13 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/pti: Mark constant arrays as __initconst
From: Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de
Date: Fri Feb 2 22:39:23 2018 +0100
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/retpoline: Avoid retpolines for built-in __init functions
From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Date: Thu Feb 1 11:27:20 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/retpoline: Remove the esp/rsp thunk
From: Waiman Long longman@redhat.com
Date: Mon Jan 22 17:09:34 2018 -0500
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/retpoline: Simplify vmexit_fill_RSB()
From: Borislav Petkov bp@alien8.de
Date: Sat Jan 27 16:24:33 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/spectre: Check CONFIG_RETPOLINE in command line parser
-From: Dou Liyang douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
+From: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
Date: Tue Jan 30 14:13:50 2018 +0800
-From: Dou Liyang douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com
+From: Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com>
commit 9471eee9186a46893726e22ebb54cade3f9bc043
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
-Cc: Tomohiro" <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
+Cc: Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/spectre: Fix spelling mistake: "vunerable"-> "vulnerable"
From: Colin Ian King colin.king@canonical.com
Date: Tue Jan 30 19:32:18 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:03:21 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing
From: KarimAllah Ahmed karahmed@amazon.de
Date: Thu Feb 1 11:27:21 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support
From: David Woodhouse dwmw@amazon.co.uk
Date: Thu Jan 25 16:14:15 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/speculation: Fix typo IBRS_ATT, which should be IBRS_ALL
From: Darren Kenny darren.kenny@oracle.com
Date: Fri Feb 2 19:12:20 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/speculation: Simplify indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()
From: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de
Date: Sat Jan 27 16:24:34 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch
From: Tim Chen tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 22:04:47 2018 +0000
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:59 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:49 2018 -0800
+From foo@baz Mon Feb 5 10:12:24 PST 2018
Subject: x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
Date: Mon Jan 29 17:02:44 2018 -0800
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
-Cc: Tomohiro" <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
+Cc: Tomohiro <misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@intel.com
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com