upstream: clarify intent and avoid (harmess, defined behaviour)

unsigned underflow. ok tb@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b73bf5f1f381c3e4561a6cc706fb1cd77c939cd8

diff --git a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c
index c2d8471ad3e32409f42f0a68a628610ddc9d9da0..8d6bcda109194df1dadc831cad9938fbfa0309bc 100644 (file)
--- a/ssh-keysign.c
+++ b/ssh-keysign.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.77 2025/08/29 03:50:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.78 2025/09/25 06:25:38 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -129,8 +129,10 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, char **pkalgp,
        /* client host name, handle trailing dot */
        if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
                fatal_fr(r, "parse hostname");
-       debug2_f("check expect chost %s got %s", host, p);
-       if (strlen(host) != len - 1)
+       debug2_f("check expect chost \"%s\" got \"%s\"", host, p);
+       if (len == 0)
+               fail++;
+       else if (strlen(host) != len - 1)
                fail++;
        else if (p[len - 1] != '.')
                fail++;