--- /dev/null
+From 563a70222b82b6067e82d3a283355b5fb1cb2255 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Thu, 1 Jul 2021 14:21:18 +0100
+Subject: ARM: dts: versatile: Fix up interrupt controller node names
+
+From: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 82a1c67554dff610d6be4e1982c425717b3c6a23 ]
+
+Once the new schema interrupt-controller/arm,vic.yaml is added, we get
+the below warnings:
+
+ arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml:
+ intc@10140000: $nodename:0: 'intc@10140000' does not match
+ '^interrupt-controller(@[0-9a-f,]+)*$'
+
+ arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml:
+ intc@10140000: 'clear-mask' does not match any of the regexes
+
+Fix the node names for the interrupt controller to conform
+to the standard node name interrupt-controller@.. Also drop invalid
+clear-mask property.
+
+Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
+Acked-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210701132118.759454-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com'
+Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts | 5 ++---
+ arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts
+index 6f4f60ba5429..990b7ef1800e 100644
+--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts
++++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts
+@@ -192,16 +192,15 @@
+ #size-cells = <1>;
+ ranges;
+
+- vic: intc@10140000 {
++ vic: interrupt-controller@10140000 {
+ compatible = "arm,versatile-vic";
+ interrupt-controller;
+ #interrupt-cells = <1>;
+ reg = <0x10140000 0x1000>;
+- clear-mask = <0xffffffff>;
+ valid-mask = <0xffffffff>;
+ };
+
+- sic: intc@10003000 {
++ sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 {
+ compatible = "arm,versatile-sic";
+ interrupt-controller;
+ #interrupt-cells = <1>;
+diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts
+index 06a0fdf24026..e7e751a858d8 100644
+--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts
++++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts
+@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
+
+ amba {
+ /* The Versatile PB is using more SIC IRQ lines than the AB */
+- sic: intc@10003000 {
++ sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 {
+ clear-mask = <0xffffffff>;
+ /*
+ * Valid interrupt lines mask according to
+--
+2.30.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From d4b406121729dd8dd20c27c63f2a878992f097c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2021 19:34:02 +0900
+Subject: cifs: fix the out of range assignment to bit fields in
+ parse_server_interfaces
+
+From: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit c9c9c6815f9004ee1ec87401ed0796853bd70f1b ]
+
+Because the out of range assignment to bit fields
+are compiler-dependant, the fields could have wrong
+value.
+
+Signed-off-by: Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
+index 5a14f518cd97..61955a7c838b 100644
+--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
++++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
+@@ -386,8 +386,8 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_interface_info_ioctl_rsp *buf,
+ p = buf;
+ while (bytes_left >= sizeof(*p)) {
+ info->speed = le64_to_cpu(p->LinkSpeed);
+- info->rdma_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RDMA_CAPABLE);
+- info->rss_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RSS_CAPABLE);
++ info->rdma_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RDMA_CAPABLE) ? 1 : 0;
++ info->rss_capable = le32_to_cpu(p->Capability & RSS_CAPABLE) ? 1 : 0;
+
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: adding iface %zu\n", __func__, *iface_count);
+ cifs_dbg(FYI, "%s: speed %zu bps\n", __func__, info->speed);
+--
+2.30.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 1c601ba3c5bdbc9591e9abd81c92d38d9c9cc3b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 7 Jul 2021 14:50:28 +0100
+Subject: firmware: arm_scmi: Fix possible scmi_linux_errmap buffer overflow
+
+From: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 7a691f16ccad05d770f813d9c4b4337a30c6d63f ]
+
+The scmi_linux_errmap buffer access index is supposed to depend on the
+array size to prevent element out of bounds access. It uses SCMI_ERR_MAX
+to check bounds but that can mismatch with the array size. It also
+changes the success into -EIO though scmi_linux_errmap is never used in
+case of success, it is expected to work for success case too.
+
+It is slightly confusing code as the negative of the error code
+is used as index to the buffer. Fix it by negating it at the start and
+make it more readable.
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210707135028.1869642-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com
+Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
+Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c | 7 ++++---
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c
+index effc4c17e0fb..081fbe28da4b 100644
+--- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c
+@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ enum scmi_error_codes {
+ SCMI_ERR_GENERIC = -8, /* Generic Error */
+ SCMI_ERR_HARDWARE = -9, /* Hardware Error */
+ SCMI_ERR_PROTOCOL = -10,/* Protocol Error */
+- SCMI_ERR_MAX
+ };
+
+ /* List of all SCMI devices active in system */
+@@ -168,8 +167,10 @@ static const int scmi_linux_errmap[] = {
+
+ static inline int scmi_to_linux_errno(int errno)
+ {
+- if (errno < SCMI_SUCCESS && errno > SCMI_ERR_MAX)
+- return scmi_linux_errmap[-errno];
++ int err_idx = -errno;
++
++ if (err_idx >= SCMI_SUCCESS && err_idx < ARRAY_SIZE(scmi_linux_errmap))
++ return scmi_linux_errmap[err_idx];
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+--
+2.30.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 05d5c57a25833d551903ca84d2b7e310e0d6ff87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 12 Jul 2021 15:18:18 +0100
+Subject: firmware: arm_scmi: Fix range check for the maximum number of pending
+ messages
+
+From: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit bdb8742dc6f7c599c3d61959234fe4c23638727b ]
+
+SCMI message headers carry a sequence number and such field is sized to
+allow for MSG_TOKEN_MAX distinct numbers; moreover zero is not really an
+acceptable maximum number of pending in-flight messages.
+
+Fix accordingly the checks performed on the value exported by transports
+in scmi_desc.max_msg
+
+Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712141833.6628-3-cristian.marussi@arm.com
+Reported-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
+Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com>
+[sudeep.holla: updated the patch title and error message]
+Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c | 5 +++--
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c
+index 081fbe28da4b..af5139eb96b5 100644
+--- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c
++++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/driver.c
+@@ -629,8 +629,9 @@ static int scmi_xfer_info_init(struct scmi_info *sinfo)
+ struct scmi_xfers_info *info = &sinfo->minfo;
+
+ /* Pre-allocated messages, no more than what hdr.seq can support */
+- if (WARN_ON(desc->max_msg >= MSG_TOKEN_MAX)) {
+- dev_err(dev, "Maximum message of %d exceeds supported %ld\n",
++ if (WARN_ON(!desc->max_msg || desc->max_msg > MSG_TOKEN_MAX)) {
++ dev_err(dev,
++ "Invalid maximum messages %d, not in range [1 - %lu]\n",
+ desc->max_msg, MSG_TOKEN_MAX);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+--
+2.30.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From d8cdce4f13509fb1cc2defb001207c9a50bf6e51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:08 -0700
+Subject: hfs: add lock nesting notation to hfs_find_init
+
+From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit b3b2177a2d795e35dc11597b2609eb1e7e57e570 ]
+
+Syzbot reports a possible recursive lock in [1].
+
+This happens due to missing lock nesting information. From the logs, we
+see that a call to hfs_fill_super is made to mount the hfs filesystem.
+While searching for the root inode, the lock on the catalog btree is
+grabbed. Then, when the parent of the root isn't found, a call to
+__hfs_bnode_create is made to create the parent of the root. This
+eventually leads to a call to hfs_ext_read_extent which grabs a lock on
+the extents btree.
+
+Since the order of locking is catalog btree -> extents btree, this lock
+hierarchy does not lead to a deadlock.
+
+To tell lockdep that this locking is safe, we add nesting notation to
+distinguish between catalog btrees, extents btrees, and attributes
+btrees (for HFS+). This has already been done in hfsplus.
+
+Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f007ef1d7a31a469e3be7aeb0fde0769b18585db [1]
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-4-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot+b718ec84a87b7e73ade4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Tested-by: syzbot+b718ec84a87b7e73ade4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
+Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
+Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
+Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ fs/hfs/bfind.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
+ fs/hfs/btree.h | 7 +++++++
+ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/hfs/bfind.c b/fs/hfs/bfind.c
+index 4af318fbda77..ef9498a6e88a 100644
+--- a/fs/hfs/bfind.c
++++ b/fs/hfs/bfind.c
+@@ -25,7 +25,19 @@ int hfs_find_init(struct hfs_btree *tree, struct hfs_find_data *fd)
+ fd->key = ptr + tree->max_key_len + 2;
+ hfs_dbg(BNODE_REFS, "find_init: %d (%p)\n",
+ tree->cnid, __builtin_return_address(0));
+- mutex_lock(&tree->tree_lock);
++ switch (tree->cnid) {
++ case HFS_CAT_CNID:
++ mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX);
++ break;
++ case HFS_EXT_CNID:
++ mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX);
++ break;
++ case HFS_ATTR_CNID:
++ mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX);
++ break;
++ default:
++ return -EINVAL;
++ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+diff --git a/fs/hfs/btree.h b/fs/hfs/btree.h
+index dcc2aab1b2c4..25ac9a8bb57a 100644
+--- a/fs/hfs/btree.h
++++ b/fs/hfs/btree.h
+@@ -13,6 +13,13 @@ typedef int (*btree_keycmp)(const btree_key *, const btree_key *);
+
+ #define NODE_HASH_SIZE 256
+
++/* B-tree mutex nested subclasses */
++enum hfs_btree_mutex_classes {
++ CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX,
++ EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX,
++ ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX,
++};
++
+ /* A HFS BTree held in memory */
+ struct hfs_btree {
+ struct super_block *sb;
+--
+2.30.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 6baef1d4c55ff5dabecd8cd290ff478e0484ab42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:01 -0700
+Subject: hfs: add missing clean-up in hfs_fill_super
+
+From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 16ee572eaf0d09daa4c8a755fdb71e40dbf8562d ]
+
+Patch series "hfs: fix various errors", v2.
+
+This series ultimately aims to address a lockdep warning in
+hfs_find_init reported by Syzbot [1].
+
+The work done for this led to the discovery of another bug, and the
+Syzkaller repro test also reveals an invalid memory access error after
+clearing the lockdep warning. Hence, this series is broken up into
+three patches:
+
+1. Add a missing call to hfs_find_exit for an error path in
+ hfs_fill_super
+
+2. Fix memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read by fixing calls to kmap
+
+3. Add lock nesting notation to tell lockdep that the observed locking
+ hierarchy is safe
+
+This patch (of 3):
+
+Before exiting hfs_fill_super, the struct hfs_find_data used in
+hfs_find_init should be passed to hfs_find_exit to be cleaned up, and to
+release the lock held on the btree.
+
+The call to hfs_find_exit is missing from an error path. We add it back
+in by consolidating calls to hfs_find_exit for error paths.
+
+Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f007ef1d7a31a469e3be7aeb0fde0769b18585db [1]
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-1-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-2-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
+Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
+Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
+Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ fs/hfs/super.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/hfs/super.c b/fs/hfs/super.c
+index 173876782f73..77b6f35a4aa9 100644
+--- a/fs/hfs/super.c
++++ b/fs/hfs/super.c
+@@ -427,14 +427,12 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
+ if (!res) {
+ if (fd.entrylength > sizeof(rec) || fd.entrylength < 0) {
+ res = -EIO;
+- goto bail;
++ goto bail_hfs_find;
+ }
+ hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset, fd.entrylength);
+ }
+- if (res) {
+- hfs_find_exit(&fd);
+- goto bail_no_root;
+- }
++ if (res)
++ goto bail_hfs_find;
+ res = -EINVAL;
+ root_inode = hfs_iget(sb, &fd.search_key->cat, &rec);
+ hfs_find_exit(&fd);
+@@ -450,6 +448,8 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
+ /* everything's okay */
+ return 0;
+
++bail_hfs_find:
++ hfs_find_exit(&fd);
+ bail_no_root:
+ pr_err("get root inode failed\n");
+ bail:
+--
+2.30.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From dee2c35e5a14f16aa6231b3a8b349dd42941cc8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Wed, 14 Jul 2021 21:27:05 -0700
+Subject: hfs: fix high memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read
+
+From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 54a5ead6f5e2b47131a7385d0c0af18e7b89cb02 ]
+
+Pages that we read in hfs_bnode_read need to be kmapped into kernel
+address space. However, currently only the 0th page is kmapped. If the
+given offset + length exceeds this 0th page, then we have an invalid
+memory access.
+
+To fix this, we kmap relevant pages one by one and copy their relevant
+portions of data.
+
+An example of invalid memory access occurring without this fix can be seen
+in the following crash report:
+
+ ==================================================================
+ BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
+ BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26
+ Read of size 2 at addr ffff888125fdcffe by task syz-executor5/4634
+
+ CPU: 0 PID: 4634 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0
+ Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+ Call Trace:
+ __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
+ dump_stack+0x195/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:120
+ print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:233
+ __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
+ kasan_report.cold+0x7b/0xd4 mm/kasan/report.c:436
+ check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline]
+ kasan_check_range+0x154/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:186
+ memcpy+0x24/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65
+ memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
+ hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26
+ hfs_bnode_read_u16 fs/hfs/bnode.c:34 [inline]
+ hfs_bnode_find+0x880/0xcc0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:365
+ hfs_brec_find+0x2d8/0x540 fs/hfs/bfind.c:126
+ hfs_brec_read+0x27/0x120 fs/hfs/bfind.c:165
+ hfs_cat_find_brec+0x19a/0x3b0 fs/hfs/catalog.c:194
+ hfs_fill_super+0xc13/0x1460 fs/hfs/super.c:419
+ mount_bdev+0x331/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1368
+ hfs_mount+0x35/0x40 fs/hfs/super.c:457
+ legacy_get_tree+0x10c/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592
+ vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300 fs/super.c:1498
+ do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2905 [inline]
+ path_mount+0x13f5/0x20e0 fs/namespace.c:3235
+ do_mount fs/namespace.c:3248 [inline]
+ __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3456 [inline]
+ __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3433 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_mount+0x2b8/0x340 fs/namespace.c:3433
+ do_syscall_64+0x37/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
+ RIP: 0033:0x45e63a
+ Code: 48 c7 c2 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d2 e8 88 04 00 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
+ RSP: 002b:00007f9404d410d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
+ RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000248 RCX: 000000000045e63a
+ RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007f9404d41120
+ RBP: 00007f9404d41120 R08: 00000000200002c0 R09: 0000000020000000
+ R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
+ R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000004ad5d8 R15: 0000000000000000
+
+ The buggy address belongs to the page:
+ page:00000000dadbcf3e refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x125fdc
+ flags: 0x2fffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fff)
+ raw: 02fffc0000000000 ffffea000497f748 ffffea000497f6c8 0000000000000000
+ raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
+ page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
+
+ Memory state around the buggy address:
+ ffff888125fdce80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
+ ffff888125fdcf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
+ >ffff888125fdcf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
+ ^
+ ffff888125fdd000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
+ ffff888125fdd080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
+ ==================================================================
+
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210701030756.58760-3-desmondcheongzx@gmail.com
+Signed-off-by: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <desmondcheongzx@gmail.com>
+Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
+Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
+Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ fs/hfs/bnode.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/fs/hfs/bnode.c b/fs/hfs/bnode.c
+index b63a4df7327b..c0a73a6ffb28 100644
+--- a/fs/hfs/bnode.c
++++ b/fs/hfs/bnode.c
+@@ -15,16 +15,31 @@
+
+ #include "btree.h"
+
+-void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf,
+- int off, int len)
++void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len)
+ {
+ struct page *page;
++ int pagenum;
++ int bytes_read;
++ int bytes_to_read;
++ void *vaddr;
+
+ off += node->page_offset;
+- page = node->page[0];
++ pagenum = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
++ off &= ~PAGE_MASK; /* compute page offset for the first page */
+
+- memcpy(buf, kmap(page) + off, len);
+- kunmap(page);
++ for (bytes_read = 0; bytes_read < len; bytes_read += bytes_to_read) {
++ if (pagenum >= node->tree->pages_per_bnode)
++ break;
++ page = node->page[pagenum];
++ bytes_to_read = min_t(int, len - bytes_read, PAGE_SIZE - off);
++
++ vaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
++ memcpy(buf + bytes_read, vaddr + off, bytes_to_read);
++ kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
++
++ pagenum++;
++ off = 0; /* page offset only applies to the first page */
++ }
+ }
+
+ u16 hfs_bnode_read_u16(struct hfs_bnode *node, int off)
+--
+2.30.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 273bb2f6423f1662fd5a5f8bd1ad71a6b499e2b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 19:53:28 +0800
+Subject: net/802/garp: fix memleak in garp_request_join()
+
+From: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 42ca63f980842918560b25f0244307fd83b4777c ]
+
+I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test:
+
+BUG: memory leak
+unreferenced object 0xffff88810c909b80 (size 64):
+ comm "syz", pid 957, jiffies 4295220394 (age 399.090s)
+ hex dump (first 32 bytes):
+ 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
+ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................
+ backtrace:
+ [<00000000ca1f2e2e>] garp_request_join+0x285/0x3d0
+ [<00000000bf153351>] vlan_gvrp_request_join+0x15b/0x190
+ [<0000000024005e72>] vlan_dev_open+0x706/0x980
+ [<00000000dc20c4d4>] __dev_open+0x2bb/0x460
+ [<0000000066573004>] __dev_change_flags+0x501/0x650
+ [<0000000035b42f83>] rtnl_configure_link+0xee/0x280
+ [<00000000a5e69de0>] __rtnl_newlink+0xed5/0x1550
+ [<00000000a5258f4a>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90
+ [<00000000506568ee>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x439/0xbd0
+ [<00000000b7eaeae1>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x420
+ [<00000000c373ce66>] netlink_unicast+0x550/0x750
+ [<00000000ec74ce74>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xda0
+ [<00000000381ff246>] sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120
+ [<000000008f6a2db3>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x820
+ [<000000008d9c1735>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x145/0x1c0
+ [<00000000aa39dd8b>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfe/0x1d0
+
+Calling garp_request_leave() after garp_request_join(), the attr->state
+is set to GARP_APPLICANT_VO, garp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last
+transmit event in garp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be
+leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before
+rerturning from garp_uninit_applicant().
+
+Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/802/garp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/802/garp.c b/net/802/garp.c
+index 7f50d47470bd..8e19f51833d6 100644
+--- a/net/802/garp.c
++++ b/net/802/garp.c
+@@ -206,6 +206,19 @@ static void garp_attr_destroy(struct garp_applicant *app, struct garp_attr *attr
+ kfree(attr);
+ }
+
++static void garp_attr_destroy_all(struct garp_applicant *app)
++{
++ struct rb_node *node, *next;
++ struct garp_attr *attr;
++
++ for (node = rb_first(&app->gid);
++ next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL;
++ node = next) {
++ attr = rb_entry(node, struct garp_attr, node);
++ garp_attr_destroy(app, attr);
++ }
++}
++
+ static int garp_pdu_init(struct garp_applicant *app)
+ {
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+@@ -612,6 +625,7 @@ void garp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct garp_application *appl
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&app->lock);
+ garp_gid_event(app, GARP_EVENT_TRANSMIT_PDU);
++ garp_attr_destroy_all(app);
+ garp_pdu_queue(app);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock);
+
+--
+2.30.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From b845c13e07f4d1053c8273a099a353d6277e0dbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 15:22:37 +0800
+Subject: net/802/mrp: fix memleak in mrp_request_join()
+
+From: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 996af62167d0e0ec69b938a3561e96f84ffff1aa ]
+
+I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test:
+
+BUG: memory leak
+unreferenced object 0xffff88810c239500 (size 64):
+comm "syz-executor940", pid 882, jiffies 4294712870 (age 14.631s)
+hex dump (first 32 bytes):
+01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
+00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................
+backtrace:
+[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2972 [inline]
+[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2980 [inline]
+[<00000000a323afa4>] __kmalloc+0x167/0x340 mm/slub.c:4130
+[<000000005034ca11>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:595 [inline]
+[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_attr_create net/802/mrp.c:276 [inline]
+[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_request_join+0x265/0x550 net/802/mrp.c:530
+[<00000000fcfd81f3>] vlan_mvrp_request_join+0x145/0x170 net/8021q/vlan_mvrp.c:40
+[<000000009258546e>] vlan_dev_open+0x477/0x890 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:292
+[<0000000059acd82b>] __dev_open+0x281/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1609
+[<000000004e6dc695>] __dev_change_flags+0x424/0x560 net/core/dev.c:8767
+[<00000000471a09af>] rtnl_configure_link+0xd9/0x210 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3122
+[<0000000037a4672b>] __rtnl_newlink+0xe08/0x13e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3448
+[<000000008d5d0fda>] rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3488
+[<000000004882fe39>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x369/0xa10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5552
+[<00000000907e6c54>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
+[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
+[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast+0x4a0/0x6a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
+[<00000000e0645d50>] netlink_sendmsg+0x78e/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
+[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
+[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg+0x139/0x170 net/socket.c:674
+[<00000000fc210bc2>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x658/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2350
+[<00000000be4577b5>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
+
+Calling mrp_request_leave() after mrp_request_join(), the attr->state
+is set to MRP_APPLICANT_VO, mrp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last
+TX event in mrp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked.
+To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning
+from mrp_uninit_applicant().
+
+Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ net/802/mrp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/net/802/mrp.c b/net/802/mrp.c
+index a808dd5bbb27..32f87d458f05 100644
+--- a/net/802/mrp.c
++++ b/net/802/mrp.c
+@@ -295,6 +295,19 @@ static void mrp_attr_destroy(struct mrp_applicant *app, struct mrp_attr *attr)
+ kfree(attr);
+ }
+
++static void mrp_attr_destroy_all(struct mrp_applicant *app)
++{
++ struct rb_node *node, *next;
++ struct mrp_attr *attr;
++
++ for (node = rb_first(&app->mad);
++ next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL;
++ node = next) {
++ attr = rb_entry(node, struct mrp_attr, node);
++ mrp_attr_destroy(app, attr);
++ }
++}
++
+ static int mrp_pdu_init(struct mrp_applicant *app)
+ {
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+@@ -898,6 +911,7 @@ void mrp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl)
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&app->lock);
+ mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_TX);
++ mrp_attr_destroy_all(app);
+ mrp_pdu_queue(app);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock);
+
+--
+2.30.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From d46f9b31028cbe758227b2f572fd0ff2cca084e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 07:12:45 -0700
+Subject: net: annotate data race around sk_ll_usec
+
+From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 0dbffbb5335a1e3aa6855e4ee317e25e669dd302 ]
+
+sk_ll_usec is read locklessly from sk_can_busy_loop()
+while another thread can change its value in sock_setsockopt()
+
+This is correct but needs annotations.
+
+BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __skb_try_recv_datagram / sock_setsockopt
+
+write to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14011 on cpu 0:
+ sock_setsockopt+0x1287/0x2090 net/core/sock.c:1175
+ __sys_setsockopt+0x14f/0x200 net/socket.c:2100
+ __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2115 [inline]
+ __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2112 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x62/0x70 net/socket.c:2112
+ do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
+
+read to 0xffff88814eb5f904 of 4 bytes by task 14001 on cpu 1:
+ sk_can_busy_loop include/net/busy_poll.h:41 [inline]
+ __skb_try_recv_datagram+0x14f/0x320 net/core/datagram.c:273
+ unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x14c/0x870 net/unix/af_unix.c:2101
+ unix_seqpacket_recvmsg+0x5a/0x70 net/unix/af_unix.c:2067
+ ____sys_recvmsg+0x15d/0x310 include/linux/uio.h:244
+ ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2598 [inline]
+ do_recvmmsg+0x35c/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2692
+ __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline]
+ __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2794 [inline]
+ __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2787 [inline]
+ __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0xcf/0x150 net/socket.c:2787
+ do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
+ entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
+
+value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000101
+
+Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
+CPU: 1 PID: 14001 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0
+Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
+
+Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
+Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ include/net/busy_poll.h | 2 +-
+ net/core/sock.c | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/net/busy_poll.h b/include/net/busy_poll.h
+index cf8f792743ec..c76a5e9894da 100644
+--- a/include/net/busy_poll.h
++++ b/include/net/busy_poll.h
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static inline bool net_busy_loop_on(void)
+
+ static inline bool sk_can_busy_loop(const struct sock *sk)
+ {
+- return sk->sk_ll_usec && !signal_pending(current);
++ return READ_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec) && !signal_pending(current);
+ }
+
+ bool sk_busy_loop_end(void *p, unsigned long start_time);
+diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
+index e6cbe137cb6f..956af38aa0d6 100644
+--- a/net/core/sock.c
++++ b/net/core/sock.c
+@@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ set_rcvbuf:
+ if (val < 0)
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ else
+- sk->sk_ll_usec = val;
++ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_ll_usec, val);
+ }
+ break;
+ #endif
+--
+2.30.2
+
--- /dev/null
+From 99634ffa3428242d18bf0a1a521de04da5d8e47d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+Date: Tue, 29 Jun 2021 23:34:08 -0400
+Subject: sctp: move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+From: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+
+[ Upstream commit 1d11fa231cabeae09a95cb3e4cf1d9dd34e00f08 ]
+
+The doc draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 that restricts 198 addresses
+was never published. These addresses as private addresses should be
+allowed to use in SCTP.
+
+As Michael Tuexen suggested, this patch is to move 198 addresses from
+unusable to private scope.
+
+Reported-by: Sérgio <surkamp@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
+Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
+---
+ include/net/sctp/constants.h | 4 +---
+ net/sctp/protocol.c | 3 ++-
+ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/net/sctp/constants.h b/include/net/sctp/constants.h
+index 48d74674d5e9..bc22e44ffcdf 100644
+--- a/include/net/sctp/constants.h
++++ b/include/net/sctp/constants.h
+@@ -348,8 +348,7 @@ enum {
+ #define SCTP_SCOPE_POLICY_MAX SCTP_SCOPE_POLICY_LINK
+
+ /* Based on IPv4 scoping <draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00.txt>,
+- * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.18.0.0/24,
+- * 192.88.99.0/24.
++ * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 192.88.99.0/24.
+ * Also, RFC 8.4, non-unicast addresses are not considered valid SCTP
+ * addresses.
+ */
+@@ -357,7 +356,6 @@ enum {
+ ((htonl(INADDR_BROADCAST) == a) || \
+ ipv4_is_multicast(a) || \
+ ipv4_is_zeronet(a) || \
+- ipv4_is_test_198(a) || \
+ ipv4_is_anycast_6to4(a))
+
+ /* Flags used for the bind address copy functions. */
+diff --git a/net/sctp/protocol.c b/net/sctp/protocol.c
+index dd5125658255..7207a9769f1a 100644
+--- a/net/sctp/protocol.c
++++ b/net/sctp/protocol.c
+@@ -412,7 +412,8 @@ static enum sctp_scope sctp_v4_scope(union sctp_addr *addr)
+ retval = SCTP_SCOPE_LINK;
+ } else if (ipv4_is_private_10(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
+ ipv4_is_private_172(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
+- ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) {
++ ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
++ ipv4_is_test_198(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) {
+ retval = SCTP_SCOPE_PRIVATE;
+ } else {
+ retval = SCTP_SCOPE_GLOBAL;
+--
+2.30.2
+
net-split-out-functions-related-to-registering-inflight-socket-files.patch
af_unix-fix-garbage-collect-vs-msg_peek.patch
workqueue-fix-uaf-in-pwq_unbound_release_workfn.patch
+net-802-mrp-fix-memleak-in-mrp_request_join.patch
+net-802-garp-fix-memleak-in-garp_request_join.patch
+net-annotate-data-race-around-sk_ll_usec.patch
+sctp-move-198-addresses-from-unusable-to-private-sco.patch
+hfs-add-missing-clean-up-in-hfs_fill_super.patch
+hfs-fix-high-memory-mapping-in-hfs_bnode_read.patch
+hfs-add-lock-nesting-notation-to-hfs_find_init.patch
+firmware-arm_scmi-fix-possible-scmi_linux_errmap-buf.patch
+firmware-arm_scmi-fix-range-check-for-the-maximum-nu.patch
+cifs-fix-the-out-of-range-assignment-to-bit-fields-i.patch
+arm-dts-versatile-fix-up-interrupt-controller-node-n.patch
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
