--- /dev/null
+From 31b0b385f69d8d5491a4bca288e25e63f1d945d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Date: Sat, 14 May 2016 11:11:44 -0700
+Subject: nf_conntrack: avoid kernel pointer value leak in slab name
+
+From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+
+commit 31b0b385f69d8d5491a4bca288e25e63f1d945d0 upstream.
+
+The slab name ends up being visible in the directory structure under
+/sys, and even if you don't have access rights to the file you can see
+the filenames.
+
+Just use a 64-bit counter instead of the pointer to the 'net' structure
+to generate a unique name.
+
+This code will go away in 4.7 when the conntrack code moves to a single
+kmemcache, but this is the backportable simple solution to avoiding
+leaking kernel pointers to user space.
+
+Fixes: 5b3501faa874 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: per netns nf_conntrack_cachep")
+Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
+Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
+Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
++++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
+@@ -1757,6 +1757,7 @@ void nf_conntrack_init_end(void)
+
+ int nf_conntrack_init_net(struct net *net)
+ {
++ static atomic64_t unique_id;
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+ int cpu;
+
+@@ -1779,7 +1780,8 @@ int nf_conntrack_init_net(struct net *ne
+ if (!net->ct.stat)
+ goto err_pcpu_lists;
+
+- net->ct.slabname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "nf_conntrack_%p", net);
++ net->ct.slabname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "nf_conntrack_%llu",
++ (u64)atomic64_inc_return(&unique_id));
+ if (!net->ct.slabname)
+ goto err_slabname;
+