--- /dev/null
+From 1bf72720281770162c87990697eae1ba2f1d917a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
+Date: Thu, 16 May 2019 09:09:35 +0200
+Subject: cpu/speculation: Warn on unsupported mitigations= parameter
+
+From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
+
+commit 1bf72720281770162c87990697eae1ba2f1d917a upstream.
+
+Currently, if the user specifies an unsupported mitigation strategy on the
+kernel command line, it will be ignored silently. The code will fall back
+to the default strategy, possibly leaving the system more vulnerable than
+expected.
+
+This may happen due to e.g. a simple typo, or, for a stable kernel release,
+because not all mitigation strategies have been backported.
+
+Inform the user by printing a message.
+
+Fixes: 98af8452945c5565 ("cpu/speculation: Add 'mitigations=' cmdline option")
+Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
+Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
+Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
+Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190516070935.22546-1-geert@linux-m68k.org
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ kernel/cpu.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/kernel/cpu.c
++++ b/kernel/cpu.c
+@@ -2308,6 +2308,9 @@ static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdl
+ cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+ else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
+ cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
++ else
++ pr_crit("Unsupported mitigations=%s, system may still be vulnerable\n",
++ arg);
+
+ return 0;
+ }
--- /dev/null
+From 68f461593f76bd5f17e87cdd0bea28f4278c7268 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2019 16:41:16 -0400
+Subject: NFS/flexfiles: Use the correct TCP timeout for flexfiles I/O
+
+From: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@gmail.com>
+
+commit 68f461593f76bd5f17e87cdd0bea28f4278c7268 upstream.
+
+Fix a typo where we're confusing the default TCP retrans value
+(NFS_DEF_TCP_RETRANS) for the default TCP timeout value.
+
+Fixes: 15d03055cf39f ("pNFS/flexfiles: Set reasonable default ...")
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.8+
+Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
+Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c
++++ b/fs/nfs/flexfilelayout/flexfilelayoutdev.c
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
+
+ #define NFSDBG_FACILITY NFSDBG_PNFS_LD
+
+-static unsigned int dataserver_timeo = NFS_DEF_TCP_RETRANS;
++static unsigned int dataserver_timeo = NFS_DEF_TCP_TIMEO;
+ static unsigned int dataserver_retrans;
+
+ static bool ff_layout_has_available_ds(struct pnfs_layout_segment *lseg);
mm-page_idle.c-fix-oops-because-end_pfn-is-larger-than-max_pfn.patch
dm-log-writes-make-sure-super-sector-log-updates-are-written-in-order.patch
scsi-vmw_pscsi-fix-use-after-free-in-pvscsi_queue_lck.patch
+x86-speculation-allow-guests-to-use-ssbd-even-if-host-does-not.patch
+x86-microcode-fix-the-microcode-load-on-cpu-hotplug-for-real.patch
+nfs-flexfiles-use-the-correct-tcp-timeout-for-flexfiles-i-o.patch
+cpu-speculation-warn-on-unsupported-mitigations-parameter.patch
--- /dev/null
+From 5423f5ce5ca410b3646f355279e4e937d452e622 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2019 22:31:40 +0200
+Subject: x86/microcode: Fix the microcode load on CPU hotplug for real
+
+From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+
+commit 5423f5ce5ca410b3646f355279e4e937d452e622 upstream.
+
+A recent change moved the microcode loader hotplug callback into the early
+startup phase which is running with interrupts disabled. It missed that
+the callbacks invoke sysfs functions which might sleep causing nice 'might
+sleep' splats with proper debugging enabled.
+
+Split the callbacks and only load the microcode in the early startup phase
+and move the sysfs handling back into the later threaded and preemptible
+bringup phase where it was before.
+
+Fixes: 78f4e932f776 ("x86/microcode, cpuhotplug: Add a microcode loader CPU hotplug callback")
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
+Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1906182228350.1766@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
+@@ -790,13 +790,16 @@ static struct syscore_ops mc_syscore_ops
+ .resume = mc_bp_resume,
+ };
+
+-static int mc_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
++static int mc_cpu_starting(unsigned int cpu)
+ {
+- struct device *dev;
+-
+- dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+ microcode_update_cpu(cpu);
+ pr_debug("CPU%d added\n", cpu);
++ return 0;
++}
++
++static int mc_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
++{
++ struct device *dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+
+ if (sysfs_create_group(&dev->kobj, &mc_attr_group))
+ pr_err("Failed to create group for CPU%d\n", cpu);
+@@ -873,7 +876,9 @@ int __init microcode_init(void)
+ goto out_ucode_group;
+
+ register_syscore_ops(&mc_syscore_ops);
+- cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_MICROCODE_LOADER, "x86/microcode:online",
++ cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_MICROCODE_LOADER, "x86/microcode:starting",
++ mc_cpu_starting, NULL);
++ cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/microcode:online",
+ mc_cpu_online, mc_cpu_down_prep);
+
+ pr_info("Microcode Update Driver: v%s.", DRIVER_VERSION);
--- /dev/null
+From c1f7fec1eb6a2c86d01bc22afce772c743451d88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2019 13:20:10 -0400
+Subject: x86/speculation: Allow guests to use SSBD even if host does not
+
+From: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>
+
+commit c1f7fec1eb6a2c86d01bc22afce772c743451d88 upstream.
+
+The bits set in x86_spec_ctrl_mask are used to calculate the guest's value
+of SPEC_CTRL that is written to the MSR before VMENTRY, and control which
+mitigations the guest can enable. In the case of SSBD, unless the host has
+enabled SSBD always on mode (by passing "spec_store_bypass_disable=on" in
+the kernel parameters), the SSBD bit is not set in the mask and the guest
+can not properly enable the SSBD always on mitigation mode.
+
+This has been confirmed by running the SSBD PoC on a guest using the SSBD
+always on mitigation mode (booted with kernel parameter
+"spec_store_bypass_disable=on"), and verifying that the guest is vulnerable
+unless the host is also using SSBD always on mode. In addition, the guest
+OS incorrectly reports the SSB vulnerability as mitigated.
+
+Always set the SSBD bit in x86_spec_ctrl_mask when the host CPU supports
+it, allowing the guest to use SSBD whether or not the host has chosen to
+enable the mitigation in any of its modes.
+
+Fixes: be6fcb5478e9 ("x86/bugs: Rework spec_ctrl base and mask logic")
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com>
+Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
+Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Mark Kanda <mark.kanda@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
+Cc: bp@alien8.de
+Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com
+Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
+Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
+Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560187210-11054-1-git-send-email-alejandro.j.jimenez@oracle.com
+Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+
+---
+ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 ++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
++++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+@@ -821,6 +821,16 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
+ }
+
+ /*
++ * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper
++ * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the
++ * case where the host does not enable it.
++ */
++ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
++ static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
++ x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
++ }
++
++ /*
+ * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
+ * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
+ * - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
+@@ -837,7 +847,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
+ x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+ } else {
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+- x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ }
+ }
projects / thirdparty / kernel / stable-queue.git / commitdiff
