storage: avoid short reads while chasing backing chain

Our backing file chain code was not very robust to an ill-timed
EINTR, which could lead to a short read causing us to randomly
treat metadata differently than usual.  But the existing
virFileReadLimFD forces an error if we don't read the entire
file, even though we only care about the header of the file.
So add a new virFile function that does what we want.

* src/util/virfile.h (virFileReadHeaderFD): New prototype.
* src/util/virfile.c (virFileReadHeaderFD): New function.
* src/libvirt_private.syms (virfile.h): Export it.
* src/util/virstoragefile.c (virStorageFileGetMetadataInternal)
(virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD): Use it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5327fad4f292e4f3f84884ffe158c492bf00519c)

Conflicts:
	src/util/virstoragefile.c: OOM error reporting & buffer signedness

diff --git a/src/libvirt_private.syms b/src/libvirt_private.syms
index 0b78109de689a67a8374ee1cc918a115662648a3..7d2933ed360a99ab81a5bbe766594d07173fedcd 100644 (file)
--- a/src/libvirt_private.syms
+++ b/src/libvirt_private.syms
@@ -1308,6 +1308,7 @@ virFileOpenAs;
 virFileOpenTty;
 virFilePrintf;
 virFileReadAll;
+virFileReadHeaderFD;
 virFileReadLimFD;
 virFileResolveAllLinks;
 virFileResolveLink;

diff --git a/src/util/virfile.c b/src/util/virfile.c
index 458d346cc5de0275f9bf046a1945b104bb58eeb1..af0b9709f46a5787a493e6347b94539cd9af839b 100644 (file)
--- a/src/util/virfile.c
+++ b/src/util/virfile.c
@@ -1161,6 +1161,27 @@ saferead_lim(int fd, size_t max_len, size_t *length)
     return NULL;
 }
 
+
+/* A wrapper around saferead_lim that merely stops reading at the
+ * specified maximum size.  */
+int
+virFileReadHeaderFD(int fd, int maxlen, char **buf)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    char *s;
+
+    if (maxlen <= 0) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+    s = saferead_lim(fd, maxlen, &len);
+    if (s == NULL)
+        return -1;
+    *buf = s;
+    return len;
+}
+
+
 /* A wrapper around saferead_lim that maps a failure due to
    exceeding the maximum size limitation to EOVERFLOW.  */
 int

diff --git a/src/util/virfile.h b/src/util/virfile.h
index 72d35ce4ebe9b76d9ddc489838c9f98b291119bb..e2e708acca965fc36a5f39aa27f112141471f5ab 100644 (file)
--- a/src/util/virfile.h
+++ b/src/util/virfile.h
@@ -122,9 +122,12 @@ int virFileNBDDeviceAssociate(const char *file,
 
 int virFileDeleteTree(const char *dir);
 
-int virFileReadLimFD(int fd, int maxlen, char **buf) ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK;
-
-int virFileReadAll(const char *path, int maxlen, char **buf) ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK;
+int virFileReadHeaderFD(int fd, int maxlen, char **buf)
+    ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(3);
+int virFileReadLimFD(int fd, int maxlen, char **buf)
+    ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(3);
+int virFileReadAll(const char *path, int maxlen, char **buf)
+    ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(1) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(3);
 
 int virFileWriteStr(const char *path, const char *str, mode_t mode)
     ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(1) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(2) ATTRIBUTE_RETURN_CHECK;

diff --git a/src/util/virstoragefile.c b/src/util/virstoragefile.c
index f0e91146dbddcd450ed733f883fdea8eb9c05a9b..a0529e5c3fff80c731b7a3af86258c6c72e43d2d 100644 (file)
--- a/src/util/virstoragefile.c
+++ b/src/util/virstoragefile.c
@@ -703,12 +703,7 @@ virStorageFileGetMetadataInternal(const char *path,
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(buf, len) < 0) {
-        virReportOOMError();
-        goto cleanup;
-    }
-
-    if ((len = read(fd, buf, len)) < 0) {
+    if ((len = virFileReadHeaderFD(fd, len, (char **)&buf)) < 0) {
         virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
         goto cleanup;
     }
@@ -843,17 +838,12 @@ virStorageFileProbeFormatFromFD(const char *path, int fd)
         return VIR_STORAGE_FILE_DIR;
     }
 
-    if (VIR_ALLOC_N(head, len) < 0) {
-        virReportOOMError();
-        return -1;
-    }
-
     if (lseek(fd, 0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
         virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot set to start of '%s'"), path);
         goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if ((len = read(fd, head, len)) < 0) {
+    if ((len = virFileReadHeaderFD(fd, len, (char **)&head)) < 0) {
         virReportSystemError(errno, _("cannot read header '%s'"), path);
         goto cleanup;
     }